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BY

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE

BREVET LIEUTENANT-COLONEL UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED LIST; AUTHOR OF "THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE," "A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR," "PATROCLUS AND PENELOPE. A CHAT IN THE SADDLE," "GREAT CAPTAINS," "ALEXANDER," "HANNIBAL," "CÆSAR," ETC., ETC.

IN FOUR VOLUMES

VOLUME III

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PREFACE.

THESE volumes on Napoleon are not a history of his era. The two now issued are confined to the second half of the military life of the great captain, and are the concluding volumes of the History of the Art of War, begun by the author in 1890 with the life of Alexander. Political events are barely touched on; personal matters only to throw light on Napoleon's character as a soldier. While narrating in much detail the campaigns from 1808 to 1815, Volumes III. and IV. furnish a study of the causes which led to Napoleon's downfall, as Volumes I. and II. contain the story of his amazing rise to power. Although a part of the larger History, yet this military life of Napoleon is of itself a complete work.

The subject is so vast that to write double the number of pages would have been far easier. To compress the matter into its present size has obliged the author to sacrifice diction to facts, and to reduce many chapters to what appears crude. All useless words, such, *e. g.*, as titles, have been omitted. "Son Altesse Sénérissime le Prince Connétable" becomes merely Berthier; Ney is not even "Marshal Ney," much less "Duke of Elchingen" or "Prince of the Moskwa;" the "Duke of Auerstädt and Prince of Eggmühl" remains plain Davout. Even in translating from the Correspondence, the well-known names of Lannes, or Soult, or Massena are retained instead of their more picturesque titles of nobility. Adjectives have been erased wholesale. As all this tends to simplicity, the author need not in this practical day apologize for a style often lacking color.

There are for busy people many shorter histories of Napoleon's wars, and many histories treating of the era and devoting little space to military events. On the other hand, the amazing detail of the French and other Staff works cannot be followed by many readers, even those who make a study of military operations, numbered as these voluminous publications are by the hundreds of thousands of pages. The present work will be found to fill a want for those who, within reasonable compass, wish to know how this giant soldier wrought.

As Napoleon's career progresses, his strategic manœuvres become more interesting, and his failures more instructive. The detail of these has accordingly at times been given to a greater extent than demanded by the general reader, but still appropriate to a military history, and essential to a full understanding of his methods, as his armies and projects increased in vastness and his difficulties multiplied. But skipping has been made easy to those who do not desire to enter into *minutiæ.*

Over thirty years ago the author began the study of Napoleon in the ample library of the late John C. Ropes of Boston, a clear-headed critic, an able writer, and an authority on the subject. This study he has continued at intervals ever since, and for the last five years in Paris; and his travels and studies in working up the campaigns of the other great captains, as they fitted into the History of the Art of War, have aided him in understanding what this last of them did.

The author is peculiarly indebted to General Brugère, late Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, for many acts of personal and official courtesy and helpfulness; to the Chiefs of the Historical Section of the French Staff, Colonel Coutanceau, and especially Commandant Desbrière, himself a distinguished author; and to the several officers now working in that section collating and publishing the documents relating to the Napoleonic wars, — Controlleur Alombert, Captain Colin, Captain de la Jonquière, Lieutenant Fabry, Captain de Cugnac, Commandant Balagny, Lieutenant-Colonel Saski, Lieutenant-Colonel Foucart, and others. He is also much indebted to Professor Oman, and regrets that all the volumes of his splendid History of the Peninsular War are not yet issued.

Just as he has leaned on the documents published by the Historical Section of the French Staff, the author has also leaned much on Napoleon's Correspondence, for its value in showing his motives at the moment of action. We have seen Napoleon rise to a dizzy height; we are now to see him fall. To what was the fall due? No surer method can be found than to follow his own utterances at the time. These are worth more than many criticisms, even those of the greatest authorities, unless the latter are directly based on what Napoleon said. The Correspondence and other auxiliary documents are the original record; others are subsidiary, as expressing only opinions. In trying Cæsar by the Commentaries, or Alexander by Arrian's Anabasis, we must remember that these were written long after the event, like the records of St. Helena. In trying Napoleon by the Correspondence we subject him to a vastly severer test. "C'est dans la correspondance des généraux que je voudrais étudier une campagne; je me flatte que je la connaitrais bien mieux par ce moyen que par leurs bulletins ou par les récits des historiens," says Gouvion Saint-Cyr. Because, however, an extract from the Correspondence is herein published without comment, it does not follow that the author indorses its statements.

Many of the contemporary records are of the greatest value, both those of the French and those of other nations; but because a record contemporary with the Napoleonic Wars has just come to light, we cannot assume that it is more valuable or reliable than those published at the time, or shortly after. Newly discovered evidence is always interesting, but not necessarily of the first importance. The author pretends to have made no great discoveries, but his study of the subject has been long, his travels over campaigning grounds and battlefields have occupied years, his presentation is new, the criticisms are original, and the treatment is exhaustive.

So far as discussion of all the military operations is concerned, it will be found that every aspect of each campaign has been passed under ample critical review. Were the merely critical portions of the book to be collected from the narrative, where they are hidden by the details, they would be found to amount to a large volume.

The author would have been happy to delay the publication of Napoleon until the French Staff has finished all its labors; but these may last into the next generation; and, while minor facts are sometimes changed by their publications, and the colors accentuated, the general matter is not altered, nor the principles of strategy or tactics changed. And it is these that mainly interest us, and which furnish the basis of this history.

To save space and reader's time, much matter of secondary importance has been printed in small type. In quotations, when an order or a report is of marked importance, it has been put in text type; when not so, but yet illuminating, in small. Much valuable matter has of necessity been crowded out.

Footnotes did not seem essential in writing the histories of Alexander and Hannibal. In Napoleon they might prove more useful; but uniformity has been maintained, and it will be found that the references in the text are as numerous and as precise as the footnotes found in most histories. An Appendix contains a partial list of authorities consulted in writing the entire history, — from Herodotus down, — out of which many extracts are made or views gleaned.

The volumes on Frederick the Great are half completed, and will, it is hoped, be published within two years. Placed between Gustavus and Napoleon, they will complete this History of the Art of War.

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NAPOLEON.

XXXVIII.

MEDINA AND BAYLEN, OCTOBER, 1807, TO JULY, 1808.

Spain was under the influence of Godoy, Prince of the Peace, while Charles IV. and his son Ferdinand were at odds. To maintain his Continental System, Napoleon seized the Roman States, and agreed to occupy Portugal and cede it to Spain for the territory north of the Ebro; an army under Junot was dispatched to Lisbon; and to open roads to Portugal, troops were advanced into Spain. The people rose against the monarchy, Murat occupied Madrid, and the king and Ferdinand, appealing to Napoleon as arbiter, were wheedled into resigning their rights to the throne, to which a fabricated Junta elected Joseph. The people rose in arms. Spain was an awkward land in which to campaign, the roads running across the rivers and mountains instead of along them, and provision being scant. The army amounted to little, but victories over the insurgents never brought results, and the authorities of every town occupied fled as well as the people. The Spanish infantry was poor, the artillery somewhat better and the cavalry inefficient. The men were better than the officers. The French troops first sent to Spain were new, but far superior to the Spanish. At the opening of the Napoleonic wars the English army status was low, but the Duke of York began to raise it, and Wellington brought it up to the highest pitch. Napoleon did not believe Spain would be a difficult problem. In May, 1808, Junot was in Lisbon, Murat in Madrid, Bessières on the Ebro and Dupont on the Tagus, and scattered forces were in Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia,—all opposed by Spanish armies. England sent munitions. A Spanish army under Blake and Cuesta advanced on Astorga, and this Bessières beat at Medina del Rio Seco, July 14, thus "placing Joseph on the throne." Dupont moved down to Seville and Cordova, but, opposed by Castanos and Reding, in a weak battle was compelled to surrender. After seven days in Madrid, Joseph was obliged to leave. On hearing this news Napoleon determined to go to Spain in person.

We left Napoleon after the Treaty of Tilsit at the height of his power, and yet with work before him which it seemed beyond the capacity of man to accomplish. How, after his astounding rise to power, he failed to continue his victories, it will be the purpose of these volumes to narrate; and in so doing the interesting question of the emperor's gradual loss of strength, physical and moral, will be dwelt upon.

In consequence of the Tilsit peace, the Grand Army had been gradually withdrawn towards the Confederation of the Rhine, and a treaty had been made with Prussia, somewhat relaxing the grievous pressure succeeding Jena; but Napoleon's hand still lay sore upon the land, and the presence of French troops all over the Continent was a never-ceasing menace.

Napoleon had upheld his Continental System with the aid of Austria and Russia; but in order to carry it forward to the point of isolating England and reducing her to accept peace, it had become essential for him to control the several minor navies of the Continent, and thereby match her victorious fleet; and as a further block to British commerce, to possess Italy, Sicily and Spain, with their extensive coast-line and numerous seaports. The next step, then, in the emperor's political and military career was interference with the status of these countries.

Charles IV., of Spain, was under the influence of his wife and of her favorite, Manuel Godoy, who, by virtue of good looks backed by mediocre talents, had risen from plain body-guard through various grades to a dukedom and the ministry of foreign affairs. Although, after the execution of Louis XVI., Spain formally declared war, yet believing that quiet was better for the country and himself, in 1795 Godoy signed the Treaty of Basle, by which he earned the name of Prince of the Peace. But he went too far, entering next year into an onerous treaty with France that embroiled Spain with England, and led to the loss of her navy at Cape St. Vincent in 1797. On more than one occasion Godoy attempted to play a fast and loose game with Bonaparte, and when the First Consul prepared to use Spain for ulterior purposes against Portugal, he wrote, December 1, 1801, to Gouvion St. Cyr, who represented him in Madrid: "I desire that you should make Their Majesties understand my extreme discontent with the unjust and inconsequential conduct of the Prince of the Peace. . . . If he continues on this system, say plainly to the Queen and to the Prince of the Peace that all this will finish by a clap of thunder." The thunder-cloud was long in gathering, but it burst in 1808. Up to this date, Spain had made little but losses out of France, had practically been her vassal, and with her had been beaten at Trafalgar without glory or gain; while her cousin Bourbons had been driven out of Naples, and Joseph Bonaparte made king. Everything tended to chill the French alliance.

After Austerlitz Godoy made hasty advances towards the victor, and Napoleon was not slow to recognize him as a useful tool, keeping touch with Spain by occasional correspondence with king and minister. In answer to a New Year's greeting, he wrote Charles from Warsaw January 20, 1807: "One and the same cause unites us. I have always regarded our interests as inseparable, and in this view I have striven to render useful to Your Majesty the success which Providence has accorded to my armies." He ends with assurances of inviolable amity. And next day he wrote to "His Cousin the Prince of the Peace," to keep the English away from the Continent: "to strike their commerce there is to attack the base of their power. It is there we must aim before all."

Thus alternately cajoled and threatened, Spain had fairly well adhered to her treaties. Still the ancient Spanish monarchy was allied to the new French empire by fear rather than interest; and as her defection, which in 1807 Napoleon began to fear, would be the speedy ruin of his Continental System by opening to England the ports of the Peninsula and of all Spanish America, it became essential to bring Portugal into the Continental System; but when, though summoned to accept this yoke in August, 1807, the little kingdom clung to its ancient British alliance, Napoleon determined to occupy the land by force, and to cede it to Spain, in exchange for the Spanish provinces north of the Ebro. A treaty to this effect was entered into at Fontainebleau October 27, 1807; and Marshal Junot with twenty-five thousand men was allowed free passage across Spain to reach Portugal.

Being one of Napoleon's favorites, Junot was given unusual instructions how to act and what to do. Many of the emperor's letters are interesting, as affording a view of his methods.

He wrote October 17, 1807: "Do not quit your army: first, because a general never ought to quit it; again, because he is great only in his army, and that he is little in the Court. Whatever invitation they may give you, march with one of your divisions." A fortnight later full orders were given prescribing Junot's marching, and finding fault with his slowness: "I am in haste for my army to arrive at Lisbon. From Bayonne to Salamanca there are only one hundred leagues. At the season we are in, you take for this twenty-six days. You may do it in sixteen or seventeen." "There are from Lisbon to Bayonne two hundred leagues. To-day it is for our troops a very ordinary march. This ought to be made in thirty-five days." "The Portuguese is brave. The town" (Lisbon) "is populous. My order is then, positively, that my troops should not be disseminated in barracks, but camped on heights well disposed, so as to be masters of the river, of the port and of the town." "Lisbon is everything. I will send you new instructions before" you reach it.

Junot was to have marched via Ciudad Rodrigo; but thinking to save distance and in ignorance of the country, his route was changed to one down the Tagus; and this led him through territory where, living on the country, his troops fell away from hardship by the thousand—as later did Victor's.

Learning of Junot's approach, the Portuguese royal family sailed for Brazil; and the too early publication of the Proclamation of November 13, to the effect that "the House of Braganza had ceased to reign," enabled them to carry off the national treasures, though to anticipate this Junot had marched with reckless speed, reaching Lisbon with but three thousand men, utterly prostrated. Meanwhile, to aid the seizure, the Spanish generals entered Portugal along the Douro and across the Guadiana; and a Spanish division joined Junot in Lisbon.

There had long been a breach between the king and Ferdinand, his son and heir, who was the favorite of the people and the enemy of Godoy; and a fresh outbreak, as well as the hope of getting a backer, induced Ferdinand to seek a marriage in the new Imperial family. Napoleon was inclined to select the daughter of Lucien Bonaparte, and while this year in Italy he urged the project; but his brother refused the conditions imposed by the emperor. It was during this visit, on receipt of the English Declaration of November 11 of a blockade of all ports excluding the English flag, that on December 17, 1807, Napoleon issued the Decree of Milan, declaring that every vessel conforming to the English Declaration was denationalized, and would be treated as if English, whether at sea or crossing from or sailing for an English port; any such ships being lawful prize. The decree again declared the British Isles to be in a state of blockade.

Napoleon now saw his way to renew the French power at sea, for he hoped soon to control Spain and Portugal, and the many excellent harbors of north and south Italy were already his; but he was still at odds with the Pope, whose temporal estate covered all central Italy. This was a factor in his plan; and as it never took long for him to find a pretext, Rome was occupied by a corps of six thousand men in January, 1808.

To hold Portugal, open roads through Spain were needed; ostensibly to sustain Junot, Murat was pushed out from the Pyrenees to the Ebro with fifty thousand men, and on the way he seized and garrisoned St. Sebastian and Pampeluna, while Duhesme, entering Catalonia on the same errand, took possession of Figueras and Barcelona. After so long a first step, it was weakness to retrograde, and Junot occupied Portugal in his master's interest, the French flag being run up in Lisbon December 1, 1807. That he might mould the countries of Europe to fit into his Continental System, despite national aspirations or prejudices, seemed to Napoleon quite possible. His astonishing career so far had warranted him in attempting anything; yet it was a strange mental aberration for one who usually was so sound a thinker.

On December 2, 1807, Napoleon gave Junot orders to seize the fleet, send out of the country the princes of the royal house and those enjoying enough reputation to be a rallying-point, disarm the country, send all the Portuguese line troops to France, in columns of eight hundred men each, and camp the French troops in good positions and together. "This will be followed by health and safety." On November 12 he had afforded Junot some sound personal advice: —

> "Give an example of the greatest purity. It is better to have a fortune nobly acquired, that you can acknowledge and that you will receive from my hands, than an illegitimate and shameful fortune. It seems that the military glory that you gather in Portugal will not be great. You must then acquire that of an administrator, honest and irreproachable. You must give the example. Your chief of staff is a man of little delicacy, who took much money at Fulda. Impose upon him a scrupulous law. Make it understood that whoever it may be who steals, I will deal out to him justice. . . . I think that the plan you follow is not good because it has no foresight. You act like men who have not the experience of conquests. You cradle yourselves in vain illusions. All the people before you are your enemies. You will have, so soon as the sea

can be held, the English on your borders and intrigues in your provinces. . . . Portugal will turn against you, for after all the Portuguese nation is brave. Do not seek popularity at Lisbon, nor means of pleasing the people; that is to miss your aim. To strengthen the people is to prepare ill fortune for yourself."

These encroachments in the Peninsula, in violent anticipation of the treaty of Fontainebleau, threw the several parties in the Spanish court into conflict. Godoy accused Ferdinand of conspiracy, and on March 17, 1808, a popular revolution against the monarchy broke out in Madrid and Aranjuez, to which latter place the royal family had retired. Godoy almost lost his life in the tumult, Charles IV. abdicated (as he later claimed under duress) in favor of Ferdinand, and both appealed to Napoleon as arbiter. This was a windfall. No better opportunity to take a hand could occur; Napoleon at once accepted the proffered rôle, and Murat (who himself seems to have harbored some hopes of the Spanish throne) marched from the Ebro to Madrid to represent the arbiter, and occupied the capital, March 23, with thirty thousand men. Napoleon officially found fault with Murat's over-prompt action; but the occasion of making Spain his own and thus conserving his naval power was too promising, and he naturally feared that if France did not seize the Peninsula, England would do so. But he would have been glad to do all this peaceably.

On March 14, in giving Murat full instructions how to take possession of Madrid, he wrote him: "Especially commit no hostility, unless obliged so to do. I hope everything can be arranged, and it would be dangerous to antagonize these people too much." And the next week: "I suppose that you have arrived to-day or will arrive to-morrow in Madrid. You will keep good discipline there. If the Court is at Aranjuez, you will leave it quietly there, and you will show it good sentiments of friendship. If it has retired to Seville, you will equally leave it quietly there. You will send aides at once to the Prince of the Peace, to tell him that he did ill to avoid the French troops, that he is to make no hostile movement, that the King of Spain has nothing to fear from our troops." And again, on March 25: "Live on the best terms possible with the King and the Court. . . . Take no part in the different factions which divide the country. Treat everybody well and anticipate in nothing the action I may take." . . . And on March 29: "I order that discipline shall be maintained in the most severe manner — no excuse for the smallest faults. One is to have for the inhabitants the greatest care. One is to respect especially the churches and convents. The army will avoid every encounter, whether with the Spanish army corps or with detachments. It is essential that on neither side a cartridge should be burned."

This intervention of Napoleon was at first countenanced by the Spaniards because they believed he was purposing to sustain Ferdinand, and put an end to the dominion of Godoy, of which every reputable man was heartily ashamed; and indeed Napoleon would have been wise to keep Ferdinand on the throne, and to ally him to the Bonapartes; or failing this, he should have had a new and strong king ready. Louis having refused to leave Holland, he turned to his elder brother. Joseph was not without ability; he had been a lawyer, a war commissary, an ambassador, member of the Five Hundred, and signatory at Lunéville and Amiens. He had refused the vice-regal crown of Italy, later given to Eugène Beauharnais; but he accepted the crown of Naples, where he had done well; and although he preferred to remain as he was, the emperor finally induced him to change to the throne of Spain, while Murat later ascended that of Naples. It is probable that Murat, as King of Spain, would have been better able to carry out Napoleon's designs. He was more forceful, and his dramatic character would have impressed the people.

Meanwhile a Junta, or assembly of notables, gathered in Bayonne, and undertook to represent all Spain; political prestidigitation was employed to put an end to the old Spanish régime; both Charles and Ferdinand, who had been persuaded to visit Bayonne to submit their grievances to the Imperial arbiter, after much cajoling ceded their rights to Napoleon; Joseph Bonaparte was elected by the Junta king of Spain and of the Indies; and later, on July 6, he was duly proclaimed and a constitution voted. He entered Madrid, July 20, 1808, and was crowned July 25. Spain had been made a subject country like Italy and the Rhenish provinces; but the fact that Napoleon believed that he could accomplish much to regenerate Spain, in no sense excuses the treachery employed. Yet even this was less than the blunder of not crowning Ferdinand VII.

All that remained for Joseph to do was to secure possession of his throne, but the task proved beyond his or Napoleon's power. It was for this throne that war was waged in the Peninsula for nearly seven years; and in this war the English got their best military training of the nineteenth century; in it Wellington was able to transform the army from a slovenly to an efficient body; it consumed three hundred thousand French soldiers, as many Spaniards and Portuguese, and some forty thousand British. Although the war in Spain was but one of the causes of Napoleon's gradual downfall, yet it contributed its full share to the difficulties bred of his gigantic and impracticable schemes. One must neither minimize nor exaggerate the effect of the Peninsular War on the destinies of the empire; it is a small part of the Napoleonic legend; its chief interest for us resides in the fact that here England most powerfully opposed Napoleon, and Wellington grew to be a great leader. Napoleon himself was in Spain only a few months; but he kept a species of control of operations, although he could not save his marshals from mistakes.

Napoleon's proceedings had given but a questionable validity to the tenure of the new king, and they were but the prelude to another and more violent insurrection, which, on May 2, 1808, broke out in Madrid, this time against the invaders, who, instead of crowning Ferdinand, had placed a stranger on the throne. Many Frenchmen were massacred, and the rising was mercilessly put down by the French troops. Here was the cause of war. Within a few days all Spain had united to support Ferdinand, whom Napoleon had meanwhile sequestered. The notables in each province took up the matter and raised troops: Aragon rose; Saragossa made ready for defense; the fierce peasants of Catalonia, after sharp fighting, shut up Duhesme in Barcelona; every province, every city, was aflame; and though Spain was occupied by foreign soldiers, its legal head captive, its frontier forts lost, its army stationed in every part of the world, from Holstein to Portugal, and its seaports closed to England, yet the Spanish people never doubted they could replace a Spanish king upon the Spanish throne. Never did people rise more earnestly to defend its rights. All the provinces formed insurrectionary Juntas, Seville being the principal one, and national armies arose as from the soil. In Andalusia appeared an army under Castaños; in Leon Cuesta raised troops; in Asturias, Blake; in Valencia, Caro; in Catalonia, Vives; in Aragon, Palafox. Every man from seventeen to forty years was enrolled. Troops were assembled in numbers which promised to reach a hundred and twenty-five thousand men, and there were at the moment but seventy thousand French in Spain and Portugal, distributed all over the country, while the Grand Army was still in northern Europe. The provisional Juntas ruled the land; every town, every village was ready to oppose the invaders — it was essentially a popular insurrection. Those in authority would have preferred quiet: the people demanded war. There was but one sentiment, that for national union. The clergy was heartily in accord with the people, preached resistance to French arms, and made the killing of a Frenchman a meritorious act. The war in Spain was never a regular war. Victories won in Germany would give opportunity for controlling the people and feeding the army; in Spain a victory was of none effect; the population deserted all the towns, destroying or carrying off victual, wells were filled up, springs were poisoned, isolated detachments massacred, prisoners tortured; and the topography essentially favored this guerrilla warfare.

Here was a new problem for Napoleon. He was called on to suppress an universal popular uprising in a great land, cut up by irregular mountain ranges, ill-provided with roads, not all too rich in breadstuffs, and filled with a passionate, irrepressible, patriotic population, which was better suited to carry on a war of independence than any people in Europe, save the Swiss. How would he face it?

This peculiar land, so fatal to the French arms, deserves careful description. Across the Pyrenees, from France to Spain, there exist only two approaches, near the Bay of Biscay and the Mediterranean. Between them, for two hundred and fifty miles, there were then only mule paths, poor at that. The eastern roads lead principally to the coast provinces down to Valencia, the main entrance into Spain being through Bayonne. From here the royal road runs across the mountains to Vittoria, and thence across the Ebro at Miranda, through Burgos to Madrid; and two other roads run through the Maya and the Roncesvalles passes to Pampeluna, whence are several roads to the river and the interior.

The central plateau of Spain is largely barren, the wealth of Spain lying in the land which is washed by the sea. Madrid is a political rather than a commercial centre, having too much heat, too much cold and poor soil. This capital had been created by Philip II. in 1560 as a central means of cementing the ancient kingdoms which formed the new empire of Spain. From this geographical centre radiate the highways: north to Burgos and Bayonne; northeast to Saragossa and Barcelona; east to Valencia; south to Cordova, Seville and Cadiz; southwest to Lisbon; northwest to Corunna. Other less prominent roads then existed; but the country roads were impracticable. In Spain the provinces do not depend on the capital as in other countries: to control Madrid is not to control the land. In most parts of Europe the rivers prescribe the strategy, and except in the uplands of the Alps the mountains do so in a lesser degree, rivers being more important than roads; but in Spain, mostly a treeless country, the rivers, torrential in winter, are wont to be scant in summer, and useless for navigation. The Spanish river, instead of affording one an entrance to the enemy's country, presents a difficulty. During low water there are innumerable fords, and none are reliable during high water.

Separating Navarre and Aragon from the Castiles, as well as the Ebro and Douro, a fairly distinct range zigzags under several names from the upper Ebro to the plateau of Murcia. From this watershed the rivers run easterly and westerly to the coasts, and from it also spring other east and west ranges, which frame the basins of the rivers. South of this range comes Old Castile, and this is separated from New Castile by the Sierra de Guadarama, prolonged into the Castilian mountains and the Sierra de Gredos, and in Portugal the Sierra Estrella, and dividing the valleys of the Douro and the Tagus.

South of the Tagus lie the Sierra de Toledo and the Sierra de Guadelupe, and then the valley of the Guadiana. Again to the south we cross the Sierra Morena into the fertile basin of the Guadalquivir. These ranges are cut by several passes more or less difficult. South of the Guadalquivir lies the highest range in Spain, the Sierra Nevada, but it has little military significance. All the great rivers run westerly, except the Ebro, which empties into the Mediterranean.

Between Portugal and Spain is an irregular chain cut by the big rivers. East of this in Spain is a long, poor road from the seacoast near Oviedo down through Salamanca to the old Roman bridge at Alcantara, and thence by way of Badajoz to Seville; while in Portugal, along the coast, is a main road from Ferrol to Lisbon, and less good ones nearer the frontier mountains.

The Pyrenees are prolonged parallel to the smiling seacoast of the Bay of Biscay by the Cantabrian mountains. To separate Leon, Asturias and Galicia this range divides, one branch going on to Cape Finisterre, and the other forming the northerly boundary of Portugal. Between the two flows the Minho. Along the Mediterranean coast runs a chain, with innumerable valleys and plateaux capable of stout defense by irregular troops.

The roads all through Spain, when the Peninsular War began, were in the worst condition; and as the mountain ranges and river basins ran as they did, difficult communication prevented success or failure by armies in one place from affecting armies in other places. When a marshal overran one province, his success in no wise helped his brother marshal, who was striving to subdue a neighboring one. He could not lend a hand because it might take him weeks to manage his transportation across some intervening range and river. On the other hand, if a leader could secretly make all his preparations to cross to a new campaigning ground, he was apt to surprise the enemy, because the latter would not learn his approach and could not rapidly collect his scattered forces.

A glance at the map shows that the lines of advance from

France into Spain run across all the ranges and rivers, instead of, as in south Germany or Italy, along the rivers, say the Danube or the Po. This enabled the enemy, from Portugal, or Catalonia, or Valencia, by following the rivers or ranges, to take the French in flank. The Ebro country was peculiarly vulnerable, unless the crossing of the royal road at Miranda was held in force. Had Napoleon as a first step conquered Portugal, and held its harbors, he could more readily have subdued Spain. As against this disadvantage, the central position of Madrid was of value.

The interior Spanish plateau is surrounded by mountains that fall off like steps on the four sides. On the east, south and west these descend to the sea, on the north they again rise to the Pyrenees. This topography creates great variety of climate and fruitfulness. By their situation Navarre, Aragon and Catalonia, at the foot of the Pyrenees, were kept out of the general scheme of war, the strategic knots of the country being along the Ebro, and on the banks of the Douro and the Tagus. Up these latter rivers, whoever held Portugal might debouch into Spain at will, and down the rivers, Portugal had to be invaded. Being mountainous, Portugal itself is so divided from Spain as to make of it a great intrenched camp, with few debouches. Still, the chief difficulty of campaigning in Spain was the inadequacy of the food-supply; armies could not live on the country and remain effective. Henri IV. had said: "In Spain large armies will starve, and small ones will get beaten." The remark showed wisdom, and the lesson was learned by Napoleon too late.

Unlike the plains of the Danube or the Po, which were adapted to warfare on a large scale, war in Spain was particularly ill-suited to the French soldier, and to the military habits of Napoleon and his generals. Here the horizon was everywhere closed in by mountains; troops could be deployed


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

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only in a limited measure, and had to be used in small detachments along the bad roads and narrow valleys. Whoever held the sea, and could retreat thither to his base, had a distinct advantage over any one holding the interior. In larger operations you must disperse to live and assemble to fight. To disperse to live, you need cross-roads and villages full of breadstuffs: in Spain but poor roads ran between the ranges, the main arteries across them; and not only was the country itself poor, but the population fled from the invaders, and no administration was on hand in the villages to raise victual by the usual means. Recognizing all this, Napoleon saw that in Spain he could not put his strategical skill to best use; and when he left the task, it was to men he had trained in quite another species of country, who were sure to blunder in learning to work in this. Yet he harbored no doubt that the land would be got subdued, sooner or later, — as it would, had not so strong and patient a man as Wellington come upon the scene.

With about ten millions of inhabitants, Spain pretended to possess a royal army of one hundred and twenty thousand men. Early in 1808 there were on paper one hundred thousand regulars and thirty thousand armed militia, the latter being mostly in seaport garrisons. La Romana, with fifteen thousand of the best regulars, had at Napoleon's request been sent to the Baltic. A not inconsiderable part was made up of foreign bodies, — Walloons, Swiss, Germans, Neapolitans and Irish; perhaps two thirds of the paper figures were Spanish. Of cavalry there were fifteen thousand men, two thirds mounted, — the horses of low quality. As an effective arm it was barely one twelfth of the total forces, when it should have been one sixth. Bad at the beginning of the war, its constant defeat made it worse, and it is hard to say anything in its favor. The artillery was better, but insufficient, and as artillery is always difficult to raise and equip, it was long before this arm was improved; yet it was markedly better than the cavalry. If three guns per thousand men were at that time a fair average to get actually at work with an army (Napoleon had many more), this Spanish arm always lacked strength; and as the guns were largely hauled by mules, it is to be wondered at that the Spanish batteries did even fairly well.

Discipline in the Spanish army was as scant as rations. When the men were nearly starved, they would disperse and get food wherever they could; but when they had got it, patriotic fervor would drive them back into the ranks. The men averaged better than the officers. Full of pride and inefficiency, the latter were unwilling to learn, and did little to gain their men's respect. A third of the company officers came from the ranks, but the regiments were under-officered. In the cavalry they were supposed to be nobles, but under Godoy commissions could be bought. Of the sprinkling of foreign officers, perhaps the best were the Irish. As a whole, the Spanish army in 1808 was in poor shape, although history shows us that Spain could furnish as good infantry as any that ever bore arms. It was not that native quality was lacking; it was the system and its abuses. "I am quite convinced," said Wellington, "that the Spanish officers would rather submit to France than consent to give us the smallest authority over their troops." And, in speaking of the troops as a whole, "They are mere children in the art of war; they know only how to advance, how to take to flight, and reassemble again, as if they were in a state of nature." Napoleon, in 1808, said: "The entire body of insurrectionary forces is incapable of beating twenty-five thousand French in a good position."

The fact that the Spanish army was as poor as it was must be attributed to Godoy. He it was who gave promotion or punished criticism, and knowing nothing of war himself, he had not, like the other nations of Europe, which the French Revolution drove into raising good armies, done anything towards improving the forces.

Inasmuch as at the time of the Spanish war many changes were made in the organization of the entire French army, so as to enable the emperor to increase the numbers as demanded by casualties and the growing theatre of wars, some details of these may be of interest. Early in 1808 the French army consisted of: —

Infantry. The Guard, with six regiments (two grenadier, two chasseur and two fusilier), and the velites and marines.

Eighty-nine line regiments and twenty-six light regiments, most of three battalions and some of four.

By decree of February 18 these regiments were all increased to five battalions, the fifth being in depot, the other four each having six companies (there had been nine), of which in the line four fusilier, one grenadier, one voltigeur; and in the light four fusilier, one carbineer and one chasseur. The fifth had only four fusilier companies.

The company had three officers, six sub-officers, eight corporals and one hundred and twenty-three men. The regiments, with a staff of twenty-four officers and twenty-six men, thus numbered thirty-nine hundred and seventy men. During the year eight new line and one new light regiments were formed.

The footman carried a flint musket with bayonet, of the model of 1777 modified in the Year IX, which could be fired twice a minute. Damp affected the paper cartridges, of which a large percentage missed fire. The calibre was seventeen mm., about $\frac{11}{16}$-inch; a ball weighed thirty-four grammes, nearly an ounce and a quarter; its point-blank range was one hundred and ten metres; good carriage at two hundred and twenty metres; greatest distance five hundred and fifty metres. The infantry, in three ranks, habitually opened fire at not exceeding four hundred metres. The voltigeur had a shorter, lighter weapon. Each infantryman carried sixty cartridges, and an equal number were in the artillery caissons. From June, 1809, each battalion had its own cartridge-caisson, with fifteen thousand rounds.

The battalion had a commissary wagon, and each regiment one headquarters wagon and one ambulance. The corps baggage was transported by requisitioned wagons. Ségur tells us that "each of the knapsacks, reduced to the strict necessary as to clothing, contained two shirts, two pairs of shoes with nails and soles for resoling, a pair of trousers and linen half-gaiters, a few toilet articles, a bandage, lint and sixty cartridges. In the two sides were placed four biscuit of sixteen ounces each. Underneath and at the bottom a long, narrow round bag was filled with ten pounds of flour. The entire knapsack thus arranged, with its straps and the overcoat rolled and attached on the top, weighed nearly thirty-four pounds. Each soldier also carried in a strap over the right shoulder a linen bag containing two three-pound loaves of bread. Thus with his sword, filled cartridge-box, three flints, screwdriver, musket and strap, he was loaded with forty-eight pounds, and had four days' bread, four days' biscuit, seven days of flour and sixty rounds."

Cavalry. The Guard cavalry had four regiments (grenadiers, dragoons, chasseurs, Poles) and a company of Mamelukes. The line cavalry consisted of two regiments of carbineers, twelve of cuirassiers, thirty of dragoons, twenty-eight of chasseurs and ten of hussars. Each regiment had four active squadrons of two companies, and a fifth depot squadron. The company having ninety-nine men and three officers made a force of one thousand and fifty men per regiment, with its staff. A number of provisional cavalry regiments were organized for Spain.

The cavalry was armed with a sabre and a pair of holster-pistols. The dragoons had a musket shorter than the infantry, with a bayonet, and the light cavalry a musketoon with bayonet. As a rule, the light cavalry accompanied the corps, and the heavy cavalry was in reserve. Each division had a horse battery of six pieces.

Artillery. In the artillery, which included the pontoniers, etc., the foot companies had one hundred and twenty men and officers, the horse companies one hundred men and officers, the train-artillery one hundred and forty-one men and officers. The foot batteries had eight guns, the horse batteries six. The men marched beside the guns in the former, climbing on the caissons in moments of speed; with the latter were "Wurst" wagons for the men to straddle in rapid action. The guns were four, six and eight-pounders, with a few twelve-pounders and some six-inch mortars, and each battery carried three hundred rounds per gun, of which a third was grape and canister. The balls were solid, hollow or shell. The guns were supposed to carry a thousand metres with ball, and four hundred metres with grape and canister. The artillery opened fire at from six to eight hundred metres, according to the size, but strove to hold back its fire to point-blank range, which was some four hundred metres for shot, and about three hundred for grape. The average was two rounds a minute per gun.

Each corps was supposed to have two guns per thousand men, and each dragoon division a horse battery.

The emperor always kept a reserve of artillery, and in the rear of the army was a park, from which to supply gaps and ammunition.

The Engineers had two battalions of miners of five companies, and five battalions of sappers of nine companies. Each company had eighty-eight men, mostly carrying picks and shovels. There were four hundred engineer officers and six hundred sub-officers for use on details.

Up to 1807 the transportation of the army was let out, but in 1807–8 a transportation corps was created, consisting of eleven battalions of four companies each, the company having an officer and ninety-two men, one hundred and sixty horses and thirty-six wagons. The battalion was under command of a captain and staff.

The Administration consisted of review inspectors, who performed not only what we call inspection duty, but paymaster's and some other duties; and war-commissaries, who provided equipment and victual, and did provost duty.

The Hospital service was good for that day, and averaged two ambulances per thousand men under arms; and each regiment, from 1805 on, had a four-horse ambulance which could carry six or eight wounded men; but in the field the medical service was as a rule insufficient.

During the Spanish campaign there were created provisional regiments, reserve legions and observation corps, used mostly for work in the interior. There were also "companies of march," organized to convoy depot troops to the front, but sometimes seized upon and used for service. Paris had a municipal Guard of about twenty-four hundred men. In addition to the above there were a number of foreign legions, Batavian, Germanic, Helvetian, etc. Some of these were really part of the French army and carried the French flag, some fought under their own. There were even Portuguese, Prussian and Irish regiments. Of auxiliary troops there was a Polish division, a Dutch-German division, a Westphalian division, two Italian divisions and some light horse of Berg. Joseph also had a Royal Guard of mixed troops, not included in the French army, but still composed principally of Frenchmen.

The troops first sent by Napoleon in 1807 to subdue Spain were largely poor levies. The emperor had been anticipating the conscription: in December, 1806, that of 1807: in March, 1807, that of 1808; in January, 1808, that of 1809. Even before Baylen a few better troops were ordered thither, and mostly kept in reserve organizations. Out of the old troops which went to Spain Napoleon used a few to strengthen the conscripts, but generally kept them together. The men not needed to fill the gaps in the Grand Army were put in so-called "legions," for coast and garrison duty. Some thirty thousand men were in provisional regiments, formed of battalions which had no community of regimental interest, and were commanded by recalled retired officers, or lieutenants just commissioned.

Upon the outbreak of the Spanish patriotic war, more troops were hurried forward, and soon there stood in the Peninsula over thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse of veterans, and sixty-five thousand foot and over ten thousand horse of legions, provisional regiments, "regiments de marche," and foreigners. Junot had a force largely veteran. Duhesme in Catalonia had some veterans, Moncey and Bessières few. Dupont's men had been drilled only in camp, a fact that in part explains Baylen.

When Napoleon came to Spain, he brought a different kind of force, two hundred thousand Grand Army veterans being the bulk of it. When a battalion was detached, the strength of the regiment would dwindle; many regiments had three battalions or less. A pet regiment was sometimes given a fifth or sixth war battalion, and the attrition of service frequently decreased what was intended to be kept up. The battalions in a brigade would vary from three to nine, an average of six; a division had two or three brigades, that is ten to eighteen battalions, or from six to ten thousand men. In the French cavalry the carbineers and cuirassiers were heavy, the chasseurs and hussars light, and the dragoons either. Nearly all were dragoons that went to the Peninsula, with a few hussars; they had a considerable admixture of foreign elements, and did not average more than six hundred men; at the end of the war perhaps only four hundred men.

The French artillery, mostly of seasoned troops, proved excellent, although difficult to maintain. There was not as much of it as Napoleon demanded, not exceeding two guns per thousand men, and frequently less.

Let us turn to the English forces. Before the days of William the Conqueror England was defended by a species of militia, every freeman being liable to service when called out by the sheriff of his county; the thanes mustering on horseback, and the commonalty serving as footmen. When William seized upon the property of the Anglo-Saxon nobles slaughtered at Hastings, and on that of later revolters, he was able to allot to his followers many grants of land, which he did upon condition of military service; and thereafter knight's service was a rental, or a debt paid by the vassals to the lords, and not a service given by the citizen to the country. The Conqueror ended by having at his call sixty thousand knights; but gradually a system of fines took the place of personal service, and the foreign wars under the Plantagenets were waged by paid troops, among whom desertion during the term of service could be punished; and after each war the troops were disbanded. But these warriors were not liked; opposition to regular soldiers and their billeting on the people grew strong under Elizabeth; and when Charles the First raised forced loans, billeted his troops and established martial law, the Petition of Right was the result. Under Cromwell, the soldiers at first came from a better class and the officers from a less good class than theretofore; but they could not match the noble adherents of Charles until Cromwell raised his Ironsides of men who had the Bible wherewith to meet "Noblesse Oblige." This force was disbanded on the Restoration. But a standing army grew up in its stead, and under William, in 1689, the Mutiny Act first established a constitutional army. In peace, this was rarely twenty thousand men, and in war it varied from seventy-five thousand men in 1750 to two hundred and fifty thousand men in 1812. William's force, as we have seen, did gallant service at Steenkerke, Neerwinden, and Namur; and under Marlborough the British army won the admiration of Europe, — Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde and Malplaquet being inscribed on its standards. At Dettingen, Fontenoy and Minden, in victory and defeat, English valor was shown; it enabled Britain to conquer India; and while in America, pitted against its own flesh and blood, it was not successful, no cloud was ever cast upon the conduct of the British soldier.

As long obtained on the Continent, and until after the Napoleonic wars, regiments were raised for the Crown by noted soldiers or noblemen, who were either paid so much a head, or were allowed to sell the commissions in the regiments raised. This "raising men for rank" was apt to result in filling the companies with criminals, debtors and vagabonds. The engagement was for a period between three years and life. The army-drill was founded on Frederick's method, — the Old Dessauer's, — but the American war taught the British troops the value of open order and of fighting behind cover. This method of raising troops led to abuses, but the Duke of York, as commander-in-chief, began to elevate their standard, and Abercrombie in Egypt, Stewart at Maida, and Wellesley and Lake in India led the way upward; and later Wellington carried it forward to its acme of glory. In 1800 Dundas' system of tactics was introduced, and the drill of the British troops became excellent, the three-rank formation giving place to two ranks in America and India, and finally in the Peninsula. The English company was supposed to have one hundred rank and file, with a captain, a lieutenant and an ensign. In each battalion was a grenadier company, a light company and eight "battalion companies." When full, with the field and staff, the battalion would have ten hundred and thirty-five officers and men. The attrition of service, unless a recent draft of men had arrived, was apt to run the battalions down to half or two thirds this strength. The normal regiment had two battalions, but the working unit in the field was the one battalion, for the second one remained at home. An occasional regiment had more than two battalions; of about a hundred line regiments in service, nearly half had but one and the rest two. The light company of each battalion did the skirmishing in its front; and Wellington utilized two of the rifle regiments so as to have an extra company of skirmishers for each brigade. A three-battalion brigade would thus have four companies of riflemen to skirmish in its front. The school of the soldier, company and battalion was not very different from what descended to us in America together with the ten-company regiment, and is shown in Scott's tactics; and the minor evolutions were simple and stiff. Pipe-clay and touch of elbow were prominent factors; but the English soldier was an unsurpassed fighter, in line or as a skirmisher, and in a charge his blow was hard to equal.

In the Peninsula the army was permanently organized in divisions, usually consisting of two brigades of three or four battalions each, and one or two batteries of artillery.

Although only in part veteran, the French foot in Spain did well. It had so far proved itself better than any other, save perhaps the Russian, in Europe. It now met in the English foot its hereditary adversary of many centuries, and as put to work by Wellington, the British line troops constantly proved superior.

With reference to cavalry, Wellington considered the manoeuvring power of the British horse less than its courage. It did not preserve order in a charge as well as the French. As to the artillery, the French generals in Spain kept up the system of massing batteries at important points in the line. Wellington met this by choosing positions where he could carefully conceal his men; and as his habit was to fight defensive battles, he left the French no target at which to aim. The English field artillery was good: Foy says it was superior to the French, and yet the French was good. Wellington was wont to use his guns in small groups, well placed, and to uncover them to meet the advance of the French line of columns. The English siege artillery was deficient.

To Clarke, April 4, 1808, Napoleon wrote: "I shall have need of many officers in Spain . . . the easiest way is to begin by making some." He then orders that there shall be sent to Spain immediately: 1st, twenty-five velites of the guard, and twenty-five of grenadiers, "to be the best educated, the oldest and strongest, who have been in the Austerlitz or Polish campaigns." 2d, fifteen sergeants, corporals, or soldiers of the grenadiers, and fifteen from the guard, "from among old soldiers, educated, vigorous and fit for officers." 3d, thirty-five others to be chosen from the horse guard. These one hundred and fifteen men to be uniformly equipped and sent to Bayonne to serve as officers in Spain. 4th, if among the disabled officers should be found thirty captains, eight or ten battalion chiefs and a few colonels of some value, they were also to be sent to Bayonne, where work would be found for them.

At the beginning Napoleon did not suppose that Spain would raise many troops. He anticipated easily putting down the uprising in detail. "If this enterprise were to cost me eighty thousand men," he one day remarked to de Pradt, "I would not venture on it; but it will not cost me more than twelve thousand. It is child's play; the Spaniards do not know what the French army is. Believe me, it will end quickly." He was soon to change his mind; the Spanish problem proved as difficult and as fatal as the Russian. He had neither reckoned with the English, nor the English-drilled Portuguese; neither with the difficulties of the country, nor that of victual.

At the end of May, 1808, Murat was in Madrid, representing the emperor, with a force of thirty thousand men under Moncey; Junot was in Lisbon with twenty-five thousand; Bessières, with headquarters at Burgos, which he was fortifying, had twelve thousand men under Verdier along the upper Ebro down to Logroño, while an equal number under Lasalle, having dispersed the insurgents at Torquemada, had pushed on to Palencia and Valladolid. Duhesme had thirteen thousand men in Catalonia; and Dupont was on the Tagus, near Toledo, with a force later reinforced up to twenty-four thousand men. These bodies were not all ready. With Madrid in his eye, Napoleon remained in Bayonne, where the Spanish Junta was still sitting, in the hope that the "insurrection" would die out of itself. He wrote Bessières, June 16, that he must take no backward step, that revolution called more for the appearance of strength than the reality. And to Savary, lately one of his aides, and now in a fashion replacing Murat, who was sick: "In a war of this kind, it is necessary to act with patience, with calm, and after calculations well-made. In civil wars it is the important places one should defend. We ought not to go everywhere." Though the emperor, as later in Russia, far underrated his task, he went at it skillfully; but he was unable to control manœuvres in every section. The summer of 1808 was a busy one. Duhesme was besieged in Barcelona, until Gouvion St. Cyr released him.

Moncey marched through Cuença, defeated a Spanish army, and attacked Valencia; but failing to take this town of eighty thousand inhabitants, retired to Almanza. Dupont was dispatched to Andalusia. Bessières, whose men were distributed in the various towns of Old Castile, and who was ordered to occupy the country as far north as the Biscay shore, lest the English should land a force there and, operating down the Ebro, cut the intercommunication among the several French columns, was so completely engaged by the uprisings in Logroño, Valencia and Valladolid that he had no men to send to the coast until late in June, when Santander was taken. In Aragon, resistance centred in Saragossa under Palafox, who was joined by old soldiers and officers of all arms, and by young engineers from the military school of Alcala. With nine thousand men Palafox advanced to Epila, but here Lefebvre met and defeated him, and he again sought refuge in Saragossa, whither Verdier, after beating the insurgents of Logroño, followed him up in June, and with his eight thousand men sat down to a regular siege.

The emperor was taken aback at the outlook. There were too many columns, which left less than was needed at the important points, — the line of communications and the capital.

On July 13, in a note for Savary, "If Dupont should meet a check, it would be of little consequence," he said. "It would have no other result than to make him recross the mountains; but a blow to Bessières" (who was moving against Cuesta) "would be a blow delivered at the heart of the army; it would give tetanus, and would be felt at all the extremest points of the army. . . . The real manner of reinforcing Dupont is not to send him troops, but is to send troops to Bessières. . . . The aim of all the efforts of the army should be to conserve Madrid. . . . If he (Bessières) has been defeated . . . you must concentrate . . . all the troops in a circle of seven or eight days from Madrid . . . so as to profit from the advantage one has of being in the middle, to crush successively with all your forces the different corps of the enemy. . . . This is the general spirit of war in Spain." And next day, in a long note to the new king, he said: "The most important point of all is that of Bessières. Everything must be done so that this corps should not suffer any retrograde movement, any check. That of Dupont comes after. The affairs of Saragossa are in third order, those of Valencia only in fourth. This is the veritable situation of the military affairs of the kingdom."

Meanwhile a storm was gathering in the northwest. England had awakened to the fact that in the Peninsula, open at many points to her fleets, she might to advantage oppose the Napoleonic scheme. She had promised assistance to the Junta of Oviedo, and was actually forwarding troops; fifty thousand muskets were sent to the insurgents of Lugo; and a reinforcing corps was advancing from Portugal. When concentrated under Blake, — an Irish soldier of fortune, — this army moved on Astorga, and joining Cuesta on the Esla, made up a force of thirty-five thousand men. Here was an array which Bessières could not disregard; and breaking camp, he marched out with fourteen thousand men and, on July 14, met the enemy standing on the heights of Medina de Rio Seco. Had he lost the battle, the whole French situation would have been compromised; but he did his work handsomely. The Spaniards, some twenty-two thousand strong, stood in two bodies under Cuesta on the right and Blake on the left, quite too far apart for tactical coöperation. Advancing Lasalle's cavalry in the centre, Bessières contained Cuesta with Mouton, and threw Merle on Blake, Lasalle taking him in flank. The hastily raised troops of the army of Leon and Galicia were unable to hold themselves against the French charges, were defeated with loss of five thousand prisoners and a number of guns, and retired on Benavente. The French loss was small. "Bessières has put my brother Joseph on the throne of Spain!" exclaimed Napoleon, no longer fearing for his lieutenant's standing. Indeed, it was this victory that won Madrid, as it was Baylen, a week later, that lost it. On July 17 the emperor wrote him: "The battle of Medina de Rio Seco will be one more title to your military reputation. Never was battle gained under more important circumstances. It has decided the affairs of Spain." Medals were ordered to be distributed; and on the same day he told Joseph to send Bessières the order of the Golden Fleece, and added: "We must at the moment support Dupont. Gobert's division and those which are placed on the route to him may march towards this general. It is most important that Dupont should put to rout the army of Andalusia."

In his Notes, July 21, he wrote: "In the actual position of affairs the French army occupies the centre, the enemy a great number of points of the circumference. In a war of this kind one needs *sang-froid*, patience and calculation, and the troops should not be exhausted in false marches and countermarches. One must not believe, when one has made a false march of three or four days, that one has repaired it by a countermarch. This is ordinarily two faults instead of one. The only important point of to-day is Dupont. If the enemy were able to seize the defiles of the Sierra Morena, it would be difficult to chase him away. We must therefore reinforce Dupont, so that he shall have twenty-five thousand men."

During this short campaign, Joseph Bonaparte had entered Spain to take possession of his dubious rights as king. On July 19 Napoleon wrote him: "I see with grief that you are getting worried. It is the only misfortune I dreaded. The victory of Bessières . . . is worth more than a reinforcement of thirty thousand men. . . . You must not find it too extraordinary that you have to conquer your kingdom. Philip V. and Henri IV. were obliged to conquer theirs. Be gay, do not let yourself be troubled, and . . . do not doubt for a moment that things will finish better and more promptly than you think."

Dupont, whose gallant work in the Ulm campaign we remember, and who expected to win his marshal's baton, was sent reinforcements to enable him to win Cordova, Seville and

Cadiz. From Toledo, late in May, he started out with his division and cavalry to join hands with the French fleet in Cadiz. With troops mostly conscripts, ill-prepared for the work in hand, he crossed the Sierra Morena and reached Andujar June 2, to learn that Andalusia had risen, that the French squadron was captured, and that he himself was surrounded by numberless irregulars, to sustain whom Castaños was raising a regular army in his rear. Marching to Cordova, on June 7 he sacked the town, and with his plunder marched back to Andujar, which he reached June 19. Here he received orders to remain, and not to recross the Sierra Morena, lest the moral effect should be bad. The inhabitants had fled. Victual was scarce. The French collected the harvest, ground the corn, and baked their own bread; but the young conscripts were losing strength. Dupont was being starved out, as later Victor was in Estremadura.

Meanwhile the Seville Junta put on foot forty thousand regulars with good artillery, under Castaños, aided by Reding, an able Swiss officer. On July 16, to reinforce Dupont, Vedel came up at Andujar, followed by Gobert to Baylen. Castaños was moving from Cordova on the left bank, and Reding, from Granada, forced a passage of the Guadalquivir against Gobert. Dupont ordered Vedel back to Baylen to head off Reding, of whose oncoming he heard. Not finding Reding there, — he lay behind a range of hills, — Vedel imagined that he had marched towards the mountain gaps, and followed on to Carolina. Reding then seized Baylen, separating Dupont and Vedel, and with Castaños on his right and Reding on his left, Dupont's only resource was to cut his way out through Baylen. On July 19, at daybreak, his van found Reding intrenched on the hills, with plenty of artillery. Though outnumbered two to one, the French attacked lustily, but by noon they had lost two thousand men, and the Swiss troops in French service deserted to the enemy. Dupont — the fighter of Ulm — unwisely asked a truce.

At the sound of battle Vedel returned to aid Dupont, whom he reached late in the day, and disregarding the truce, he attacked with some success. Thus Reding was caught between Dupont and Vedel, as Dupont was between Reding and Castaños. Under the truce, Dupont ordered Vedel to cease his attack. Matters were undecided. Dupont demanded the right to retire to the mountains. Reding referred him to Castaños. The latter saw his chance, by a little temporizing, to win a decided success. Vedel urged the sacrifice of the artillery and train, and proposed to Dupont to cut their way through, but Dupont at the last moment weakened, and capitulated July 22. Vedel strove to march away, as he was not surrounded, but Dupont ordered him back. One squadron of cuirassiers did fray itself a passage at Baylen, as the whole army might have done. Dupont's forces became prisoners, and Vedel's were to evacuate Spain by sea. The Spaniards did not, it is alleged, carry out the capitulation in good faith.

Napoleon was in the highest degree incensed by Dupont's conduct, writing to Clarke, August 3: —

> "I send you some documents for yourself alone. Read them with a map in hand, and you will see whether, since the world exists, there has been anything so stupid, so inept, so cowardly. Here, then, are justified the Macks, the Hohenlohes, etc. One may perfectly see from Dupont's own recital that all that has arrived is the result of the most inconceivable ineptness. He appeared to have done well at the head of his division; as chief he has done horribly. When this blow of fate struck us, everything in Spain was prospering."

From Madrid, to the aid of Dupont, a small column had been sent, which at Madridejos heard of the disaster. Joseph, who had been king in the capital just a week, quit Madrid July 28. The army retired to Burgos and thence to the Ebro, and at Miranda, Bessières from the right was called in and Verdier from the left — the French having been obliged to raise the siege of Saragossa, after almost carrying the city by assault, upon the Valencian army coming to its relief. Castaños shortly entered Madrid.

When, on July 17, at Bayonne, Napoleon had heard of Bessières' victory, he concluded that, as he held Madrid and Lisbon, and Joseph was on the way to his new capital, everything would go right, and he returned to Bordeaux in a triumphal progress. On receiving the news of Baylen, he saw all his plans upset. Within three days he had completed new ones; had made suggestions of good-will to the czar, so as to forestall the ugly news, and had asked for a meeting; had demanded from Austria the reason of her armament, and had ordered towards Spain half of the Grand Army: Victor's 1st Corps from Brandenburg via Cassel through Mainz, Marchand with the 6th Corps and Mortier with the 5th from Silesia through Bayreuth and Mainz, a number of infantry regiments from Wesel to Paris to form Sébastiani's command, a number of 4th battalions in Italy to Perpignan, a division of Italians under Pino to Lyon, a division of Poles from Davout's command, and a number of divisions of cavalry from sundry places. France was almost denuded of troops, and good divisions were taken from the Grand Army; but these were replaced by a levy of one hundred and sixty thousand men in September, out of the conscription of 1810 and the exemptions of the three previous years. The troops could not, however, arrive in Spain before the end of October.

The emperor reached Paris August 14, and at once began collecting clothing and supplies in Bayonne and Perpignan, purchasing provisions, horses and mules, organizing a train of nearly eight hundred wagons to transport the baggage of the moving troops, creating hospitals, and, as was his wont, providing three pairs of shoes for each infantryman he expected to send across the border.

Soult's 4th Corps evacuated Prussia, save the big fortresses, he himself going to Spain. Boudet, Carra St. Cyr, Legrand and Molitor were to march to France. The Grand Army in Germany became the Army of the Rhine under Davout, who was reinforced in Silesia, and stood on a line from Magdeburg along the Elbe and Saale to Bayreuth. Bernadotte remained in the Hanseatic towns. This made something like one hundred thousand men, which could be more than doubled by the 4th and 5th battalions, by the troops which had reëntered France, and by the allied contingents. In Italy were one hundred thousand men under Eugene, and in Dalmatia twenty thousand under Marmont. The effective sufficed to secure French interests against Austria for a number of months, and warranted Napoleon in saying to the legislative body that "as passions have so much blinded the English counsels as to make them renounce the protection of the seas and present their army on the Continent, I will leave in a few days to put myself at the head of my army, and with the help of God, myself crown in Madrid the king of Spain, and plant my eagles on the forts of Lisbon." The emperor thus meant to avenge Baylen, and it seemed as if, at the head of a quarter of a million men, he might easily do so.

Sword of the Period.

XXXIX.

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY. JULY TO SEPTEMBER, 1808.

Joseph had retired behind the Ebro. The siege of Saragossa was stopped and Duhesme cooped up in Barcelona. Napoleon at once ordered a large part of the Grand Army from Germany to Spain. England sent an expedition to Portugal in command of a division in which was Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had already made a name for himself in India and won the battle of Assaye. Reaching Portugal, Wellesley found the Spaniards in a bad way. The English disembarked at Mondego Bay just after Dupont's defeat, which allowed Spenser to come around from Cadiz. This was the beginning of the Peninsular War. Although compromised by Baylen, Junot marched boldly out to meet the English, without, however, concentrating all his forces. Delaborde held Wellesley back for a day or two, and at Vimiero Junot attacked him August 21. Though not senior, Wellesley happened to be in command. He fought a defensive battle, the type of all his battles in the Peninsula. He held his own, Junot retired on Lisbon, which revolted, and as a result the Convention of Cintra was made, by which the French troops were sent back to France. Many think that Wellesley here showed that, as a tactical method, the line was superior to the column. He showed rather that the fire of a line of English troops in a good defensive position could stop the assault in battalion-columns of the French. He certainly utilized his knowledge of his English soldiers to the best advantage, but against any other troops the column remained what it had been. Wellesley, who returned to England, was blamed for the Convention of Cintra, but exonerated by a Court of Inquiry. Napoleon was much vexed by Cintra, succeeding Baylen, and made ready to go to Spain.

The moral effect of Baylen was grave. That the Dupont who fought so stubbornly at Ulm was capable of such weakness astonishes the soldier; and that French troops, who had earned a marvelous reputation since 1796, were capable of surrender, reduced them in the eyes of the Spaniards, vain of their prowess, to the level of all other soldiers, and much encouraged the patriots. At this point began Spanish activity, and it was the first event that convinced Napoleon that he must personally assume the conduct of military matters there. "I see," said he, "that I must go there myself to wind the machine up." Dupont and Vedel were court-martialed, but nothing could undo the harm. The defeats of Baylen and Vimiero proved that mere numbers of Frenchmen could accomplish nothing in the Peninsula, — it needed good troops; as we have seen, to strengthen the Spanish forces Napoleon weakened the Grand Army; and while, thus weakened, that army still won many victories, these were never as brilliant as those from 1805 to 1807.

Napoleon had a way, not unusual with great captains, of writing down his impressions of a situation, not only for the instruction of his lieutenants, but apparently at times to weigh the conditions for his own satisfaction. Clearly as his thoughts came to him, he yet defined them the more sharply by dictating them to one of his secretaries; and on August 5, in a Note on the Present Situation in Spain, he said that the next thing to do was to take up a position at Aranda on the Douro, with videttes out in the Sierra Guadarama, while Bessières should keep up connection with Junot in Portugal via Valladolid. Should this advanced position not be practicable, Burgos would be the rendezvous, and the Ebro the line of defense; or in the worst event the Vittoria-Pampeluna line could be held, to enable the approaching Grand Army to debouch from the Pyrenees.

"But one must not lose heart on account of a few mishaps." The "unexpected events of Dupont are one proof more that success in war depends on the prudence, good conduct and experience of the general. . . . If Dupont . . . had fought with his corps united, he would have completely routed" the enemy. "One must not make a timid war, nor suffer any assembling of the enemy within two marches of any of the army corps. If the enemy approaches, one must not be discouraged by what is past, but confide in one's superiority, march towards him and beat him. . . . To attack and overturn all that shall present itself is to be the general instruction given to Bessières, to Ney and to Verdier." . . . "The first aim is to maintain ourselves in Madrid, if that is possible. The second to maintain our communications with Portugal by occupying the line of the Douro. The third to conserve the Ebro, the fourth to conserve communications with Pampeluna and St. Sebastian, so that on the arrival of the Grand Army we can in a short while overturn and destroy all the revolters." One was not to look at the enemy with a magnifying glass; nor adopt anything like a cordon-system, which was valuable only against smugglers, but of no use against an organized enemy. "After ten years' service one is not to revert to such blunders," he wrote Berthier.

But though Napoleon strove to direct Spanish affairs, while hurrying up the Grand Army, matters kept going from bad to worse. And not only was this so on the Peninsula; as Austria began to gain courage and to put on foot her landwehr, Napoleon felt obliged to mobilize the troops of the Confederation of the Rhine. Despite some concessions and the withdrawal of many French troops, Prussia was dangerous, and only the strict Russian alliance could neutralize her. Happily Alexander, so far as could be seen, was loyal to his Tilsit promises, and his recognition of Joseph as king of Spain weighed much in Napoleon's favor. Still, the result of Baylen was not only to encourage Napoleon's enemies all over Europe, but the evacuation of Madrid, when Joseph had barely entered it, was followed by the erection in the capital of a Supreme Spanish Junta as governing body. Neither the line of the Douro nor even Burgos was held; and the entire French army, over fifty thousand strong, as we have seen, withdrew behind the Ebro, gave up the siege of Saragossa, and was glad to hold a short line up and down the river from Logroño. Duhesme was still cooped up in Barcelona: and to cap the list of disasters, the Spanish troops, which under La

Romana were serving in the Grand Army and had purposely been sent to the Baltic, mutinied, and ten thousand of them managed to get on board English vessels and to reach Spain. La Romana did the Spanish cause effective service.

Meanwhile Junot, who had easily occupied Portugal and sat himself down in comfortable vice-regal state in Lisbon, was being utterly compromised by Joseph's retreat from Madrid, about the details of which he was ill-informed; and to make his position desperate, the British government had finally determined, as a means of combating the Continental System, to uphold the rising in Spain with men and arms, and had dispatched an expedition to Portugal, one division of which was commanded by the future great Duke of Wellington.

Arthur Wellesley, fourth son of the Earl of Mornington, a descendant of the English conquerors of Ireland, was born — as was also Napoleon — in 1769, received his early education at Eton, and, curiously, studied in a military college in Angers, France. When seventeen years old, he entered the army as ensign, and, pushed by family influence as was usual in those days, rose to a majority in six years and a colonelcy at twenty-seven, having served in both horse and foot, but having devoted his best efforts to infantry, as Napoleon had to artillery.

In 1794, in the Low Countries under the Duke of York, he was known as a good officer, his regiment being a model. At one time commanding a brigade, he distinguished himself in this scarcely glorious campaign, more than once acting as rearguard, and beating the French in a small affair near Boxtel on the Waal.

At this time the British army was at a low ebb, a fact of which Wellesley made note. From leader to lowest officer there was little knowledge of the business of war, and less desire to acquire it; favoritism governed everything, and all duties were performed in a haphazard manner. So foreign were these conditions to Wellesley's ideas of what they should be, that he strove to get out of the army and into the civil service, but fortunately for his country, he did not succeed. It was largely due to his labors that in the succeeding twenty years the British army rose from this condition to the height of its efficiency.

Sent to India with his regiment, Wellesley landed in Calcutta early in 1797, when Bonaparte was completing one of the most splendid campaigns in history by his march to Leoben. One of his first duties was to prepare for a descent on Manilla, but the expedition was countermanded. At this time the French in India were working against British supremacy, and Tippoo Sahib was striving to regain his power. Happily for Wellesley, his elder brother, Lord Mornington, was a year later made governor-general. This was at the time when Bonaparte was embarking for Egypt, hoping that success there would open the way for an expedition to India. England has been lucky in having extraordinary men come to the surface when their services are needed. The exceptional power of colonization of the English is not more due to the honorable class of well-born men ready to leave home for colonial duties, than it is to the succession of strong souls that have arisen to undertake the almost impossible in subduing the semi-civilized nations over which she has sought control. Her failures have only led to successes.

At this moment the English supremacy in India was in danger. Assuming that Bonaparte could have obtained access through Egypt to India, it is not impossible that all India might have become French, for native opposition to English rule was strong. Tippoo Sahib, in Mysore, practically controlled the Mahrattas, and was organizing an expedition against Madras and Bombay; the Nyzam of the Deccan, who had some troops drilled by French officers, being about the only ally of the English — his motive, jealousy of Tippoo.

This great chieftain was the problem of the new governor-general, who had to keep at peace with the Directors of the Company, while these worked for present dividends, and he looked towards the future. The two brothers did not always agree, and curiously Wellesley was for peace, while Mornington was ready to resort to war. This hyper-cautious trait, next to common sense, was the one which most distinguished the Iron Duke throughout life. He was wont to beware of



India.

entrance to a quarrel; but being in, he bore it that the opposed might beware of him.

It was determined to move against Tippoo. Two lines were chosen, a military error against civilized opponents, but practicable under the conditions. Stuart advanced from Bombay, Harris from Madras. In February, 1799, the Nyzam, with fifteen thousand men, joined the Harris column, and these troops were put in command of Wellesley. Tippoo undertook the offensive and fell on Stuart. Defeated, he turned on Harris, at Malavelly, near Seringapatam. In this fight Wellesley commanded the left wing, with which he turned Tippoo's right and contributed to his defeat. Harris marched on Seringapatam. Tippoo had some twenty-two thousand men, Harris thirty-five thousand, including the Nyzam's. In approaching the great fortress, Wellesley met one of his early defeats, in carelessly attacking an outpost after dark. The backset was shortly retrieved, but none the less for the moment worked against him. Seringapatam was duly captured and Wellesley made military governor of Mysore. Succeeding Tippoo, there appeared on the scene one of his old lieutenants, Dhoondia Waugh; but him Wellesley fairly corralled after a series of rapid and skillful marches.

At this time a British expedition was organized to reach Egypt from India. Wellesley would have been glad to head this, but it was fortunately given to Baird, who, as has been narrated in the Egyptian campaign, was too late to join in any results accomplished in the Delta.

Wellesley fully reduced Mysore. In his government he frowned on the common peculation of the day, and it is one of the tributes to the brothers Wellesley that they fostered in India a government of honesty. The Mahrattas still remained independent, but schism among the Hindoo powers aided the English. Two other princes, Scindiah and Holkar, were fain to try issue with them. The Peishwa, or head of the Mahrattas, a puppet in the hands of the Scindiah, turned to the English for help. Holkar, on the Jumna, and Scindiah disagreed, the latter was defeated, and the Peishwa seized Poona, the capital of the Mahrattas. Stuart was sent against Holkar, with Wellesley, now a major-general, under his orders. Wellesley entered Poona and confirmed the Peishwa in his rights. Scindiah and Holkar again joined hands and procured other allies. In August, 1803, while the First Consul was busy building up the power of France, Wellesley, who was in command in the Poona country, with some thirteen thousand men, marched northward, captured Ahmednagar, where Stephenson, with six thousand men, joined him from the Deccan, and made ready to fall on the enemy. To do this he crossed a range of hills through two passes, eight miles apart, a false movement justified only against Oriental troops. On August 23 Wellesley learned that Scindiah and his allies, thirty thousand foot and twenty thousand horse, were awaiting him. Stephenson being delayed, he himself, with but eight thousand men, at once determined to attack, as Clive had done at Plassy. Scindiah stood at Assaye, with his cavalry, his best arm, on his right, his infantry, which was poor, on his left, and in his front the Kaitna River, into which, some distance downward, ran the Juah. Wellesley discovered a ford beyond Scindiah's left flank, and making what would have been, in front of civilized troops, a fatal manœuvre, he moved in the face of the enemy,

Wellesley.

by his right, to this ford, crossed and attacked the foe in flank. As he calculated, Scindiah did not attack, and made but a partial change of front to his left. The difference between European discipline and Oriental bravery was once more proved. The rapidly advancing British, after more or less fierce resistance, and by the use of the cold steel, drove Scindiah from the field with loss of five thousand men, their own loss being eighteen hundred and fifty men, killed and wounded. Tried by the rules of European warfare, Wellesley was wrong; tried by the conditions confronting him, he showed the utmost ability. "He acted like Miltiades at Marathon, like Alexander before Arbela," says O'Connor Morris, and full success was his reward; but an early symptom of what was one of his weak points was here shown: he did not pursue.



Battle of Assaye.

Assaye is a sample of those wonderful battles by which a handful of bold Englishmen conquered India. Unlike modern war, they approach more nearly in general scheme to the battles of the Greeks with their high discipline against the untrained hordes of Persian invaders, or against the viceroys of Asia Minor. They illustrate the value of character, coherence and training, and are the highest illustration of that intimate co-agency which sportsmen call team-work.

Meanwhile the Frenchman, Perron, had been defeated by Lake, and Delhi and Agra captured. In November Wellesley marched against Scindiah, and met him at Argaum on the 29th. He had fourteen thousand men and four thousand irregular horse: Scindiah had forty thousand. Owing to the moral influence of Assaye, a victory was easily won, and the British force kept on to Gaivilgarh, which was captured December 15. The Mahratta chiefs, again defeated by Lake at Laswarree, sued for peace, and ceded Delhi, Agra, Broach and Ahmednagar. Wellesley returned to Poona.

In 1805 Wellesley went back to England. He had won his chance of service in India by his connections; he had won his success by his own courage and energy, displaying, in addition to much crisp judgment and military common sense, that prompt audacity in battle which alone imposes on Oriental nations. He had learned that, to be efficient, soldiers must be kept in the best condition, and he always supervised the commissariat and transport, and paid great heed to every detail of the administration, — sometimes to his own strategic loss. Exhibiting firmness and equity towards the native chiefs, he did much to increase the British influence in the Deccan and in southern India. He was highly esteemed by his subordinate officers; yet he was inclined to be restless under control, and to deem that his superiors had not done him justice.

Arriving in England in September, 1805, Wellesley was sent to Hanover in command of a brigade under Cathcart; but this force was recalled as soon as Austerlitz was won. He then went into Parliament, and in 1807 became Chief Secretary for Ireland.

When, by the Treaty of Tilsit, it was contemplated by

Napoleon and Alexander to make use of all the minor navies they could control to sustain the Continental System, England determined to seize the Danish fleet as a pledge of peace — a fair example of the politics of the day. An expedition was sent out for this purpose, with land forces of twenty-seven thousand men under Cathcart, two divisions in which were commanded by Wellesley and Baird. Copenhagen was invested and bombarded; Wellesley defeated some hastily armed levies at Roskilde, and the Danish fleet was captured.

In July, 1808, having been promoted to be lieutenant-general, Wellesley was appointed to command an expedition of ten thousand men organizing at Cork for operations in Portugal. A few weeks later the force was raised to thirty thousand and placed under Dalrymple; whereupon it was decided that Wellesley should have one of its four divisions. Shortly after leaving Cork, he transferred to a fast frigate and sailed to Corunna, reaching that place July 20. News of Bessières' victory at Rio Seco a week before showed him that, despite their boasting, the Spaniards were in a bad way, and that the whole of northern Spain might be overrun by the French; for except on paper there was practically no Spanish or Portuguese army afoot. The Bishop of Oporto, however, bound himself to hold the Portuguese frontier against the French invasion, and Wellesley consulted with the authorities as to where the fleet from Cork should land. It was a question whether it would not be wiser to move to the south of Spain and drive Dupont back; but with Bessières near northern Portugal and Junot in Lisbon, it was decided to disembark at some middle place. Mondego Bay was chosen, and here Wellesley heard the report of Dupont's defeat, which no doubt saved Portugal from invasion by Bessières, and released Spenser, who came on from Cadiz. Wellesley's force was soon to be followed by the rest of the troops under

Dalrymple and Moore; but for some time he had to direct his own and Spenser's forces of thirteen thousand men, which joined near Mondego Bay early in August. This was the beginning of the Peninsular War.

Junot had in all thirty thousand men of fair quality, but it was after Baylen, when Joseph's retreat to the Ebro rendered his position in Portugal dangerous, that Wellesley appeared upon the scene.

Loison's division was at Estremoz and Delaborde's in Lisbon, and Junot ordered the two to concentrate out towards Leyria, while Wellesley's plan was to march along the coast to be near the fleet. Moore with ten thousand men was due to arrive, and Wellesley projected that he should march on Santarem, and both converge on Lisbon. Wellesley reached Leyria first, and forced Delaborde back to Roliça. With more gallantry than discretion, Junot resolved to hazard the event on a single battle; but he left too many men on detachment, and marched out to meet his redoubtable opponent with inferior forces, although he needed every man he could put in line. "He saw too many things at once."

Leaving Lisbon August 15, he advanced to meet Wellesley, who with the force in hand had moved down the coast road to be near arriving reinforcements, and had been delayed at Roliça August 17 by the determined stand made by Delaborde. Wellesley strove to surround the French on both flanks, but Delaborde beat him off and retired to Columbeira. Here he defended himself handsomely and finally joined Junot, while Wellesley stood at Vimiero, where his reinforcements came up. Junot attacked him August 21. Wellesley was superseded on the day of the battle by Burrard, but was left in command of the troops on the field. In this his first battle, as in his last battle at Waterloo, he had poor means of retreat in case he should be defeated, his main line running along a ridge extending from Vimiero to the sea. In front of the English centre was a strong hill where Wellesley put three thousand men. His left was weak, on lower hills, but had a ravine in front. His right was well posted. His front was short, and had back of it a road along which troops could move. The position was skillfully chosen. He had seventeen thousand men, plus two thousand Portuguese, but only two hundred and fifty cavalrymen and eighteen guns. The key of his position was in front of Vimiero; and he began his Peninsula career by the typical defensive battle which he constantly repeated with so much success, and which exhibited marked comprehension of the character of his English troops.



Battle of Vimiero.

Wellesley expected Junot's attack down the Maceira, while the latter planned to attack Vimiero in front, and at the same time to turn the English left. He had not thoroughly reconnoitred, and the march around Wellesley's left was too long, for noticing the French moving in that direction, Wellesley easily sent additional troops thither. Junot's first attack on Vimiero hill failed, the English receiving it with severe volleys and the new Shrapnel shell. The second attack, led by Kellermann, was longer and fiercer, but it too, after a handsome struggle, failed, and the British handful of cavalry, smartly used, put an end to the affair. On the French right the failure was as marked; and after a loss of two thousand men to the English seven hundred, Junot retired on Lisbon, now in full revolt. Burrard came on the field late in the day, and weakly stopped the pursuit that Wellesley is said to have been ready to conduct. Next day Burrard himself was superseded by Dalrymple. The credit of Junot's defeat is entirely due to Wellesley. Junot was much to blame; he could have got together more than twenty thousand men, and he should have attacked at one point. Too large a force was left in Lisbon, which he did not intrench, as later Wellesley did at

English Grenadiers.

Torres Vedras. It was by good luck alone that he escaped Dupont's fate.

The result of Vimiero was the Convention of Cintra, which Kellermann and Dalrymple negotiated during the following week. The French troops, twenty-six thousand in number, were carried by sea on English vessels to Quiberon. Thus Baylen, which lost Madrid, was followed by Cintra, which allowed the English to gain a sound foothold in Portugal. Both seriously blocked the schemes of Napoleon.

At Vimiero Wellesley first put in practice the method of opposing the French line of battalion columns by a two-deep English line. The relative value of the line and the column has been much discussed. It must not be supposed that the English followed the old Prussian lineal system, nor operated on what was known as the cordon system, fully described in previous volumes. What Wellington did was to recognize and to bring out the best qualities of the volley and file firing of the English foot in their normal formation of a line two deep, and to make efficient use of their succeeding counter-charge. In Wellington's tactics, a single line two deep was not all there was to oppose to a line of French battalion columns. Ten thousand English marshaled for battle would occupy as wide a front as ten thousand French, and there would be on hand as many English as French to contest any given position. Though the English front firing line was only two deep, behind it lay supports and reserves which would make as many men to the yard-front as in the French line.

The French line of attack, formed of battalions in column at deploying distance, or something less, had proved effective against all the Continental armies in line; but Wellington's singular ability in utilizing the fire of his two-deep British line, with proper reserves to sustain it, rendered his troops superior to any the French had yet encountered. Each French column covered a part only of the space of the English line in its immediate front, and had intervals on either hand which allowed the latter to pour, not only frontal volleys into the deep mass, but concentric volleys into its flanks. For years the column, preceded by skirmishers, had proved itself so efficient that all the armies of Europe began to adopt the French method. Wellington, however, believed that his English regiments, in a two-deep line, and with proper supports ready in the rear, could be so handled as to check the greater momentum of the columns. He would conceal his main lines behind rolling ground, walls or hedges, or behind the crest of a position. The French tirailleurs would be met by the English light companies, and although the heavier French skirmish line usually broke down the latter, these retarded their advance somewhat. Meanwhile the concealed English guns were

French Light Infantry.

unmasked, and their fire opened on the French columns, while the English line, in perfect order, would emerge from cover and pour one or more volleys into the French, who were usually out of breath and order by moving up the height on which the British were fond of taking up their defensive stand; and once the French column was unsettled by their fire, would make a counter-charge. The French so-called bayonet-charge was an advance in column without stopping to fire. The English charge — like Frederick's — was an advance in line with volleys, or fire by file; more rarely it was a rush with the cold steel. The French column against the Spaniards was always superior. When it met the British, it found fully its equal in gallantry, and in tactics its superior. Against a line of English infantry, used as Wellington knew how to use it, the French column failed to win the success it had got in the habit of expecting against all other forces. Grand-tactics, put to use as Napoleon was wont to do, could alone match this admirable tenacity.

This interesting question will more than once be recurred to.

The Convention of Cintra was much misunderstood in England, and Wellesley, who, dissatisfied with his status in Portugal, had asked to be sent home, was for a while held responsible. But after a Court of Inquiry had sat on the case, he was sent back to the Peninsula to command the allied army. In the interval Craddock remained in charge, and Sir John Moore conducted his Corunna campaign.

Baylen and Cintra irritated Napoleon to the utmost; but he looked on them as only temporary backsets — not as pointing to eventual failure in Spain. He found constant and serious fault with all that was done. "It seems as if the army was commanded, not by generals who have conducted war, but by post-office inspectors," he wrote Joseph.

To Clarke, October 2, with regard to Cintra, he wrote: "I do not know whether I ought to approve it, but . . . I see nothing in the act which is contrary to honor, because the troops did not lay down their arms, they came back with their flags, they are not prisoners, and they arrive, not by capitulation, but by a convention rather political than military." And to Junot October 19 : "You have done nothing dishonorable. You bring back my troops, my eagles, and my guns. I had, however, hoped that you would do better. . . . This Convention, you gained it by your courage, but not by your dispositions ; and it is with reason that the English complain that their general signed it. . . . Before the end of the year I propose myself to replace you in Lisbon. Retain near you the officers who best know the country. Send me the best map that you have. Have the roads traced upon it, and join to it all the information on the means by which one may reënter Lisbon without a siege."

Junot.

Although not on the spot, the emperor made constant efforts to direct and control operations : he might have done better to leave one marshal in command and unhampered. But his Notes are full of interest.

On August 27, in Observations on the Affairs of Spain, he says : "Tudela is important from several points of view. It has a bridge on the Ebro, and perfectly protects Navarre. . . . The first operation that the army should make when it reassumes the offensive . . . is to invest and take Saragossa ; and if this town resists as it did the first time, to give an example which will resound throughout Spain. . . . Tudela must then be occupied. . . . It would be useful to occupy Santander. . . . Biscay and Navarre must be occupied and disarmed. . . . We have no information about what the enemy is doing. . . . In Spain, as elsewhere, send out parties to carry off sometimes a curé, or the alcalde, then a chief of convent, or a postmaster, and especially all the letters. . . . Put them in arrest until they talk, by cross-questioning them twice a day. . . . One must intercept all the mails and the letters. Nothing but the motive of having news may justify a great detachment of four or five thousand men, which moves on a big town, takes letters from the post, and seizes the most well-to-do citizens and their letters, papers, etc. It is certain . . . when one is not in a desert, and that one is in a peopled country, that if a general is not informed, it is because he has not known how to take proper measures to be so. The services which the inhabitants give to a general of the enemy are never given for affection, nor even to have money. The best ones that are got are so as to have safeguards and protection ; it is to conserve one's goods, lives, towns and monasteries." . . .

In Notes on Matters in Spain, August 30, he says : "In the position of the army of Spain one has to fear to be attacked on the right by the army of Galicia, on the centre by the army coming from Madrid, on the left by the army coming from Saragossa and Valencia. It would be a great fault to let the latter army take position at Tudela." "The position of Burgos is equally important to keep, it being a city of high reputation, and the centre of communications and reports."

In Notes for Joseph, September 15, the emperor wrote : "The offensive position of the Army of Spain is essentially bad. The position on the Ebro, and especially the so important debouch of Burgos, are only tenable so long as Tudela is occupied. . . . The left corps, all assembled at Tudela, is to have nothing in common with the rest. Its *rôle* is quite separate. Its principal object must be to maintain Navarre. . . . If Tudela is not occupied, this is what the enemy will do : if he is in force, he will come there, and then all Aragon will revolt. . . . If one is placed with fifteen to eighteen thousand men at Tudela, there is nothing to fear. . . . The proof of what we now say is that the least noise disquiets headquarters, because you are not in a good position. . . . We have already made it known that the system of cordons is most harmful, and that a line like the Rhine and the Vistula even, can be sustained only by occupying bridges which permit one to undertake the offensive afresh. Although in a plain, one must compare the position of Tudela to a height which dominates, because occupying Tudela, one is occupying an offensive position. The enemy has everything to fear and must be careful everywhere. . . . The entire left should be centralized at Tudela . . . and constantly menace. . . . The right is not better placed. Why occupy Burgos only with cavalry? Why not with Bessières' whole corps? . . . By sending reconnoissances out fifteen or sixteen leagues . . . one would open up all the movements of the enemy. . . . The centre corps of Ney as well as the corps around the king . . . can be in second line, between Logroño and Burgos. . . . One conceives the position of the army to be offensive on the right, and offensive on the left. Then one is certain not to be disquieted by false rumors spread by the enemy's army. . . . There is not a sub-lieutenant who does not see that the army is in a bad position."

Then follow three lost sheets showing (as other documents indicate) that after Baylen, Madrid should not have been evacuated, Saragossa should have been taken, and the communications with Portugal should have been kept open.

On September 18 there was sent Berthier for issue a —

PROCLAMATION TO THE GRAND ARMY.

Soldiers! After having triumphed on the borders of the Danube and on the Vistula, you have traversed Germany by forced marches. I make you to-day traverse France without giving you a moment of repose. Soldiers! I need you. The hideous presence of the leopard soils the continents of Spain and Portugal. Let him flee terrified at your aspect. Let us carry our triumphant eagles to the columns of Hercules. There also we have injuries to avenge. Soldiers! you have surpassed the fame of modern armies. But have you equaled the glory of the armies of Rome, which in the same campaigns triumphed on the Rhine and on the Euphrates, in Illyria and on the Tagus? A long peace and durable prosperity will be the profit of your labors. The true Frenchman cannot, should not, take repose so long as the seas are not open and liberated. Soldiers! all that you have done and what you will do yet for the happiness of the French people, for my glory, will be eternally in my heart.

It was easier for the great master of war at St. Cloud to find fault with Joseph, who, with Jourdan at his side, was commanding the army on the Ebro, than it was for Joseph to remain passive under these never-ceasing monitions; and we little wonder at his submitting to the emperor, on September 14, an abnormal plan, which substantially amounted to throwing up his communications, marching out to meet the enemy, and giving him battle wherever he should find him. To this plan Napoleon responded with a positive refusal.

Note for Joseph, September 22: "It is proposed to march with fifty thousand men on Madrid, assembled and abandoning communications with France. The military art is an art which has principles which it is never permitted to violate. To change one's line of operations is a work of genius. To lose it is an operation so grave that it renders criminal the general who is guilty of it. . . . With an army composed all of men like those of the Guard, and commanded by the most able chief, Alexander or Cæsar, if they were able to commit such foolishness, one could not answer for anything. . . . You must renounce this scheme, which the laws of war do not approve. A chief who would undertake such a military operation would be criminal." Napoleon then repeats in some detail his former instructions: "One can thus only repeat what has been said and re-said. Attack the enemy when he approaches within two marches. . . . But all these combats must be delivered according to the rules of war, that is to say, having one's line of communications assured." And again he wrote, September 24: "In war one needs healthy and precise ideas. That which they propose to you is not feasible. . . . In war you have to make your decision in front of the enemy. One always has the night for one's self to make preparations. The enemy is not to take a position without your having reconnoitred him. . . . According to the laws of war, every general who loses his line of communications merits death. I understand by communications the place where are the hospitals, the relief for the sick, the munitions of war, the victual, where the army can reorganize, repair itself, and regain, in two days of repose, its morale, sometimes lost by an unforeseen accident. One does not understand that his line of communication is lost, when it is worried by guerrillas and bandits and revolted peasants, and in general those that in war one calls partisans."

Speaking of the possibility of Joseph's having been cooped up in

Madrid with the army, he says: "If one is in a besieged place, one has lost his line of communications, but not his line of operations; for the line of operations runs from the glacis to the middle of the place." This idea is sound, but the words are not as exact as Jomini's would have been to express the idea. And to Berthier, August 16, he wrote: "Who is the military man who has made six months of war and does not feel that in such a position one is to guard against the reports which see the enemy everywhere and with a big lens?"

Napoleon was finding the usual difficulty which great captains experience in seeking to instruct and control their lieutenants at a distance. No man who has not the military instinct can properly conduct war. In matters military Joseph was a blunderer, while Jourdan had not waked up to the new methods created by Napoleon since 1796, which, never having served in any of the great captain's campaigns, he had been afforded no opportunity to study near at hand, and had not the rare faculty of comprehending from reports. Neither King nor Mentor could understand Napoleon's strategy, nor even take a first step under his direction; and from Paris the emperor was unable to start them aright, with the assurance that the second step would not be a fatal one. He could not well prescribe details — this he never did; neither was he able to so formulate his plans that Joseph or Jourdan could fathom them. Worse still, Joseph never had much authority over the marshals, although he pleaded for it. "I beg Your Majesty to give orders only to me and I will have them executed," he wrote September 22 — but without avail.

It had become evident that Napoleon must undertake the work himself. "In war men are nothing, it is a man who is all," he had written August 30, 1808; and it was for this purpose that the Grand Army had left Germany, and in October, 1808, was approaching the Spanish frontier. After the brilliant Conference in Erfurt in mid-September, where Alexander came to meet Napoleon, and where the two emperors proved to Europe that the Treaty of Tilsit was — for the moment at least — a reality and not a pretense, Napoleon could more readily devote himself to solving the Spanish problem. Yet no one more clearly saw the difficulties of the whole situation than he. He had made concessions to Russia only with regard to Moldavia, Wallachia and Finland; and while the czar was for the moment satisfied and ignored the seizure of Spain, he would by and by demand more. Peace had again been offered to England, but as always without results. Austria protested her desire to maintain it, and arms were stacked all over Europe, excepting in the Peninsula. Yet peace was not in the air. It had been far-sighted on the part of Alexander to conserve his good relations with Napoleon. He knew that the Spanish imbroglio would result either in success or failure for France, and it was the part of prudence to await results, and reserve action to the future. For the moment he cared little for the proceedings in Spain, for although in war to wait beyond the proper instant is fatal, to know how to wait is everything in politics. Napoleon thought Alexander was simple; he found later that he was the keener, perhaps because the more honest, of the two. The Russian emperor was the better statesman, if the French emperor was the better soldier.

About mid-September Bessières lay on the right, with Merle, Bonnet and Mouton, and Lasalle's cavalry scouted the Briviesca-Gamonal country. Ney was in the centre with Desolles and Merlin at Logroño, Franceschi's horse out in front. On the left were Moncey's four divisions in the Lodosa country, with ample cavalry. In reserve was Lépic; and Pampeluna, Bilbao, Vittoria and the line of communication were well held.

Facing them lay the Spaniards. They had learned a bad lesson from Baylen, and were preparing to surround the

French by turning their two wings at Bilbao and Pampeluna; and to carry out this idea the Junta divided the forces into four army corps in an immense semi-circle, of which Castaños was supposed to be in supreme command, the centre corps under Cuesta, the right corps under Vives, with Reding and Palafox as lieutenants, the left corps under Blake, a reserve corps at Burgos under Belvider.

Early in October Blake was near Valmaseda; La Peña at Logroño, Lodosa, Calahorra; Palafox at Saragossa and on the Aragon. This made thirty-five thousand men in Biscay and sixty thousand on the Ebro and Aragon, with one hundred miles between them, so that they were unable to act together. Shortly the Junta decided that there should be an army of the right to operate in Catalonia under Vives; an army of the centre under Castaños, to operate on the Ebro between Tudela and Logroño; an army of the left in Galicia under Blake to threaten the right of the French army towards Burgos; an army of reserve under Palafox to operate on the Aragon and threaten the left flank of the French. When the English came up, they were to operate between the left and centre. Castaños was not in chief command, but had the main direction, Palafox and Blake to consult him. The Spaniards hoped to reach Pampeluna and Roncesvalles, and Blake to push as far as Tolosa. The plan was that of Palafox.

Pistols once belonging to Napoleon.

XL.

NAPOLEON IN SPAIN. OCTOBER, 1808, TO JANUARY, 1809.

When Napoleon reached Spain, November 5, he found the troops along the Ebro with the right on the coast, and faced by a semi-circle of Spaniards. He had in and coming to Spain a quarter of a million men, to meet one hundred and fifty thousand, plus Moore advancing from Portugal. He elected to live on the country. The Spanish line was weak, especially in the centre. At Espinosa, November 10–11, Victor defeated the Spanish left under Blake and La Romana, while Soult moved forward to Burgos. Ney was pushed on Aranda, and cavalry searched for the English. On the Spanish right Lannes defeated Castaños November 23, but Ney, sent towards Soria, failed to cut off his retreat. Saragossa was invested. Napoleon marched on Madrid, which after a fight at Somo Sierra surrendered, December 4. Soult held the Carrion on the French right, Ney Guadalajara on his left, and Napoleon made ready to move down the Tagus to seek the English army. He had created a perfect strategic situation for an advance on Portugal, with a line of retreat on either end of the Pyrenees. Sir John Moore, with columns from Lisbon and Corunna, reached Salamanca November 20. He felt like retreat when he heard of Napoleon's capture of Madrid, but finally decided to advance on Burgos, as a threat to the French rear, and to coöperate with La Romana. By mid-December he reached Soult's front, who strove to hold him back. On December 19 Napoleon in Madrid heard of Moore's manœuvre and at once headed Ney across the mountains, not expecting Moore to stand; but on learning that Moore was near Valladolid, he crossed the Guadarama in a bad storm, joined Ney, and strove to cut Moore off from Corunna. Moore was ready to attack Soult, December 24, on the Carrion, when on learning that Napoleon was approaching his rear, he smartly escaped to Benavente. Napoleon now heard bad news from Austria, and turning over the pursuit of Moore to Ney and Soult, he left for Paris. Moore was pursued to Corunna, where he turned and fought a battle to embark his army, himself being killed. Ney and Soult occupied the country. On February 20 Saragossa surrendered after an extraordinary defense. Napoleon had conducted a beautiful campaign, but he had overrun, not subdued the land.

The French troops on the Ebro had not stood exclusively on the defensive against the Spanish armies that were striving to encircle them. Ney, late in October, pushed Castaños out of Logroño; Moncey advanced, backed by the Pampeluna garrison, and the Spaniards were forced beyond the Ebro. But Castaños still held Calahorra and Tudela, and Palafox the Aragon, while growing forces occupied Aranda and Burgos. Lefebvre's corps had begun to reach Spain in mid-October, and moved towards Bilbao to reinforce Merle. Blake, who had advanced from Valmaseda, attacked Merle October 24, Lefebvre marched on Durango, and the French troops from Zornosa were withdrawn to that place. Although instructing Lefebvre not to attack, for so long as the French held the passes of Orduna and Murguia in his rear Blake was more compromised at Zornosa than if driven back to Bilbao, Joseph sent him Villatte of Victor's corps, and when the Spaniards attacked Lefebvre's outposts, he replied by an offensive, drove Blake back after a defeat at Zornosa on the 29th, and occupied Bilbao. Blake concentrated at Nava. These movements were contrary to Napoleon's designs, but Joseph, hoping still to surround Blake, sent Victor with Ruffin's division forward to Amurio and Orduna. During these operations a body of nearly ten thousand of Blake's troops had been cut off, but by poor French manœuvring had managed to escape. Once started, Joseph expected that Lefebvre would reach and hold Valmaseda, so that Victor might be brought back to Miranda, and all be ready for the offensive on the emperor's arrival.

Berthier had preceded the emperor to glean full information of the military status. Napoleon reached Bayonne November 3, at 3 A. M., and according to his habit at once began to work out the situation. He had ordered a defensive attitude right and left, with troops ready for the offensive in the centre, but although this had been disregarded, he merely wrote Joseph that the army was too much disseminated, sat down to his work, and in three hours his orders were all dictated to assemble the army on the centre for a movement forward on Burgos. At 2 A. M., November 4, Berthier wrote the king: "The emperor's intention is that Lefebvre should be master to continue to manœuvre on his right, . . . to have act against Santander only Bessières and Lefebvre, and to hold in reserve Victor, to second one or the other, and to be able by a quick movement to the left to send him elsewhere." The reason for substituting Bessières for Victor was to place in reserve the best corps he had; but before so doing, he wished him to capture Burgos, which would prevent the enemy from taking the French corps on the right in flank from that place.

Napoleon then turned towards the administration question and wrote Dejean: "You will see how unworthily I am served. I have . . . only seven thousand capes instead of fifty thousand, and fifteen thousand pairs of shoes instead of two hundred and twenty-nine thousand. I lack everything. . . . My army . . . is naked and has received naught. . . . Your reports are nothing but paper." Some reports are inclosed, and then he adds: "You will see in them that everything is theft and dilapidation. Once more, my army is naked, and yet is about to open a campaign. For all that I shall have spent much money, but it might as well have been thrown into the water." Somewhat later he wrote Clarke: "Send away from Paris only those conscripts who have their clothes, their shoes and their cloaks, otherwise all these miserable conscripts will serve for nothing except to fill the hospitals." The speed with which the emperor had acted seriously delayed deliveries of clothing and equipment at Bayonne.

On November 5 the emperor drove to headquarters at Vittoria, and took over the personal command of his Spanish army, which, created by decree of September 7, was fast assembling. His first act was to demand detailed reports of all the roads in the country between Bayonne and Madrid, and to east and west of them, with a statement in leagues of France of the distances from place to place; and to order new lines of communication made to Pampeluna by way of St. Jean Pied de Port.

The Army of Spain included a part of the Guard, troops from the Elbe and the Rhine, Dutch, German and Polish, and battalions from Italy. It was to consist of six corps under

The Emperor, with Berthier as Chief of Staff.

I.	Victor. (Villatte, Ruffin and Lapisse; Beaumont's 2,000 cavalry)	28,000 men.
II.	Bessières, later Soult. (Mouton, Merle, Bonnet; Lasalle's 2,000 cavalry)	26,000 "
III.	Moncey, later Lannes and Junot. (Musnier, Morlot, Maurice-Mathieu; and 3,000 cavalry)	21,000 "
IV.	Lefebvre. (Sébastiani, Leval, Valence, some Dutch, some Westphalians; 1,500 cavalry)	25,000 "
V.	Gouvion St. Cyr, later Mortier. (Chabran, Souham, Chabot, Pino, Lecchi and 4,000 cavalry) Duhesme's division in Barcelona belonged to this corps	36,000 "
VI.	Ney. (Marchand, Lagrange, Mermet, 2,200 cavalry)	32,000 "
	Reserve. Bessières (Desolles, Guard, six battalions of fusiliers, six of grenadiers and riflemen, the cavalry of the Guard and four divisions of dragoons, 16,000 cavalry)	34,000 "
	The 1st Corps and the Reserve were of the best quality; the 2d had nearly three quarters old troops; the 3d was mostly new; the 4th foreign; the 5th half old, half foreign; and the 6th mostly old.	
	Later, two other corps came to Spain: —	
VII.	Mortier, later St. Cyr. (Gazan and Suchet)	30,000 "
VIII.	Junot. (Delaborde and Loison)	19,000 "

In 1811 a 9th Corps was sent to Spain under Drouet, Comte d'Erlon. This made a grand total of a quarter million men; and though it was to arrive successively, it was a large force to throw upon the puny kingdom of Spain. Napoleon did not believe in doing things by halves.

Among these men were many fine division, corps and cavalry commanders. Few were men of exceptional ability, able to work by themselves; not one in any sense could be called



Part of Northern Spain

a great leader. Lannes was in Spain for the moment, but did not stay. Of all the rest, only Soult and Suchet in any measure succeeded. Worse still, the marshals did not work together: Soult and Ney quarreled in Galicia, Ney and Reynier served badly under Massena. A marked want of comradeship in the upper grades had its ill effect on the rank and file. Some enlisted men once chalked on the walls of their cantonments: "The war of Spain is the death of the soldier, the ruin of the officer, the fortune of the generals." Ill-omened words!

Yet, with short-sighted vision, every one felt that the Spanish war would soon be over. A letter by Berthier to his wife, dated November 14, says: "Everywhere our victorious armies are beating the Spanish rebels in English pay. The nation is good, the people come forward to meet us. We have already destroyed two armies. . . . Everything is flying so fast that we kill our horses to reach the enemy. We are seeking to get near the English, and if we meet them, few will return to England. Here we are near Madrid, and soon this war . . . will be finished."

The corps were now grouped on a semi-circle of seventy miles diameter. Lefebvre was in Bilbao, with Victor on his left at Amurio and Orduna; Bessières held the great crossing of the Ebro at Miranda with Mouton and Bonnet pushed forward on Pancorbo; Ney was at Logroño; and Moncey was at Lodosa and Tafalla. These corps had entered Spain on the west of the Pyrenees, while St. Cyr, having debouched on the Mediterranean end, was posted on the road from Perpignan to Gerona, ready to march to the relief of Duhesme, who was still holding out with his ten thousand men in Barcelona, against Vives with double his forces. The Guard and reserve were coming up at Tolosa and Vittoria. The divisions of the several corps had got much mixed.

Facing the French stood the Spanish armies, confident of victory. Blake with the Army of Galicia, thirty thousand strong, still purposing to take Vittoria in reverse, lay on the left at Valmaseda, whither he had retired after his recent defeat, and here too La Romana had joined him from Santander with part of his forces just arrived from Denmark. In the centre was Belvider at Burgos, with the Army of Estremadura, of ten thousand men. On the right the Army of Andalusia, forty thousand strong, under Castaños, stood on the line Calahorra-Tudela. Farther on the right, Palafox, with seventeen thousand men, was at Saragossa and along the Aragon. The Spaniards were acting on the plan drawn up by Palafox, to take the French in rear of both right and left flanks at once, and reach Bayonne by way of San Sebastian and Roncesvalles; and they had taken two months and a half to bring into contact with the French some hundred thousand men, placing thirty thousand on the French right, sixty thousand on the French left, and only thirteen thousand in their front. There was abundant good-will, but little common sense. In Madrid a considerable force was still mustering. In all nearly one hundred and forty thousand men could be figured, not counting the Anglo-Portuguese army of thirty thousand men under Moore, now advancing towards the theatre of action; but except the last named, the troops, even when called regulars, were by no means the equals of the French. Napoleon wrote St. Cyr: "In general the Spanish troops are very bad. One regiment like the 42d can destroy six of the Spanish." Nor, indeed, with enthusiasm in plenty, was there any real coöperation between the several armies: victory or defeat in one place had a remote effect on armies elsewhere, and each commander worked on his own lines, with no one to prescribe common action. While in a way bad for Spain, this had the effect of reducing the war from a single regular operation which the French could meet, to a series of endless isolated campaigns. As Oman aptly says: "To endeavor to grasp a Spanish corps was like clutching at a ball of quicksilver: the mass dispersed in driblets between the fingers of the manipulator, and the small rolling pellets ultimately united to form a new force."

As a condition precedent to any operations, Napoleon had to choose between his usual habit of living on the country and a system of magazines and supply-trains. The first would enable him to move rapidly, to hunt down small bodies, and to do the business of suppressing the insurrection promptly; but its daily depredations would make bitter enemies of the whole population, now fully roused, and would lead to the usual excesses of the troops. The latter plan would place the cost of the war on France, where it was already none too popular, and would entail slow marches, lumbering convoys and heavy detachments along the line of communications. Moreover, the country was not well organized for a system of magazines, inasmuch as even the town governments fled on the approach of the French; it did not appeal to Napoleon as apt to lead to the prompt conclusion of the campaign; he did not know how poor the land was; and he elected again to make war nourish war, as he had so successfully done in other lands.

"The emperor," says Balagny, "was decided in Spain, as everywhere else, to make his army live on the country, and to apply in all their rigor the laws of war, to obtain in effect a terror on the Spanish nation, and to bring about its submission; resolved to employ pitilessly this system, that he judged the only efficacious one." Unfamiliar with Spain, the error was natural; but owing to the topography and the furibund population, his decision resulted in more than one strategic situation succumbing to starvation.

The war in Spain and Portugal was yet more complicated for the French by the numerous bands of guerrillas. The regular armies could be beaten, were in fact beaten; the guerrillas could be driven off, but neither beaten nor destroyed. Though guerrillas pure and simple, they were given a legal standing by the Juntas, and as the war was upheld by the priesthood, who inculcated the killing of a Frenchman as a meritorious act, murder by the Spaniards and retaliation by the French added to it a peculiar sting.

The guerrillas were not always local inhabitants, but often bands under a set chief, perhaps an officer out of service, or an ambitious university student, or an old soldier too restless to serve in the regular ranks, and yet more frequently a monk. These bands not only did constant mischief to the French troops, but they prevented the country authorities from helping them collect victual, and the French armies were never able to gather more than a fraction of the provisions of any country through which they passed. If the English, with the magazine system and Portugal and Spain as allies, could scarcely feed their armies, how could the French, living on a naked and hostile country, expect to do so?

As the Spaniards had been encouraged by their successes, and as the emperor ill understood the land and the people, it was natural for him to believe that they might, like his former adversaries, decide to concentrate and receive a general battle. "In the situation of things, the presumption of the enemy leads one to think that he will remain in the position he is in. The longer he remains near us, the better it will be. The war could be ended at one single stroke by a cleverly combined manœuvre, and for this it is necessary for me to be there," he had written Joseph from Erfurt, October 13. In fact, prior to Napoleon's arrival, the Spanish left had offered an exceptional chance for a fatal blow, hemmed in as it was at Bilbao by sea and mountains. Had Lefebvre lured Blake farther east and awaited the oncoming corps, his Spaniards could have been cut off by a turning manœuvre, and captured or thrown into the sea. Napoleon, who saw what might have been done, blamed Lefebvre for his hasty action. And yet, how could this marshal comprehend his master's larger strategic problems? Who except the emperor himself did so? Even when executed with brilliant results, who understood them?

The long, semi-circular position of the Spaniards still offered many a weak spot for a successful thrust; at one moment the emperor thought Saragossa could be captured out of hand; but the logical direction seemed to be on the centre towards Burgos, at which point Blake and Castaños could be cut asunder and each one taken in reverse, as well as the direct road to the capital be opened. It was therefore determined to move the 2d Corps on Burgos, while Lefebvre and Victor, Ney and Moncey, should contain the forces in their front. Napoleon by no means gave up hope of being able to get into Blake's rear, although this was but a minor part of his plan.

Victor was hesitating in his work. Between him and Lefebvre, Blake might have been surrounded, but they did not work together; Victor objected to Villatte's detail to Lefebvre; and after reaching Amurio and Orduna, although Lefebvre was still advancing, he retired, leaving Villatte at Valmaseda. Blake moved forward and attacked Villatte, and by good luck alone did this excellent division escape disaster. Napoleon, who had ordered Lefebvre forward, believing Victor to be on his left, was incensed at the latter's withdrawal, and, adding Lapisse to the column, at once sent Victor orders to return and sustain Lefebvre and Villatte.

Berthier wrote him: "His Majesty is very discontented that instead of sustaining Villatte you left him in engagement with the enemy, a fault all the more grave because you knew that Lefebvre had committed that of leaving a division of your corps exposed, while with his other two he moved back on Bilbao. . . . How, then, instead of moving in person to the head of your troops to sustain one of your divisions, did you leave this important operation to a general of brigade who had not your confidence, and who had with him but a third of your forces?" To Lefebvre Berthier wrote: "The emperor is much annoyed at the false movement of retreat on Bilbao. . . . If you had put your headquarters at Valmaseda, and camped with your three divisions so as to act according to circumstances, you would already have made eight to ten thousand prisoners."

The army now in the emperor's hand stood thus: Sébastiani and Villatte at Bilbao and Valmaseda, under Lefebvre; Victor with Ruffin and Lapisse between Valmaseda and Orduna; Bessières with Bonnet, Merle and Mouton, out towards Burgos; Desolles and Ney with Bisson at Logroño; Marchand at Tolosa; Moncey at Tafalla and Lodosa; the Guard at Vittoria; the cavalry at various places along the line. There were over one hundred thousand foot and twenty thousand horse, and to sustain his attack on the centre Napoleon still intended to call in Victor as soon as the French right was clear. Meanwhile he never ceased to issue instructions for the protection of the communications. He gave orders to fortify Miranda, Pancorbo, Burgos when taken, and other places, and to intrench strong positions along the roads of communications. He could never get enough information, and on November 15 Berthier issued a general circular on the subject, requiring the chiefs of staff of the corps and of detached bodies, and all commandants of strong places and others in authority, to render full and detailed reports every day, and especially with regard to the breadstuffs in their respective localities.

Bessières had been thrown forward on Burgos, and on November 8 found Belvider in force in the wood of Gamonal, whereupon instead of vigorously attacking, he assumed the defensive, thus arresting the advance when he might have given the Spaniards a lesson. "It seems to the emperor," Berthier wrote, "that you missed a fine occasion of having a success and getting us news."

By this time Napoleon had got a fair grasp of the situation. Matters on the right could be corrected. The few movements



The Ebro Campaign.

on the left would serve only to keep the enemy's attention away from the centre, which quite fitted into his plan. He overrated the enemy in front of Burgos, but his own army had nearly all arrived in Spain. Soult was placed in command of Bessières' corps, and the latter given charge of the cavalry of the army, a position he much preferred, although the action may have been taken on account of Bessières' slowness.

On the 9th the emperor heard that Lefebvre had beaten Blake at Guenes, and sent word to both Victor and him to push the enemy hard. While he wished to forge ahead, his forces were too much dispersed on the right and left to permit him to sustain Soult strongly. Not until the 12th could he count on troops enough in the centre, say forty-five thousand men; and before he ordered any movement, he received word from Soult that Burgos had been taken. He at once sent for Joseph to come up and make a triumphal entry into the town. "As much as I think it desirable to make little ceremony for me, so much I think it necessary to make it for you," he said. But while upholding Joseph's dignity as king, he would none of him as a soldier.

Soult had won a victory cheaply. He had in front of him no very great force, and this was at once dispersed by a bayonet charge of Mouton in close column without firing a shot. Belvider had had no chance against the French; he had boldly marched out to Gamonal and had driven back Bessières' cavalry; but when it came to meeting a substantial body of foot, his rout was quick and dire. The French lost two hundred men, the Spaniards nearly thirty-five hundred, it is said. Mouton's tactics had a strong moral effect, and was probably so intended by Soult, and did well against poor troops; but "we shall see later," says Balagny, "against troops solid and masters of their fire like the English troops, this contemptuous method of treating the enemy, and this brilliant manner of deciding in a few moments the issue of a combat, brought on for our troops the most disastrous results, and caused them considerable losses without giving them the victory."

Lefebvre had again moved forward on Valmaseda, which he took November 8, and pushed on after the enemy to Nava. Victor, on November 7, had reached Orduna, and likewise moved on Nava. The enemy retired towards Villarcayo, and Victor, having taken over Villatte's corps without authority, moved away from Lefebvre, as if wanting to do the fighting himself. At Espinosa, on the 10th, he met Blake, who, joined by La Romana, had taken up a strong position on the road from Burgos to the sea, hoping to protect the Spanish stores amassed at Reynosa and Santander. The position was excellent for defense, but bad for a defeat. Victor had been able to bring on no guns across the hills, although Lefebvre had a number, and Blake had a few from Santander. Each side had somewhat over twenty thousand men. Victor attacked at once, but oncoming darkness stopped the fighting. During the night Blake drew up his forces for another trial. Renewing his attack at daylight, November 11, Victor broke down the Spanish defense, and Blake's army fled on Reynosa and Santander, with the loss of five thousand men. What was kept together reached Reynosa the 12th. Victor had no cavalry, and could neither pursue nor reconnoitre; and as he had exhausted his ammunition, he had to beg a supply from Lefebvre. Had the two marshals worked together, a decisive gain might have been obtained. On hearing of this victory early November 14, Napoleon gave orders for pursuit, and dispatched Soult from Burgos direct towards Reynosa, hoping yet to be able to cut off the Spanish column, an operation which, had Blake been slower, would have resulted in a marked success. Indeed, at one moment the emperor thought of joining this column in person. But Blake was too much alive to the danger: on the approach of Soult's cavalry van, on November 13, he marched hurriedly towards Asturias, in which province La Romana assembled the remnant — barely fifteen thousand men — of the Spanish armies, and took over the command November 24. The Army of Galicia was for some time out of service. After the victory at Espinosa, Victor remained there until the 14th, and then advanced to Reynosa, where Soult relieved him. Three days later Soult moved up to Santander, from which port the emperor wished to exclude the English. The Spaniards had left. Later Soult took Lefebvre's place at Carrion, with La Romana in his front, leaving at Santander Bonnet, faced by Ballesteros.

La Romana was the ablest of the partisan soldiers in Spain, and destined, it was thought, to the chief command of the Spanish armies. But the Junta was afraid of him; finally so much so, that he sought out Wellington, and worked with him three years.

The emperor had reached Burgos November 11. By the evening of the 15th he was ready to push his cavalry forward, cross the Douro into the mountains, and at the same time move against the left of Castaños; and for this purpose he intended to draw in Victor and Lefebvre, as soon as Soult should get the Santander country in hand. The Spanish centre and left had been practically disabled for the season: and the emperor dispatched Ney's foot towards Aranda to seize this important crossing; while Milhaud rode towards Palencia and Valladolid, to gather news of any approaching force, and keep up connection with Bessières moving on Madrid. Certain rumors of the English in the Leon and Salamanca regions were disquieting, and these forces might not be allowed to move towards Burgos; but as nothing immediately threatening was found, the emperor saw that he might safely turn on Castaños. Victor was ordered in to Burgos, where were headquarters and the Guard; Lefebvre, on the Carrion, was to keep up outpost service for Santander and Burgos, to tie Soult to the main army, and to reconnoitre the Leon-Benavente-Valladolid region; and the French right wing and centre being secure, Napoleon strengthened his left to advance upon Castaños, whom Palafox had now joined. By November 18 he knew that the Spanish troops had fallen back south of Aranda, while Castaños was still at Calahorra; he imagined Castaños might strive to march on Madrid via Soria and Almazan, which was the shortest way, and on such a march might be cut off; and at noon of this day Ney, reinforced by Desolles, was ordered on Almazan or Soria, according to the information gleaned on the way, so as to get in the rear of the Spanish army. Should Castaños retire towards Madrid by way of Calatayud, Soria was to be occupied before marching beyond. "Thus, on the 22d," ran the orders, "the left will be at Calahorra, the centre, that you form, will be at Almazan-Soria, the right at Aranda. The emperor relies on your talents and your zeal. Thus the first aim of your movement is to cut off the retreat of Castaños' army; the second to subdue the town of Soria." Such is the order in the records of the Prince of the Moskwa; but in the minutes of the War Archives, Soria comes first, and Castaños second. Corresponding orders had already been sent to Lannes, Moncey, Ney and Bessières, when word ran in from the last that the enemy had occupied Somo Sierra, and Napoleon for a moment retarded Ney's movement on Soria, so that he might sweep clear the ground up to the mountains.

On November 20 Soult was in Santander, Lefebvre on the upper Carrion, Victor on the way to Burgos, and the status on the Ebro was unchanged. The emperor determined to move his entire force on Aranda, so as to follow up Ney's movement if desirable. He had at Burgos six thousand of the Guard, and

Victor was within a march or two with twenty thousand men. Next day Victor and the Guard were moving on Aranda, Lefebvre on the town of Carrion, and Lannes was ordered to attack Castaños the 22d. Headquarters went to Aranda the 22d, Mathieu Dumas remaining in charge at Burgos.

The emperor never forgot that the English were the most dangerous of his opponents, but he had small knowledge of their whereabouts or intentions. As they were on his right, he was cautious about moving too far away to the left, lest he should miss the chance of meeting them with proper force; but so soon as he had learned that there was no trace of the English troops in the Valladolid country, that Castaños was still on the Ebro, and Aranda was firmly held, and was thus relieved from fear for his centre and right, he felt more free to act. By November 24 Victor and the Guard occupied Aranda.

While Napoleon had a large force in Spain, not more than one hundred and twenty thousand men were immediately available, and he could not have brought together enough men to justify him in joining Ney with any additional force. According to his orders, Lannes and Ney were to be respectively at Calahorra and Soria, November 22, and if Lannes should beat Castaños, and the latter retire by way of Soria, he would be netted to the last man. That Castaños might withdraw to Tudela to fight, and then flee via Calatayud, had not been divined by Napoleon. The emperor might have put off Lannes' attack and relied upon Castaños remaining somewhat longer at Calahorra, but he was afraid that Castaños would move away if he gave him too much time. In his original orders to Ney, he reckoned on battle at Calahorra.

Lannes had already taken over Moncey's corps and Lagrange's division, and advanced down the Ebro on Castaños' front. It was unfortunate for the Spanish cause that Castaños and Palafox, both able and useful men, could not agree upon one general plan; each desired to carry out his own ideas, irrespective of the other's, or of the general scheme. Late in October they had consulted as to plans, and Palafox would listen to nothing except the defense of the Aragon, so as to turn the French left via Sanguessa in rear of Pampeluna, while Blake was doing the same opposite Bilbao: but Blake's defeat at Zornosa spoiled this plan, which indeed grew less possible as the French reinforcements arrived. Castaños then planned to fall upon the French flank as it should march on Madrid, and had also conceived a plan for attacking Moncey's left; but he fell sick, and owing to constant misunderstandings, nothing on the Spanish side got done. By November 20 Castaños learned that Lannes was at Logroño, Moncey at Lodosa, and that Ney, who had reached Almazan, was moving up the Douro Valley; and as the rumors kept on increasing, on the night of November 21–22 he withdrew to Tudela, where he went into position stretching out to Tarazona. Palafox still clung to his plan, and though Castaños expected an attack by the French at any moment, he could do nothing to meet it without his colleagues' consent. At the same time Lannes was preparing to cross the Ebro at Lodosa, and Ney was marching on Soria. The Spanish generals were not abreast of their danger, from military inexperience rather than from lack of news.

By evening of November 22 Ney's report that he had arrived at Almazan, and would march the 22d on Soria, reached the emperor. Lefebvre would be in Carrion November 24, and bring Soult's left into connection with the army. Milhaud was in his front, keeping his eye out for the English.

On the morning of November 23, Lannes, who had been advancing via Calahorra, and was disappointed at not having found the Spaniards there the day before, reached the Spanish position at Tudela, where stood the victors of Baylen and the defenders of Saragossa and Valencia — the hope of Spain. They were confident, but had assembled without a definite plan. The line was over ten miles long; and in it, owing to the disagreements of the Spanish generals, the troops had been hastily marshaled, Palafox on the right with the Aragonese, in the centre the Castilians and Valencians, and Castaños on the left near Cassante. Lest the enemy should again retire, Lannes was afraid to wait for Ney, who was yet far off, and neither had heard from the other. Discovering how sparsely held the line was, and having much less than the Spanish force, — for his divisions came up by different roads and singly, — Lannes wisely massed his blow. It was not safe to accept battle on the defensive, and perhaps Lannes, like Victor, was ambitious to keep all the glory to himself. The cavalry having almost surprised Tudela between 9 and 10 A. M., he threw Maurice Mathieu sustained by Grandjean in on the Spanish right, backed by the fire of sixty guns, hoping to destroy this before help could arrive from the left, which was at a distance and separated from Tudela by a long gap, which O'Neil was to have filled, but did not. Morlot, sustained by Musnier, operated on the Spanish centre. The fighting was hearty, and the French did not at once succeed, but by dint of steady pushing, at 3 P. M. the Spanish right wing was broken. The several sections of the enemy had not worked together. Palafox left his army and rode to Saragossa, and Lefebvre Desnouettes

Spanish Grenadiers.

penetrated the gap and, taking the Aragonese in reverse, shattered the right wing and sent these troops whirling down the river. Tudela was captured. The Spanish left wing took no hand in this fighting, but at first had some success against Musnier; had it attacked with vigor, Lannes might have been compromised; but it was broken by Lagrange, who came up by 5 P. M.; and partaking of the demoralization of the right and centre, it fled towards the south. Luckily night fell and saved the relics of the Spanish army. Castaños was able to retire across the head of Ney's column, rally his demoralized troops at Calatayud, November 25, and retreat to Siguenza on the way to Madrid. In this battle of Tudela, Lannes, out of thirty thousand men, lost only one thousand; the Spanish army, out of fifty thousand, of which two thirds engaged, lost, chiefly among the Aragonese, three thousand killed and wounded, thirty guns and four thousand prisoners.

French Voltigeur.

The honor was all Lannes'; Ney had lent no hand in winning the victory.

Napoleon wrote Lannes November 27: "Your aide . . . has announced the brilliant affair of Tudela. I make you my compliment. Ney has not on this occasion carried out my purpose. Arrived at Soria the 22d at noon, he ought, according to orders he had received, to have been early the 23d at Agreda; but having allowed himself to be imposed on by the inhabitants, and placing faith in a lot of foolishness which they told him, . . . he was afraid to compromise himself and remained the 23d and 24th at Soria. I have given him the order to move at once, and to fear nothing."

The victory was not the decisive one Napoleon desired, and it seems that no person was particularly responsible. The trouble with the whole operation on the French left was that Napoleon did not give enough thought to the accidents which might arrive in this peculiarly difficult country. To quote Balagny: "Napoleon had himself announced a great truth in saying that nothing succeeds in war except in consequence of a well-combined plan, but he might have added, without ceasing to be correct, that the inverse proposition is not always executed, and that the best combined plan may not succeed in consequence of a thousand unforeseen circumstances, which often come to interfere with its execution. Such is, we believe, the lesson one may draw from the manœuvre attempted by the emperor against the Spanish armies in the valley of the Ebro."

Napoleon's criticism of Ney was scarcely fair. The order of November 18 to move on Almazan and Soria was received the 19th; Ney started next day, and during the 20th and 21st marched to Almazan, more than sixty miles, and by evening of the 22d to Soria, having made nearly eighty miles in three days. Not only were his troops tired out, but not understanding that his orders required him to move on Agreda, he remained at Soria the 23d and 24th. He had been told that "on the 22d the left will be at Calahorra, the centre that you form will be at Almazan-Soria, the right at Aranda." To him this indicated that he was to stay at Soria. He had exhausted his men in an effort speedily to carry out his orders, and having, as he supposed, done so, he gave them needed rest. Had he started with the idea that he was to reach Agreda, he would have made haste more slowly. Still, the last phrase of his orders being that his first aim should be to cut off Castaños, he construed these too narrowly. We shall see a grievous result at Bautzen from the same misunderstanding of orders lacking explicitness. Had he understood that he was to keep on to Agreda, he could not have reached it before the 23d, over the thirty miles of bad mountain roads; by that time Castaños was moving on Tarazona, and in no case could he have headed him off. From Burgos, at 4 P. M., November 21, Berthier wrote Ney: "Lannes and Moncey on the 22d will attack the enemy at Calahorra. You are therefore to continue your movement on Agreda, to reach the flanks of the enemy and join Lannes if that is necessary." But this order did not reach Ney in season to permit him to head off the Spaniards. How could it have been expected to do so? In the night of November 25–26 Napoleon received two letters from Ney, the first to the effect that he had heard the sound of guns towards Tudela, and would have liked to march thither, but that he felt that his orders were to hold Soria; the second to the effect that he had received the orders of November 21 to move on Agreda, which he would do next day, as he did. Starting at

French Hussar.

dawn the 25th, he reached Tarazona the 26th in the forenoon, having covered all told one hundred and twenty miles in six and a half days.

Napoleon, who did not know the result of the battle of Tudela, was left in disagreeable uncertainty, but the fault should not be wholly charged up to Ney. At one moment the emperor was on the point of moving after Ney with all his available forces, especially when he heard that Lefebvre had reached Carrion.

Berthier wrote Ney, 10 A. M., November 27: "The emperor has not yet received news from you since you left Soria. It seems that after the battle of Tudela, the Army of Aragon retired into Saragossa, and that Castaños' army retired on Tarazona, and if you had been the 23d at Agreda, it would have been captured. I have already notified you that your mission was to pursue Castaños. His Majesty charges me to reiterate this order. Do not leave him, and pursue him with the bayonet in his back." This was unfair; Ney could not have reached Agreda on the 23d, and the routed army passed Tarazona in the night of the 23d–24th.

Ney wrote Berthier December 8: "You reproach me for having remained two days too many at Soria, from November 22 to 24, but I received the order to move on Agreda only the 24th at 3 P. M., and carried it out the 25th. It was just this direction which made it impossible for me to undertake anything against Castaños."

Thus, in the emperor's grand strategic scheme, the Spanish left and right wings had both been defeated. But neither one had been destroyed: each was in a position to rally on reinforcements for a fresh effort. The operation of breaking through the Spanish centre by an advance along the Burgos road bears the Napoleonic brand in conception, while it somewhat lacks Napoleonic vigor in execution. At no time in the emperor's active life was there any diminution of intellectual power: his last campaign in 1815 was as well planned a breach of the enemy's centre as was his first in 1796. Yet the crispness of the execution, which in 1796 had depended on the almost superhuman activity of the young commander, was lacking in 1815, as indeed it was to a lesser extent here; and from now on it will be found, with notable exceptions, to be on the decrease. At Friedland, as has already been pointed out, Napoleon violated his strategic maxims. Here he did not. The same problem was before him as in 1796. The Spanish wings were separated by a huge gap, with little danger of their being able to reunite, or indeed, owing to the French superiority of organization and numbers, to surround his piercing column; and into this gap, with the speed which always guaranteed success, he threw himself, and took his enemy's right and left in reverse. Still, there is a difference between the Italian manœuvre and this one in Spain. It is not enough to cut your enemy in two; you must pursue each half and annihilate it. In 1796, there was not an instant's pause in the onward push of the restless, nervous commander, who was present at the right, at the centre, at the left, at whichever point the situation most required. In 1808, Napoleon remained at headquarters. To be sure the distances were greater; but a hundred miles would once have seemed a trifle to him. He might have visited the right and made Lefebvre and Victor work together; when he was no longer needed on the right or at the centre, he might well have gone to the left with Lannes or Ney; but no longer equal to seeing everything with his own eyes, and doing everything with his own hands, he felt that his marshals, whom he had trained as leaders and elevated to honor and riches, ought to suffice for eyes and hands, and push as hard as he himself. But none of them had the master's *coup d'œil* or best vigor; and Blake, who should have been annihilated, was able to get away, even if in small force; while Castaños and Palafox retired, with their army broken to be sure, but still in serviceable condition. Had Napoleon gone to Ney's headquarters, or had he been with Lannes, Ney would not have spent two days at Soria, but both he and Lannes would have coöperated. There would have been no room for misconstruing orders. While the emperor's criticism of Ney is unfair, yet it holds a grain of truth. Except under the eye of the chief, not one of the French marshals was perfectly efficient. And here, brilliant as was the conception of the plan, the execution by Victor and Lefebvre, by Lannes and Ney, was scarcely worthy of it, and the result incomplete. The Spanish armies had not been destroyed; they were still in the field and capable of indefinite future mischief.

Good reasons can be alleged for Napoleon's remaining at headquarters; but we shall find him in a few weeks heading his army against the English instead of dwelling in Madrid, and it was his presence that pushed the manœuvre home. Similarly, it is not unfair to assume that he might have visited his right or left, at a moment of grave import.

The road from Burgos to Madrid was now practically open, the main force had advanced towards the Douro at Aranda; and here, on the 26th, Napoleon learned the details of the Tudela operation. He was hardly satisfied with the result: how could he expect to be so, when his own individuality was not in the work? But while no one recognized better than he the want of definite accomplishment, — although in any other country it would have been decisive, — yet the field was now clear for his further operations. He saw that his presence was no longer needed on the Ebro, and made up his mind to move straight on Madrid.

In the midst of the rabid population of the peninsula the emperor knew little of what was occurring, except within his own lines and along his own front. News could not be transmitted. French couriers were assassinated; Spanish couriers were beaten and turned back. Had he been fully informed, there was a choice of operations to undertake: to march on Madrid and from the Spanish capital impress his success on Europe, or to turn on the most dangerous force now in the field, the English army under Moore, of which he had heard indefinite rumors.

After the Convention of Cintra at the end of August and the departure of Wellesley, Moore, succeeding to the command of the troops, had marched from Lisbon toward Spain, and his van had by mid-November reached Salamanca; while another body of ten thousand men under Baird, recently landed at Corunna, had by November 26 reached Astorga. In ignorance of these facts, Napoleon could do nothing but march on Madrid. He expected an advance of the Anglo-Portuguese from Lisbon up the Tagus on the Spanish capital; he had no idea that Moore would attempt an operation towards his communications; and to take possession of the centre of government was not only more in accordance with his method of utilizing the moral forces, but in view of the limited numbers of the English, it was the wiser course; for had the French moved on him in superior force, Moore would have fallen back, and delayed their entry into the capital for a mere thrust in the air. Moreover, the Guadarama passes were held by ten thousand Spanish troops to protect the assembling of the army in Madrid, and everything seemed to point to the capital as the proper objective.

Arranging for Moncey to undertake the siege of Saragossa, for Lefebvre to march from Carrion via Palencia and Valladolid on Segovia to protect his right flank, and for Ney to move via Guadalajara to protect his left flank, Napoleon marched on Madrid.

Owing to Lannes' disablement by a fall from his horse, Moncey, after the late battle, had sent Maurice Mathieu towards Borja, where he struck the rear of the fleeing Spaniards, and another column on Saragossa. Both Ney and

Moncey were aiming at Saragossa, but Lannes ordered the latter on Calatayud, where with Mathieu he arrived the 28th. Lannes also advised Ney to turn on Castaños, but Ney deemed Moncey strong enough, and thought he himself might seize Saragossa out of hand. Moncey also shortly returned, leaving pursuit to Mathieu, and although the latter won a handsome success at Bubierca, November 29, Castaños was able to keep his troops together.

Only on December 2 did the emperor get Ney's and Moncey's reports of November 27, whereupon he sent Moncey orders to open the siege of Saragossa, while Ney was coming on to Madrid, to help swell the troops needed there. Here is again an instance of how the emperor's method began to lose in efficiency by his not being personally at the point of the most important operations. Ney had marched to Alagon, November 28; and Moncey was moving towards Calatayud in pursuit of Castaños. Thus Ney was near Saragossa and Moncey much nearer Guadalajara; but the emperor, arguing upon not what they had done but what he expected they would do, gave them instructions which added seriously to the distance each had to march. To compare the emperor's present manner with his omnipresence in former campaigns exhibits a decrease of the activity we have so much admired; yet we must not forget that the theatre was more extended, the forces much greater, and the difficulties of movement far more pronounced than in 1796 or 1800. But the comparison of 1808 with 1805 or 1806 stands good.

Ney was just sitting down before Saragossa, December 1, when he received the emperor's orders of November 28 to pursue Castaños so he should not reach Madrid; but being so far out of the way, he could accomplish little. Mathieu had, as ordered by Moncey, gone not more than a day beyond Calatayud. Upon Ney's leaving, Moncey with Morlot, Grandjean, and Musnier, twenty-two thousand men, sat down before Saragossa, and Ney, taking Lagrange, Marchand and Desolles, marched to Calatayud. As, after Tudela, Palafox had withdrawn into Saragossa with his thirty thousand Aragonese, Moncey merely observed the town, not having men enough to besiege it, until Mortier joined him.

Ney reached Guadalajara December 7. From here he sent his cavalry to Madrid and cantoned his troops. The central Junta ordered Castaños to Aranjuez ostensibly to undertake the general management, and La Peña and Cartaojal, left in command, essayed sundry raids on the capital.

From Aranda Napoleon broke up, November 28, to march on Madrid, which was ill-prepared to resist him; the same day Savary had attacked the enemy in the foothills of the mountains, but they had checked him, and Victor was sent forward with Ruffin and Villatte to take Sepulveda. On the 30th at early dawn, with Victor, — Ruffin in the lead, — the cavalry and the Guard, the emperor pushed up towards the pass at Somo-Sierra, which he found held by San Juan and a force of ten thousand men, with sixteen guns trained down the mountain road.

The road was full of curves, so that guns could not be pointed to advantage, and as the pass could be defended only by holding the road and the slopes on either hand, the Spanish troops had occupied them both. It was foggy until noon. French skirmishers were sent along the adjoining slopes to outflank the batteries, and soon met the Spanish on the hills. The road was broken in places, and the repairs consumed time; the progress was slow. The emperor rode up to the defile as far as his own advance batteries, and under fire examined the ground. His escort was as usual a squadron of each of the cavalry regiments of the Guard, and as the tirailleurs on right and left were not advancing fast enough to suit him, he ordered the Polish squadron forward to charge up the road, and take the Spanish battery. Montbrun was that day in command of the vanguard cavalry and started with the squadron ; but before pushing it out on its desperate task, he hid it behind a roll in the ground, and sent back word to the emperor that the charge was simply impossible. The emperor replied that he knew no such word, and sent Major Ségur with the renewed order to the Polish squadron. The chief of squadron, Kozietulski, received the order, Ségur accompanied him, Montbrun remained behind, the squadron galloped up the road by fours, and though having grape and canister in front, and musketry fire from the heights on either side, bravely carried the three Spanish batteries stationed at the curves and firing down the road. The loss of this squadron was heavy ; all the officers fell, Kozietulski's horse being killed at the beginning. Ségur had three wounds, fifty-seven men had been killed or wounded, many had remained behind because their horses had been shot. Thus the first squadron was checked ; but the squadrons in rear that charged soon after, leaping over dead men and horses and shouting their national battle-cry, pushed in on the battery, the defenders of which were already shaken by the flanking foot, and, imposing on the Spanish defenders by sheer audacity, rode over the guns, sabred the gunners and captured every piece. The loss of the second squadron was small. The Spaniards decamped and the emperor's aim was accomplished. As a noteworthy instance of gallantry, the charge of the first squadron earned a name for the Polish horse throughout every corps of the Grand Army. The distance covered was about a mile and a half, and consumed seven or eight minutes. It was of course assisted by the advance made by the French skirmishers on right and left, but this does not detract from its exceptional gallantry. To the moral effect produced by the charge was mostly due its success. "The Poles merited fully," says Balagny, "the flattering mark of esteem which the emperor gave them on the morrow of the battle, when, having assembled the regiment and sounded the trumpets, he rode to the front of the squadron, and uncovering his head before them with the ample gesture so familiar in him, he said to them in a loud voice: 'You are worthy of my Old Guard, I see in you the bravest cavalry.'" The routed corps dispersed in every direction, and Napoleon bivouacked that night at Buitrago. Somo-Sierra was ordered to be fortified, as the Spaniards ought long before to have done. The cavalry pursued the enemy along the Madrid road; and hearing that Spanish troops were arriving from Escorial and Guadalajara, bodies of horse were sent out to check them. The emperor expected to find no further resistance unless Castaños or the English had got to Madrid; but curiously, while he was moving on Madrid, Hope was leading his English column towards Avila in the reverse direction.

Polish Lancer.

The road to Madrid was now clear, and Ruffin and Villatte, with the Guard, marched thither, Bessières' cavalry reaching the heights of Chamartin, overlooking the city, in a dense fog during the forenoon of December 2. The emperor had at hand barely thirty thousand men; but they were excellent troops and flushed with victory, while in Madrid were forty thousand mixed troops under Morla. The Poles again showed their gallantry by driving in the Spanish troops they met, and reaching one of the city gates; and a reconnoissance showed that the city had been barricaded and armed. At noon the emperor arrived, and was received by the enthusiastic acclamations of the cavalry, "who desired to fête," says Balagny, "the double anniversary of his crowning and of Austerlitz. This capital was the third in three years in front of which they arrived victorious." The Junta had left, Madrid was evidently in the hands of the populace, and Napoleon, desiring to rescue it, demanded a surrender, which was refused. An attack was made at the northwest on three gates, fortified with artillery, and a lodgment effected. As the infantry came up late in the evening, Villatte was placed in front of the Retiro park, Ruffin in front of the northeast gates, and thirty guns were drawn up before the Retiro, and twenty on the northwest to sustain Lapisse, behind whom also stood the Guard. A fresh demand for surrender was made after midnight. No answer being given, at 9 A. M. fire was opened by a smart attack on the Retiro, and feints at other places. A breach was opened in the Retiro, and Villatte forced his way in as far as the Prado.

At eleven o'clock the fire ceased and a fresh summons was made. Time was asked to quiet the people, and on December 4 the city surrendered. The emperor purposely made no triumphal entry, though Ney later paraded through the streets to impress the people, and several reviews were held outside the city limits.

It was lucky that Madrid surrendered. Had it resisted while Castaños came on from Guadalajara, it might have occasioned a serious moment; for Ney was far in the rear, and if, in addition to that, Moore had marched towards Madrid, the emperor might have needed all his ability to manage the situation. Since November 26 two groups of English had been reported by the cavalry as at Astorga and Salamanca, but there were no details, and these Napoleon had sent out to get; and when he heard, December 8, that a body (it was Hope) was moving away, the emperor wrote Ney: "The English are making haste to the rear, are running with all their legs. We have been here for a moment in a serious situation." Still being in the centre between the English and Spaniards, the emperor would no doubt have been able to handle one after the other, for his troops, though few, were of the best quality.



Madrid.

Jourdan wrote: "The submission of Madrid did not produce upon the nation the effect that Napoleon expected from it. It caused at first a great amazement, but soon it was attributed to treason, and a cry of indignation arose on all sides against Morla, accused of having delivered up the capital."

In the capitulation of Madrid were a number of political clauses, all of which Napoleon did not keep, alleging that the Spaniards had broken theirs, as, *e. g.*, that before the French entered Madrid, all the Spanish soldiers, who were to become prisoners of war, had left the city, and moved to Talavera.

As the immediate theatre of conflict advanced south, so the emperor changed the location of his corps. On November 28 he had sent Soult orders to move down into Old Castile, so as to cover Burgos, and to Lefebvre orders to move from Carrion to the south of the Douro. By December 4 Soult had his van at Sahagun and headquarters at Saldaña, and was sent additional cavalry for his reconnoissances; Merle replaced Mouton, and was replaced by Mermet; Lefebvre through Palencia and Valladolid reached Segovia, which the Spanish troops had just left, December 4. Had his march occurred four or five days earlier, he would by accident have run across Hope's column, which debouched, November 29, from Puerto de Guadarama on the way to Salamanca, and whose cavalry saw the French without being seen; Hope might have been headed off and Moore been left without cavalry or artillery; or in fact, the emperor might have headed off Hope, had he known the facts. From Segovia Lefebvre reached the vicinity of Madrid the 8th, and regained command of all the troops properly belonging to his corps. The just arriving 5th Corps — Mortier's — was ordered to Burgos, and Valence from that town on Madrid. The 8th Corps, — Junot's, — completing at San Sebastian and Bayonne, was to move to Vittoria, and Milhaud and Lasalle were drawn in to Madrid.

On December 3 and 4 cavalry parties were sent out towards Escorial, Avila, Aranjuez and Guadalajara. The Retiro was victualed and fortified; all the war material in Madrid was collected there; and depots were established at Buitrago, Somo-Sierra, Aranda, Burgos, Vittoria and other places on the line of communications.

The Spanish Army of the Centre had reached Guadalajara December 4; and on the 6th, when Bessières announced troops moving towards Aranjuez and Madrid, Napoleon sent out cavalry parties along every road. He found fault with Ney, Victor and Bessières for allowing any Spanish troops to approach the capital. Ney was slow in following the enemy, and Victor and Bessières had done the usual work, but the lay of the land enabled the Spaniards, who knew the country, to hide their operations. Seeing no chance, however, of annoying the French in Madrid, the officers commanding the relics of Castaños' Spaniards moved toward Cuença, while the bodies at Aranjuez retired to Toledo. The southeast of the capital being thus freed, the emperor sent Milhaud and Lasalle forward to Talavera, December 7. He had already determined to move on Portugal.

Once in possession of the capital, Napoleon, as was his habit, adopted the elsewhere successful means to quiet and occupy the surrounding provinces. In the vicinity of Madrid this was accomplished, although every measure taken cannot be characterized as either fair or wise. There was issued, December 7, a

PROCLAMATION.

. . . Spaniards, your destiny is in your own hands. Reject the poison that the English have spread among you. Let your king be certain of your love and your confidence, and you will be more powerful, more happy than you have ever been. . . . But if all my efforts are useless, and if you do not answer my confidence, there will remain nothing for me

> to do but to treat you as conquered provinces, and to place my brother upon another throne. I shall then put the crown of Spain on my own head, and I shall know how to make it respected by bad men, for God has given me force and will necessary to surmount all obstacles.

The threat accomplished small good.

A number of foreign soldiers in the service of Spain were made into a Royal Guard, and a National Guard was created.

On December 4 a decree was issued abolishing all feudal rights, such as private fisheries, taxes on nets, and levies on bakeries, mills, inns, etc. "It shall be permitted to every one, in conforming to the law, to give free scope to his industry." The tax-barriers between provinces were also abolished, and taxes were to be collected only at the frontiers. A week later the Council of Castile was suppressed, a new court created, and a number of prominent Spanish nobles were arrested and some expatriated; the lord's right to administer justice was annulled; the holding by one man of more than one office was forbidden; and a decree was issued abolishing the outworn Inquisition, and sequestrating its goods; two thirds of the convents were suppressed, fresh admissions to them were forbidden, the number of religious was reduced to one third, and they were permitted to leave their convents at will. There were one hundred and eighty-five thousand ecclesiastics in Spain, whose income was over fifty-five million dollars, while in France, at the opening of the Revolution, there were one hundred and thirty thousand ecclesiastics, with an income of forty million dollars. The Inquisition in Spain at this time was only a shadow of the old body, and the churchmen were of a low order. The emperor treated the religious without ceremony. Bigarre tells us that he was in the room when some monks were introduced to the emperor. The latter received them very coldly, and said with an air of much ill humor: "Messieurs the monks, if you pretend to mix yourselves up in our military affairs, I promise you that I will have your ears cut off," — a phrase that lacked dignity and effect.

The Spanish people was not ready for all these changes. Napoleon mistook it. By taking a decided stand against the clergy, the emperor thought to gain the people; but the hold of the Church being too ancient and strong, the net result was to make him enemies. From the political standpoint he was predestined to fail. The Spaniards would accept nothing from any foreign conqueror. "If they had benefits to receive or ills to cure, they would owe obligations to no one for them. This people was like the wife of Sganarelle, who wanted to be beaten," says de Pradt.

While Napoleon was looking down the Tagus for the approach of his most important foe, let us see what the English were doing.

After Wellington and Dalrymple had been called home, the English army was left under Burrard, who projected an operation into Spain by way of Almeida; but in October Sir John Moore was placed in command, under orders to move thither to the aid of the allies with twenty thousand men from Lisbon and fifteen thousand just landed under Baird at Corunna. This meant to advance concentrically into Spain from two points three hundred miles apart; and withal Moore was not given the necessary moneys, while his forces were ill-equipped for long inland expeditions, and were half-heartedly aided in Spain.

Planning an advance through Almeida, while Baird was ordered to Astorga, Moore started from Lisbon in October. But, informed that the road from Alcantara to Ciudad Rodrigo was not fit for artillery, he committed the curious error of sending his batteries and cavalry with four regiments of infantry under Hope by way of Badajoz and Talavera, along the Madrid road, to file to the left across the Guadarama mountains. His invading army was thus divided into three main parts at a time when he did not know whether the French might take the offensive or not. In his own central column Beresford with six battalions moved from Coimbra to Almeida through Celorico; Fraser with nine headed on Almeida by way of Abrantes, Castello Branco and Guarda; Paget left Elvas through Alcantara and Coria for Ciudad. Moore reached Almeida November 8, Hope being at Truxillo and Baird at Corunna; and advancing on Salamanca in four columns, he crossed the frontier November 11, having easily marched one battery with his own column; his mistake in sending Hope by a detour was due not only to misinformation, but to his maps of the country, which marked the roads in an uncertain fashion. He gradually reached Salamanca from November 13 to 23, the march having consumed much time for a body of less than twenty thousand men. By the last date Baird was at Astorga with his head of column, the Spanish authorities having obliged him to march in detachments of two thousand men for easier rationing.

Moore suffered from the common difficulty — lack of or false information. In Salamanca he learned that the French had entered Burgos, where he expected to find the Spaniards, and that the long concave line in which a place had been allotted him no longer existed. On November 15 he heard that the French had entered Valladolid, but after dispatching orders to Baird not to advance beyond Astorga, he learned that it was only a French cavalry party. Another false rumor reached Moore, November 16, that Castaños had been superseded by La Romana; and two days later he learned that Blake had been defeated and dispersed. Still he determined to hold on at Salamanca.

Moore and Baird had no cavalry, it was all marching with Hope. On his march past Madrid, Hope visited the capital, November 19, and met the English envoy and the Spanish authorities; when, quickly making up his mind that Madrid would not hold out, he pushed his troops by way of Escorial, and November 27 and 28, crossed the Guadarama. With abundant horse to protect his advance, Hope ran no danger. On November 29 he saw traces of French cavalry parties in the Arevalo-Segovia country, and on December 5 he joined his chief. Moore was getting unsettled by the conditions; after considering a junction with Castaños in the centre of Spain, as the Junta desired, he began to deem it safer to retire to the coast to concentrate all his forces; and on learning November 28 of Castaños' defeat at Tudela, his presence in Spain appeared to him both unnecessary and dangerous. He wrote Baird that he should probably order him back on Corunna, purposing, when Hope came on, to move back to or beyond Ciudad Rodrigo; but when, December 1, he learned that Hope was across the mountains, he decided to hold on. It would seem that his decision to retire was needless, for concentrated he would have over thirty thousand men of English troops, which meant a decided factor on the theatre of war, at the head of which he need not fear to enter the arena. His lieutenants objected to the retreat, and on learning that he proposed to do so, the Spanish Junta sent him delegates assuring him that in Madrid he would find three Spanish armies and nearly fifty thousand men, not counting the new levies, and with his aid these could easily crush the French. If he would not come to Madrid, it was suggested that he should join La Romana in Leon.

Moore was still of a mind to retreat, but on receiving further assurances that there would be stout defense at Madrid, as there was to be at Saragossa, he remained in place. Baird, who had actually moved back to Villafranca, was ordered again to Astorga and thence to Benavente, and Moore was preparing to move on Zamora and Toro, and coöperate with La Romana, when on December 10 he heard a rumor that Madrid had fallen. It was odd that in a friendly population this news should have been a week in reaching him; but either the Spaniards were too proud to confess the fall of their capital, or they felt that the English had been too indecisive in helping them.

At one step Moore went over from vacillation to audacity. Now that a large part of the French forces would probably advance to Madrid, he made up his mind to move on Burgos, threaten Napoleon's line of communications, and thus withdraw his attention from Lisbon, on which he believed it to be fixed. This manœuvre, though a handsome strategic conception, was clearly a risk, and nearly compromised him, as we shall see; but his first objective was Valladolid, whither Baird could come forward, and from there he deemed both lines of retreat safe, one back the way he had come, and one on Corunna. La Romana had been anxious to join Baird at Astorga, and march with him on Zamora and Salamanca to join Moore, but the condition of his army forbade this, and he remained at Leon, facing Soult at Carrion.

On December 8 the emperor heard of Ney's arrival at Guadalajara with his cavalry, the infantry to arrive next day, and from Moncey that, unable to do much at Saragossa because Ney had carried off Desolles' division, he had retired to Alagon; whereupon, while criticising the intermixture of troops, the emperor ordered Mortier, whose 5th Corps had just entered Spain, to move to Saragossa, and to remain in observation on the roads to Barcelona and Madrid, while Moncey should conduct the siege. A heavy detachment occupied Calatayud, but practically the road to Madrid was closed by a frenzied uprising at Siguenza.

As a necessary first step, from the military standpoint, the emperor threw out reconnoissances from Madrid towards every quarter, Bessières pushing the enemy towards Cuença and heading them off from Toledo, Victor near Ocaña and beyond to fend off insurgents from the southern provinces. The cavalry regiments having been shifted to make the divisions more homogeneous, La Houssaye rode to Escorial to ascertain whether the English were at Avila; and Lasalle and Milhaud moved on Talavera, December 11, from which direction Napoleon so positively expected the Anglo-Portuguese that he followed up this cavalry column by Sébastiani and Valence. Latour Maubourg reconnoitred out from Aranjuez towards Sierra Morena to Madridejos. Lasalle was at Arzobispo December 13, and two days later the cavalry was pushed out to Almaraz and Avila, the enemy retiring. The bulk of the cavalry was thus upon the Tagus.

Spanish Officer.

All the dispositions for pushing forward the cavalry and sustaining it with foot were prompt and able. Wherever Napoleon was present, matters moved. In Madrid the emperor kept the Guard, Lapisse and Marchand, and Mathieu of Ney's corps. He was making every proper preparation to fight the English, but where were they? He could only guess that they were at Lisbon, or that, if away, a threat would send them back thither; and the capture of some of Hope's stragglers, December 12, gave color to the probability of an English advance from Portugal. In ordering troops towards Talavera the emperor said: "It is in this direction the army will advance."

Convinced that Soult had nothing in his front, Napoleon ordered him to push forward and subdue the Leon country. The fact that on the same day Napoleon was arranging an operation on Lisbon, while Moore was preparing to march towards Burgos, shows how ill-informed he was: "You cannot have any English in front of you. . . . All leads us to think that they are in full march to the rear. Our vanguard is to-day at Talavera. . . . This movement will force the English to run towards Lisbon," he wrote Soult.

Napoleon had completed his strategic foothold in Spain. From Madrid, where stood his main force, he could advance via Talavera and down the Tagus on Lisbon, secure in two lines of communications through Madrid, one covered by Soult and running across the Guadarama via Aranda and Burgos on Bayonne, and one covered by Ney, south of this range, via Guadalajara and Calatayud through Catalonia on Perpignan. This was one of the most perfect strategical positions this great captain ever created, and not only deserves just admiration, but exhibits at its best his vast grasp of the military problems. It was only of the details he was growing impatient.

The emperor had never campaigned in a country where information was so sparse and unreliable as it was in the Peninsula; and he was far from thinking that the army under Moore was marching towards a point where it would be a menace to his communications with Bayonne, and where his lieutenants were not in force enough to hold head to it. That such a threat should be made, he had considered a negligible factor in the campaign.

By December 15 nearly all the troops ordered to Spain had come on, and were posted as follows: in Madrid, Ney with

Marchand and Mathieu, and Colbert's cavalry, Lapisse, Leval and the Guard; at Toledo, Victor with Villatte and Ruffin, and Beaumont's cavalry, who soon scouted out as far as Ciudad Real; at Madridejos, Aranjuez and Tarançon, Latour Maubourg; at Guadalajara, Desolles on the road to Madrid; at Talavera, Lefebvre with Valence, Sébastiani and Milhaud's and Maupetit's cavalry; out towards Almaraz, Lasalle. On the Carrion was Soult with Merle and Mermet, and Debelle's and Franceschi's cavalry at Sahagun and Valladolid; at Santander, Bonnet. At Alagon was Moncey with Morlot, Grandjean, Musnier and Walthier's cavalry, and at Tudela, marching on Saragossa, Mortier's corps. Between San Sebastian and Miranda, a new corps, made up of the relics of Junot's Portugal army, which had just reëntered Spain, was marching on Burgos to join the main force. Twenty thousand conscripts were in Bayonne. In Catalonia, St. Cyr took Rosas December 5, beat Reding and Vives December 15 and 16, and entered Barcelona December 17.

Napoleon unreasonably found fault with Moncey, who was doing all he could, telling him that "nothing is more ridiculous than to leave the best troops in Pampeluna, where simple troops suffice," and he was shortly replaced by Junot, to whom Mortier was to act as observation army. Delaborde took temporary command of the 8th Corps. But with thirty thousand regular soldiers in so well protected a city as Saragossa, Junot could do no better than Moncey.

On December 14 Lasalle had been thrown out beyond Naval Moral, and finding the Spaniards at Almaraz, and rumors that La Romana was marching down to the Tagus, he had retired to Arzobispo; but La Houssaye, reporting Avila quiet, showed the rumors to be absurd. Napoleon was convinced that the north of Spain needed nothing beyond an advance into Leon by Soult: and that his own ample force in and about Madrid was ready for the offensive down the Tagus, to "plant his eagles on the towers of Lisbon." That he did not at once march was due to the necessity of reëquipment, caused by six weeks of steady marching by the troops. Uniforms and shoes, worn out by the long marches, which were not supplied from Paris, were ordered to be made in Madrid and Bordeaux. Madrid was victualed in military fashion, and the Retiro made a great depot: "Without depots there is no army," said the emperor.

Moreover, Madrid had formally asked for Joseph's return as king: Napoleon had promised this, provided the citizens would swear fealty before the altars in all the churches; and having fixed this ceremony for December 23, may have desired to take part in it. Meanwhile, he never rested in completing preparations for an early advance with the army of over forty thousand men and one hundred and fifty guns he had near Madrid, plus thirteen thousand vanguard at and beyond Talavera.

To protect his right flank in his advance on Madrid, Napoleon had thrown Soult out towards Leon, and on December 4, when Madrid surrendered, Soult had reached Saldana on the Carrion, where his scouts learned that La Romana held the Esla and that Baird had arrived at Astorga. He had some old troops like Merle's, but Mermet and Bonnet had many conscripts; and having barely fifteen thousand men all told with which to cover Santander and Burgos, and to occupy Leon, he felt reduced to the defensive. He protected himself by Debelle's cavalry at Sahagun and Franceschi's at Valladolid, and during the early part of the month saw no immediate danger in his front.

Before Moore made up his mind to undertake what was almost in the nature of a raid towards Burgos, he had been led by the Spaniards to believe that Napoleon had less than one hundred thousand men in Spain, that though the Retiro was taken, Madrid was still holding out, that Saragossa was consuming many French, and that his movement would markedly assist the Spanish cause. Unaware that Soult was on the Carrion, and underrating Napoleon's care for his communications, he thought that only cavalry protected Burgos. Starting from Salamanca, December 11, he marched up the Douro in two columns, Beresford with cavalry on the north of the river to join Baird, and Hope, Bentinck, Hill, Fane and Alten on the south. If Moore had been placed in an uncertain position prior to his advance on Burgos, good luck certainly attended him during his manœuvre. Owing to the uncertain communications, it happened that Napoleon's order of December 10, sent by way of Segovia, was intercepted and delivered to Moore on the night of the 13th–14th, while a duplicate forwarded by way of Burgos did not reach Soult until the 18th. This order stated the situation of the French army and the intentions of the emperor, and told Soult to march cheerfully on Leon, as he had nothing in his front. Thus, with a knowledge that Napoleon was aiming at Badajoz and Lisbon, his van being already in Talavera, that two corps were moving on Saragossa and one on Burgos, and that Madrid was in the hands of the French, Moore could manœuvre against Soult, who had no knowledge whatever of the approach of the enemy, and who, if he had carried out his proposal to move on Mansilla against the Spaniards, would have run across the whole English army. But from the dispatch captured, Moore recognized that in moving on Burgos he might meet an army corps in front, while Soult was on his left flank, and that his only safety was at once to join Baird; and on December 14 he filed to the left through Zamora and Toro towards Mayorga, sending word to Baird to join him there, and threw his cavalry to the east of his marching column to protect its advance; and on December 20 he found himself at Mayorga with a force of twenty-six thousand men, of which four thousand cavalry and artillery, all of excellent material. Curiously, although Moore harbored the idea that Napoleon would try to cut him off, he sent out no troops towards the Guadarama to give him notice of such an oncoming. This was a marked lapse.

The first notice that Soult got of anything being in his front was on December 15, when Franceschi was surprised by English horse at Rueda, near Valladolid. As Franceschi said, the English were the better off, for "neither finesse nor the habit of the trade" (of war), "nor audacity is useful, because the enemy, always notified by the peasants when we marched on him, or conducted by them when he marched on us, has the greatest advantage."

Moore's chance was now better than Soult's. Franceschi had reported Baird at Astorga and La Romana at Leon, with rumors that the latter was moving down to the Douro, and Soult saw that with such a reinforcement Moore might march on Palencia and Burgos in his rear. He estimated the English and Spaniards at fifty thousand men. Still, he did not lose his head, but eagerly scanned his front, scarcely believing that Moore would move up the Douro beyond Valladolid, and quite ignorant of his concentration in his front. It was fortunate for Napoleon that he had so good a man as Mathieu Dumas to represent him in Burgos, for without orders Dumas had intelligence enough to dovetail the rumors, guess the danger, and divert some arriving troops from the Madrid road out towards Soult. Lorge's horse rode towards Palencia and Valladolid, and Delaborde's division, with Junot's consent, followed on in reserve. Soult was obliged to give some support to Bonnet, who had been attacked by Ballesteros near Santander; but by December 20 he had concentrated Mermet at Carrion and Merle at Saldana, covered by his horse, and still unconscious of the danger in his front, was preparing to move forward to attack La Romana.

While Moore, with a knowledge of Napoleon's status, was cleverly manœuvring against Soult, Napoleon was still at the Chamartin headquarters, with his troops ready to march down the Tagus. He had believed that Moore would retreat, but although no news came from Talavera up to noon of December 19, La Houssaye sent him word from Avila that three French prisoners, escaped from Salamanca, reported that Moore had sixteen thousand men there. The emperor was beginning to feel uneasy, his efforts to get news being fruitless. He understood the situation in Saragossa; he understood that in the Guadalajara, Tarançon, Aranjuez, Toledo regions; he knew that Soult was on the Carrion or advancing from there; but movements out towards Salamanca were a blank. He had ordered a great review on the Chamartin plains for December 19, and it was during this review that a dispatch reached him from Burgos. Guessing its importance, "he rushed upon the messenger," says Balagny, "snatched the envelope he was holding out and took note of its contents."

The dispatch stated that Franceschi had been attacked December 13 and 14 at Rueda by British cavalry, which appeared to be Moore's vanguard marching on Valladolid; and that rumors stated that Baird and La Romana were in movement. Soult did not think that the English would go beyond Valladolid, and reported that Dumas and Junot had coöperated with him to protect that point.

At once stopping the review, Napoleon galloped to Chamartin and sat down before his maps. He saw Moore, who as he thought must retreat on account of his own thrust down the Tagus, advancing on Burgos. Was it a real operation, or only a reconnoissance in force to get news? As the former might be true, he at once determined to meet the manœuvre by sending a force across the Guadarama mountains to cut Moore's retreat on Salamanca; and at 4 P. M. he issued orders for Ney to start next morning with Colbert's cavalry, supported by the foot of Marchand and Mathieu. He wrote Dumas: "It is hard to believe, I confess, that the English are ready to compromise their army for ephemeral things. . . . In any case, Ney will leave with his corps to manœuvre to throw himself on the rear of the English army. . . . In case their movement is verified, Ney will be strongly supported. If it appears that it is only a march of cavalry on the part of the English, our movement will not be continued."

During the afternoon of the 19th, Belliard sent in accidental information got from a traveler coming from Valladolid, that the English cavalry had been near there on the 13th. With regard to the Rueda affair, Franceschi could no longer communicate by way of Segovia, because the English cavalry had cut him off from there; but he reported to Soult the 14th; Soult forwarded this to Dumas the 16th; Dumas to Berthier the 17th, and the emperor got it the 19th. The circuit was of two hundred and eighty miles, and this took four days, about seventy miles a day.

Although the emperor also learned on the 19th that movements were making in the Cuença country, he believed that a small force could hold head to this, and prepared to move to the Douro with a substantial body. To another commander this situation might cause alarm; to Napoleon it but offered a fine strategic opening: to conserve his own he would march in superior force on the enemy's communications, for at worst he had a second line of retreat through Aragon and Catalonia. The corollary of having guessed the enemy's design was immediately to get afoot: half his force was to be left in and about Madrid, while with the other half he would march across the Douro, fall on Moore's rear, cut him off from Portugal and the Galician ports, and thus have him completely at his mercy. Everything was got ready to this end, although only Ney was as yet afoot. Tilly at Segovia was to bake bread, Houssaye at Avila was to reconnoitre towards Salamanca and Arevalo, Desolles was to call in the troops with which he had punished the Siguenza revolt, and leaving two battalions in Guadalajara, to move on Madrid. Victor was to march to Tarançon, if an advance came from Cuença. All outlying troops were to move into Madrid. With his old Mantua inspiration, Napoleon was ready to give up every point except Madrid, and march in full force upon the enemy. He wrote Soult: "If, then, the English have come with foot and all their forces on Valladolid, manœuvre and act with the knowledge that we will manœuvre to cut their communications with Salamanca. The emperor will himself march, if he learns that there is a possibility of giving a good lesson to the English." The crude plan is clear and distinct, but as Napoleon did not know just where the English might be, he headed Ney in their general direction so as to discover their whereabouts and intentions, and determine on ulterior operations. Lasalle, in front of Talavera, was to send reconnoissances towards Placencia and Salamanca, Lefebvre to send cavalry on the Salamanca road, and to be ready himself to march to Avila or Salamanca. No further news immediately came. Cuença and Almaraz were reported quiet. Ruffin was drawn in to Madrid to replace Lapisse, and Desolles, Lapisse and the Guard would be ready to follow Ney, leaving Ruffin and Leval in Madrid.

On the morning of December 21, the emperor was still inclined to think that Moore must retire. He had sent his mounted Guard towards Guadarama so that Ney might have plenty of cavalry, and was holding Lapisse and the foot Guard ready to march. Ney was to move to Arevalo, glean news, and if infantry proved to be in Valladolid, Lapisse and Desolles would promptly follow; but if the English were still at Salamanca, it would be useless to send them. About 2 P. M. a report came from Tilly of English foot in Valladolid, and Ney and Soult both sent word that rumors were to the same effect. These three items, added to the other indications, sufficed to form the emperor's judgment. "The movement seems to be rather pronounced," he wrote Ney, and at 3 P. M., though he could only guess that the English had moved forward from Salamanca, he ordered afoot the forces he was holding ready. He had little idea that Moore had reached Mayorga the day before, had joined Baird, and on this same 21st was preparing to march on Sahagun against Soult.

While the columns were thus starting to cross the Guadarama as a reply to Moore's advance on Burgos, the emperor began utilizing his other forces. On December 22 La Houssaye was ordered from Avila towards Valladolid to report to Ney. The emperor proposed to use Lefebvre to cut the road to Ciudad Rodrigo in Moore's rear, and in order to safeguard the troops on the Tagus, ordered him to seize the bridge at Almaraz on the 24th and drive the enemy to Truxillo the 26th and 27th, and then be ready to move north. He was to send Maupetit's horse across the Gredos mountains to Avila, to join the column and keep open the roads. Victor, with Villatte and Latour Maubourg, was left at Toledo, to scour the country to right and left; Leval and Ruffin were in Madrid, which Belliard commanded, and Paris the Retiro.

In calling Joseph to Madrid, Napoleon still considered himself sole master in Spain so long as war existed. The king could not take this in good part, and tendered his resignation of the crown to his brother, who would not accept it. This, added to the fact that Napoleon wanted to get money out of Spain instead of putting money into it, widened the gap.

Finally he promised Joseph, with the title of Lieutenant-General of the Emperor, the command of the corps of Victor and Lefebvre, and the two brothers parted reconciled. He was leaning on a broken reed in supposing that Joseph could control the marshals or command the troops, but "it was because the necessities of his politics put Napoleon the emperor in contradiction with Napoleon the army leader," says Balagny; and as he had determined to replace Joseph on the throne in his own absence, he was compelled to do this. Later he found out that Joseph as general brought about disaster, but at this moment he looked for no trouble. He left full instructions as to how the king should hold Madrid, as he easily could do against any probable attack, and along the road he himself was marching he echeloned gendarmes, and had Joseph sustain them with posts from his new Royal Guard, so as to keep it open. Just before leaving headquarters at Chamartin, in the morning of December 22, he heard from Avila that Moore had left Salamanca the 15th.

On December 22, in a Note to Joseph, he showed his clear grasp of the entire problem: "The manœuvre of the English is extraordinary. It is proved that they have evacuated Salamanca. It is probable that they have made their transport vessels come to Ferrol with the idea that there was no security for them to retire to Lisbon, in view of the fact that from Talavera we can advance along the left bank of the Tagus, and shut this river to them; . . . that with the cavalry they have they think they cannot embark except in a good port and under protection of a strong place; everything then leads one to believe that they are evacuating Portugal, and that they are carrying their lines of operation to Ferrol, which offers these advantages. But in making these movements of retreat, they may hope to make the corps of Soult suffer a check, and they have not decided to do this until they have assured a good retreat and taken their direction on the right of the Douro. 1st, they may have made this reasoning: if the French engage themselves in Lisbon, we will evacuate Oporto, and we shall be yet within our lines of operation at Ferrol. 2d, they may have the hope of receiving new reinforcements; but whatever may be the project of the English, it will give rise to events which will have a great influence on the end of things. The only real aim of the king is to guard Madrid, all the rest is of little importance."

In this Note, Napoleon further discusses the various things which can happen, in a fashion too long to quote, but exhibiting a breadth of treatment of the conditions solely his own.

The weather had become cold — 15° Fahrenheit — and a furious tempest fell upon the mountains. Ney had great difficulty in crossing, and lost a number of men in the ravines, while those who suffered from frost bites fell behind. As the emperor followed on after the army, December 22, he found that a hurricane had arrested the column which was moving up the mountain. The cavalry in the van had in fact turned back, but ashamed of its action, started afresh, each man leading his horse. The animals slipped, the artillery could scarcely drag the guns, many had to be left behind. It was nearly six miles from Guadarama, at the foot of the rise, to the top. Reaching Guadarama and irritated at being opposed by even the weather, with all his ancient vigor Napoleon threw himself into the breach, set the pioneers at work to clear the road, detailed men to tramp down the snow, and doubled teams on the guns. Determined not to lose a day, he demanded of his men exceptional efforts. As he passed through the ranks, there were many murmurs and an occasional rough word, but the emperor paid small heed to this bad humor, for he knew that "if the men growled, they would still follow." In order to set a good example, he dismounted, and though at considerable effort, for he was no longer thin and active, by occasionally taking the arm of Savary, or Lannes, or Duroc, he made his way on foot to the top of the pass, and spent the night in a peasant's hut. The descent was shorter and easier, and the tempest grew less violent. It had, however, arrested the column more than a day, and though the emperor had got across the Guadarama, with his van at Arevalo, his army of thirty thousand foot and eight thousand horse would take at least three days to close up and get ready for battle. Many men had died of exposure, but the army soon recovered its good-will, as the little French soldier so quickly does, and was ready to tax its legs again.

At San Rafael, December 23, Napoleon learned that the English had passed Medina del Campo December 20, on the way to Valladolid; and he headed Ney towards Tordesillas, hoping, at Benavente and Astorga, to be able to cut the two roads leading back to Corunna on which they must depend. The Guard was pushed on towards Arevalo, and Lapisse marched twenty-five miles in support, although he had already covered nearly forty miles since the afternoon of the 21st. Fresh communications were opened with Burgos from Arevalo by way of Segovia. As Napoleon always paid heed to having posts in all important towns, and relays along the roads, this was more easily accomplished. Headquarters went to Villacastin, and hither came the Guard infantry, which had marched fifty miles over the mountain in two days, and through snow and storm.

Ney reported that he was marching on Medina del Campo, and had scouted out towards Salamanca, Toro and Valladolid. All reports indicated that the enemy was on the north side of the Douro, that they had given up their retreat on Lisbon, and that to cut them from Salamanca would now be no gain. The only chance of success lay in reaching the Esla in time to cut them off there, and if with sufficient forces the emperor could reach Tordesillas before the English, whom he supposed were near Valladolid, had caught the alarm, he would be nearer the Esla bridges, and with Soult ready to fall upon their rear, he could turn them with good chances of corralling their last man. On the 24th Ney was to send a strong vanguard on Tordesillas to seize the bridge, gain news and allow his corps, strung out over thirty miles, to close up on Medina del Campo.

Ney reported from Arevalo, December 22, that "a peasant just arrived here and who left Valladolid yesterday evening, assures me that he saw there much English infantry and cavalry." Napoleon drew the inference from all this that the English were not far from Valladolid; but as a matter of fact they had been gathering at Sahagun, and were ready to fall upon Soult at Carrion, while Napoleon's army stretched in a long column of march from the Tagus to the Douro, with detachments thrown out to the west; and troops were coming on from Burgos.

What, meanwhile, had Soult and Moore been doing?

On December 16, at Toro, Moore received a deputation from the central Junta, accompanied by a letter from the English minister, begging him to unite with La Romana. These letters were already out of date, and in answer to Moore's expressed attitude when he was thinking of retreat to the coast. He also heard from La Romana that the latter had twenty thousand men, and wished to coöperate. These were poor troops and ill-supplied; still, though he could have accomplished something in moving against Soult on the English left, the time consumed in discussion made coöperation uncertain. La Romana, ill-informed of the general situation, was several times on the point of retiring to Asturias, on the assumption that Moore would not carry out his project on Burgos.

We left Soult concentrating for a thrust towards the upper Esla against La Romana, while Moore was moving towards Sahagun. Paget's and Stewart's cavalry had been fending off the fewer French squadrons to the east of the marching foot column, and at Sahagun Paget struck Debelle's brigade early December 21, nearly surrounded it, and drove it back with considerable loss on the Carrion. There were a good many cavalry combats in these few days, and the English officers naturally claim that they defeated superior numbers of the French; but this is scarcely established by comparing the records of both sides. This defeat of Debelle's, who retired to Carrion, proved to Soult that Moore had obliqued north to join Baird; and he at once arrested his offensive and prepared to fight for the line of the Carrion, believing Dumas and Junot would push forward troops to Palencia to sustain him; and this they did. Unaware what useful work Dumas was doing, Berthier recalled him to headquarters, and Junot being personally ordered to Saragossa, the command of his corps fell to Delaborde, who continued to act with Soult. The latter knew little of what Napoleon was doing, but believed he would come up towards Benavente; and on the 24th he received the dispatch of the 19th, so to "manœuvre and act as if knowing that we would manœuvre to cut their communications on Salamanca." On December 24 and 25 Soult stood awaiting what might come.

French Cuirassier Trumpeter.

Moore had formed his infantry into four divisions, under

Baird, Hope, Fraser, and Paget in reserve; two light brigades under Crawfurd and Alten, and two brigades of cavalry under Lord Paget, commanded by Slade and Stewart. Arriving at Sahagun, December 21, he learned Soult's whereabouts, and La Romana having assured him that he would also advance, although eventually he got ready only seven thousand good troops, Moore determined on attack.

Had his troops been less exhausted by their marches, Moore might have attacked December 22, but he decided on a rest day, during which he could concentrate at Sahagun and make ready; and on the 23d he put off the attack to the 24th. He purposed to move from Sahagun to Carrion during the night, cross the river at Carrion at daylight, and move up to Saldana, La Romana at the same time moving around Soult's right. Although he had heard that considerable forces had arrived at Palencia, everything was preparing during the 23d for a battle on the 24th, when at 6 P. M. he learned from La Romana that on December 18, five days before, the French army was moving upon him from Madrid, and he concluded that Napoleon was aiming at his communications at Benavente. He had foreseen this somewhat, but did not expect it so soon, believing he had several days' leeway. His only safety was to get back of the Esla. At 8 P. M. orders were issued for retreat, much to the distress of his subordinates, who did not comprehend the situation, and La Romana was already at Mansilla waiting to operate on his left. Moore used much of the 24th to prepare his retreat, although an army of twenty-five thousand men with its train ought to be able to about-face in a few hours. He marched in two columns, the left column, Hope and Fraser, via Mayorga on Benavente, the right, Baird, on Valencia, Paget's division to remain behind to back the cavalry and cover the retreat. Squadrons were thrown out towards Carrion and Saldana to keep the enemy busy. During December 24 and 25 Moore withdrew; the cavalry followed the 26th. From Sahagun he might have taken a shorter route, more to the north and farther away from attack by Napoleon's van, but he moved by way of Benavente because most of his material was there.

La Romana's information that the French were moving on Moore's communications was inexact, for Napoleon did not give his orders until the evening of December 19, and Ney did not get to Guadarama until December 21. It was a mere rumor, but it had traveled fast this once. Had he not received this inexact information when he did, Moore might have moved on Soult, and even if he had beaten him, he would have got so far to the east that Napoleon would have surely reached his communications. This was a second piece of rare luck. Had the information been delayed a day longer, Moore, victor or vanquished, would have been cut off and captured.

Ney arrived at Tordesillas December 24, and sent news to Soult, who received it in the night of the 25th–26th, and saw that he had divined aright. To sustain this movement, Soult did the proper thing; and having once prepared to move forward from the Carrion towards the Esla, he notified Berthier that he would do this, hoping to be supported by Junot's division. "If Ney moves on Benavente and from there to Astorga, while I attack the enemy in front, not an Englishman will escape, and La Romana will have to lay down his arms, because I do not think his troops can retire through the mountains." All this was excellently thought out, but the circumstances changed, because while Soult was expecting to attack, Moore had caught the alarm and moved back to the Esla, masked during December 24 and 25 by five cavalry regiments, against which Debelle and Franceschi were not strong enough to work. Even on December 26, Soult did not know of Moore's retreat. He had shown during an anxious ten days much coolness and skill.

Napoleon had personally hurried on to Tordesillas, reaching the place Christmas day, and found that Ney had put his infantry over the Douro the day before, and was sending cavalry parties out on Medina del Rio Seco and Valladolid. He could learn nothing positive of Moore's whereabouts, but he had not lost faith in being able to cut him off, as he believed him to be somewhere to the east of the Benavente country, moving towards Soult. Had it still been a question of heading off Moore from Portugal, Toro would have been a better point than Tordesillas, as earlier reaching the road thither. Indeed, Ney had been about to take that route, but as his orders specified Tordesillas, he had stuck to the letter of them. The emperor had other ideas; and for fear that Soult should be overwhelmed before he could reach him, on the 27th he headed a trifle to the right towards Rio Seco; but while protecting Soult, he was losing his quarry. The "Race to Benavente" had begun.

On December 27, at 3 A. M., the emperor wrote Joseph: —

> "Marshal Soult is at Carrion. The English are opposite to him. I am, with what came from Madrid, on the right of the English. The English appear to be about thirty-six thousand in number. To-day I shall be at Medina del Rio Seco, and probably to-day or to-morrow great events will take place. If the English have not already beaten in retreat, they are lost, and if they retire, they will be pursued to their embarkment after a fashion that the half certainly will not embark. . . . Have put in the Journals and spread abroad everywhere that thirty-six thousand English are surrounded."

Unaware of Moore's escape, Napoleon, on learning that the enemy had been in Soult's front at Sahagun, pressed forward his tired troops despite cold and bad roads, hoping to get fully in the English rear. On the 27th he reached Medina with the cavalry, while Soult, now assembled, headed for Mansilla. At this moment Moore was closing up at Benavente, the cross-roads of the routes of Lisbon to Leon, Madrid to Galicia; and his column was just starting for Astorga. His cavalry, in parties along the Esla, protected the retreat, while he personally remained at Benavente during the 28th to close up the column, and to destroy such stores as he could not carry off. On this day Napoleon with the van reached Valderas. Early next day Moore vacated Benavente and followed towards Astorga, while his well-handled cavalry stopped the French horse from forcing the Esla, and then followed on to Baneza. He had escaped Napoleon by a bare two days. It was now a race for Corunna. Soult threw back La Romana with the Spanish auxiliaries at the Mansilla crossing of the Esla on December 30, and next day was at Leon, still hoping to turn Moore's left; while Napoleon reached Baneza, and on January 1, 1809, Astorga. Moore kept on towards Corunna; La Romana followed on awhile, and then filed off towards Orense.

If it was intended as such, Moore had made a notable strategic advance on the French communications, and on being skillfully met, had effected a prompt and able retreat. On the other hand, the French had made a good bid to cut off the Anglo-Portuguese. Over snow and ice they had marched in twelve days from Madrid to Astorga, little less than two hundred miles as the crow flies, or two hundred and thirty miles along the road they had taken, with a mountain range to cross. This was almost twenty miles a day. But owing to Moore's alertness, they had lost their chance of forcing battle on a compromised enemy.

The above is not the view of the French general staff — usually most even-handed — in reviewing all the documents. "The operations of Sir John Moore," says Balagny, "during the period of December 11 to 23, were undertaken without method and without art, in conditions particularly adventurous, and without assuring his liberty of manœuvre and the security of his troops. Therefore he came close to paying for his lack of foresight dearly, and owed his safety only to circumstances independent of his will." It is, perhaps, questionable whether by his operation Moore could do the Spanish cause any good, and he was risking his own army. He seems to have acted from gallantry, unwilling to leave Spain without a fight, rather than to have conducted a campaign on any well-established principle which might result in any permanent gain. It cannot be said that Napoleon moved up to the Douro merely to protect his communications: he did so with the hope of cutting off Moore and possibly the Spaniards. Yet, as Moore mistakenly believed that Napoleon had left no suitable forces to protect Burgos, and that all told he had but eighty thousand men in Spain, he may have been

English Officer and Riflemen.

warranted in the assumption that a thrust on the French communications would be a protection to Lisbon. He scarcely understood the emperor and his methods; and his operation towards Burgos stands out in contrast to his uncertainty with regard to earlier manœuvres. Would he not have been stronger as a threat to Napoleon, if he had concentrated and remained at Benavente with his army intact? And yet the fact remains that his manœuvre transferred to Leon and Galicia a large body of French that might have accomplished more by moving down the Tagus on Lisbon.

Turning over to Soult, with Ney in support, the task of following up Moore, Napoleon started the Guard towards Valladolid, and himself reached the city January 6. He here received news of the Austrian situation which demanded his speedy return to Paris. As matters stood in Germany, Spain and Portugal were but a side-show. That he ever doubted his own ability to subdue the Peninsula is improbable: his mind was not given to such doubts. Neither had he any misgivings as to its eventual conquest by his lieutenants, and with Moore eliminated, a prompt operation in force on Lisbon must, it would seem, have succeeded.

On January 15, 1809, he wrote Joseph from Valladolid, "The circumstances of Europe oblige me to go and pass twenty days in Paris. If nothing opposes it, I shall be back towards the end of February. The major-general will remain ten or twelve days more, to be well assured that you have a knowledge of all affairs. . . . If you think it wise, you can keep my absence secret for a fortnight, saying that I have gone to Saragossa." "The Court at Vienna is behaving very ill, but might repent. Have no disquiet, I have enough forces, even without touching my army of Spain, to go to Vienna in a month."

The English fleet was at Vigo, and, had contrary winds prevailed, Moore might have been in bad case; but the lay of the land enabled him to retard pursuit. From Astorga to

Lugo is a species of defile some eighty miles long, where a feeble rearguard could hold the one practicable road, with only here and there a chance to turn its position by climbing the rugged mountains on either hand. Soult was unable to do much to disturb Moore's retreat, and Ney, in Soult's rear, was quite neutralized. Yet Moore, though able to retire at his leisure, made unusual efforts to get to Corunna, refusing to accept battle at Astorga, but coming close to so doing at Lugo. Having no supplies provided for his retreat, and the country being poor, his troops suffered severe hardships, while many men were left behind and much of the train abandoned. The French column suffered no less.

Why Moore was unwilling to defend Corunna, which had marked value for the English, is not easy to understand. It was not a strong place, but neither had the French any but field guns; the sea was open to the British to victual the town; and even at the last minute, with due precautions, the army could embark. Though not proposing to hold himself there, when, on January 11, Moore reached Corunna, he found himself compelled to turn and fight for the chance of embarking, for the fleet did not come up until the 15th. On reaching the vicinity, January 14, Soult found Moore drawn up in battle order in front of the town; he heartily attacked January 16, with some twenty thousand French against a somewhat lesser number; the English maintained the defense with their national tenacity; the battle, largely fought among the walls and hedges with which the country is filled, was drawn. Moore was killed, and Baird and Paget wounded. The English stuck to their main position, showing an obstinacy to which the French were unused, and during the night and next day completed their embarkment. In the battle, the English records show the small loss of seven hundred men; the French casualties probably added up twice that number; but even this is a small percentage. In the entire operation Moore lost some six thousand men and much material.

The Spaniards in Galicia made scarcely a pretense of defending themselves. Corunna surrendered January 20, with two hundred guns; and a few days later Ferrol, with three hundred guns, ten war ships and several merchant vessels, was captured. La Romana finally left the Orense country and retired to Monterey, in the mountains, to reorganize.

The other Spanish forces had not been idle. Encouraged by Napoleon's absence from Madrid, the Army of Andalusia advanced on the Tagus from Cuença, in the hope that the capital might be disgarnished of troops, and at the same time the Army of the South moved against Lefebvre. But, crossing at Almaraz, Lefebvre drove the latter back to Merida and beyond the Guadiana; and during this manœuvre, Victor de-



Part of Northwest Spain.

feated the Army of Andalusia at Ucles, January 13, with loss of eight thousand prisoners and thirty guns, which enabled him to maintain not only an advanced position out towards Valencia, but also one near Madridejos on the road to Andalusia.

In Catalonia, meanwhile, the warlike inhabitants in their mountain fastnesses and fortified cities had been bidding defiance to the French arms. From Barcelona, in August, Duhesme had opened the route to Gerona and invested it; but, driven off with loss, St. Cyr took command of the province with twenty thousand men, French, Tuscans and Neapolitans. Vives opposed him with nearly seventy thousand men, including much armed peasantry, invested Barcelona, and was morally sustained by an English squadron off the coast. Taking Rosas in December, St. Cyr advanced to succor Barcelona, and pluckily overcoming many obstacles, strategic and logistic, reached Cardedeu December 16, dispersed Vives' force, and entered Barcelona in triumph. Then advancing on Tarragona on December 21, he again defeated Vives, who was replaced by Reding. But St. Cyr attacked and beat him also, February 16 and 25, 1809, and drove him back to Tarragona. It looked as if St. Cyr had established a foothold on the Catalonian seacoast.

While resultless battles and manœuvres over the entire Peninsula were keeping the French forces employed, sieges were the order of the day on the Mediterranean, for, beaten in the field, the Spaniards were yet of value behind defenses. Generations before, Spanish infantry had been the best in the world, but decadence had put walls in the place of pike and sword, and though there had been none to train the Spanish foot in line, yet Spanish courage was well exemplified at Saragossa, Gerona, Tarragona.

There were two sieges of Saragossa that illustrate the spirit of the Spanish people. We have seen how, early in the war, the city, under Palafox, had undertaken to defend the Spanish cause. This officer possessed courage, and beside him stood an able Belgian officer, Saint Mars, for whom part of the credit is claimed. On June 29, 1808, when Dupont was in Andalusia, Verdier and Lefebvre-Desnouettes began the siege.



Saragossa.

Saragossa, lying on the right bank of the Ebro, possessed only an old wall; but on one side was the Ebro, and on the other a series of large and strong buildings, like the palace of the Inquisition, and a number of convents, which could not be captured without a breach; and half the circuit of the town was covered by a deep-lying brook. Cutting off the city on the right bank, the French opened an attack against the gate of El Carmen. The resistance was extraordinary; women, children and religious joined the combatants, and one peasant woman, Augustina by name, served a piece of artillery throughout the siege. Verdier had but twelve thousand men; but after seizing the Portillo gate, and an assault on August 4, he reached the Coso, in the centre of the town. To a summons to capitulate, Palafox replied by "War to the death," and for a week the battle for the city was carried on with brutal ferocity from house to house. It was understood that, should the French win, the population would leave by the left bank and destroy the bridge; but in mid-August, as one result of Baylen, the French were ordered back on Miranda. The Spaniards now had time to patch up the wall and mount one hundred and fifty guns, and before the second siege the big buildings were prepared, earthworks thrown up in front of the walls, which were repaired, and the houses of the town made ready. We have seen how Palafox, after Tudela, retired to Saragossa with thirty thousand regular troops, of which two thousand were cavalry; there were fifteen thousand well-armed peasants and an equal number of inhabitants, and the town was victualed for a long siege. The English had sent abundant ammunition. A gallows was erected as a warning to those who spoke of surrender, and religious fanaticism furnished a yet more potent incentive.

Late in December, 1808, when the emperor was moving against Moore, Mortier joined Moncey, and both, with some thirty thousand men, sixty guns and a corps of sappers and miners, began operations. On January 2 Junot took Moncey's place, and Suchet's division was to keep up communications with Madrid. Mortier's other division, Gazan, held the left bank, where he was hemmed in by peasants under

Palafox's brothers, while Junot conducted the siege from the right bank, first attacking the convent of St. Joseph, which he captured January 12, and then beginning operations against St. Ingracia.

Napoleon then sent down Lannes, who, arriving January 22, drove away the enemy outside, and called back Suchet to hold him at a distance. By January 26, fifty pieces opened against the wall; and on the 27th it was captured, with the El Carmen gate, St. Ingracia and the Capucines. But to take the wall was not to capture the town. Each house was made a fortress; each street was barricaded; the town could not be taken by assault. Mines and galleries were resorted to, and houses were captured from the cellars up. No such curious siege is on record. From each captured house the besiegers moved through the cellars into the adjoining house; in every room holes were made in the walls and floors through which to fire. Stairs were cut away and only ladders used. Every night there were surprises and fierce combats hand to hand. Dire sickness was engendered of this work, and by the 1st of February, four hundred people a day were dying, most of whom could get no burial; but the defense of the town never ceased. Whoso spoke a word of surrender was hanged.

On February 18 Gazan captured the left bank suburb, and next day Lannes attacked the Coso. Palafox was sick; most of the chiefs had been killed; no new leader appeared. A new Junta was chosen February 20, a surrender was signed, and on the 21st what was left of the garrison, twelve thousand men, filed out of the Portillo gate and laid down their arms. Lannes treated the town with humanity; but Father Basil and some other leaders were punished by death. On February 24 the French entered the town, the victims in which, as a sanitary measure, had to be burned in piles. During the siege, half the population and two thirds of the garrison, approaching fifty thousand people, had perished. The French lost five thousand men.

In the hope that the English would now leave Portugal to her own defense, and before leaving Spain, Napoleon ordered Soult from Galicia down towards Lisbon to repair Junot's misfortune at Cintra. But like Spain, Portugal had risen in arms; the entire population from eighteen to sixty years of age was in the ranks; Beresford was organizing the best material into regiments under English superior officers; Craddock had received reinforcements, including Mackenzie's division; and the land was in a mood for staunch resistance. In leaving instructions, Napoleon made the grave mistake of having the corps commanders correspond with and receive the emperor's orders through the minister of war in Paris; Joseph and his adviser, Jourdan, were left with no authority in military matters. Ill-digested orders from Madrid would have been worth more than the best orders from Paris or Vienna, delayed by the distance. The result of this method was military anarchy.

There are for an army several entrances to Portugal: at places along the northern frontier; down the Douro; through Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and down the Mondego or Zezere; from Coria down the Tagus or by poor roads across the mountains; at many points from the Tagus to Elvas, and across the Guadiana. The routes most practicable and most used were those protected by the guns of Ciudad or Badajoz.

Soult commanded his own and the 8th Corps under Delaborde, a force now reduced to twenty-five thousand men. Victor was to fall down along the Tagus, and Lapisse's division, which had remained in Salamanca, was to advance to his aid; but Napoleon could only crudely plan the movement before he was called away. Never doubting the capacity of his marshals to handle the matter, he left Valladolid January

17, and reached his own capital on the 23d, just as Joseph was making his second formal entry into Madrid as King of Spain. Had he been able to remain, there is no room for doubt that 1809 would have seen the French in full possession of the Peninsula; ability quite apart, with his limited means Wellesley could not long have resisted the emperor and his concentrated hosts.

Joseph was now left to his own devices. Jourdan, the hero of Fleurus, who was beside him, was an honest, old-fashioned soldier, who knew only a bad system of war; and the French marshals trained by Napoleon served unwillingly under him. Napoleon did not like him, and pretending to place him in an important post, he had practically expatriated the old soldier. Jourdan and the new king were left with a good chance of success; but the task proved too severe.

The general tone of operations to be pursued is well indicated in letters to Joseph. On January 16 Napoleon wrote: "Whatever the number of the Spaniards may be, you must march straight on them and with a firm resolution. They are incapable of standing. You must neither hesitate nor manœuvre, but rush them." And on February 21: "You will never get to the end in Spain except with vigor and energy. This cover of clemency and kindness ends in nothing. People will applaud you as long as my armies are victorious. They will abandon you when they are vanquished."

The emperor had conducted a beautiful campaign on a clearly thought out plan, and successful apparently at all points. And yet he had failed in what he came to do: he had overrun, but not subdued Spain. He may have believed he had crushed out opposition, and that Jourdan, who had once stood at the head of one hundred thousand troops, and was deemed by most men a strong and able soldier, would build a secure structure for Joseph on the foundation he had laid. Habituated as Napoleon had become to immense and positive results, he had also grown to believe that whatever he did must be followed by the success he aimed at and so far had constantly enjoyed; and he confidently turned his back on the Peninsula. Yet he must, at times, one would fancy, have cast a dubious glance towards the insecure throne upon which he had seated his brother. The Spanish war was not merely a popular insurrection — such are always finally put down. It was a popular insurrection, sustained by abundant enthusiasm, excellent armies and, above all, a powerful ally with a fleet which controlled the sea. Though on the battlefield the Spanish armies could not stand against the French, they yet kept on foot after every defeat, and with the leaven of British assistance, eventually won back the liberty of Spain. Napoleon's efforts had been mainly directed against the armies in the field, in the effort to destroy instead of merely defeating them; but he had not really reduced any part of Spain. He had swept over it like a hurricane, but he had nowhere stopped to pacify the land itself. To this work he had no leisure to devote. He had in all other cases brought the governments of the countries he invaded to his feet, and they in turn, as was their trade, had kept the land quiet. But in Spain he had overturned the government, had put his own king upon the throne, and now it depended on that king, whose particular trade it was not, to hold himself against the whole nation in arms, with a strong ally coming up, under one of the best leaders of that age.



Sword of the Period.

XLI.

RATISBON. FEBRUARY TO APRIL, 1809.

Napoleon wrote his allies that Spanish affairs were settled, and turned to the Austrian question. Austria had been arming for months under Archduke Charles, and had eleven corps, the bulk assembled in Bohemia. Napoleon desired peace, but believing a war would finally settle the Austrian question, he began assembling troops in Germany, and heading them for the Danube-Lech country. His base was on the Main and the Rhine, and he could oppose to the Austrians an equal field army. The Austrians' first plan was to debouch from Bohemia and march towards the Rhine, attacking whatever they met, and being earlier prepared, this would have resulted ill for the French; but no sooner started than the Aulic Council changed the plan to an advance along the south of the Danube, and the troops had marches to make that lost a month. Not to appear the aggressor, Napoleon sent Berthier to open the campaign, with clear instructions that, if the Austrians "attacked" before April 15, the army was to withdraw behind the Lech; if not, it was to assemble as far forward as Ratisbon. The Austrians did "attack" before April 15; but Berthier, lacking strategic insight, instead of withdrawing, strung out the army from Augsburg to Ratisbon, so that, having crossed the Isar, Archduke Charles had only to advance straight forward to cut it in two. Happily, Napoleon arrived in season. The army had never been in such danger, but by a series of rapid manœuvres, which he always deemed to be his best, in two days he not only rectified his position, but led Charles so to manœuvre as to weaken his own centre, and to open his left to being turned. Nothing more beautiful is found in the annals of strategy. Davout, on the left at Ratisbon, was ordered in to the centre, which he accomplished by fighting the battle of Thann. Massena, on the right, was ordered around Charles' left to seize Landshut in his rear, and meanwhile Napoleon firmly held the centre, while Charles reached out to Ratisbon, hoping to surround Davout. By April 19 the bad position was rectified, and the armies stood so that Charles was in grave danger.

Disappointed that the Erfurt Conference had not prevailed on Austria to remain at peace, the emperor reached Paris January 23, 1809. He had written to all his allies — as he might fairly assume — that his Spanish campaign had been a success; *e. g.*, to the Prince Primate of the Confederation of the Rhine: "The armies of Spain have been destroyed. The English army has been thrown into the sea, after having lost half its people, its horses, its baggage, its munition and part of its treasury." However exaggerated, the claim was helpful because credited by the public.

For many months Austria had been a source of disquietude to the emperor. He had ordered Berthier, July 1, 1808, to send agents into Bohemia "to learn the movements of the Austrians," and the Correspondence is full of letters to this end. To Jerome, July 25, he wrote: —

> "Austria is arming. She denies her armaments, therefore she is arming against us. . . . Because Austria arms, we must then arm; therefore I order that the Grand Army shall be reinforced. My troops are collecting at Strasburg, Mainz, Wesel. I engage Your Majesty to hold his contingent ready. If there is a means of evading war, it is by showing Austria that we are picking up the glove, and that we are ready. I repeat to Your Majesty that there is not between Austria and me a single subject of difference, that I am asking nothing of her, and I arm only because I see her arm."

Francis Joseph had written a pacific letter to the emperor on September 18, 1808, whereupon the troops of the Confederation of the Rhine had been dismissed; but in January, 1809, the danger warranted Napoleon's calling to them to remobilize. And again, January 16, 1809, he wrote Jerome: —

> "The affairs of Spain are finished. Not only will Italy not move, but she furnishes us eighty thousand men, and the Emperor of Austria, if he makes the least hostile movement, will soon have ceased to reign. That is very clear. As to Russia, we have never been on better terms." On February 21 he wrote Louis: "Austria threatens me with war. I laugh at her, and as soon as she shall have thrown down the mask, I will make her repent it. I desire that you shall give her no help for her loans."

There had existed for centuries in Europe a certain arbitrary balance of power, which every ruler had striven to maintain or modify. After his own fashion Napoleon had created a new balance of power. A natural outgrowth of the French Revolution, he had been the chief factor in ending the chaos then engendered in France; he had given the countries brought under French influence a better government, and he had implanted in their peoples' hearts an instinct of liberty, which has helped them in their struggles against autocracy and has survived to this day; he had redeemed France and given her good laws. By nature and instinct himself an autocrat, yet as the opponent of other autocrats, and the exponent of that liberty to which, on the Continent, France had given birth, Napoleon has been perhaps the most useful man of modern days. But as monarch, he stood on a basis the other rulers of Europe did not recognize. The latter had for centuries maintained a basis of which Ex Deo Rex Ex Rege Lex was the motto; but Napoleon, however little he lived up to it, could have no legal cornerstone other than Vox Populi Vox Dei.

In the long struggles of France against the despotisms of Europe, England had played a leading part. Herself difficult to assail, on account of her insular position, endowed with a commerce which had brought her exceptional wealth, and having the sea as her special element, she had in a way influenced each of the coalitions against France. If she did not furnish her due quota of land troops, — as in Continental wars she has never done, — yet she manned her great fleets, and paid for men to fight land battles by enormous subsidies to every coalition nation. And when Napoleon had in succession beaten every one of the greater powers, he found that he could harm England only by attacking her commerce. Hence his insistence on the Continental System — the exclusion of English commerce from all Continental ports.

It was to uphold this system that Napoleon was now contending. This was his balance of power. Had he been able to make peace with England, he might have been content with fewer conquests. While France and Austria had for generations striven for the upper hand, now it was France and England; and as Napoleon's political scheme demanded that all Continental nations should rally to his standard to force Great Britain into accepting peace, so must he fight for his principle until she did so. But in effect he was striving for a false balance of power, one to which all the national aspirations of Europe ran counter, and against which most countries were ready to revolt.

As Russia had been wise in allowing Napoleon to become entangled in the Spanish war before asserting herself, so Austria was now wise in seizing this occasion to slough off French domination. When Napoleon declared war against Spain, she began preparations. After Baylen and Cintra, she argued, as Napoleon would be compelled to keep a quarter of a million men in Spain, he could not, in addition to this vast force, place in Germany as many men as he would need. Not only was the whole population of Austria and Hungary instinct with the desire to avenge Ulm and Austerlitz, but Prussia was eager to awake from her three years' nightmare. The Hanseatic towns had been robbed of their commerce, and the Tyrol was restless under Bavarian rulership. Especially, Westphalia and Hanover had suffered by the Continental System and Napoleonic rule. Not only was their commerce also lost, but taxes to sustain armies for the benefit of other lands, and to pay to Napoleon's marshals pensions for their services in conquering the fatherland, ground down the people. Hesse heretofore had earned revenue by hiring out her legions; now these men were compelled to serve for nothing, and money went from the country instead of pouring into it. Every land was stripped to enrich France. Here was the opportunity of Austria. A joint uprising against Napoleonic power was fostered, by means of secret calls and the guild named the Tugendbund, throughout Germany and Italy. Poets sang, divines preached, philosophers argued, against the French thralldom. Italy had less to complain of, but even here were seeds of opposition.

Austria made a supreme effort to raise a force capable of coping with Napoleon. Archduke Charles had for many months been in charge of Austrian military matters, and had done his work well. The active army, in better heart than ever, consisted of over three hundred thousand men, the cadres of which were kept full from one hundred and fifty battalions of landwehr and heavy home reserves. The French system

French "Guide."

of army corps was adopted, and of these there were eleven, which, about March 20, were placed as follows:—

1st, Bellegarde, at Saatz	27,000	men.
2d, Kollowrath, at Pilsen	26,000	“
3d, Hohenzollern, at Prague	25,000	“
4th, Rosenberg, at Pisek	28,000	“
5th, Archduke Louis, at Budweis	26,000	“
6th, Hiller, south of Danube	25,000	“
7th, Archduke Ferdinand, in Poland	40,000	“
8th, Chasteler, in Italy	30,000	“
9th, Giulay, “ “	30,000	“
Reserve, Lichtenstein, at Kolin	16,000	“
Reserve, Kienmayer, south of Danube	12,000	“
Division of Jellachic	8,000	“

Seven corps under Charles assembled in Bohemia, to debouch into Bavaria at Ratisbon; John was to head the 8th and 9th Corps in Italy, while Ferdinand should invade Poland with the 7th. Appeals were to be distributed broadcast by the marching armies, and Austria and the Tyrol were to strike first and together.

However desirous of keeping peace, Napoleon was ever ready to accept the gage of battle. Although he believed in eventual success in Spain, he had been disappointed with the slim result of the recent victories, and was unwilling his opponents should think his powers on the wane. In a fresh campaign he could, he thought, settle the affairs of Austria on a better basis for France, and he relied on Russia for both men and moral influence. “The Emperor Alexander by his letter of March 1 renews the assurances that at the first attack of Austria he will start to come and meet me at the head of his troops,” he wrote Jerome; and to Eugene: “We are still on the best of terms with the Russians, who will probably make common cause with us.” “Russia is entirely on my side,” he wrote Joseph.

The French spies in Vienna reported with regularity the passage of troops from every part of the empire through the capital towards the army in Bohemia or Bavaria, and everything that could be gathered pointed to the 15th or 20th of April as the opening of hostilities. On March 23 the chargé d'affaires notified the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris that the Austrian armies of the North, of Italy, of Galicia, the militia and the reserve would number five hundred and ninety thousand men; so that, however erroneous the figures, the emperor could estimate after a fashion what he had to meet.

French Marine.

From the moment he reached Paris, Napoleon began his measures to meet the oncoming storm. On ordering the bulk of the Grand Army to the Peninsula the previous year, he had left Davout and the Army of Occupation in control of Germany and Poland; large forces were at Hanover, Magdeburg, Stettin and near Bayreuth, and headquarters at Erfurt was the centre of military and political activity. His first orders were for Davout to leave good garrisons in the fortified cities, and with forty-five thousand men to rendezvous at Bamberg, leaving the Polish divisions of twenty thousand under Poniatowski at Warsaw, and the sixteen thousand Saxons in Dresden. Oudinot, with his grenadiers, who had been in the Frankfort region, was ordered to Augsburg; the cavalry reserve, from its various stations all through the Rhine and

Main country, was set on the march to the Danube; Lannes turned over his Saragossa work to Junot and came north; Massena, actually on the road with thirty thousand men via Lyon towards Spain, was brought to the right-about, to reorganize his corps in Strasburg with part of the troops he had and two divisions already in Germany, and then to advance on Ulm; the Guard was withdrawn from Spain and headed for the Danube; and thirty thousand men of the Confederation of the Rhine were mobilized. Bernadotte had some time before been sent to Dresden to command the Saxons, look after the Hanseatic towns and raise an army among the allies. As secrecy had presided over the Army of Reserve in the Marengo campaign, so now a great flourish was made over this Army of the North, mainly to impose on Hanover and north Germany, for this year the English had gone to more extensive preparations than ever before. Bernadotte's public orders, spread abroad in every direction, were to hold the Prussians and the English in check; his private instructions were to be ready to start along the Bohemian frontiers for the Danube with two Saxon divisions, and to leave the allies to protect their own territory. In the effort to efface the recollection of previous faultfinding, — as at Jena, — and to get from Bernadotte his best efforts, on April 19 Napoleon wrote him: "My Cousin, I have received all your letters. The war that I am to maintain is in concert with Russia. You have entered for something into this combination. Here, then, is a proof of my esteem, and of how much I make of you in the destination which I have given you." And fearing an invasion of Saxony, on April 5 he recommended Bernadotte, "in case war was suddenly declared, to have the royal family retire on Leipsic and Erfurt, or even into France, if agreeable to the king, to leave the garrison at Dresden, and to direct himself with all the disposable

Saxon troops towards the French army, to join it on the Danube."

The itineraries of the various regiments of the Army of the Rhine (Davout's force) moving to Bamberg were ordered with the utmost accuracy, as were the day's marches of every part of the army. As an example, the 11th Hussars was to move March 13 to Naumburg, Camburg and Jena, the 14th to Rudolstadt, the 15th to Gräfenthal, the 16th to Neustadt, the 17th to Stafelstein, the 18th to Bamberg, the 19th to Forschheim, the 20th to Erlangen. The 30th of the line with its artillery was to march the 12th to Kalbe, the 13th to Connern, the 14th to Halle, the 15th to Merseburg, the 16th to Naumburg, the 17th to Jena, the 18th to Rudolstadt, the 19th to Gräfenthal, the 20th to Coburg, the 21st to Bamberg, to be followed by the 6th of the line, and that by the 65th of the line, each doing the same day's marches, and stopping at each of the same places one day later than its leader. These marches were drawn up with care, and each body held to accomplish them. As the troops arrived at their destinations they were cantoned and fed, under orders issued in each corps.

By the vigorous concentration above ordered, the emperor could, by the end of March, count on sixty thousand men in Bamberg, thirty thousand men in Ulm and twenty thousand at Augsburg, while Lefebvre, in command of the Bavarian army, would have thirty thousand more along the Isar, and the Guard would be fast coming along. He was based on both Rhine and Main, with numberless roads leading to Würzburg, Mainz or Strasburg, while Charles' communications were the roads running up the Danube, and through Bohemia and the mountains.

During the last half of February many reports ran in showing Austria's purpose to force war; and from Paris, March 23, the emperor wrote Berthier: "My Cousin, a French officer has been arrested at Braunau, and the dispatches of which he was bearer were taken away from him by main force by the Austrians, although sealed by the arms of France. Write to



The Rhine-Enns Country.

Davout, Massena and Oudinot to try to have arrested some Austrian couriers. Recommend them to make these expeditions very secretly, to accelerate the march of the troops without fatiguing them . . . and to be ready to move to the Danube."

Anxious not to appear the aggressor by heading his armies too early, Napoleon, in an Order from Paris of March 28, — and especial heed is to be paid to this, — placed Berthier, Chief of Staff, in charge of operations, and indicated to him the general plan he was to pursue, until he himself should reach the front. "Should the Austrians attack before April 10, the army is to concentrate behind the Lech, the right occupying Augsburg, and the left the right" (bank) "of the Danube towards Ingolstadt and Donauwörth. Donauwörth is to be the most central point of the army. Therefore recommend, if the case should arrive, that the biscuit of Ingolstadt and Munich be sent behind the Lech. Establish hospitals at Ulm, at Augsburg, which is to be always guarded, and at Donauwörth." This was the key-note which the emperor sounded time and again. "Should the Austrians attack before April 10" — later made the 15th — "the army is to concentrate behind the Lech." By the word "attack," of course, he did not mean tactical onset: before this could be met the army must be assembled and ready. What he meant was such a strategic advance by the enemy as to seek touch with the French, and deliver battle when met. In other words, he meant an advance with hostile intent into Bavaria, across the Inn and towards the Isar, or on Ratisbon from Bohemia. This underlying idea of the opening of the campaign could not be made clearer.

Two days later, March 30, detailed "Instructions for the Major-General" as to the preliminary manœuvres were dictated to Berthier before he left Paris, and no doubt these were fully explained to him by word of mouth. Though Napoleon still supposed the Austrians were assembling in Bohemia, from his experience with the methods of the Aulic Council, he scarcely expected them to open the campaign before April 15. In these Instructions he tells Berthier that "the Austrians have not declared war. To believe that they will attack without recalling their ambassadors does not seem probable, yet it is what they did in 1805." On the assumption, however, that they would be slower than they actually were, he favored Ratisbon as the most available point of assembly: the Bavarians would concentrate along the Isar; and hither Oudinot's grenadiers and the cavalry were to come, while Davout would assemble at Nürnberg and Massena at Augsburg ready to close up. "Thus," say the Instructions, "headquarters would be at Ratisbon in the midst of two hundred thousand men, astride a great river, guarding the right Danube bank from Ratisbon to Passau, and we would then be in a position secured from care about the enemy's movements, with the advantage of the Danube, which would bring up speedily to the army everything of which it stands in need." But this selection of Ratisbon was strictly dependent upon the enemy's remaining quiet, or advancing so slowly that concentration could without interruption be effected so far forward. In this project Napoleon was striving to rendezvous at a point as far in the advance as circumstances rendered possible, and especially where he would be in command of the Danube, the best line on which to invade Austria. Moreover, Ratisbon was the apex of the two lines of Charles' advance.

It will be noticed that Napoleon does not open the campaign by asking what the enemy will do: he does not build his plan upon that of the adversary. Looking over the geographical situation and the general conditions, he determines upon what he himself shall do, and then first asks how the enemy will respond to this. No one paid more heed to every event that had already occurred to limit his actions: beyond this he was free, always chose the initiative and followed it. A quite exceptional campaign was that of 1813. On more than one occasion he carried the idea too far, as in once writing to Soult: "One must never want to guess what the enemy can do. My intention is always the same." As a fact, no one was more constantly striving to divine his enemy's operations: in this dictum Napoleon meant that if, before yourself taking action, you waited for the enemy to develop, you lost one of the winning cards in war — initiative.

French Drum Corps.

Having, then, selected Ratisbon as the best place of assembly, provided always the enemy remained quiet, among a multitude of other things, Napoleon ordered that Augsburg with large supplies should be placed beyond danger of seizure out of hand, that the bridge-heads on the Lech should be strengthened, that Donauwörth should be well victualed, as probable headquarters of the army; and that at Ingolstadt there should be good bridge-heads, to enable the French to debouch at will on the Danube left bank. Berthier was ordered to Strasburg, on the way to the front: "As it is probable that the Austrians will make no movement, the major-general can go to Ulm . . . and Augsburg," but if nothing pressed, he was to stay in Strasburg, where he could be more readily reached. "My aim is to carry my headquarters to Ratisbon, and there to centralize all my army. The headquarters of Donauwörth and the line of the Lech are a position to occupy in case the enemy should forestall me; but if the Austrians do not stir, I desire that Oudinot and St. Hilaire assemble at Ratisbon." All this is unmistakable.

Thereupon Napoleon argues out what the enemy may do, providing the French cannot assemble at Ratisbon before he "attacks."

> "What is it that the enemy, who is ready, could undertake to-day against our army? It would be to move from Pilsen on Ratisbon via Waldmünchen and Cham" (the two available gaps in the Böhmer Wald). "This case arriving, the Bavarian division at Sträubing would fall back on Ingolstadt, the Bavarian division at Landshut would make the same movement. The corps of Davout would move on Ingolstadt and Donauwörth," instead of on Ratisbon, "and then it would be a matter of putting headquarters at Donauwörth." But if the Austrians do not advance so soon, "once the army having cantoned about Ratisbon, what will the enemy do? Will he move on Cham? That would enable us to assemble all our forces against him, to stop him at the positions we should have reconnoitred on the Regen. Will he move on Nürnberg? He would find himself cut off from Bohemia. Will he move on Bamberg? He will be equally cut off. Finally, will he choose to march on Dresden? Then we shall enter into Bohemia and pursue him into Germany. Will he act against the Tyrol, debouching at the same time from Bohemia? He will no doubt arrive at Innsbruck, but the ten or twelve regiments which he would have at Innsbruck would not be found in line of battle on the

debouches of Bohemia, and these troops, which would be at Innsbruck, would learn the defeat of their army in Bohemia by our arrival at Salzburg. Finally, if the enemy seems to desire to take the extremities of the left and of the right to act, we must accept" (strengthen) "the centre, having for retreat the Lech, and holding Augsburg as a garrison, so be sure always to have this town at our disposition."

In these Instructions the army is again called the "Grand Army," although by an order of October 12, 1808, from Erfurt, the Grand Army had been dissolved.

One thing remains clear. Napoleon was preparing to concentrate his forces at his own chosen spot on a single line of operations, and was thus making ready to meet the enemy at whatever point he might operate: if on Franconia, to turn his left; if on Saxony, to take him in reverse; if from Bohemia on Ratisbon, to meet him by a frontal attack along the Regen; if from Bohemia and on the Tyrol, to beat the Bohemian army and turn the Tyrolese. Every step is definite, and set down in words that wonderfully exhibit the clearness of the great captain's conceptions and prevision.

Armed with the Instructions, Berthier left Paris March 31, and arrived at Strasburg early April 4, put the finishing touches to the artillery and engineers, and hurried up the troops still in the rear, inspecting every detail with his usual care, and especially seeing that the troops were well armed and provided with ammunition. Orders were also issued for repairing and guarding the roads from Strasburg to Nürnberg and to Donauwörth, and equally detailed instructions were given to Intendant-General Daru as to supplies and equipment to be collected at Strasburg and wheeled forward to the army.

In this anti-Gallic uprising, though all Germany was instinct with the same antagonism, the gallant Tyrolese were the first to give the signal. At the beginning of April the uprising broke out in its every mountain valley; the Bavarians were massacred right and left; and Bisson, who came to the rescue with two thousand French troops, partook the same fate. The insurrection quickly spread to the Voralberg and threatened Wurtemberg; but, except the Tyrol and Austria, no country stirred. The dread of Napoleon was marked.

Early in March, the Austrians, for once on the alert under Charles' pushing, had concentrated their main army in western Bohemia, with Hiller, Kienmayer and Jellachic south of the Danube along the Traun and Enns. At Charles' suggestion, the main army was to cross the Bohemian mountains, and move on the French in one mass. It was not to swerve from its path even if the French should enter Bavaria, but to rely on its own manœuvre to force them to retire; and if Davout fell back from the Bamberg region, the line of advance was to be one between the river Main and the Black Forest. And especially it was to give battle to the enemy, wherever met, so as to detach from the French alliance and bring back to Austria the troops of Saxony, of the Confederation of the Rhine and other German states. This was a sound strategic project. At this moment, in a few marches, the whole Austrian force could debouch upon Ratisbon or Würzburg, and catch the French corps in dispersed order and ill-prepared for battle; for near mid-March, Davout's divisions were cantoned about Würzburg, Bamberg, Bayreuth and Nürnberg; the Bavarians were on the Isar; Oudinot at Augsburg, Massena's divisions at Ulm, Memmingen, Günzburg and Donauwörth; and the Wurtemberg troops back of Ulm. Charles' advance would have compelled them all to hurry back towards Wurtemberg, and reassemble much farther in the rear than Napoleon had intended. But at the opportune moment the views of the Aulic Council suddenly shifted, — perhaps because the presence of Oudinot and Massena at Augsburg and Ulm seemed to indicate a French concentration on the Lech, — and against the protest of Charles, the main force was ordered from Bohemia to the south bank of the Danube, to head for the Isar, a change that gave the troops thrice the marches to get within striking distance, and prevented their thrusting at the enemy's weakest point. A sound strategical plan, with the initiative in one's own hands, should be altered for none but vital reasons, and it was to this vacillation Napoleon owed it that his divisions were not struck in detail and successively hustled into the Danube or whirled back to the Rhine. By the advance that she was all ready to make in March, Austria could haved robbed Napoleon of one hundred thousand allies, and have added them to her own strength. But beginning the new manœuvre March 20, it was April 8 before Charles stood along the Inn from Schärding to Braunau, with six army corps, leaving in Bohemia two corps, at Budweis and Pilsen. A month's time had been lost, and the Austrian forces were divided into two sections by the great river.

French Elite Chasseur.

According to the new plan, the two Bohemian corps, under Kollowrath and Bellegarde, were to debouch from the Bohemian mountains via Cham on Ratisbon: the centre and reserve, in three corps under Hohenzollern, Rosenberg and Lichtenstein, were to advance by way of Schärding towards Ratisbon; the two left corps, under Louis and Hiller, with Kienmayer in support, were to move via Landshut. As the Austrians saw it, the French were in two great bodies, in the Ulm-Augsburg and the Nürnberg-Bamberg country, and Charles, having taken Ratisbon, could there cross the Danube, and with his own and the Bohemian corps cut the French apart, thus playing something like the game of his 1796 campaign against Moreau and Jourdan. Should the French meanwhile concentrate on the Lech, the ground there, with the Austrian superior forces, was not unfavorable for operations. In addition to the main army, backed by heavy home levies, Am Ende with a division was to march on Saxony; Jellachic, advancing from Salzburg towards Munich, protected the left; and an equal force was heading for the Tyrol. This makes no count of Ferdinand in Poland, of John in Italy, or of a force in Croatia facing Marmont in Dalmatia. The total Austrian levies for this memorable year in Germany were three hundred thousand men under the colors, one hundred thousand landwehr as reserves, and seven hundred field guns. To meet this hitherto unheard-of force the emperor could count on twenty thousand Poles, thirty-five thousand Russians to come up later, twenty thousand Saxons and Dutch, fifteen thousand Westphalians, one hundred and forty thousand present effective in the Grand Army, twelve thousand Baden, Hesse and Nassau troops, forty-five thousand men in Italy under the viceroy and Macdonald, fifteen thousand in the Division of the Interior and fifteen thousand under Marmont. This made three hundred and twenty thousand men, with five hundred and sixty guns. Military skill quite apart, it was about an even match, provided the French could concentrate at a good strategic point before the Austrians had advanced too far. With Napoleon in command, the French had a marked superiority. The Austrian underestimates of what he could raise had been falsified.

During the last half of March great activity prevailed, and orders were issued daily for the assembling of troops, for the collection of victual and ammunition, and for such fortification of cities forward from the Lech as could be effected, and of Passau so that it could hold out two or three months.

Many minor matters came under criticism, of interest as local color about the emperor: On April 8 Napoleon approved sending the eagles back to France, except one for each corps, and the use of small ensigns; and a large number of boats were ordered for a fleet on the Danube, to be manned by French sailors. On April 9 he complains of the newspapers as publishing everything that he does: "It is curious that one can do nothing without the journals serving as spies." Even he could not always control the press. Innumerable other matters receive like treatment.

In a letter of March 17 to the King of Wurtemberg, Napoleon states that he will consider the army corps of that country a particular reserve, and that he has named to command it Vandamme,

"whom your troops have already known in Silesia in the last war. He will be the only Frenchman, and will receive the orders of the Major-General directly. I suppose that it will not be disagreeable to the general to whom Your Majesty had destined the command of his troops to serve under the orders of this officer, who is a very ancient general and a man of experience." And a fortnight later Napoleon wrote the king that he was sorry that he did not like Vandamme: "The great matter in the conditions we are in is to triumph. Your Majesty's troops know and esteem the brave Vandamme, and have had success under his direction. I do not dissimulate the faults he may have, but in the great trade of war one must put up with many things. I will give Your Majesty's troops another commandant if you desire it, but they will have lost in my eyes half of their value."

Vandamme remained, and the Wurtembergers did excellent service. On April 9 he gave Jerome command of the 10th Corps, with the duty of maintaining quiet from Hamburg to the Main.

On April 10 Napoleon wrote Eugene: "Everything leads us to believe that the Austrians will have commenced hostilities yesterday, to-day, or to-morrow. If they attack before the 15th, I have given orders that my Army of Germany is to fall back on Augsburg and on the Lech so as to be able to be there myself to direct the first blows." This shows that, although the emperor remained in Paris until the 13th, his plan was clear and distinct, and that he felt that he had made it so to Berthier, who was still conducting the concentration from Strasburg, and making his first orders conform to the proper theory given him by his master.

On April 8 Napoleon wrote Berthier: "My Cousin, to date from April 1, all the troops that I have in Germany are to be known under the title of the Army of Germany, of which I reserve to myself the command in chief. You are its major-general, Songis the commander of the artillery, Bertrand of engineers, Bessières of the cavalry."

"The depot of the army, in France, is Strasburg. It is at Strasburg that the Rhine is to be crossed; it is no longer to be crossed at Mainz nor at any other point. The route hereafter is to be by Stuttgart and Ulm; from there it is to pass by Nürnberg for Davout's corps, and by Augsburg for the other corps. After Strasburg the first depot of the army shall be Ulm; the second depot Augsburg; the third Donauwörth; the fourth Ingolstadt. Augsburg and Ingolstadt are to be put in a state to resist a sudden attack."

In another letter of the same date he wrote: "There must be in Augsburg much ammunition and provision. Give orders to palisade the half-moons, to fill the ditches with water, and to work with the greatest activity, for my intention is to remain master of Augsburg, and to lean my right upon it. Let us leave the Austrians to do what they will in the Tyrol, because I do not propose to engage in a mountain warfare." Two days later he wrote further details for strengthening Augsburg.

In the first Order of April 8 the emperor organizes the army, as it is to be when completed: —

The 2d Corps, Lannes, is after May 1 to have the divisions of Tharreau, Claparède and Grandjean, each of three half-brigades under brigadier-generals, and with twelve pieces of cannon and eight thousand men. Oudinot to have only two divisions until May 1. St. Hilaire with five regiments and fifteen guns to be part of the 2d Corps, and a brigade of light cavalry and Espagne's cuirassiers.

40,000 foot.
6,000 horse.
4,000 art. & eng.
57 guns. 50,000 men.

The 3d Corps, Davout, is to have four divisions, three of five regiments each, and the fourth of fourteen 4th battalions, each division having fifteen guns; also a light cavalry division, St. Sulpice's cuirassiers and six guns.

45,000 foot.
6,000 horse.
9,000 art. & eng.
66 guns. nearly 60,000 "

The 4th Corps, Massena, to have four divisions numbering,
French, 30,000 foot.
Allied, 10,000 "
A division of light, and two regiments allied cavalry, 5,000 horse.
5,000 art. & eng.
68 guns. 50,000 "

The 7th Corps, Lefebvre, the Bavarians,
30,000 foot.
4,000 horse.
60 guns. 34,000 "

The 8th Corps will consist of Dupas'
French division, 4,000 foot.
Allied division, 6,000 "
Vandamme's Wurtemberg division, 10,000 "
3,000 horse.
30 guns. 23,000 "

"This Corps will be commanded by Augereau."

The 9th Corps is to have the Saxons under Bernadotte, the forces at Warsaw, and the garrisons of Glogau and Danzig. 50,000 "

The 10th Corps to be a reserve under Jerome, of Westphalians, Dutch and the garrisons of Magdeburg, Stettin, Cüstrin and Hamburg. 18,000 "

The cavalry reserve will be commanded by Bessières, with Lasalle's and Montbrun's light troops, and Nansouty's division and the dragoon division, making	18 guns.		6,000 men.
The Imperial Guard of ten regiments,		16,000 foot.	
Four regiments horse,		4,000 horse.	
		2,000 art. & eng.	
	60 guns.		22,000 "
		Total	313,000 "
			360 guns.

Included in the engineers were the pontoon train, the sappers and miners, and other workmen; but the "administration" was not within the numbers given, and this comprised a large force, in which were "six hundred bakers and sixty oven-builders" — most essential men.

"Give all the orders to carry this out," said the emperor; but to accomplish this consumed time. Lannes had not arrived, and Oudinot remained for the moment in command of the 2d Corps. Other changes became necessary. And we find, from the "Situation des Troupes Réunis sur le Théatre des Opérations le 16 Avril, 1809," that following were those practically disposable. Later the heavy horse got massed under Bessières; in the "Situations" it is counted with the several corps.

The Emperor. Chief of Staff, Berthier.

	Inf'y Div'n.	*Cav. Div'n.*	*Present for Duty.*	*Absent.*
Davout	Morand.	Montbrun, Lt.		
	Friant.	(Pajol, Piré,		
	Gudin.	Jacquinot) St.		
	St. Hilaire.	Sulpice's Cuir.		
	Demont.		60,600 men.	8,300 men.
Massena	Legrand.	Marulaz, Lt.		
	Carra St. Cyr.			
	Molitor.			
	Boudet.		37,600 "	3,100 "

Oudinot	Tharreau.	Espagne, Cuir.		
	Claparède.	Colbert, Lt.	21,300 men.	1,900 men.
Lefebvre	Crown Prince.			
	Deroy.			
	Wrede.		27,600 "	1,400 "
Vandamme	Wurtemberg.		12,300 "	400 "
	Dupas.		5,000 "	
		Nansouty.	1,500 "	
			165,900 "	15,100 "

On January 16 Napoleon had decreed that the infantry of the Guard should consist of one regiment each of grenadiers, of fusilier-grenadiers, of chasseurs, of fusilier-chasseurs, of tirailleurs, of tirailleur-chasseurs; that each such regiment should have two battalions, each battalion four companies, each company two hundred men, making the battalions eight hundred men, the regiments sixteen hundred men, not counting staff. All the men were to have at least ten years of service. Admission to the corps was to be a recompense, and the grenadiers and chasseurs were to rank as sub-officers, the fusiliers as the ancient members of the Guard. For admission to the fusiliers two years' service in the tirailleurs and a knowledge of reading and writing were required. Promotion into the grenadiers or chasseurs was from the fusiliers. The tirailleurs were to be selected conscripts, to rank as ordinary soldiers, but to be the most robust and the best educated.

Rumors had been frequent of the Austrian advance. On April 6, from Sträubing, Wrede wrote Oudinot that he heard that the Austrians were to cross the Inn that night or the next. On the 8th Lefebvre wrote Berthier to the same effect: "It will be necessary for you to arrive as early as possible at Augsburg, for if the enemy attacks us, as seems probable, it will be necessary, in the absence of the emperor, for you to give us orders." On the same day news from the Bohemian frontier was that the enemy was about to cross. Davout wrote the emperor to the same effect, but added: "Whatever may happen, we are quite ready. St. Hilaire has four regiments at Ratisbon, Morand is between Ratisbon and Neumarkt, Gudin is at Nürnberg, Friant is at Bayreuth, Nansouty . . . will all be in Ratisbon the day after to-morrow; Montbrun . . . and Piré will be there in three or four days." Finally came the actual news. From Munich, April 9, at 8 P. M., Otto and Lefebvre both reported to Berthier a notice by an aide-de-camp of Archduke Charles that he was about to advance. Wrede was informed of the commencement of hostilities by a signal agreed upon with Passau. Pajol received a similar notice, and informed Davout and St. Hilaire.

Having delivered their declaration of war on the 9th by letters to the King of Bavaria, to Otto the French minister at Munich, and to Lefebvre commanding on the Isar, the Austrians under Archduke Charles, confident that on this occasion they not only outnumbered the enemy but anticipated him, stood on the line Braunau-Schärding, much belated by the Aulic change of plan. At this moment, Lefebvre, with the Bavarians, had the Crown Prince Division at Munich, on the way to Freising, Deroy at Moosburg and Landshut, and Wrede at Sträubing, with outposts at Schirling and Cham; Massena was at Ulm about to advance on the Lech, with Legrand near Günzburg, St. Cyr near Stitzingen, Boudet at Memmingen, and Molitor east of Ulm; Oudinot was at Augsburg and down the Lech; Vandamme was at Elwangen; of Davout's corps, with headquarters still in Nürnberg, St. Hilaire was in Ratisbon, Morand on the lower Naab, his right touching St. Hilaire, Gudin at Neumarkt, Friant at Amberg; Demont was marching on Eichach, Nansouty's heavy cavalry was at Ratisbon, Montbrun's light horse at Nittenau, holding the Regen. Up to this moment the emperor had believed he would have time to concentrate at Ratisbon.

From the demeanor of the Austrian ambassador at Paris, and from sundry intercepted dispatches, Napoleon had guessed the Austrian intentions, and on April 10, in a letter to Berthier, — in strict pursuance of the plan of opening the campaign, — he ordered him to notify the various commanders, and especially Davout, that "everything leads one to believe that the Austrians are going to commence the attack, and that if they attack before the 15th, everything is to fall

Dragoon of Imperial Guard.

back upon the Lech." He also says that Dupas (Bernadotte's French division), who had been in Würzburg, was, in case the enemy should attack during the manœuvre, to march to Augsburg, and that "the Bavarian court had better hold itself ready to make a trip to Augsburg." But "if the enemy makes no movement, you will still have the movement of Massena made on Augsburg, that of the Wurtembergers on Augsburg or Rain, as you may judge proper, and that of the light cavalry divisions of Nansouty and of St. Hilaire on Landshut or Freising, according to what happens. Davout will have his headquarters at Ratisbon, his army will platoon itself at a day's distance around this town, and this under all conditions" — but *provided always the enemy makes no movement.* "The Bavarians will make no movement if the enemy does not."

To be sure that Berthier made no mistake, he sent him the same day a telegraphic dispatch to Strasburg: "I think the Emperor of Austria will attack soon. Betake yourself to Augsburg to act according to my Instructions, and if the enemy shall have attacked before the 15th, you must concentrate the troops at Augsburg and Donauwörth, and let everything be ready to march. Send my Guard and my horses to Stuttgart." This dispatch reached Strasburg at noon April 13; but Berthier had gone to the front April 11, on learning from Lefebvre the crossing of the Inn by the Austrians, having at 5.30 A. M. written the emperor what had been done. This was to give the command of the troops on the north bank of the Danube to Davout, with orders to assemble at Ingolstadt or Ratisbon, to sustain St. Hilaire and Nansouty. But he had written Davout that "if circumstances make you think they should withdraw, it is on Ingolstadt and Donauwörth that all the army would assemble." He had also given the command of those on the south bank to Massena, with orders to assemble on the Lech; and Lefebvre had also been permitted in case of attack before the 15th to move back to Ingolstadt and the Lech. Berthier also wrote Bernadotte that the army was assembling at Ingolstadt and Donauwörth; and in the evening of the 11th he wrote Massena: The emperor's "project is to assemble all his Army of Germany. It is therefore always by your left that you are to manœuvre, so as to find yourself all reunited on Donauwörth, the Lech and along the Danube."

So far, so good; this was according to Napoleon's previous orders and suited the immediate strategic situation; for while the enemy could not be said to have "attacked," he would probably advance towards the Isar, and this would be the "attack" referred to by the emperor, and the French concentration must at once be made on the Lech, and Davout be drawn in to Ingolstadt, if not to Donauwörth. Up to this moment, Berthier seems to have kept in mind the idea of an assembly behind the Lech, in case of an Austrian advance before the 15th — not as a theory so much as a mere fact. But as Jomini says, on Berthier "twenty campaigns had impressed no comprehension of strategy," nor indeed daily association of the closest order with the emperor; and soon the whirling events and conflicting reports and rumors begat in the mind of the chief of staff that cloudy uncertainty, and that inability to see clearly and act correctly, which distinguishes the commonplace commander from the genius.



Berthier's Manœuvre.

Early on April 13 Berthier had reached Gmund, where he heard from Davout at Hemau, April 11, that Friant was between Naumburg and Amberg, and Morand and Gudin were marching on Ingolstadt; that Nansouty was on the right bank of the Naab sustained by St. Hilaire, and would assemble on the Ingolstadt road; and that St. Sulpice was at Ingolstadt and Demont at Eichstadt. In his answer Berthier implied that Davout had better concentrate on Ratisbon, unless he had already vacated the city. On arriving at 8 P. M. at Donauwörth, Berthier seems to have quite lost his ability to gauge the conditions. The predominant idea in his mind was no longer that if the enemy attacked before the 15th he was to retire behind the Lech, but it was that the emperor had said that his aim was to have his headquarters at Ratisbon; he wrote Davout that the emperor's plan to assemble at Ratisbon could not be executed because St. Hilaire had probably left the place, but added: "I am very impatient to know if we are still in Ratisbon;" and he wrote to Lefebvre that he also should have retired thither. When shortly he heard that St. Hilaire still held Ratisbon, he ordered Davout to cling to the place, as the emperor desired to "centralize his troops at Ratisbon," and would no doubt make his headquarters at that point, "so as to manœuvre on the enemy." He was to assemble there on St. Hilaire and Nansouty's heavy cavalry, instead of carrying out the operation he was under previous instructions engaged in, of moving down to Ingolstadt. Oudinot was also ordered to march on and be in Ratisbon in four days; and Wrede and Lefebvre, who as the Austrians advanced had begun to fall back from the Isar, were instructed to reoccupy Sträubing and Landshut. Berthier seemed to choose those parts of Napoleon's Instructions whose execution would do the most harm, and irrespective of the enemy's operations, ordered accordingly. He also wrote the emperor what action he had taken.

Later, April 13, at 11 P. M., the letter of April 10 reached Berthier, and he therein quite overlooked the phrase "if they attack before the 15th everything is to fall back upon the Lech," grasped at the other phrases, which were secondary to this one, and again wrote Davout that the emperor had ordered that he was to carry his headquarters to Ratisbon, and place his corps within a day of that town, "and this whatever happens;" and added that the emperor's intention was that after Davout should have made his movement on Ratisbon, St. Hilaire, Nansouty and Morand were to be sent forward to Freising or Landshut, and the Bavarians to hold their position. And, "the emperor having changed his dispositions," he also withdrew the orders given Oudinot, Wrede and Lefebvre to move to Ratisbon and the Isar.

Thus went lost the spirit of all Napoleon's instructions to his chief of staff, as well as the principle, which Berthier ought by this time to have learned, that Napoleon always strove to concentrate at a place so distant from probable contact with the enemy that the whole army might be got in hand and ready for a massed blow, before one could be received or given. Napoleon had distinctly laid down, as the principle governing the case, that if the enemy "attacked" before April 10 (later made April 15), the army was to retire to the Lech. Should the enemy debouch from Bohemia towards Ratisbon, the Bavarian corps would naturally retire on Ingolstadt, and Davout on Ingolstadt and Donauwörth, and headquarters would come to the latter place. Every word he had written, his uniform habit, his new rules of strategy, all pointed to one idea, to concentrate at a point out of touch with the enemy — in this case behind the Lech; but the natural inference followed, that if the enemy was late in advancing, then to make that point as far forward as possible — in this case preferably Ratisbon. Under shifting conditions,



The Danube-Isar Country.

no instructions could have been more clearly given; and yet, though Berthier had seen Napoleon act on this theory ever since 1796, he could not grasp it. He neither acted on any theory, nor obeyed the one important condition of the Instructions; and yet he had robbed himself of every excuse by writing at 5 A. M., April 11, to the emperor from Strasburg: "The enemy, Sire, has anticipated us by crossing the Inn without our knowledge."

Quite apart from the fact that Napoleon always concealed his military theories, this hebetude is not to be wondered at. Others had been as blind; and Napoleon kept Berthier near him, not because of his military breadth, but on account of his habit of literally obeying orders and attending with admirable patience and skill to logistical details; and, be it said, because he was used to him, and "hated new faces about him." Is there any wonder, when the man nearest the emperor was so obtuse, that Napoleon's new method of war so long remained a puzzle?

On April 11 the Austrians had finished their passage of the Inn, Rosenberg and Lichtenstein at Schärding: Hiller, Louis and Kienmayer at Braunau; Hohenzollern between them; but they had not advanced farther. The two Bohemian corps had reached the Naab, where the van crossed above Nabburg, struck some of Friant's troops and pushed them back to Amberg. Uncertain what this portended, Friant was ordered to manœuvre in that vicinity to hold back any Austrian advance, while Davout was still moving his column on towards the Danube at Ingolstadt, eager to get in touch with the rest of the army, in accordance with his earlier orders. By the 13th the Austrians had their main force on a line north and south through Eggenfelden, and the Bohemian corps were closing up near Nabburg. St. Hilaire and Nansouty were still in Ratisbon; and Montbrun and St. Sulpice kept up connection with Morand, Gudin and Demont, who had reached Ingolstadt; Friant was at Neumarkt. "The orders which have been given me to reunite with the French troops which were on the Lech have been carried out," Davout wrote. Lefebvre was manœuvring on the Isar; Massena was about Augsburg, and Vandamme at Rain. Here was precisely the situation in which Berthier was to retire behind the Lech; the enemy had "attacked" before the 15th; and yet he was unable to see it.

Davout, who was not only a staunch fighter, but one of the best equipped of soldiers, comprehended the conditions when Berthier did not. Calling the attention of the chief of staff to the danger of the existing positions, and the inadvisability of concentrating his own corps at Ratisbon, he indicated Ingolstadt as the proper place for assembly. Indeed, he had constantly been acting on this idea. Yet Berthier, though a dispatch to Massena and one to the emperor seems to indicate the feeling that the Lech was the better place for concentrating, reiterated his instructions to Davout to collect his divisions at Ratisbon, having, he said, only mentioned Ingolstadt under the impression that Ratisbon might have been quite vacated.

On April 14, A. M., Davout wrote Berthier: "It is very pressing that this unstitched condition that exists should be ended;" but on receiving the new orders he wrote: "I will leave to-night for Ratisbon. I will do what I can to assemble the army there to-morrow. . . . I fear much for Wrede's march. . . . I fear to arrive when Ratisbon is evacuated. . . . It seems to me that the best manœuvre to make was to debouch through Ingolstadt. . . . The Austrians would not for several days have been attacking Friant and St. Hilaire, if they had not some plan. In this state of things I believe that what it would be best to do would be to debouch through Ingolstadt, and it would be easy to assemble the army promptly there. . . . If you persist in the orders, I will execute them. . . . It is impossible to assemble the army at Ratisbon in less than forty-eight hours, and before that time it can be ready to debouch through Ingolstadt, occupying all the cross-roads of the Altmühl. You will remember that in assembling at Ingolstadt I conformed to the dispositions which had been sent me." And he asked, if the right bank was free, the privilege of marching on Ratisbon that way. Later in the day he notified Berthier that St. Hilaire was still in Ratisbon, and that he was moving thither.

On the 14th, accordingly, the French army was no nearer concentration, while the Austrian columns advanced to a line north and south through Neumarkt. Next day the Austrians pushed on to the Vils, and the Bohemian corps down the Naab to Schwandorf, while Berthier continued his cross-purpose orders.

At noon he had written Davout that everything had been fixed so that Wrede should retire to Ingolstadt, Vandamme being at Rain, Davout to be at Ratisbon and Lefebvre falling back on Augsburg, St. Hilaire to move out towards Freising or Pfaffenhofen, Massena and Oudinot at Augsburg. "This is the way the emperor, who is to arrive to-morrow or day after to-morrow, desires to find things. . . . On reflection, the reserve of cavalry and St. Hilaire should be directed on Pfaffenhofen, and confine themselves to scouting out towards Landshut and Freising. . . . I repeat to you that your headquarters are to be at Ratisbon, and all your army corps within a march of this town, according to the circumstances. The emperor desires to find you there." At 4 P. M. he wrote Davout again : "I do not doubt that to begin with you have given orders for your whole corps to move on Ratisbon, where the emperor intends that you shall have your headquarters." And at 10 P. M. : "When you reach Ratisbon, you will take care of Sträubing." And at 2 A. M., April 15, that he might march on both banks of the Danube, and if he still found Ratisbon unoccupied by the enemy, he could occupy it. If the enemy had it, the line of the Altmühl would be taken up. At 7 P. M., April 15, he ordered St. Hilaire, as soon as relieved by Davout, to move back to Ingolstadt, and Wrede to fall back through Ingolstadt on Rain. At 11 P. M., April 15, Davout notified Berthier that Bellegarde and Kollowrath were in his front, that he held Ratisbon, and could debouch on either side with fifty thousand men.

During the night of April 15–16 Berthier drove to Augsburg, thinking the emperor might first go thither, and at 5 A. M. the 16th, wrote Davout that he might keep St. Hilaire in Ratisbon if the enemy was near by. He wrote Lefebvre to reunite his corps near Geisenfeld so as to protect Ingolstadt and Vohburg, and to Wrede to do the like at Biburg. At 6 A. M. he got Napoleon's much belated Paris dispatch of the 10th: "If the enemy shall have attacked before the 15th, you must concentrate the troops at Augsburg and Donauwörth, and let everything be ready to march." And he had on the 13th received the letter of the 10th: "Davout no doubt has his headquarters at Nürnberg. Notify him that everything leads us to believe that the Austrians are to commence the attack, and that if they attack before the 15th, everything must fall back upon the Lech." Yet with all this before him, Berthier did nothing on the 16th to prevent Davout from carrying out his erroneous orders to assemble in Ratisbon; he only wrote the emperor at 8 A. M. that he much desired his arrival, and "it is the moment to assume our dispositions against the enemy, who manœuvres much and has the initiative," and gave him the situation of the army; while three divisions of Davout's corps, which were just where they were needed, at Ingolstadt, set out to march on Ratisbon, where, at a distance from the French right wing, they would be in danger of being crushed between the Bohemian corps and Charles. Berthier had failed to see that the orders to assemble at Ratisbon were always qualified by the condition that the Austrians should have made no movement — should not have "attacked" — by the 15th; and he had manœuvred the several corps in such fashion that he himself scarcely knew their whereabouts.

Confederation Artilleryman.

Meanwhile, on this same 16th of April, the archduke slowly advanced to the Isar, Rosenberg on the right towards Dingolfing, throwing a party on Sträubing to reconnoitre the road to Ratisbon; Louis, Hohenzollern, Lichtenstein and Kienmayer on Landshut; and Hiller on the left on Moosburg. Jellachic reached Munich. This consuming of six days to march from the Inn to the Isar, — from Braunau to Landshut, — a matter of fifty miles, is explainable partly by exceptionally bad weather, and partly on the ground of hypercaution. Following the error of the Aulic Council, it was what transferred the initiative of the campaign from the Austrians to the French, what saved Napoleon from an early backset.

From Ingolstadt, April 17, Lefebvre explained his late manœuvres to the emperor: "Sire, Your Majesty will recall the positions you had the three divisions of the Bavarian army take: Munich, Landshut and Sträubing. They occupied them when I took command, and they stayed in them until April 14, when seeing myself pressed by the Austrians, I decided to retire during the night to the Lech, the two right divisions through Dachau on Augsburg, and the left one through Ingolstadt, Neuburg and Rain, in accordance with my first instructions. . . . I was about to execute my movement . . . when I received orders to reoccupy Landshut, which I had left the day before, and to move towards Ratisbon to cover that town. It was noon, I had not a moment to lose. At two o'clock Deroy was marching on Landshut, while the crown prince was moving on Freising. . . . Wrede had already gone to Abensberg."

But this fresh advance to the Isar proved of no avail; for lest he should be cut off by the columns which were crossing above and below him, Deroy shortly fell back to Pfeffenhausen, to protect Siegenburg and the crossing of the Abens; the crown prince gave up the Freising crossing and retired towards Pfaffenhofen; Wrede had already made his way to Abensberg, where was another important bridge. This reassembling was as critical as it was essential; it could not have taken place had the Austrians speedily followed; but Charles, under the control of the Aulic Council, was cautious even to the danger limit. None the less, on the 16th we have the thoroughly un-Napoleonic situation of the two French wings separated in the presence of the enemy by the eighty odd miles between Ratisbon and Augsburg, and this gap held only by these same Bavarian divisions, standing at isolated places; while the Austrians might next day advance in one overwhelming mass from the Isar on this very point. So much for Berthier's military skill. Had the archduke known the situation and suspected that he was facing only Berthier, and not Napoleon, he surely would have pushed ahead, seized Siegenburg, and broken up the Bavarians, as a prelude to a march on the right or the left wing of the French; or at least would have reached Ratisbon on the 15th, where he would have trapped Davout between his own and the Bohemian armies and crushed him; whereupon a further march on Lefebvre and Massena would have beaten the entire French army part by part. But his information was, as is usual in war, quite limited; and able as he was, he had not the emperor's rare gift of strategic divination.

Luckily for the French, Napoleon was near at hand. A number of "telegraph" or semaphore stations had been established in central and southern Germany, all converging on Strasburg — from which place were some forty stations to Paris. Theoretically, messages could be delivered very rapidly, but neither speed nor accuracy were always present, and the slowness of the April 10 dispatch does not speak much for the service. Having learned from Otto, late April 12, in Paris, the Austrian crossing of the Inn on the 10th, the emperor started at daylight next morning for the front. "I suppose," he wrote Berthier, "that you are at Augsburg, and that you have centralized all my army on the Lech." The emperor stopped only at Strasburg, the morning of the 13th, and at Kehl to see the new fortifications. At Ludwigsburg he met the King of Wurtemberg, and at Dillingen the King of Bavaria, who had taken refuge there, remaining a short hour to consult with each. On receiving, early April 16, at Ludwigsburg, Berthier's report of having ordered Oudinot to Ratisbon, and Lefebvre back to Sträubing and Landshut, he at once saw that his chief of staff had blundered. He later told him, says Savary, that if he did not thoroughly know him, he would have suspected disloyalty, for he had placed Davout more at Charles' disposal than his master's. He at once wrote: —

> "You do not let me know what necessitates so extraordinary a measure, which enfeebles and disseminates my troops. . . . As to the order to occupy Landshut, I do not find it reasonable. . . . I do not well understand the spirit of your letter of the evening of the 13th, and should have preferred to know my army concentrated between Ingolstadt and Augsburg, the Bavarians in first line, as Lefebvre had placed himself, until one knows what the enemy will do. I am anxious to have news of Davout. You must conform to my Instructions, which are to rally my army and to have it well in hand. If the enemy debouched by the Tyrol, and we were obliged to give battle at Augsburg, without Oudinot being there, it would be a great misfortune. If, on the other hand, we were obliged to abandon Augsburg, which is not yet in a condition of defense, and thus to give up our magazines at Ulm, it would be a great misfortune. Everything would have been excellent if Davout had been near Ingolstadt, Massena, with the Wurtembergers and Oudinot's corps, at Augsburg. . . . As to Davout, St. Hilaire, Nansouty and Montbrun, the instructions for them, as for everybody, are to concentrate between Ratisbon, Ingolstadt and Augsburg; so that just the opposite should have been done from what you have done."

This dispatch was hurried forward, and another informing Massena that he had countermanded Oudinot's advance: "I have given the order that he should arrest his movement and hold himself within reach of you, so that he might rejoin you before the enemy at Augsburg, and that if the Austrians attempt anything, your corps, that of Oudinot, that of Vandamme, and that of Lefebvre should be reunited." Napoleon himself followed, uneasy about the army, and yet, hearing that the Austrians had not got far beyond the Inn on the 14th, believing that affairs could not be inextricably mixed. Augsburg and Ratisbon were fairly strong, and could resist Charles for a short period, under such men as Massena and Davout; and if the archduke turned towards either, he would enable the emperor to fall on his rear from the other direction. The weakness of the centre was the crying danger; but on studying the situation from the few facts known, and especially by watching Bellegarde and Kollowrath, Napoleon judged Charles' direction would be Ratisbon, and on this he based his action. Through Dillingen he reached Donauwörth at 4 A. M., April 17, hoping there to find Berthier, who was then in Augsburg; but it did not take many hours to ascertain the main facts, and to realize the grave danger into which the Major-General had manœuvred the army.

At 8 A. M., April 16, Berthier wrote the emperor that Massena was at Augsburg, Oudinot at Aichach, Vandamme along the Lech and at Neuburg, the Bavarians at Ingolstadt, Geisenfeld and Vohburg, Friant on the Altmühl, Wrede at Neustadt, Davout and St. Hilaire at Ratisbon, and the cavalry moving on Neuburg and Ingolstadt. "I await Your Majesty with impatience," he says. "It is the moment to decide your plans of campaign. Your troops are about as you desire, except the reserve of cavalry and St. Hilaire."

In a postscript he adds: "In carefully re-reading your Instructions, you seemed to hold strongly to Ratisbon, and that is a position we are occupying." And then most curiously: "I should have preferred that we should concentrate on the Lech."

At the same hour Davout was writing Berthier that Ratisbon was safe.

The emperor at once wrote Berthier to return to Donauwörth, and began to glean information as to the situation of the army, with which no one seemed familiar. He wrote during the morning to Lefebvre at Geisenfeld: "Let me know yourself where you think are the principal forces of the enemy;" and to Massena that he was to hold himself in readiness to march "at the moment when the enemy shall approach a little, and that we shall know well his dispositions." To Davout he wrote: "My intention had always been to concentrate my troops behind the Lech. Fall back with all your troops on Ingolstadt. I am giving orders to Lefebvre to hold in respect the Landshut corps, and to protect your movement. Friant must equally withdraw on Ingolstadt. He can nevertheless hold posts of observation on the Altmühl, considering it a great bridge-head. . . . Hold your troops close and in order, and if in this sharp movement, which the enemy is not expecting, you find means of falling on the Landshut column, if it has advanced, this will be a superb occasion; but do not move away more than half a march to bring it about." It is amazing that, within a few hours of the emperor reaching Donauwörth and finding his forces absolutely disseminated and compromised, he should thus undertake the offensive. He also wrote Lefebvre at Vohburg that Davout was coming in by way of Neustadt, and that he was to protect his left: "My intention is that you should go to the vanguard at Neustadt where Wrede is, and that you should assemble your troops to hold in respect the Landshut corps, or to carry yourself to the aid of Davout if it should be necessary, while he makes his movement, and to coöperate in the defeat of the Landshut corps, if the unexpected return of Davout should surprise it, and put it in the way of doing him an injury."

While Napoleon was rectifying the situation from Donauwörth, Berthier, from Augsburg, was still sending out cross-purpose orders; but he wrote to the emperor stating his anxiety to find him, and giving, at 8.30 A. M., April 17, the situation of the troops and the enemy. "It seems to me that the enemy has his right at Munich and his left on the Tyrol, which he has persuaded to rise. He counts on movements in Switzerland. He does the same thing with his right . . . in the Bamberg country. His posts are Amberg, Cham, Sträubing, Landshut, Munich and the Tyrol. Your army to-day is thus placed: at Augsburg, Massena and Oudinot; at Donauwörth, the Wurtembergers; the Bavarians near Ingolstadt . . . moving by Rain on Donauwörth; Demont at Ingolstadt; at Ratisbon, Davout with his three other divisions, St. Hilaire and Montbrun." Shortly Berthier received the emperor's message to return to Donauwörth, and at once ceased issuing orders and drove thither.

Despite the serious conditions, there yet lay hope in speed and purpose, and the emperor pushed his inquiries for news as well as his orders, and again asked Lefebvre: "What is the army corps which has debouched at Landshut? Where is it moving to? What is the march of the other columns of which you, or Wrede, have knowledge?" It was indeed fortunate that he was at hand, and that the Austrian advance was slow; for no one knew exactly where the French corps were, let alone the enemy's, as the topographical errors in the orders show. Yet although the Grand Army had never been manœuvred into so grave danger, despite want of information the emperor made no strategic mistakes in rectifying matters. One might suppose that, in this perilous situation, he would have ordered Davout in by way of the safer if longer roads on the north Danube bank. But no: to him the safest defense was a bold front, and Davout was to march on the south bank in battle order and ready for attack.

Lefebvre was to join in the operation, if conditions were favorable — all this being undertaken with the one essential purpose of assembling far enough in the rear to be prepared for the enemy.

Unaware that Davout would have to wait for Friant, whom he believed at Neumarkt heading for Ingolstadt, Napoleon expected Davout to march at daylight the 18th; but Friant had filed off towards Ratisbon in accordance with Berthier's later dispositions, and at 8 A. M., April 18, Davout wrote Berthier that Friant was eight leagues away, the heavy cavalry five leagues, and that it would be evening before he could get them together. Later in the evening he sent a dispatch that Montbrun had found Austrians out towards Sträubing, and that Gudin had found them on the Landshut road: "We are well assembled on the right bank. To-morrow at daylight we will march on Neustadt in three columns, of which one, composed of the train, will follow the route along the Danube."

With regard to the difficulty of getting accurate news, a letter from Davout to Berthier at 1 A. M., April 17, is of interest: "A Bavarian officer, who said he left Deroy at Landshut about 4 o'clock, and who arrived here at midnight, announced that this general had fought and was withdrawing on Ingolstadt. I questioned this officer much; he had in all his answers a certain embarrassment, which might have given me suspicion. He spoke to me of five hundred dead. Having asked him what he had seen, that number was reduced to about thirty; having asked him on his word of honor, he answered me that it was possible that he may have seen some men who made believe dead." This officer was evidently what we used in Virginia to call "demoralized," and about as useful an informant as the "intelligent contraband" of 1862.

When Berthier reached Donauwörth at noon on the 17th with headquarters reports of the slow Austrian advance, the emperor determined to make a sharper offensive subserve his concentration; and instead of retiring the left wing on Massena, he sent this marshal at 1 P. M. orders to start at 2 A. M. next day, the 18th, in light order and with four days' rations, from Augsburg, which he was to organize, with Moulin in command, as if it were to be besieged, and to march via Aichach and Pfaffenhofen towards Ingolstadt. "Your march has for object to combine itself with that of the army, to take the enemy in the very act, and to destroy his columns. It is necessary then that you should be light, that you should not have any strung-out rear" (queue, tail), "that the park-artillery should be with the army corps, and that two hours after it has debouched there should be nothing left on the road." And he ordered that all baggage and trains on the march from Ulm should be headed for and kept in Augsburg, so that if the enemy penetrated beyond the Lech, they could seize upon nothing. Secrecy was impressed upon Massena.

During the 17th, from Donauwörth, Napoleon had written Davout by the hands of Savary, by his aide Vence, by an artillery officer, and by a Bavarian major, and at 6 P. M. he sent back one of Davout's aides, telling him that Massena and Oudinot were to move before daylight on Pfaffenhofen, via Aichach, and that Nansouty, Demont and Vandamme would be at Ingolstadt (where they arrived late in the day), and the Bavarians between that city and Neustadt; and that he did not know what was at Sträubing or on the Altmühl. "To-morrow will be a day of preparation for coming together, and I suppose that Wednesday we shall be able, according to conditions, to manœuvre on the columns which have debouched from Landshut and elsewhere, and put into rout whatever shall be between the Danube, the Isar and perhaps even the Inn. . . . Your five divisions, including Demont's, the six divisions Massena is bringing, the three divisions of cuirassiers, are equal to beating all the assembled forces of the Austrian monarchy; but before all, it is necessary that our communications should be assured, and to march according to system. . . . My horses have not yet arrived. If you can send me one or two of yours without too much trouble, do so."

Owing to the archduke's slowness, the emperor was thus able to turn a questionable situation into the offensive, and by bringing up Massena towards Davout and the latter towards Ingolstadt, to recover his initiative. This one day of the master-mind had completely altered the situation. No study is more fruitful than the detail of these few stirring days, and it is particularly interesting to see how the emperor, with no greater information than the archduke, nevertheless divined the situation and probable Austrian operations, and, although thrusting in the dark, each time scored a hit, — as Charles did not.

Napoleon also sent Otto a proclamation for him to translate and print in German and French and distribute.

TO THE ARMY.

Soldiers! The territory of the Confederation has been violated. The Austrian general thinks we should flee at the aspect of his armies and abandon to him the territory of our allies. I arrive in the midst of you with the rapidity of the eagle. Soldiers! I was surrounded by you when the sovereign of Austria came to my bivouac in Moravia. You heard him implore my clemency and swear to me eternal friendship. Victors in three wars, to our generosity Austria has owed everything. Thrice she has been perjured. Our past successes are a sure guarantee of the victory that awaits us. March then, and at the sight of us let the enemy recognize his victors.

Meanwhile, during this puzzling 17th, the Austrian main force had been deploying on the left bank of the Isar on a line from Moosburg through Hohenthann, while the two Bohemian corps were at Nittenau on the Regen and Schwarzenfeld on the Naab. Louis followed Wrede towards Siegenburg; Hohenzollern and Rosenberg kept on towards Rottenberg, to reach the Laber; the reserve corps got to Altdorf and Ergolding; Hiller, from Moosburg, advanced on Mainburg and Au, sending a detachment towards Pfaffenhofen to connect with Jellachic, who was supposed to have advanced from Munich; and the party sent towards Sträubing reported Davout still there. The Austrian direction was on Kelheim and Neustadt — one fatal to the French centre.

During the coming night the reports as to the Austrian advance confirmed Napoleon in the idea that the archduke, assuming Davout to be still isolated at Ratisbon, proposed to fall on him; and at 4 A. M. he wrote to Lefebvre at Neustadt: "It seems that Archduke Charles with three army corps is moving between Landshut and Ratisbon." He also knew of the crossing at Moosburg and Freising and the occupation of Munich, and foresaw the probability of Davout's running across Charles, who was within a day's march of Ratisbon. In order to help him out, Lefebvre was instructed to be afoot at 2 A. M., to get his three divisions assembled by 9 A. M., and to operate on the enemy's left flank while he was thus heading north: "You will make the Bavarians understand what I expect of them these days." And Massena, who had to consume time in collecting his cantoned divisions, was told the situation, and was urged to the utmost speed to reach Pfaffenhofen: "The importance of your movement is such that it is possible that I may myself join your corps," Napoleon wrote. "Prince Charles with all his army debouched yesterday from Landshut on Ratisbon. He had three army corps, estimated at eighty thousand men." Davout, he said, was moving on Neustadt, and would operate with the Bavarians against Charles; and he ordered Massena to move up sharply on the latter's rear, or upon any columns coming from Freising and Moosburg: "Without doubt Davout, who has nearly sixty thousand men, can, if pushed to it, come out of this affair with honor, but I look upon the enemy as lost if Oudinot and your three divisions shall have debouched before day, and if on this important occasion you make my troops feel what it is necessary for them to do." In an autograph postscript he added: "Activity! Activity! Speed! I leave myself in your hands!"

The idea possessing the emperor's mind was that even if the archduke did throw his three corps against Davout on April 19, this marshal could hold his own — he had done more at Auerstädt; and if only Massena could get to Pfaffenhofen, cross the Ilm and take the Austrian army in reverse, a certain victory could be snatched from the situation. "Everything leads us to believe that between the 18th, 19th and 20th all the affairs of Germany will be decided," he wrote Massena.

During the afternoon of the 18th headquarters came to Ingolstadt, with Vandamme and the Wurtembergers; and Lefebvre had got concentrated — Wrede at Siegenburg, whence he drove out an Austrian party, repaired the bridge and occupied Biburg; the crown prince and Deroy at Neustadt. Later, Vandamme moved on Vohburg to sustain them. Except Friant, who on the 18th was at Hemau, Davout had got together his forces in Ratisbon, and St. Hilaire, Gudin and Morand, with St. Sulpice's cuirassiers and Montbrun's dragoons, stood ready to start towards Ingolstadt on Friant's arrival. The marshal wrote Berthier, reciting the status: "The column from Landshut shall not prevent our passing." Massena had completed the concentration, and his head of column under Oudinot had already got to Aichach. What saved Napoleon was the speed with which his marshals executed his orders, added to the accurate direction he gave their march. Yet both Massena and Davout had been a day late, owing to the dissemination of their divisions. The emperor's task for the 18th was to hold Abensberg, Siegenburg, and Neustadt, lest his centre be broken and Davout cut off. The Austrians were still marching in this direction with nearly one hundred thousand men, while Napoleon could assemble there less than forty thousand; and if he could not maintain his centre, the campaign was inevitably lost. Had Charles divined the situation and pushed in with vigor, he might have driven even Napoleon into the Danube; but the archduke could not see and act as quickly as his great opponent. Moreover, Napoleon had no idea of a defensive attitude. He knew that unexpected blows, even if not heavy, would serve to gain him a day's time; and in one day more he could finish shifting the scenes.

French Line Fusiliers.

Charles had not been as rapid as the conditions demanded, but according to his light he was wise. In the presence of Napoleon he could not afford to run risks. The 18th had seen the army advancing to a line drawn through Pfeffenhausen, to which Louis advanced, and Rottenburg, which Rosenberg and Hohenzollern reached, while Hiller got to Mainburg. His orders for the 19th were still to move in three columns in the general direction of Neustadt and Kelheim to keep the French wings apart; but when, partly by a captured dispatch of Lefebvre's to Davout, he learned the latter's continued presence in Ratisbon, and the arrival of the emperor, he felt anxious to join his Bohemian corps; and hoping at the same time to surround Davout, he changed his orders, and assembled the corps of Hohenzollern and Rosenberg, with Lichtenstein's reserve, at Rohr, leaving Louis advancing towards the Siegenburg region, and Hiller's flying wing at Mainburg, with Kienmayer's reserve corps coming up as a support to the left wing. Charles' purpose was to move upon Davout at Ratisbon; yet he imagined the French readier to meet him than they really were, and continued to advance with caution. If he meant to inflict the heaviest blow possible on Davout, he could best do so by first crushing the French centre and then turning on this marshal, or else by marching on Ratisbon through the defile by which Davout would be apt to approach Ingolstadt. This was a narrow stretch, between heavily wooded hills and the river, from Abach to Saal. Charles had men to spare, and the position at the mouth of the Saal defile could have been made for Davout a Caudine Forks; but like every one of that day, he feared to venture on a bold manœuvre with Napoleon in his front.

The emperor had impressed on Massena alternate possibilities of action: he would either have to head on Abensberg to join Davout, or to move off to the right towards Landshut to take the Austrians in reverse — which course the events of the 19th might call for was uncertain. At 3 A. M. Lefebvre was ordered to hold Siegenburg and Abensberg, and until Davout's arrival, to fend off an attack, which might at any moment come. Napoleon still assumed that the archduke must have advanced against Davout, and yet no sound of firing came during the forenoon to confirm this view; but hearing from Massena that Oudinot, leading the right wing van, had at Pfaffenhofen run across an Austrian body of some four thousand men, the situation was again confused, for he did not know that it was only a large reconnoitring detachment from Hiller's flying wing, which had made a handsome fight to develop the force of the French. But the emperor's instinct was keen, and he wrote Massena at noon, April 19, from Ingolstadt: —

> "This is the true state of things. Prince Charles with all his army was this morning within a day of Ratisbon, and has his line of operations on Landshut. Davout last night and this morning evacuated Ratisbon to move on Neustadt and join the Bavarians. I expected an affair to-day, yet it is noon, and cannon has not yet been heard. You see that in this manœuvre I am refusing my left, wishing to advance my right, which you make up, and which from to-day is entering the game. This evening or to-morrow they will perhaps be fighting on the left. . . . All this must get cleared up to-day, and minutes are precious. Hold Oudinot's corps ready, and place your four divisions around Pfaffenhofen in the three directions of Neustadt, Freising and Au, so that according to circumstances, one of these can march first and lead the others on the point to which the march may have to be made. Here everything is now a calculation of hours."

This action was taken in the effort not only to seize Charles' communications, but to bring these troops up where they would be within call of those on the Abens. Just before starting for the line of the Abens, where he expected the first development, the emperor again, in a postscript to a duplicate of the above order, changed the direction of the Au column to Neustadt, "so as to gain a march to sustain the left." This uncertainty as to whether he would draw in Massena to Davout, or throw him on the Austrian rear, together with the action he took, is in the highest degree interesting.

Friant's division having stolen a march on the Bohemian corps and arrived at Ratisbon during the night of April 18–19, and Coutard's regiment been detailed to hold the bridge, with orders to retard until the last moment possible any Austrian troops which might essay to cross, Davout started before daylight towards Ingolstadt in three columns of foot and one of horse, "all dispositions being made to assure this flank march, which the presence of the whole enemy's army rendered very delicate," says his report. One of these, consisting of the reserve artillery, train, and heavy cavalry, preceded by a foot battalion and followed by light horse, moved via Abach through the defile towards Saal and Abensberg, while, to protect this march from the Austrian army, which was known to be liable to attack the column on the march, Morand, followed by St. Hilaire, headed from Hohengebraching for Peising and Teugen, and Gudin, followed by Friant, from Weinting via Hinkofen and Weilohe, covered by cavalry parties well out in front, advanced over roads Davout had

French Hussar Trumpeter.

taken pains to reconnoitre. Montbrun's horse, from Egglofsheim, by way of Luckenpoint and Dinzling, covered the left of the whole corps. These last columns, able to take in reverse any Austrian force that adventured too far towards the critical point Abensberg-Saal, show the careful and bold method of Davout's work. The men were all keyed up to battle pitch.

Shortly before 11 A. M., when Davout's column reached the Feking brook, a report ran in announcing the approach of a large Austrian force ; and in fact, from his position facing the Abens, the archduke had the day before ployed the three corps assembled in Rohr to the right into three columns, and started them on Ratisbon. He had seventy thousand men to Davout's forty-five thousand. The right column under Lichtenstein was to head through Langquaid and Eggmühl on Egglofsheim ; the centre under Rosenberg through Dinzling on Weilohe; and the left under Hohenzollern to divide in two columns, one through the defile and one to the right of Hausen and Teugen — both on Abach. Some six thousand men under Thierry were detailed to move on Abensberg and keep touch with Louis, in front of Siegenburg, sustained by Kienmayer at Pfeffenhausen, and with Hiller in front of Mainburg and Au. When the left Austrian columns, on the march towards Abach, between Saalhaupt and Hausen, ran across Davout's left foot column, this marshal, who was on the ground, quickly guessed that the Austrians were mainly heading for Ratisbon, and, aware that such a march would now be a thrust in the air, was wise enough to keep in rapid motion towards Abensberg those divisions which were not affected by the Austrian manœuvre, or could be kept out of it, and particularly the train. To protect the latter, he filed the leading divisions of the two foot columns, Morand and Gudin, over towards Saal, and brought up the following divisions, St. Hilaire and Friant, to meet the Austrians in front. These he deployed on some heights called the Kuhberg, and met the enemy's advance with his accustomed vigor. It was evident that the farther the French columns got, the easier they could not only approach the army, but take in reverse any Austrian force advancing on Ratisbon; and as his first duty was to join the French centre, Davout put into action only such forces as became essential. His assumption proved correct. Morand and Gudin, having advanced far enough towards Saal to secure the defile, were wheeled in to support the right of St. Hilaire and Friant, but they were barely needed. After a short and sharp tussle, largely in the woods east of Teugen and Feking, St. Hilaire, who opened the fight, and Friant, who came up on his left, won the field with their superior forces, the enemy about 6 P. M. fell back in a heavy thunderstorm through Hausen, with loss of between three and four thousand men to a somewhat less loss of the French,



Battle of Thann.

and Davout's head of column by dark got into touch with Lefebvre. "These two divisions assembled not only sustained the effort of all the army of Archduke Charles and maintained the position on which they had rapidly formed despite the reiterated attacks of the enemy, but they chased him from what he had taken, drove him back a league in their front, and slept on the field of battle. The fruit of this day was the reassembling of the 3d Corps with the rest of the Army of Germany." Of the other two Austrian columns, only Rosenberg's was engaged, and he slightly. They kept on to Dinzling and Egglofsheim, Montbrun and Piré merely skirmishing for effect, and, having no guns, being compelled to file off during the afternoon towards Peising. It is not frequent that a heavy engagement is thus fought within reach of large bodies without bringing more of the rival forces into contact, and the fault lay with Charles.

While all this was occurring on the Austrian right, the force under Thierry, in order to protect the left of the main advance on Ratisbon from interference by the French troops on the Abens, had advanced from Rohr forward on Arnhofen, and in front of this place ran across Lefebvre, who, pursuant to Napoleon's orders, was debouching from Abensberg, to neutralize in part, by his offensive, any attack the archduke might make on Davout, and to enable his own left to reach out towards this marshal. The contact came about 2 P. M., east of Arnhofen, and Lefebvre, whom Morand appears to have reached near Thann and aided by a flank attack, quickly thrust the Austrian line beyond Offenstetten, the cannonading lasting until late at night; whereupon the crown prince and Deroy took post at Abensberg, while Wrede was sent back to Siegenburg, where another detachment by the Austrian left wing had been thrown forward towards the Abens.

Davout safely reached the vicinity of Abensberg by night. Friant and St. Hilaire camped on the battlefield, Gudin and Morand at Arnhofen. The grave danger of Berthier's creation had been turned into an excellent offensive position, and it was now the Austrian centre that was open to a breach. The emperor rode the lines of the Abens, and then, joining the Bavarians, brought headquarters to Vohburg.

At night Lichtenstein was at Egglofsheim, Rosenberg at Dinzling, Hohenzollern at Hausen, Thierry near Offenstetten, Louis facing Siegenburg, and Hiller at Mainburg, with Kienmayer supporting both. Kollowrath was at Stadt am Hof, and Bellegarde was approaching from Amberg.

Massena meanwhile had kept in motion, and by nightfall on the 19th had got all his forces up to Pfaffenhofen, several of the divisions having made thirty miles as their day's stint. He drove an Austrian detachment out of the place and was practically neutralizing Hiller. Oudinot took position on the roads towards Au and Freising.

The first Bulletin of the Army of Germany, dated Headquarters at Ratisbon, April 24, 1809, contains something worth a paragraph. Like all generals, ancient and modern, Napoleon issued bulletins to encourage his troops, satisfy the public and add to his own reputation.

> With regard to the battle of Thann, we find that "the division St. Hilaire arrived at the village of Peising, met the enemy, stronger in numbers but much inferior in bravery, and there the campaign opened by a combat glorious for our arms. St. Hilaire, sustained by Friant, overturned all that was before him, carried the positions of the enemy, killed a great number of men and made six or seven hundred prisoners. The 72d distinguished itself in this day, and the 57th sustained its ancient reputation. Sixteen years ago this regiment had in Italy been named The Terrible, and it has well justified its surname in this affair, where

alone it met and successively defeated six Austrian regiments. . . . In all these combats our loss was small in comparison with the enemy, who particularly lost many officers and generals, who were obliged to go to the head to give movement to their troops."

In the two days and a half that Napoleon had been on the field he had transformed the entire strategical situation. When, on the morning of the 17th, he reached Donauwörth, the enemy stood substantially in one body in front of Landshut, while the isolated French left wing, less than thirty miles away at Ratisbon, was liable to be overwhelmed; the French right wing, equally isolated at Augsburg, seventy miles away, could not get up in season to be of any aid; and the sparsely held centre could have been brushed away like a cobweb. The archduke, with speed and knowledge of the situation, had an easy problem in handling Davout (who, moreover, had the two Bohemian corps approaching on him from the rear), in then wheeling to the left up the Danube right bank to sweep away Lefebvre, after which he could confidently meet Massena. Such an operation, sharply carried out, would have hustled the French army back upon the Rhine. Napoleon had shown in several campaigns how to overwhelm an enemy; but not only had the lesson fallen on sterile minds, but that speed which is of the essence of success the Austrian leader, able though he was, had not at his command. On the other hand, Napoleon had worked with marvelous rapidity; and in a brief sixty hours he had drawn in Davout, so that the Bohemian corps had lost their objective; he had drawn in Massena's corps to a point where it could enter into the manœuvre; and he could confidently meet the Austrian onset. Moreover, the Austrians were beginning to separate their forces, as they approached the enemy, and Napoleon was concentrating all he had. He was profiting by their faults.

On April 19 Napoleon wrote to the King of Saxony from

Ingolstadt: "Your Majesty will have seen in the declaration of Austria the little reason she has to make war. I only learned it by the passage of the Inn, for this declaration was never sent to me. I at once made my way to the army, and before eight days the Austrians will see the extent of the precipice that they have dug under their feet."

Bavarian Sergeant.

XLII.

ABENSBERG AND EGGMÜHL. APRIL 19 TO 23, 1809.

For two days Charles had been lengthening his front by reaching out to Ratisbon, and Napoleon had been shortening his by bringing Davout and Massena in towards the centre. The tables were turned. Charles' only safety was to smartly retire to the Isar, but Napoleon afforded him no time. Although his information was scant, he divined the situation, and on April 20 advanced his own centre sharply on the Austrian centre, while Davout contained Charles' right, and Massena moved towards Landshut around his left. From being outnumbered in the centre, Napoleon now had an excess there, and in the battle of Abensberg he ruptured the Austrian centre and cut Charles' right off from his left. Meanwhile Davout had contained Charles' heavier right, while Napoleon supposed the left the stronger. On April 21 Napoleon pursued the Austrian left wing, and at Landshut struck it severely, while Davout, as seriously outnumbered as he had been at Auerstädt, still contained Charles, who had not acted as vigorously as required. Late April 21 Napoleon saw Davout's danger, for the two Austrian corps which had debouched from Bohemia had been called in by Charles. He hurried him reinforcements, and himself, on April 22, marched towards him. Early in the afternoon he reached Eggmühl, and between Davout opposite the Austrian left and his own forces on its right, in the battle of Eggmühl Charles was driven back to Ratisbon. For the first time Napoleon neglected to pursue, and on April 23 Ratisbon had to be taken, while Charles withdrew in good condition across the Danube, and later towards the Bohemian mountains. Bessières, suitably sustained, was pursuing the Austrian left wing.

During the 19th of April Charles' manœuvring had lengthened the front of the Austrian lines; Napoleon had been shortening the front of the French, who in the evening faced their opponents on the Danube-Abens line; Vandamme occupying Neustadt and Siegenburg, Lefebvre with the crown prince and Deroy at Abensberg and Wrede at Biburg; Morand and Gudin of Davout's corps in the Saal-Arnhofen region under

Lannes, who had just arrived from Spain and been invested with command; and Nansouty's and St. Sulpice's cavalry near by in support. Out on the left, on yesterday's battlefield, was Davout personally, with Friant and St. Hilaire, and Montbrun's dragoons; and Massena was in the vicinity of Pfaffenhofen, with a party out at Au, and Oudinot on the Freising road. Thus the centre and left were now together, and the right within working distance of the centre. Opposite Davout stood Charles' right wing, Hohenzollern on the heights behind Hausen, Rosenberg near Dinzling; the 1st Corps reserve on the heights of Grub, Lichtenstein with the cuirassiers, Lindenau and Veczay, on the main road from Eggmühl to Ratisbon, with van at Egglofsheim. Charles' centre was thus pushed forward from the Laber in the direction of Hausen and Thann, while the left wing under Louis stood facing the Abens, with Bianchi on the heights in front of Biburg, Reuss on those in front of Siegenburg, Thierry near Offenstetten, and Kienmayer in reserve; Hiller's flying left wing had advanced to the river at Mainburg. Bellegarde was marching from Amberg on Neustadt, and Kollowrath was at Stadt am Hof.

As in almost all similar cases, the authorities differ much as to the exact positions and strength of the rival divisions and corps: the different bodies are mentioned in the many French and German reports and authorities as occupying certain posts at hours not always specified; and all that one can be certain about is the presence of the larger parts of each army at such places as shall explain the grand tactical manœuvres. On small charts, the purpose of which is only to indicate at a glance the general position, so as to catch the eye of and assist the reader, nothing like exactness can be arrived at. The most reliable contemporary records and the best historians vary frequently. But the strategy and grand tactics are plain.

Charles had been outmanœuvred. Whereas at Landshut he had been concentrated opposite the weak French centre, his line was now long and in awkward groups; and his right wing, reaching out towards the Bohemian corps, was too strong for the petty force that opposed it. Should the Austrians strive to concentrate for battle, Massena could sooner strike Hiller's flying left wing at Mainburg than the archduke fall in on his own centre and left. Napoleon proposed to follow up the success of April 19 by vigorous work on the 20th, but he was ignorant of what the enemy might be doing. At 3 A. M. Berthier wrote Lefebvre: "The emperor desires that you should let him know at once if the enemy has beaten in retreat." He did, however, believe that Charles would retire on Landshut, which was his natural line of retreat, and where large supplies were accumulated: it was a second thought which suggested to him to break through the Austrian centre. Although each leader was but half informed of the other's whereabouts, yet Napoleon's admirable manœuvring of the 19th, on his assumptions from what he did know, had completely turned the tables. There was a gap between the Austrian right and left wings, held by a slender cordon of troops, which the French could brush away and cut the army in two, and then turning to the right and the left beat each of the severed parts in detail: Napoleon had now the precise opportunity Charles had neglected. And yet the archduke

Bavarian Light Infantryman.

was a soldier of high rank, perhaps — with Wellington — the strongest of his contemporaries, except when the gigantic personality of Napoleon overshadowed him and robbed him of the push and purpose he really possessed. That he was but one of many in like case cannot discredit him.

The only manœuvre by which Charles could assemble his dispersed divisions before Napoleon could strike his blow was by a rapid concentric march to the rear on Landshut; and that he must not be allowed time to do this was manifest. Like Gustavus and Frederick, Napoleon was always scheming what to do under conditions which might arise: without running riot, his imagination constantly conjured up possible combinations. It has been often alleged that Napoleon thought and ordered once for all. This is not so. His plans developed rapidly, but by the usual process; and at the expense of prolixity, this process has occasionally been dwelt upon, together with the changes his ideas and plans underwent, as their study or the shifting conditions gave them a new complexion. So here was gradually developed the plan for nullifying this retreat to Landshut by advancing Massena around the enemy's left to seize his direct line of communications, as well as his rich magazines. To best accomplish this, he proposed to leave Davout with St. Hilaire and Friant to "hold the enemy in respect" near Thann and Hausen, and St. Sulpice to hold the Saal defile. This would contain the Austrian right wing, while Lannes should head Morand and Gudin with Nansouty's cuirassiers on Rohr, break through the enemy's line, seize the road to Landshut, and cut Charles and Louis apart; and Napoleon with the Bavarians and Wurtembergers should advance on Pfeffenhausen against the Austrian left.

The situation was clear to the emperor's mind. He was as yet mistaken as to the existing facts, for at 6 A. M., April 20, he wrote Massena: —

> "All the reports of this morning are that the enemy is beating in retreat with all speed. The battlefield is covered with his dead. The divisions Friant and St. Hilaire, and a Bavarian division, were the only ones engaged. I am mounting to go myself to reconnoitre the situation of things at the outposts, attack the enemy if he still occupies certain positions, and pursue him with my sword in his ribs if he retreats. I beg you on your side not to lose an instant, and to surprise him at the passage of the Isar."

That the enemy was retiring in all speed was not the case; Lefebvre at 6 A. M. notified Berthier that the enemy was still on the heights of Biburg, and that Charles was in command (which was also a mistake), and that he did not yet know what Davout was doing. "There have arrived on my route only the divisions Gudin and St. Sulpice which I have seen, and Morand's which Savary has seen," he said; and in an hour he sent word that he had heard news from Davout, but knew little about him. But although the emperor's information was scant, he was right in his deduction, from this error and the other facts, as to what it was wise to do. It is just this ability to throw aside unimportant items and to act on the essential ones which equips the able captain; and in deciding on action it made small odds whether the enemy was retiring or not. From several reconnoissances and the late clash of arms he knew that Charles was out towards Ratisbon with a large part of the Austrian army; he knew that there was another considerable Austrian force in the vicinity of Mainburg; he knew the total of the Austrian army south of the Danube, and he was justified in believing that he had a force superior to that opposite him in the Austrian centre, as well as one better concentrated. He cast aside the minor fact of the enemy's advance or retreat, and used the essential one of superior forces at the critical point. All Napoleon needed was numbers, to which he could impart momentum by his extraordinary speed, and give a proper direction by his strategic insight, and he could afford to forget what the enemy was doing when the main facts ran in his favor. His confidence in his ability to do a thing was apt to get it done. We shall hereafter see this wonderful sense of perspective, this singular power of arraying and gauging facts and then promptly acting on them, weaken and bring disaster. Here it was in full force.

The 1st Bulletin states that Napoleon's main object was to destroy the corps of Louis and Hiller. "He ordered Davout to hold Hohenzollern, Rosenberg and Lichtenstein in respect, while with Morand and Gudin, the Bavarians and Wurtembergers, he attacked in front the army of Louis and Hiller, and had the communications of the enemy cut by Massena through Freising."

Bavarian Cannoneer,
Mounted Artillery.

During the night of April 19–20 the best course of action to this end became gradually clearer. It was a delicate situation, for to push his right wing too rapidly forward might simply drive Hiller on Louis, and both up to join Charles, and destroy the chances of rupturing the Austrian centre. At midnight Massena was again notified to hold his two directions, Neustadt and Landshut; at 3 A. M. Massena himself was to move via Moosburg on Landshut, while Oudinot should get into touch with the French centre; by 6.30 A. M. the matter was settled, and Massena was to move up the Isar, — "if you could go to Landshut, it would be preferable, but strive to go to Moosburg," the emperor wrote, — while he himself directed the French centre forward along the highways on Rohr and Pfeffenhausen.

From Vohburg, at 7 A. M. on the 20th, Napoleon rode out to Abensberg, so as to get what information he might about the Rohr plateau and the outlets towards it; when he received the latest news from the patrols and reconnoissances, he saw that the moment had arrived to strike whatever was in his front; and that aggressive spirit which had so often carried him to victory once more led him on and infused force into all his marshals. The emperor and Lannes, with Lefebvre and Vandamme, were to lead the advance; and Wrede was to reëstablish the Siegenburg bridge, and then hold it until the rest of the line had started. Vandamme had been put under Lefebvre's orders, and was to debouch from Siegenburg, on his right. As the war was largely to protect the Confederation of the Rhine, an allocution was issued to the Bavarians and Wurtembergers, inciting them to courage and promising them victory and their countries accession of territory; and they were placed in a post of honor, to be led by the emperor in person.

> "The emperor decided to fight this day at the head of the Bavarians and Wurtembergers," says the 1st Bulletin. "He reunited in a circle about him the officers of these two armies and talked long with them. The Crown Prince of Bavaria translated into German what he said in French. The emperor made them feel the mark of confidence which he gave them. . . . He told them all that the moment had come to vanquish, and to carry the war on to Austrian territory. This discourse was repeated to the companies by the captains . . . and had the expected effect."

About 8 A. M. Napoleon headed Lefebvre with Deroy's and the crown prince's divisions on a line between Biburg and Offenstetten; Lannes on his left filed along the main road towards Rohr, turning Thierry's right, with orders to



Battle of Abensberg.

reconnoitre towards Adlhausen, and down the Laber as soon as he struck it, and fend off attempts by Charles to reinforce Louis; Vandamme debouched on Lefebvre's right, and Wrede, who had filed to his right towards Siegenburg to repair the bridge, so soon as this was done, moved out through Siegenburg, following Vandamme. The Austrian left was ill-placed and in bodies not inter-supporting; and having reconnoitred down the Abens on the 19th and fearing lest his associates should need his coöperation, Hiller was marching down the Laber from Mainburg via Pfeffenhausen. Lannes was to keep the lead so as to reach Rohr and cut Charles and Louis apart; and Thierry, driven back by the sudden advance of the French cavalry under Nansouty, had barely reached Rohr, when Lannes fell upon him and drove him back to Rottenburg, where he was joined by Hiller's van. But this did not check Lannes' impetuosity; the town could not be saved, and the Austrians were swept across the Laber with the French on their heels. On the right the emperor did not too early force the fighting, as he wished to afford Lannes ample time; and in effect this marshal, on reaching Rohr, sent a detachment down the river, which attacked Hohenzollern's outlying parties at Langquaid and thus added to the uncertainty in which Charles already stood as to the purpose and direction of the French. After defending Kirchdorf with obstinacy, Reuss and Bianchi, thus outflanked, fell back from before the Bavarians and Wurtembergers towards the bridge at Pfeffenhausen. The French columns had supported each other in so effective a manner that an attack on the Austrian line in front by any division was sure to be followed by one in flank by a neighboring body; and to this sharp advance the Austrians, though fighting gallantly, had been able to offer no effective resistance; even at the Laber they could not pause to form a new line, and Louis, forced to retire through the defile at Pfeffenhausen, was seriously harassed by Wrede. Napoleon had so managed his army that, although outnumbered in the aggregate, he had a marked superiority to Charles at the point of contact.

In this battle of Abensberg, on April 20, the Austrians lost over seven thousand men, the French about half as many.

Speaking of the battle the 1st Bulletin says: "The enemy, disconcerted by our dispositions, fought only an hour and then beat in retreat: eight flags, twelve guns, eighteen thousand prisoners were the result of this affair, which cost us but a few men." Headquarters in the evening came to Rohr.

Davout, with Friant and St. Hilaire, remained during the 20th in practically the same position, caring for his wounded. At 4.30 P. M. he reported St. Hilaire on the plateau between Teugen and Feking, and Friant with his right on Teugen and his left towards Peising, Montbrun at Peising. All could see troops in their front, and as "much smoke is to be seen in the forests, these might well hide from us the forces of the enemy. This morning the enemy made in our front a considerable movement from his left towards his right. . . . I have no news of Morand and Gudin since this morning. As they are away, I do not know what is passing on my right, nor have I news from Ratisbon, though I have sent an aide-de-camp thither." This shows how much in the dark the marshals often were with reference to the general positions of the neighboring corps.

Charles acted on the defensive, withdrawing Hohenzollern across the Laber at Leurndorf, while his own right extended out to Egglofsheim towards Ratisbon, with which he must not lose touch. So far as Davout could judge, Charles was moving by his right on that city, and, though weak in numbers, Davout's presence made a distinct impression. At evening his divisions had got in touch with the Bavarians, and stood in front of Teugen and Peising, while the emperor's line had moved on to the Laber, Lannes between Adlhausen and Rottenburg, Louis holding the latter town, Wrede in Pfeffenhausen, with Deroy and the crown prince in his left rear, Vandamme between the two, and Demont coming up. Massena had reached Freising, thus keeping on a front with the French right and centre, and Oudinot's divisions, that were to have marched to Au or Freising, were diverted on Abensberg and Neustadt.



Austrian Dragoon.

At 9 A.M., April 20, Massena wrote Berthier from Pfaffenhofen that Tharreau, whom he had sent to Neustadt, would file off on Abensberg as directed, and shortly after receiving fresh orders from Berthier, he wrote that one of Oudinot's divisions was marching on Geisenfeld, but that Oudinot with Claparède must already have nearly reached Freising, and could not be stopped in season. "I have thought it well . . . to send in its place Boudet's division, which is nearest Geisenfeld. . . . I send Oudinot the order to return and take the command of these two divisions." Thus Tharreau and Boudet were moving on Geisenfeld, while Massena was moving on Freising, with Claparède in the advance preceded by Oudinot's cavalry. At 4 P.M. Berthier wrote Oudinot that as the French had won a great victory, it was useless for him to move on Neustadt, and that he was to reunite his two divisions and march towards Pfeffenhausen on Landshut. And at 8 P.M. he wrote Davout: "All the Austrian armies are in rout. Lannes with Gudin and Morand is at Rottenburg, Wrede at Pfeffenhausen, Massena marching on Landshut. . . . Everywhere we have taken guns, flags, prisoners. It is a second Jena. Louis has been mortally wounded, as well as another archduke; the two Lichtensteins were wounded and a great number of generals. . . . If you receive no instructions, orders are, in a moment like this, to move wherever there are enemies, to destroy them and seize them. . . . Lefebvre will remain, I think, at Bachel, . . . if he leaves, he will notify you. The emperor is at Rohr."

The Austrian centre had been ruptured, and Charles with the right wing — Hohenzollern, Rosenberg, Lichtenstein — was completely cut off from the left wing, — Louis, Hiller, Kienmayer, — which had been thrown back towards Landshut, whither they were rapidly moving during the night, while the French had won a central position on the Laber. This "rupture of the enemy's centre," to use the ancient strategic phrase which nine tenths of the soldiers of the world understand, is much of the same order as the manœuvre of 1815. There, the emperor strove to strike Blucher and drive him away from Wellington, thus "rupturing the enemy's centre;" here, he strove to strike Louis and Hiller and drive them away from Charles. The ancient phrase is as good as many of the short terms of the common law, and means more than most new ones that might be coined.

Charles took no hand in the manœuvring to the south of him, but held the river near Leurndorf with half of his forces, while the other half advanced on Ratisbon, which the one French regiment surrendered at eventide. This regiment had for a full day and a half fended off Bellegarde on the farther bank, and had more than done its duty.

> "One thousand men of the 65th, who had been left to guard the Ratisbon bridge, had not received an order to retire," narrates the 1st Bulletin. "Surrounded by the Austrian army, these brave men, having exhausted their cartridges, were obliged to surrender. This event grieved the emperor, who swore that in twenty-four hours Austrian blood should flow in Ratisbon to avenge this affront made to his arms."

At evening of April 20 Lichtenstein was at Wölkering, Rosenberg at Dinzling, Hohenzollern at Leurndorf and headquarters at Egglofsheim. Kollowrath was at Stadt am Hof. Bellegarde was ordered by Charles on Eichstädt, an eccentric movement for which no explanation is afforded us; it may have been an attempted threat to Ingolstadt to draw Napoleon's attention to his own line of retreat. As Davout had left Ratisbon, and Napoleon could get no further news from there, he sent a Bavarian officer to the Altmühl to learn what he could with reference to the enemy's troops on the Danube, and with regard to Kollowrath and Bellegarde. The Altmühl bridges were all cut or kept ready to be burned.

This battle of Abensberg well illustrates to what different effect masses may be used. Three of the Austrian corps had been contained by Davout with but half his one corps, while Napoleon with the rest of the French army fell on two other isolated corps and overwhelmed them.

The whole operation had been beautifully conceived and executed. The emperor had chosen a decisive point at which he was superior in force, on the centre, while projecting his right towards the enemy's line of retreat; and although his left was weak, the grand-tactical situation was such that if Charles drove back Davout, the latter would be approaching the main force in the French centre, which he would strengthen, while Charles would be getting farther away from his own right and left. And even if Charles pushed past Davout as far as Ingolstadt, or Bellegarde went up river too far, Napoleon still had a second line of retreat open through Freising and Augsburg on Ulm. This line he made ready to use by suitably strengthening it.

From Gera, April 20, Bernadotte wrote that he was on the march towards the Danube as ordered, but that he was "in absolute ignorance of what is being done by His Majesty's army and that of the enemy."

On April 21, at dawn, Napoleon from Rohr wrote Davout: "The day before yesterday and yesterday were another Jena." And to the King of Saxony: "The days of the 19th and 20th have been for the Austrians what the day of Jena was for the Prussian army. . . . I shall shortly be in Vienna." He had advised the king to leave Dresden; he now told him he was quite safe there.

Despite loss of the battle, the archduke hoped that by maintaining himself between the Laber and the Danube, the Austrian left would be able to come down the Isar and join him by way of Sträubing; and he now ordered in Kollowrath to his support. He might himself, by forced marches, have retired via Sträubing, and have called in the Landshut column as well as the two Bohemian corps; but Napoleon, with the advantage of shorter lines and greater speed, had no idea of permitting such a junction. He assumed that Charles must be retiring towards his left wing, and he planned that, with Oudinot in reserve, Davout was to move back on Ratisbon, cross the Danube, and drive Kollowrath and Bellegarde back into Bohemia, while he himself with Lannes, Vandamme and Wrede, and Nansouty's horse, was to pursue the Austrian left wing, which he mistakenly deemed the stronger part of the Austrian army, and Massena was to cut off its retreat. Lefebvre's part was to fall on the Austrian centre, supposed to be in full retreat. Napoleon had no idea that Charles proposed to retire through Ratisbon, or that Davout and Lefebvre were to face the bulk of the unbeaten Austrians.

To carry out this operation, from Rohr, at 5 A. M., April 21, the emperor wrote Davout: "Massena should have arrived at Landshut at three o'clock yesterday afternoon. You have nothing in front of you but a curtain of three infantry regiments. . . . I have ordered Lefebvre with Demont and Deroy, and St. Germain, to move on Langquaid. . . . In case of need, you are to sustain him. . . . This is what you have to do. Lefebvre will pursue the parks, equipments, and even Prince Charles if he takes the direction of the Isar, whether he goes to Landshut by way of Eggmühl, or to Sträubing: sustain him if necessary. When your rear is cleaned up, . . . you will move on Ratisbon. You will attack Bellegarde and Klenau" (Kollowrath). "You will pursue them and drive them into the mountains of Bohemia. You will so act that the left bank of the

Danube shall be purged, and that only débris can get back. I am on the way to Landshut, and as soon as I shall have done all possible harm to the enemy, I will get ahead of him at the Inn."

And although at 4.30 A. M. Lefebvre had been ordered to march with the crown prince, Deroy and Demont on Rottenburg, half an hour later he was ordered to move with Demont on Langquaid, and Deroy would sustain him. Lefebvre, with the Bavarian cavalry and St. Germain's cuirassiers, was to follow the enemy "retiring via Eggmühl or Sträubing" and attack on sight. "Pursue the enemy with your sword in his back, and before to-night announce to the emperor that you have taken from the enemy his park, his baggage, his wounded." "Assure His Majesty of the route which the main part of Prince Charles' army will have taken. Has he marched on Sträubing, on Landshut, or on Ratisbon? That is what is essential to know." Lefebvre was to communicate with Davout, who would lend a hand. But as, being satisfied that he was cut off from Landshut, Charles determined on a new line, through Ratisbon and along the left bank of the Danube, Napoleon's plan became inoperative, and Lefebvre and Davout, instead of pursuing him, had to oppose Charles all day of the 21st.

After retiring across the Laber, Hiller and Louis had kept on during the night of the 20th–21st to Landshut, in great disorder and with loss of much material abandoned on the road; the marshy plain of the Isar, full of canals and crossed by roads on causeways, as well as the little town, were glutted with the wagon trains, and passage almost stopped; and while, about 9 A. M., the Austrians were struggling across the lowland and through the town, protected by cavalry which Hiller had posted on the main roads to delay pursuit, Napoleon, riding with the French van, reached the heights of Altdorf, overlooking the river. The crown prince as a reserve had remained at Rottenburg and Langquaid, but Lannes with Morand and Gudin had started at daylight on the Rottenburg road towards Landshut, and Bessières, who had arrived April 20, leading Nansouty's cuirassiers in the van, and Wrede and the Wurtembergers under Vandamme in second line, on the Pfeffenhausen road. Bessières debouched



Battle of Landshut.

from Ergolding, and Wrede's horse from Altdorf. The emperor drew up batteries on the hills, and by firing along the causeways and into the town made the confusion tenfold. With Nansouty and the Bavarian horse, he ordered Bessières to clear the way for pursuit, and the Austrian cavalry line was shortly thrown back on the Isar; but until noon the Austrian foot, by dint of hearty fighting, managed to hold the bridge. Hiller had already got his troops in line on the hills east of the town, and had set a column moving to the rear; and to capture the bridge so as to interrupt the Austrians in their retreat, a storming party, headed by gallant Mouton, one of the emperor's aides-de-camp, was organized out of Morand's division. "Mouton set going at a *pas de charge* upon the bridge the grenadiers of the 17th, which formed the head of the column. This bridge, which is of wood, was in flames, but that was no obstacle for our infantry, which crossed it and penetrated into the town," says the 1st Bulletin, and took many prisoners. Wrede and Morand followed, though the resistance was stanch.

Meanwhile from Freising, which he had reached late April 20, Massena had sent his light cavalry with Claparède's division ahead during the night; and on the 21st, had started again towards Landshut, Marulaz moving before daylight on Moosburg to seize the bridge, supported by Claparède; and an *élite* company of chasseurs "entered Moosburg at a gallop, from which the enemy retired on our approach. This company reached the bridge in time to prevent the fire of straw, which the enemy had placed there, from burning it. The enemy in line of battle on the right bank of the Isar, infantry and cavalry, gave fire to oppose the reopening of the bridge. The commandant dismounted a part of the company, which rushed upon the bridge with much audacity, to throw into the water the flaming straw, which was luckily accomplished. In an instant the company was on the other bank, and a quarter hour sufficed to make the bridge practicable." Colonel Lambert then crossed his chasseurs. The road from Moosburg to Landshut is a sort of defile between river and bank, and Marulaz marched on Hofham. Massena then ordered a brigade of Claparède to move on Landshut along the left bank with the Bavarian cavalry, and the rest of Claparède and St.

Cyr marched along the main road. Their progress was slow, as they were gallantly met by Nordman. To cover the rear, Legrand was to move but half-way to Landshut, Molitor to remain at Moosburg. Claparède was not up in season to cut off the retreat; and abandoning Landshut, the Austrian divisions, pursued by Bessières, kept on through Geisenhausen and Vilsbiburg, and reached Neumarkt during the night, whence next day they retired to the Inn at Neu Oetting. They had lost five thousand men and twenty-five guns, with five hundred wagons and their pontoon train, and were disabled from taking part in the struggle still to go on upon the theatre south of Ratisbon. At 5 P. M. Marulaz heard of the advance of the French main force on Landshut, and riding out to join hands with Morand and Bessières, he took part in the pursuit on Geisenhausen. At 7.30 P. M. the emperor ordered St. Sulpice to move upon Essenbach and scout out to Ergoldsbach, so as to open the highway as far as possible, and also to scout out two leagues along every road and especially on towards Sträubing and Landau. "He is to send out small parties which will go as far as to find the enemy, and place positions at two leagues distance on all of the roads, so that if the enemy come on, we shall be protected. He is to send a patrol of infantry and some light cavalry, even fifty cuirassiers, on Ratisbon."

On April 21 Napoleon sent Otto the following note to be distributed to the various allied governments, and to be received with a salute of one hundred guns, wherever read in public: —

NOTE.

The Austrian army has been struck by the fire from heaven which punishes the ingrate, the unjust and the perfidious. It is pulverized. All its army corps have been crushed. More than twenty of its generals have been killed or wounded. An archduke has been killed, two wounded. We have more than thirty thousand prisoners, flags, guns, magazines, baggage. Of all this army which has ventured to come and dare the French army, small débris will repass the Inn. As at Jena, we see that the fortune of war is especially fallen on those who have provoked it. Prince Lichtenstein, one of the most furious, was mortally wounded."

While Napoleon, on the 21st, saw his game escape towards the Inn, Davout was placed in an awkward situation, and Charles once more unwisely remained on the defensive, probably proposing to draw in Bellegarde and Kollowrath, and still hoping for a junction with Louis and Hiller. It was lucky that Charles did not frankly attack. Had he done so, even with the aid of Lefebvre, Davout might have been overwhelmed by the forces of the enemy, five to three of theirs. It was also lucky that, although for another purpose, the emperor had sent Lefebvre towards Davout, for without him Davout could not have held his own. As it was, Lefebvre, in accordance with the morning orders, had promptly moved through Adlhausen on Langquaid with Deroy, the Bavarian cavalry and St. Germain's cuirassiers, Demont coming up from Abensberg, the crown prince remaining at Rottenburg in reserve. From Langquaid, the Austrian parties retiring, he moved downstream towards Leurndorf, where he arrived between ten and eleven, and at once pushed in on the enemy.

From Davout's report we learn that at the point of day on April 21, he debouched from Teugen and Hausen, scouting with his cavalry and preceded by skirmishing lines, the marshal riding with the vanguard, and advanced as far as the left bank of the Laber, driving back Hohenlohe's light troops to a point overlooking Langquaid. In a few hours he learned that the Austrians had taken Ratisbon, and the Bohemian corps had joined; and before 8 A. M. he sent word of these facts to the emperor, also stating that he was engaged, and had large forces to face. Although his duty was merely to contain the Austrian right wing during the day, he believed in doing this by a stout offensive, and he soon perceived that Charles showed no sign of attack, which encouraged him to stretch out his divisions on a wider front, and though weak in depth, to hammer continuously. Hohenlohe had been on the left bank of the Laber, but on hearing of troops coming down the stream, he withdrew across to a position with his right on Schirling, and Rosenberg, who had been in the Dinzling country, was ordered down to his aid. Lefebvre had attacked the enemy's outlying troops at Langquaid, and driven them back to Leurndorf, which he seized. Meanwhile Davout advanced, and found Rosenberg drawn up on the left bank with his left at Eggmühl, and holding the heights behind the Leuchling villages, in force. The Austrians were in several lines, leaning their left on Unter Leuchling and crowning the heights with artillery, their right protected by thick woods. Hohenzollern had again crossed the river at Eggmühl to come in on Rosenberg's left. Between ten and eleven Davout again wrote the emperor: "All the enemy's army is in front of us. I am occupying the heights near Eggmühl, which is on my right. The battle is very lively." After some manœuvring Davout seized a good position in his front, the Laber on his right and wooded land on his left, and with brilliant courage, met by equal gallantry on the part of the enemy, he attacked Unter Leuchling and carried it. But Davout was nervous about Abensberg, the road to which was held only by cavalry: "Montbrun is very weak on the route to Ratisbon along the Danube," he wrote to the emperor; "I fear the enemy might try to move to Abensberg." There was, indeed, danger of this, for Lichtenstein from the Wölkering-Abach country did undertake to threaten Davout's left flank. But Lefebvre came along in time to help Davout out of his difficulties. From Leurndorf he had advanced to Hohenzollern's position at Schirling, and had driven him out of it, which was what led

Hohenzollern to join Rosenberg. This relieved Lefebvre from most of his pressure, and during the rest of the day there was only cannonading on his front, though his presence exerted a marked effect. But the battle still went on in front of Davout, who at 5 P. M. again wrote the emperor: "It is probable that the troops coming from Ratisbon will move around my left. The battle continues extremely lively. I will hold on to my position, I hope, but the troops are too much worn with fatigue to think to carry the positions defended by three times more artillery and troops than I have. . . . The enemy is trying to turn my left."

French Elite Gendarme.

Nevertheless, Davout with his lieutenants, Friant, St. Hilaire and Compans, forged slowly ahead. Ober Leuchling was taken, but the Austrians held the river, and finally Davout bivouacked under their guns, writing the emperor at 11 P. M.: "We have kept our positions. . . . Archduke Charles is there with nearly the entirety of his army. . . . I shall keep my new positions. I hope to receive during the night or to-morrow morning the orders of Your Majesty. If I do not receive any and the enemy should march on me, I will do what I can to resist the numbers." But he deemed it safer to withdraw from part of his advanced position, so gallantly won.

Davout's calls for aid gradually opened Napoleon's eyes to the actual situation, and from Landshut, late April 21, Berthier wrote him that as he now had Demont and Lefebvre, and might, if needed, call in Boudet and Tharreau, he would be strong enough; or he might call in the crown prince from Rottenburg.

The Austrians were now mostly on the left bank of the Laber, but by holding Eggmühl they still kept open the road to Ratisbon, and at night they were echeloned along the highway from the river north, and extended in a semi-circle towards Abach, faced by Davout in the Dinzling-Leuchling country, and Lefebvre at Schirling, holding interior positions. Whatever may have been Charles' idea in sending Bellegarde toward Eichstädt, he now recognized his error, and ordered him back, and by night Bellegarde got to Hemau. But Boudet, at 11 P. M., April 20, had been ordered back by Davout to Ingolstadt to protect the French rear against possible attack along the Altmühl. Tharreau was ordered from Neustadt to Landshut, Oudinot to accompany the column.

Napoleon had been laboring under the same error he had committed at Jena; he gauged the force opposite himself as the larger part of the Austrian army, while Davout had "before him only a veil of three infantry regiments" — an exaggeration that might have brought disaster to any one less staunch than Davout; and though he did not doubt that the operation of the day on the French right would draw away the enemy from before Davout, yet now incoming reports laid bare his mistake, and he made ready to sustain the left. As at Auerstädt, Davout had again faced and contained, by able handling of a small force and the timely succor of Lefebvre, the larger part of the enemy's army, and had thus enabled Napoleon to force back in disorder the smaller part with the French main body. The emperor was fortunate in having such a lieutenant.

Succeeding reports described the enemy in front of Ratisbon as in such strength that Napoleon began to believe that both Kollowrath and Bellegarde had reinforced the archduke; and turning over to Bessières the task of following up the Austrian left wing, with Wrede and Molitor and Marulaz's horse, he himself prepared to move on Eggmühl and fall upon Charles, whom he must himself beat in battle before he could call his operation a pronounced success.

From Landshut, at 2 A. M., Gudin was ordered to start at four and to reach Ergoldsbach at nine, Morand to follow at five, St. Sulpice supporting. Vandamme was to join the column, and to scout out on his right towards Sträubing. At 2.30 A. M. the emperor wrote Davout that a force would be soon on the Little Laber, and with this he was to try to communicate. "If you think that your position is not tenable, you are master to take that which will suit you, being careful only to protect the communications which pass by Rohr, Rottenburg and Landshut, so that we may promptly reunite. . . . Should you hear a cannonade out towards Eggmühl, in case the enemy moved forward and we engaged him, in whatever position you may be, sustain us; and when the enemy retreats, push him with Oudinot's division in first line, and your tired divisions in second line."

Later he wrote him that Lannes would follow with three divisions and Espagne's cuirassiers. "Arrange with Lefebvre what you will do in case of attack . . . and arrange so that Oudinot and Boudet can take part in the battle as well as Lefebvre. . . . If Prince Charles remains to-day and his position is attackable, I hope to attack at four o'clock. . . . We must exterminate the Austrian army, and avenge the regiment that was carried off."

To a duplicate of his letter of 2.30 A. M. he added a "P. S. It is four o'clock. I am resolved to march, and I will be at Eggmühl at noon, and ready to attack the enemy vigorously at three o'clock. I will have with me forty thousand men. Send me some aides, with Bavarian escorts, to instruct me what you have done this morning. It seems to me that by moving either by Rohr, or Rottenburg, or Langquaid, having the inhabitants in our favor, they need not fear to fall into the hands of the enemy, because they can hide. I will personally be at Ergoldsbach. If we hear a cannonade, that will sufficiently tell me that I am to attack. If I do not hear a cannonade, and you are all ready to attack, have a salvo fired of ten guns at once at noon, a similar one at one o'clock, and a similar one at two o'clock. . . . I am determined to exterminate the army of Prince Charles to-day, or at latest to-morrow."

From Landshut, at 3 A. M., the emperor notified Lannes that Davout was still engaged, and that he was to follow Vandamme on Eggmühl and command the whole column. "You will choose on the Little Laber a good position . . . and as soon as you have received news from Davout, you will march on Eggmühl and attack the enemy everywhere. I will support your movement with Massena and his three divisions. As the enemy is obstinate, we must exterminate him."

At 3.30 Bessières was notified from Landshut of the march on Eggmühl, but told that to sustain him, Wrede and Molitor were to remain. Rouyer, commanding the allied troops at Ingolstadt, was notified that everything from Donauwörth to Vohburg was under his orders, and that he must act independently. "If the enemy broke through on the Donauwörth side, all that is on the Danube would regain Ingolstadt, or Augsburg, if there was not time to reach Ingolstadt. You must not forget the troops which are at Neuburg."

The emperor was ready to put to the best use the interior lines his able manœuvring had won.

These orders were all promptly executed. A Wurtemberg brigade reached Ergoldsbach at 4 A. M. and attacked Vukassovich's outpost. Vandamme came up during the morning as the van of Lannes and Massena. Napoleon left Landshut at 6 A. M. By 2 P. M. the van reached Buchhausen, and before three Vandamme was near Eggmühl.

It was indeed time for Napoleon to turn against the archduke; for Kollowrath's Bohemian corps had been crossing to take its place in line, and the Austrian commander might not be willing to play the defensive rôle another long day. While Vandamme, followed by Lannes and St. Sulpice, had attacked Buchhausen, Massena had got his corps and Espagne's cuirassiers assembled at Ergolding, and had rapidly followed on.

On the evening of April 21 Charles had stood echeloned along the road from Eggmühl towards Ratisbon. Having learned that only a part of the French army was opposite him, he imagined Napoleon still at Landshut or beyond, pursuing Louis and Hiller, and saw his chance to attack Davout's left flank on the 22d, roll it up, and threaten if not seize Napoleon's communications, which he still deemed to run solely through Donauwörth. Feeling strong with his reinforcements, and forgetting the emperor's abnormal speed, he purposed to advance three corps by way of Abach and Peising, to fall on Davout's left, while he himself held on to Eggmühl. Rosenberg, who had been in action against Davout all the day before, was to stand as a pivot for the rest of the Austrian forces to wheel on, and was given reinforcements from the reserve. Kollowrath was to participate in the flanking manœuvre; but he did not cross from Stadt am Hof in season to allow an early start, and this renewed delay was what afforded Napoleon's succoring corps time to come up from Landshut and save the day. Hercules here helped the emperor, because he had put his own shoulder so heartily to the wheel.

Meanwhile, during the forenoon Davout and Lefebvre, who had contained Charles the day before, deemed it wise to remain in place and await the emperor, so as with him to give a joint blow. The outlying troops of Veczay and Lichtenstein were constantly hovering in the vicinity of Abach, and

Montbrun and Pajol spent their time in manœuvring in their front and charging their outposts, so as to keep the enemy out of the defile, and to maintain touch with Friant, who was on Davout's left.

Charles marched off in three columns from the right; Kollowrath advanced at noon on Abach to seize the pass, Lichtenstein moved up an hour later so as to take post on his left and head on Peising, Hohenzollern moved from Dinzling on the same place. Rosenberg was to hold back Davout near Leuchling; Vukassovich under his orders remained at Eggmühl. This force was overwhelming for the work to be done, but it was nearly 2 P. M. before it got into full swing. And in any event the operation was a day too late. On the 21st it might have won a notable success.

French Carbineer.

Davout, who stood in line from Schirling towards Saalhaupt, with only light troops out towards Abach, and Le-



Battle of Eggmühl.

febvre on the other bank of the Laber, was growing nervous: he was facing odds too great for even him; in the dense morning fog he could see nothing; and about noon he heard the cannonading of the Austrian vanguard out towards his left. But when "towards noon the cannon growling on the route of Landshut to Ratisbon announced the approach of the right wing of the emperor," Davout saw that the danger was over. By one o'clock Napoleon came along the road from Landshut in three columns, the cavalry on the left, the Wurtembergers in the centre, and the French on the right; and the head of the column, under Vandamme, smartly attacking, threw the outlying Austrian troops back into the town.

Following hard upon Vandamme came Lannes, and far in the rear were Massena and the cuirassiers. Marching with Lannes, the emperor, from adjoining heights, was able to scan the movements of the enemy. So soon as the emperor's head of column came up, Davout smartly attacked through the Leuchling villages.

Berthezène tells us that "towards one o'clock or half-past one, we perceived at the extreme Austrian left movements which indicated the approach of the emperor. A few minutes afterwards the guns left us no further doubt. At once all the troops of Marshal Davout broke up, and by feigned attacks, occupied on all the points the attention of the enemy, while the 10th Light, formed in column, charged with the real attack, quickly covered the space which separated it from the village of Leuchling, reached it without firing a shot, and seized it, after having made fifteen hundred prisoners, and without any other loss than that of six men wounded." He thus recovered his ground.

On his side Lefebvre attacked smartly, and "the position to the left of Schirling, from which the enemy had cannonaded us the day before, was at once carried as soon as attacked by Deroy." While Davout and Lefebvre thus advanced, Lannes was sent with Gudin's division across the Laber below Eggmühl to turn the enemy's left: "Gudin, deployed and covered by his skirmishers, attacked at once the wooded heights of Röcking," which was held by Biber, "drove out the Austrian troops, seized this important position, and established himself in the wood before the masses of the enemy presented themselves to occupy it. He resisted vigorously all their attacks until Lannes came up with the other divisions. Then this officer was able to execute the beautiful movement on the left flank of the enemy to which the emperor attributed the success of the day," says Pelet.

Savary, who was with the emperor this day, narrates: "We lost no time in manœuvring. We attacked at once by turning the enemy's left. They had flanked the village of Eggmühl with much artillery, the village itself was held by infantry. We had the infantry on our right cross the river by the aid of a number of mills and other factories which line the banks, and which nearly all have some means of passing from one side to the other. This movement alone disconcerted the infantry, which was in the village of Eggmühl, and at the same moment the emperor sent me to carry the order to St. Sulpice to form in column by division, and to force the passage at Eggmühl, so as to carry off all the Austrian artillery that flanked the village. St. Sulpice had, for two hundred fathoms, to sustain a fire from guns which would have caused him an awful loss if he had not led his cavalry so rapidly. His first squadron alone had to suffer, but the others got off scot free. He seized all the enemy's artillery and pushed his cavalry far away." Thus Eggmühl fell.

All this had not been easily done. Rosenberg, though attacked on three sides by eight French divisions, had fought with unsurpassed gallantry, and for two hours fended off the staunchest assaults of the French; but instead of bringing up his reserve to help Rosenberg, or of manœuvring with his abundant numbers, Charles determined on retiring into Ratisbon. Kollowrath was ordered back from Abach to near the Galgenberg, and Lichtenstein and Hohenzollern to withdraw so as to back up against the main road on Rosenberg's right to assist in the operation; but Friant's attack was so sharp that Hohenzollern could not retire until he was disengaged by the repeated charges of the Austrian horse. By four o'clock the whole French line was pressing back the Austrians towards Ratisbon, though Charles with his reserves managed to steady the retreat, and prevent disorder.

Davout, who had kept on his advance throughout the day, reported that "arrived at Obersanding, the resistance was much more lively, the enemy charged our troops with cavalry, and there is no doubt, in view of the frank manner with which they charged, that they would have had success against any other troops than those of Your Majesty." The *ensemble* of the attacks had been admirable, and by 7 P. M. the army had reached the level of Hagelstadt. Hereupon Nansouty and St. Sulpice were pushed forward in close column by squadrons despite bad ground, while Lannes on the east of the main road and Davout on the west were pushing the enemy towards Ratisbon. The French cavalry advanced at a trot on a front of two regiments, the other squadrons following behind on a broad front. "There was not an attack in columns in the ordinary meaning of the word, but it was a charge made by a deployed line behind which other lines followed at short distance," says Bismarck. "A little before striking the enemy, the generals and colonels gave a last time the command, 'Forward! March! March!' which the cuirassiers themselves repeated, without, however, changing the gait. This 'Forward!' is analogous to the 'Hurrah!' of the Russians; it is a means of excitation." At times the squadrons carrying musketoons paused to fire a point-blank volley. The cavalry advanced, and considerable hand-to-hand work lasted till nightfall, the Austrian horse resisting manfully.

By nightfall the enemy was forced back to Köfering, and here pursuit was stopped. Lannes and Lefebvre had headquarters at Egglofsheim, Davout at Obersanding.

Massena and Oudinot did not get up to the battle of Eggmühl. Towards the end of the day they marched on towards Egglofsheim; Claparède and St. Cyr bivouacked behind this village, Legrand near Eggmühl and Espagne at Schirling. Oudinot, with Colbert, who had been at Neustadt, had not received his orders in time to get beyond Langquaid, where he bivouacked.

The emperor's idea being to prevent the Austrians from moving down the Danube via Sträubing and to force them into Bohemia, the movement of the French had been by the right, but as Charles retired into the pocket made by the Danube bend at Ratisbon, it was not necessary to seize the Sträubing road, and the small Austrian force at this place joined the retreating left wing. But for extra safety Massena was sent thither early April 23, and having reconnoitred towards Passau, soon reported the right bank of the Danube scoured.

The emperor, surrounded by his marshals, had been viewing the cavalry combat from a neighboring hill, and was about to order a vigorous pursuit by the foot, when his lieutenants, all except Lannes, alleging the exhaustion of the troops and the oncoming darkness, prevailed on him to allow the men to bivouac where they stood, the foot on a line through Egglofsheim, the cavalry in front of Köfering. This failure to pursue was un-Napoleonic. "Had I pursued," Jomini makes Napoleon say, "as the Prussians did after Waterloo, the enemy's army, crowded on the Danube, would have been much embarrassed." But for the first time Napoleon was content with a brilliant victory, and did not strive to destroy the enemy. He had taken fifteen flags, five thousand prisoners, and a dozen guns, and the Austrians had lost over six thousand killed and wounded. His men had marched fifteen to eighteen miles from 3 A. M. to 1 P. M., and had fought the lines forward five miles more up to 8 P. M.; they had lost five thousand men, and were indeed fagged out. Any other commander would have been justified in crying halt. But Napoleon has set too high a standard for even this excuse to satisfy us; and in later years he himself so thought. No pursuit was undertaken, and the Austrian commander arrested the retreat in front of Ratisbon undisturbed.

With reference to this battle, the 1st Bulletin says: "At 2 P. M. the emperor arrived opposite Eggmühl, where the four corps of the Austrian army, making one hundred and ten thousand men, were in position under the command of Archduke Charles. Lannes attacked the enemy on his left with Gudin's division. At the first signal Davout and Lefebvre and the light cavalry division of Montbrun debouched. One could then see one of the finest spectacles which war has offered: one hundred and ten thousand enemies attacked at every point, turned on the left and successively ousted from every position. The detail of military events would be too long. It suffices to say that, put into full rout, the enemy lost the greatest part of his guns and a great number of prisoners. . . . St. Sulpice's division charged another square in which there came close to being taken Prince Charles, who owed his safety only to the swiftness of his horse. . . . In all these combats our loss might mount to twelve hundred killed and four thousand wounded. . . . Of the two hundred and twenty thousand men which composed the Austrian army, all were engaged except the twenty thousand men commanded by Bellegarde, which were not under fire. Of the French army, on the contrary, nearly half did not fire a shot. The enemy, astounded by movements rapid and beyond his calculation, found himself in a moment deceived in his foolish hopes, and transported from the delirium of presumption to a dejection approaching despair." This exaggeration is a common feature of battle reports.

Prince Charles, whose troops had fought, as they always did, with marked courage, and had retired in good order, could truthfully tell a different story of these events; but however good a soldier, he was, in this brief week, quite outmatched by the amazing skill here exhibited by the great captain. He had by no means given proof of the energy demanded by the occasion, nor that which we shall later see at Asparn and Wagram. He appeared to be overawed by the emperor. Out of his large forces, he put only fifty thousand men into contact at Eggmühl; while Napoleon put in eighty thousand and kept twenty-five thousand in reserve. The operations and battles of this Five Days' Campaign scarcely do credit to his real ability.

The archduke still numbered more troops than Napoleon, for Bellegarde had come back to Ratisbon, and could in a few hours be put into line; but preferring to reorganize his forces and retire for the protection of Vienna rather than risk a battle in the Danube *cul-de-sac*, a second bridge was thrown below the town during the night, and at daylight of April 23 the retreat began, covered by Kollowrath. Two foot regiments were left behind to hold the town, five regiments of horse remained in front to fend off the first attack, and batteries were placed on the heights of the left bank to protect the bridges.

French Light Infantryman.

During the morning of April 23 the whole army moved towards Ratisbon, Friant and St. Hilaire early in the morning; Nansouty and St. Sulpice preceded Gudin and Morand along the main road. About nine o'clock the French attacked the town, the cavalry doing the main work, while a cannonade went on across the Danube, and upon the walls themselves a number of batteries were trained. By noon the whole right bank of the Danube was free, and Davout and Lannes, with the Bavarians between them, took position in front of the town. "By an inconceivable disposition," says the 1st Bulletin, "the Austrian general had left in Ratisbon six regiments, sacrificed without reason. The town is enveloped by a bad enceinte, a bad ditch and a bad counterscarp. The artillery arrived, pieces of twelve were put in battery, an entrance was discovered near the Sträubing gate, through which, by means of a ladder, one could descend into the ditch and mount again by a breach made in the wall Lannes had a battalion pass by this breach, which gained a postern gate and opened it; then we entered the town. All who resisted were cut down; the number of prisoners exceeded eight thousand. By reason of his bad dispositions, the enemy had no time to cut the bridge;" and the French rushed on towards it, though it was heartily defended, and lay under the fire of a big battery on the hill on the farther side. Stadt am Hof was afire, and before the French broke down the resistance it was midnight and the whole Austrian army had crossed. A number of pontoons fell into the hands of the French. Napoleon was slightly wounded in the right heel by a ricochet ball, but kept on with the troops.

By the evening of the 23d Lefebvre was ordered to march with Demont to Landshut.

The Emperor of Austria, who had come on with his court to Schärding, to be present at what all expected would be an Austrian victory, and hoping to negotiate with the German princes who were now French allies, broke up the court on the 23d at evening, and returned to Vienna.

Napoleon was always more proud of this series of manœuvres than of any other he conducted. On the 12th of April he was still in Paris; on the 16th he reached the theatre of operations, and in a short week he had won two battles, Abensberg, which cut the enemy in two and isolated the Austrian left, and Eggmühl, which broke the Austrian right, as well as the combats of Thann and Landshut, Teugen and Dinzling; and all this had decided the campaign in the heart of Germany. "The greatest military manœuvres which I have ever made, and for which I gauge myself the highest, took place at Eggmühl, and were infinitely superior to those of Marengo and other actions which preceded or followed these," Napoleon said to O'Meara at St. Helena; and in the Œuvres: "The battle of Abensberg, the manœuvres of Landshut and the battle of Eggmühl were the most brilliant and most able manœuvres of Naploeon." It was truly a *veni*, *vidi*, *vici*.

The opening of this campaign is peculiarly interesting in that Napoleon found it initiated by Berthier on absolutely false lines, and so speedily transformed it into true ones. The speed with which the emperor changed from plan to plan to suit the ever varying conditions distinguished this from the 1805 campaign, where there was one purpose constantly kept in mind and never varied from beginning to end.

On April 24 Napoleon issued, from Imperial Headquarters at Ratisbon, a

PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY.

"Soldiers! you have justified my expectation. You have made up for numbers by your bravery. You have gloriously marked the difference which existed between the soldiers of Cæsar and the armed cohorts of Xerxes. In a few days we have triumphed in the three pitched battles of Thann, of Abensberg and of Eggmühl, and in the combats of Peising, of Landshut and of Ratisbon. A hundred pieces of cannon, forty flags, fifty thousand prisoners, three bridge equipments and all the parks of the enemy, carried by six hundred caissons all harnessed, three thousand car-

> riages harnessed carrying his baggage, all the treasure of the regiments, this is the result of the rapidity of your marches and of your courage. The enemy, made drunk by a perjured cabinet, seemed to conserve no recollection of you. His awakening has been prompt. You have appeared to him more terrible than ever. A short time ago he crossed the Inn and invaded the territory of our allies. A short time ago he promised himself to carry war into the bosom of our country. To-day, defeated, terrified, he flies in disorder. Already my vanguard has passed the Inn. Before a month we shall be in Vienna.

Always anxious to keep the national economies in mind, the emperor wrote with reference to the prisoners at this time sent to France: "I desire that the Austrian prisoners shall cost me nothing, and that they shall be divided up among the peasants."

In this campaign the emperor's old activity seemed to return to him. The only criticism is the one made on the failure to pursue after Eggmühl. He was always in motion, always present at the important point, hardly giving an instant to rest or food, and it almost appeared as if he was not subject to the usual bodily demands. There were no bounds to his capacity to work. In the Memorial he says: "Work is my element. I was born and formed for work. I have got to know the limits of my legs; I have got to know the limits of my eyes; I have never been able to learn the limits of my work."

Cuirassier Trumpeter.

XLIII.

AGAIN TO VIENNA. APRIL TO MAY, 1809.

While Charles crossed the Isar, Archduke John invaded Venice with fifty thousand men. Eugene met him, but was at first driven back at Sacile. Napoleon could not quit Ratisbon until he knew Charles' manœuvres, and left Davout there to watch him, while he himself joined the column which pursued Hiller with the Austrian left towards Vienna. Hiller turned and defeated Wrede at Neumarkt, but could not pursue his gain. Bernadotte from Saxony was coming on to replace Davout at Ratisbon, and the whole army, so soon as Charles withdrew into Bohemia, advanced down the right bank in echelon, the right being thrust out towards Salzburg, and the left detained at Linz lest Charles should attack this point from Bohemia in connection with an advance from the Tyrol. North Germany was giving trouble, and a reserve corps was created at Hanau. Hiller took position at Ebelsberg May 3, and here was a more serious fight than at the bridge of Lodi, and an unnecessary one, as the place could be turned. Hiller withdrew, and the French followed. Charles, moving through Bohemia, was slower than he should have been, remaining three days at Budweis when he should have hurried to Vienna. He sent Kollowrath to demonstrate against Linz, but this failed, and finally he drew Hiller across the Danube at Krems. Napoleon hurried on to Vienna, which he reached May 10, but could not seize it out of hand; and when Maximilian withdrew, he broke the Tabor bridge. Napoleon proposed to cross the Danube so as to control both banks, and threw a bridge into the island of Lobau and another out of it opposite Asparn and Essling. Meanwhile Charles had concentrated himself and his army at the Bisamberg, where the roads from Vienna to Bohemia and Moravia separate.

While the Archduke Charles had been crossing the Isar to attack the French on the plains of Ratisbon, his brother, the Archduke John, had debouched from the Julian Alps into the Venetian States with fifty thousand men. Eugene, Viceroy of Italy, was covering his territory with a somewhat less force, having with him Macdonald and Grenier. Though young and inexperienced, he bore himself like a veteran, and especially showed capacity in choosing his advisers and subordinates. He had taken up a position in front of Sacile, with his van at Pordenone, and met John's advance by a counter; but the Austrian commander turned the French left and forced Eugene back in some disorder, until, rallying on reinforcements at the Piave, he reached the Adige in fair condition. Content with his success, John detached three divisions, one against Marmont in Dalmatia, and the others against Venice and Palmanova, which Eugene had garrisoned. The news from Ratisbon encouraged the viceroy to a fresh advance; and this backset on the Po resulted only in Napoleon's pushing on Vienna all the faster, there to reëstablish the Italian status. But for a time Napoleon held Eugene to task for lack of proper reports.

Italian Grenadier.

None of Napoleon's letters exceed in interest those written to Eugene. Although fault-finding, they are full of sound military advice, and at times, despite exaggeration, enunciate some of the most precious of his maxims.

From Ratisbon, April 25, the emperor wrote : " . . . You were wrong to be disquieted by what the enemy had in the Tyrol. If you have weakened yourself to cover Verona, you have been wrong. Having a battle to deliver, you should have assembled all your troops, and if you had won it, you would have had nothing to fear from the troops which were in the Tyrol."

On the 26th, from Landshut : "My Son, I can understand nothing in your correspondence. You wrote me the 17th and 19th, and you have told me nothing. I do not know how the battle came off, the number of men or the guns I have lost, how this defeat happened. This conduct is strange. Instead of sending one officer after another, you only send me bad couriers, who know and say nothing. You keep your attention on the Tyrol, from which you have absolutely nothing to fear. . . . What do you suppose a dozen of thousands of men can do when a handful of men at Monte Baldo can hold them in respect? All this has little sense. The battle must have been terrible for you to abandon the Piave. . . . If you fear an aggression through the Tyrol, have the positions occupied which I took up in my Italian campaign. All the drummers of your army know them. I occupied Monte Baldo, La Corona, Rivoli and the Adige. The enemy was master of Innsbruck, of Bavaria and of the Tyrol, and it was especially by preventing the junction of what was in the Tyrol with Friuli that I beat him. I see that you do not well know the history of these campaigns. . . . I still cannot conceive how my troops have been beaten by this rabble of Austrians. They were three hundred thousand here, and I have always beaten them, having but one against seven. The Army of Italy was deemed to be as good as this army. . . . Whatever ill has arrived, if I knew perfectly the state of things, I would take action, but I find it ridiculous and fearful that, the battle having taken place on the 16th, we should be here at the 26th without my having the slightest idea of it. It upsets here all my campaign combinations, and I do not see what can have dictated this singular conduct."

On April 27: "I am still hoping that you have not evacuated the Piave, and that you have not abandoned to pillage the fine country between this river and the Adige. . . . All that was in the Tyrol on this side is flying as fast as they can run. Without the inconceivable check that my Army of Italy has suffered, from this moment the destinies of the House of Austria would be quite terminated."

From Burghausen, April 30: "My Son, I have received your letter of the 22d, which reached me by mail. I see with grief that you have abandoned the Piave. . . . I see with grief that you have neither habit nor notion of war. I am still ignorant of the situation of my army, the state of my loss in men, in generals, in flags, in cannon. . . . The Austrians are so little accustomed to make war thus that they were astonished that you did not hold the line of the Livenza, . . . and they do not conceive why you abandoned the Piave. In war one sees his own ills and not those of the enemy. One must show confidence. . . . War is a serious game, in which one can compromise his reputation and his country.

If one is reasonable, one must feel and know whether one is made or not for this trade. I know that in Italy you affect to despise Massena. If I had sent him, what has arrived would not have taken place. Massena has military talents before which one must bow down. One must forget his defects, for all men have them. In giving you the command of the army I made an error, I should have sent you Massena, and given you the command of the cavalry under his orders. The Prince Royal of Bavaria commands a division under Lefebvre. Kings of France, even reigning emperors, have often commanded a regiment, or a division, under the orders of an old marshal. I think that if circumstances become pressing, you ought to write to the King of Naples to come to the army. . . . You will give him the command, and you will serve under his orders. . . . I am not dissatisfied with the errors you have made, but because you do not write to me, and enable me to give you counsel, and even to regulate my operations here." It was a pity, in 1812, that the emperor did not remember this principle, and put Davout in command of his right wing, instead of his brother Jerome.

And on May 4 : "The worst of all is not to know the truth. How is it possible for the government to repair the losses if it does not know them ?"

On May 6 : "The Austrians say in their report that they took from you three eagles, sixteen guns, and six thousand prisoners. Your letters say nothing about it. I do not know whether these stories are true or false."

Napoleon soon gave up the idea of pursuing Charles along the left bank of the Danube. The many excellent positions for defense in the mountains of Bohemia would delay him in reaching Vienna, and might enable Hiller to rally in front of the capital both John from Italy and Chasteler from the Tyrol, and thus collect eighty thousand men there ; and so soon as the Austrians had secured their crossing at Ratisbon, and he could no longer attack them in the Danube pocket, his ideas reverted to the old route along the right bank, by which he might quickly reach Vienna and there dictate peace. In the 9th Bulletin, May 19, we read that "Prince Charles, thrown after the battle of Eggmühl upon the other bank of the Danube, had no other refuge than the mountains of Bohemia. After following the débris of his army . . . into the interior of Bohemia, the emperor would have seized upon his artillery and his train; but this advantage was not worth the inconvenience of promenading the army for two weeks in a poor country, mountainous and devastated."

Orders were therefore dispatched to Bessières to cross the Inn in pursuit of Hiller; and Lefebvre, Oudinot, St. Hilaire and Vandamme, with the Guard, which had just reached Augsburg, in support, were successively started for Landshut to follow on and sustain him. Massena, to whose corps Espagne's cuirassiers were added, and who had been dispatched to Sträubing to rebuild the bridge and to reconnoitre along both Danube banks, was from there to move on Passau to take command of all pursuing forces. Meanwhile Napoleon, with Lannes' and Davout's foot, and Nansouty's, St. Sulpice's and Montbrun's cavalry divisions, turned towards Ratisbon: it was unwise to neglect this city until the Austrians were so far in retreat as not to retrace their steps; and to hold Ratisbon would forestall any danger of an Austrian advance up the Danube to counteract the French advance on Vienna. Everything indicated that Napoleon could reach the capital before the archduke; and though not to pursue after the battle of Eggmühl and destroy Charles' army had been a blunder according to the Napoleonic maxims, yet once the enemy had escaped, the march along the right bank was the proper course. Merely to follow the Austrians through Bohemia to Vienna, and there find the bridges on the Danube cut, would not make the moral impression that the occupation of the capital would do; and during the night of April 23–24 Napoleon's mind was made up to march on Vienna by the road of 1805. At this moment Charles was retiring towards Cham, to reunite his corps behind the Regen next day, Bellegarde reaching him



Ratisbon to Vienna.

by way of Schwarzenfeld and Rotz. Davout was detailed to hold Ratisbon, to "pursue the enemy, crush him during the retreat, capture his baggage, and cut off everything outside the roads ;" and on April 24 he assembled Gudin and Morand (who had returned to him), Friant and St. Sulpice at Stadt am Hof, and threw out Montbrun's cavalry to Regenstauf; while imperial headquarters was established in Ratisbon for the moment. On April 25 the emperor wrote the King of Wurtemberg, announcing his intention to move on Vienna, and asking him to protect the army from movements down the Iller or Lech, so as to ward off ill results of the Tyrol rising; and so soon as, the same day, he received news that Bellegarde had marched on Schwarzenfeld, he guessed that Charles would move through Bohemia, and he himself went to Landshut. Lannes was given command of Tharreau's and St. Hilaire's divisions and Colbert's dragoons, already marching on Landshut, and joined his new corps, to which later Claparède and Demont were added. Boudet for a while went to Ratisbon, and Dupas, who had reached Würzburg the 21st, was also ordered thither. In his advance, Lefebvre had instructions to file to the right on Salzburg to protect the right flank against the Austrians in the Tyrol; and on April 24 Massena crossed the Isar at Plattling.

On his side, Hiller, hearing from Charles that he had heavy forces in his front and finding the French pursuit not over brisk, concluded that Napoleon had moved against the main army, and in the effort to aid his chief by a diversion, turned back late April 23. He believed a small force only to be opposite him, and had not yet heard of the defeat at Eggmühl. Even the Emperor Francis at Schirling only heard of it the evening of April 23, and the news had to come through that channel. Perhaps, in attacking, Hiller hoped to pick up the broken connection with Charles. At 3 A. M., April 24, at

New Oetting, he crossed the Inn in three columns, and moved on Neumarkt, Reuss seeking to turn the French left towards Ganghofen, another column moving on Neumarkt, and a third against the French right. Kienmayer was in reserve, and a flanking party moved toward Eggenfelden. In the evening before, Marulaz, Bessières' van, had been driven back to Neumarkt by Hiller's van, but the Rott bridge was held by some of Wrede's troops. Bessières was under orders to move on Braunau, and early April 24 Wrede's division occupied Neumarkt on the right bank of the Rott. Hiller's onset was masterful; Wrede resisted for a while, but Bessières, who was on the ground, saw that he could not hold on, and having but fifteen hundred men, Wrede fell back to Aich, and rallied on Molitor, who gallantly came to the rescue, parried Hiller's blow, and saved Wrede from annihilation. Bessières' cavalry, awaiting orders, had not advanced that day. Hiller held himself awhile at Neumarkt, but getting news in the night of April 24–25 of the French victories at Ratisbon, and orders from Charles, who had reached Cham, to again fall back, he promptly recrossed the Inn. "I think that if the enemy had been aware of the defeat of Prince Charles, he would have remained on the Inn," says Bessières.

Bernadotte, as we know, had been ordered from Saxony by rapid marches to Ratisbon, so that Davout might join in the march on Vienna. Berthier wrote him April 25 that Lefebvre was marching on Salzburg, Bessières had arrived at Braunau, Massena was at Passau, Davout was pursuing Charles by way of Waldmünchen. This was placing the columns somewhat ahead of their actual location, for Bessières was at Vilsbiburg, Massena crossing the lower Vils, Lannes and Lefebvre near Landshut, and Vandamme still at Eggmühl. "His Majesty hopes that you will be able to fall on the rear of the Austrians, to follow them and enter Bohemia. The emperor with his army is marching straight on Vienna." The 9th Bulletin of the Grand Army says that "Bernadotte made a movement on Egra which obliged Prince Charles to detach thither Bellegarde's corps, but by a countermarch he briskly reached Linz." Eventually, after he had passed through it, Ratisbon was held by Rouyer with ten thousand garrison.

> Bernadotte on May 10 wrote the emperor: "All the information that I have gathered on the frontiers of Bohemia agrees in saying that Prince Charles, when at Cham, assembled his generals, and discussed the question of recrossing the Danube at Ratisbon and Sträubing, with all that he could assemble of troops in Bohemia. He proposed this operation as an extreme recourse, declaring that the Austrian army could never beat the French army face to face, and that some desperate manœuvre was necessary to save the monarchy. He persisted strongly in his plan of acting on the rear of Your Majesty's army; but the want of forces, and notably the defection of the corps of Bellegarde, prevented the execution."

In view of the splendid fighting at Essling, the assumption that the Austrians could not meet the French in a stand-up fight is scarcely warranted.

During the night of April 25–26 Davout sent in word that Charles had left Cham in the direction of Passau, information which Napoleon declined to credit, and wrote: "I see that you think that Prince Charles has moved on Passau via Cham. This flank march would be very hazardous. We are to be to-day, the 26th, at Passau. Moreover, you do not say on what you found this opinion. The information given by Montbrun, which he has taken on the spot, is quite contrary. Everything leads me to believe that he" (Charles) "has taken the direction that Montbrun announces. This march is more natural. Yet I wait to know positively what there is in it. It is very important for me to have the affair cleared up." He ordered Davout to push forward as far as Bruck, to make certain of his facts. "Despite all the reports of Montbrun, I have every reason to believe that the larger part of the enemy's troops have moved on Cham in order from there to reach Passau, or the lower Danube," again wrote Davout.

Up to April 26 Napoleon remained in Ratisbon, and when he heard of Hiller's advance against Wrede, he wrote Massena to try a manœuvre against the enemy's flank, as a means of hurrying him back. For a couple of days he had been convinced that Charles would retire by Bohemia, but none the less strive to join Hiller at some point where he could cover the capital. During the forenoon of the 26th he left Ratisbon, and arrived at 2 P. M. at Landshut. Here he assembled Vandamme, Demont, and Nansouty's and St. Sulpice's horse, while Lannes got to Neumarkt, and, joining Bessières, found Hiller receding to Burghausen. Lefebvre was marching on Wasserburg with the two divisions left him, and Massena reached Passau and Schärding. Napoleon had been right in his intuition: Charles had in effect not left Cham, and Davout ran across the Austrian rear at Bruck, and remained at Regenstauf and Kurn, to hold the converging roads into Ratisbon. Angeli tells us that the Emperor Francis was anxious "to direct the operations on the south of the Danube, in accordance with the intentions of the generalissimo," and that, though the destruction "of the bridge of Linz ought to be arranged, yet that at Mauthausen should be spared as long as possible, to assure the junction with the Archduke Charles." In a sense Davout had been correct. From Landshut, April 26, at 3 P. M., the emperor wrote him: "Your instruction is general that, at the moment when the enemy shall have retired into Bohemia, you are to march on Passau, leaving Dupas in Ratisbon until Bernadotte is near. It is important that you should be present at the battle which must take place between Passau and Vienna."

Early April 27 the emperor felt sure Charles had assembled his whole army at Cham, and began to hurry his different corps on Vienna. Davout was not yet certain what had become of Bellegarde, but when during the day he found out that he had joined Charles, he was better prepared for action. He showed prudence in not pursuing the archduke too rapidly, lest if he adventured too far to the north, Charles should move back to Sträubing. On this 27th the three French columns continued to push their way towards Vienna. Lefebvre on the right got to Wasserburg, Massena on the left assembled at Schärding, and added Boudet at Sträubing to his command; in the centre Lannes and Bessières crossed the Inn at Neu-Oetting and Mühldorf, while the reserve advanced from Landshut to Vilsbiburg and Neumarkt. At night Napoleon came up with Lannes' column, and was convinced that Hiller, who had reached Altheim, was really in retreat; but though this looked as if Charles must also retire, he still remained at

French Carbineer.

Cham faced by Davout, whose front he did not leave until next day. In the evening, when the emperor learned that Massena had cleaned the country about Passau, he wrote Otto that the French army stood on the Inn.

On April 28 Hiller got to Ried, Lefebvre reached Trostburg, Massena was still at Schärding; and as all the Salza bridges were broken, in order to expedite the passage, the centre troops were distributed over a wider front, Vandamme to Braunau and Wrede to Tittmoning, to repair them; not until the 30th could the passage of the Inn be fully effected. Lefebvre alone had been able to keep on his way to Salzburg, in pursuit of Jellachic. From Burghausen, April 29, Napoleon wrote him to send out vanguards to Rastadt, Bruck and Leoben, to announce the arrival of an army of forty thousand men to cut off whatever was in the Tyrol. "Have printed and published what has happened to Louis and Hiller, and with proclamations teach them" (the people) "the danger they run." And when reached, the Salzburg citadel was to be placed in good condition, as an important place to hold.

Charles was far too deliberate to match Napoleon's speed. Angeli states that he ordered Hiller to hold on as long as possible at Linz, so as to be able to strike a decisive blow, the junction to be made May 9. If Hiller should resist at Linz until then, the assembly would meet with no difficulty, but if he was obliged to abandon the vicinity of this town as early as the 7th or 8th, he could retire on the Traun and the Enns, gaining as much time as possible behind these two rivers, and bring about his junction by way of Mauthausen. Davout did not leave Charles' line of retreat until he was sure he was moving on Budweis. Upon being satisfied of this, and when Rouyer arrived in Ratisbon and Bernadotte had reached Neumarkt, Davout started in three columns towards Passau, leaving Montbrun on the left bank in observation.

About these days, the insurrectionary spirit of Germany obliged Napoleon to take suppressive measures, and he began to create a reserve corps on the Rhine, to be commanded by Kellermann, with headquarters at Hanau. Information was to be given out that this corps would be increased up to fifty thousand men.

On May 1 the French were across the Inn and Salza; Lefebvre was at Salzburg and Wrede at Strasswäldchen, Bessières reaching out towards Linz and Lampach, Lannes and Vandamme in his rear at Ried and Altheim, and Massena at Siegharting. Hiller got to Wels. On the left bank, Charles had fallen back through the mountains to the neighborhood of Klattau in Bohemia, and Davout, having held Ratisbon until the archduke was well on his way, and not waiting for Bernadotte, was striding along to all-important Passau.

On May 1, from Braunau, the emperor wrote Davout: "Arrive as soon as possible at Passau. It seems that they have burned the bridge of Linz. They count on the bridge at Mauthausen to communicate with Prince Charles. It is probable that we shall seize this bridge before they will have been able to join. Prince Charles will then be able to assemble only at Krems or under Vienna. . . . Send Dupas and Rouyer orders to move on Passau, as eight or ten thousand men are necessary to me at Passau to guard my rear. If Dupas had not arrived, I should be obliged to leave there one of your divisions, which would be very unfortunate." He was anxious to have Davout reach Passau, for it was to be substituted for Donauwörth as centre of operations, as he wrote Berthier from Braunau May 1: "The point of principal depot of the army is Passau. It is there that in case of retreat my intention is to cross the Inn, and it is around Passau that I have the project of constantly manœuvring, in case of a retrograde movement by the army. Braunau, Schärding, Burghausen, are indifferent points to me. My intention is to leave constantly at Passau at least ten thousand men of garrison. Passau then ought to be the centre of all my munitions of war, reserve magazines, and of my hospitals."

Full instructions were given for engineering work and artillery, and for making Passau the centre of Danube navigation. Massena was urged forward to Linz, to seize the Danube bridge and the Traun crossing; and the emperor wrote Eugene in Italy that he must get rid of Archduke John and come up through Styria by way of Bruck, and join the army on the Danube. Personally Napoleon reached Ried.

When Hiller retired on Linz, Lannes wrote the emperor: "It is thought that this corps will pass the Danube at Linz, to make its junction with Prince Charles by way of Krumman and Budweis." Up to the night of May 2–3 Napoleon had thought Hiller had crossed the Enns, but perceiving his error, on the morning of May 3 Bessières was ordered on Linz, and Lannes, with three infantry divisions and cuirassiers, marched on Wels to sustain him; and during the morning of May 3 the emperor rode thither from Lampach.

But soon ran in news which showed that Hiller was not to stand at Linz, and this drew the emperor's attention to the next crossing point of the Danube, Mauthausen, or the next below, at Krems, and Lannes was ordered on Steyer, while Bessières should advance through Ebelsberg to the Enns.

Under Napoleon's urging, Lannes and Massena pushed on, and at Wels and Lampach the French van met the Austrian rearguard, and reached their objective only after a hearty struggle, Massena finding some of Hiller's troops left at Linz. Bessières got on to Wels and Wrede to Vocklabruck, Lefebvre resting in Salzburg and Davout's van reaching Passau.

Purposing to make a stand at the Traun, Hiller had vacated Linz early May 3 to take position at Ebelsberg, and here, about 10 A.M., under Napoleon's orders to push ahead on Linz, Massena's van came upon him, followed by Claparède, Carra St. Cyr, Legrand, Boudet. The position was more difficult than the one at Lodi. A much longer wooden bridge ran directly into a tower in the town walls on the farther side; and not only were the walls strong and defended by excellent artillery, but the town and bridge were commanded by the castle, and by heights difficult of access, rising right out of the river; and Hiller stood here, with thirty thousand men and eighty guns. The position had been turned in 1805, and it was Napoleon's intention to turn it now by crossing at Lampach; but the hot blood of General Coehorn, one of Claparède's brigade commanders, prompted him to a rash advance. There were some Austrian cavalry in the open and infantry in the woods on the hither side. Marulaz had charged and pursued the former, Coehorn attacked the wood. The Austrians withdrew, and Marulaz entered Klein München. Driving the enemy across the bridge, Coehorn followed on, and his men, "without calculating the number of the enemy that defended it, nor the dangers which a bridge of such great length presented, threw themselves upon it at a double-quick," says Massena's report. Crossing on the heels of the Austrian foot, only to find the gates closed on them and him, these were quickly blown in, and Coehorn pushed into the town at the point of the bayonet. There was no chance of arresting this onset, and Massena brought all the artillery at hand to bear upon the town and castle, in the effort to aid the gallant but mistaken effort. Coehorn's men fought from street to street and from house to house. He was too weak to hold himself, and Lesuire's brigade was sent over, followed by Ficatier's, while Massena called to Legrand to come up rapidly, as Claparède's division was being destroyed. The defense was obstinate. Hiller turned upon the French with bravery, threw four columns upon them from different directions, and had almost succeeded in thrusting them out, when Legrand's division arrived, rushed across the bridge, and he and Claparède renewed the battle. The town took fire, and houses filled with wounded were consumed. The butchery was awful. The French neither would nor could retreat, though heavily outnumbered, and the Austrians fought desperately; but when Ledru also arrived, the French, though at frightful cost, finally secured the town, and then advanced against the castle-crowned heights beyond. This task was yet more unequal, but the French divisions accomplished it after another bloody hour; and though by one more brave onset Hiller almost recovered the castle, the arrival of Durosnel's French cavalry down the right bank of the Traun, sustained by Molitor, decided him on retreat. In effect, Napoleon, who had reached Wels, on hearing the heavy firing at Ebelsberg, and guessing its purport, had sent Nansouty and Molitor across the Traun at Wels, and rode on towards the scene of conflict. "As soon as I knew they had been silly enough to attack with the strong hand this celebrated position, and the only redoubtable one on the Traun which had to be taken, I at once suspected some broil." The town had been set on fire, and much time was consumed in putting it out. The enemy was pursued back into the plain.

French Music of the Line.

As Lannes was on this same day debouching from Lampach on Steyer, the assault on Ebelsberg had been quite unnecessary. Berthier had written Massena, May 1, to seize a bridge on the Traun where it could readily be done, adding that "if the enemy desires to defend the Traun, he will take the position of Ebelsberg, which is to his advantage; but he will be driven out of it, because the emperor will have this river crossed at Lampach, where the position is to the advantage of the left bank." Lannes had also notified the emperor that the Wels bridge would be reëstablished by 8 A. M., May 3, and Pelet suggests that a staff officer had been sent to Massena, and had probably told him that Lannes would debouch at Wels on Hiller's rear. Coehorn had been much too enterprising. In commending his gallantry the emperor showed him how he could have saved the woeful losses by more scrupulous preparation, as a defile, with a strong force of the enemy behind it and commanded by a castle, had made the assault a more than desperate undertaking, and one which, as it could be turned, was in no sense justifiable. But it was men who accomplished results whom Napoleon wanted; he was growing more heedless of the means so long as the end was won; and Coehorn was not chidden. Massena was of the opinion that Hiller had defended Ebelsberg so as to cover the Mautern bridge, by which Charles had purposed to cross to get between Napoleon and Vienna, and thought the assault was a saving in time. In effect, the battle soon passed from mind except as another victory. Among the French troops were many battalions which went under fire for the first time, and won their spurs by the heartiest fighting, as new troops will often do. The French lost between five and six thousand men out of not over seventeen thousand men engaged, some thirty per cent. The Austrian casualties with twice the force were quite as heavy. Hiller had been turned out of Ebelsberg — not driven out.

Marulaz passed this night of May 3–4 near the Traun, and then marched on Enns, where he found the bridge burned by Hiller in his retreat. The emperor arrived during the morning at Enns, and repairs were at once begun, but in its place a bridge of rafts had to be constructed. This was finished in the night of May 5–6, and Bessières passed over and also moved on Amstetten, followed by Oudinot, Molitor, Boudet, Claparède and the rest of the columns. The army was assembled between the Traun and Enns.

Up to May 3 Napoleon had expected that Charles would join Hiller at Linz.

> Even on the 5th Berthier wrote Bernadotte: "Prince Charles hoped to be in time to arrive in Linz, but the assembled remains of the corps of Louis and Hiller have been attacked and overwhelmed in their position of Ebelsberg; and Mauthausen having been seized, he could no longer conserve any other idea than to cross the Danube at Mölk or at Krems; and it is probable that we shall arrive before him in these two places, which will leave him no other resource than Vienna."

Napoleon's idea was double, to pursue Hiller with sufficient activity to retard his junction, and also to be ready to meet any attempt of Charles on his own communications. For this latter purpose Vandamme on May 4 was ordered to Linz to reëstablish the bridge and build a bridge-head, and next day Davout was ordered to assemble at this important place.

While the broken bridge at Enns delayed Massena, Lannes, via St. Peter, had pushed on Amstetten. Davout, under whom Vandamme was placed, had by May 5 got as far as Linz, and to him the emperor gave charge of the province, which he deemed of the highest importance to the French communications, for there was always a chance that Charles might operate against the place. At 8 A. M., May 5, from Enns, the emperor wrote him: —

> "I suppose that you are arriving to-day at Linz. You will find instructions there for organizing the province. Take down everywhere the arms of the House of Austria. . . . Order a general disarmament. Sequestrate the treasuries and the magazines. Name a commission to administer the province. Have the bridge of Linz repaired. . . . Once repaired, work at a bridge-head where the Wurtembergers can hold against equal or double forces. The bridge finished, make an incursion so as to have news of what is done in Bohemia." And on the 6th: "In the last campaign I had prepared a bridge-head at Linz. This must be a species of intrenched camp, where ten thousand men with a redoubt can defend themselves against a triple or quadruple force. Have work done on this with the greatest activity. It is extremely important. That it is dominated" (by the surrounding ground) "is nothing. The principal thing is to give time to troops to arrive and debouch through there, or to those who defend the bridge to retire and burn it."

In his eagerness not to miss active work, Davout begged to join the army, but Napoleon wrote him, May 9: "I think that your presence is still necessary at Linz." Bernadotte had by the 7th arrived at Rotz in the Regen country.

After leaving Ratisbon, Charles had been persuaded by Davout's activity that Napoleon, with his whole army, had crossed so as to follow his retreat along the left bank of the Danube, or through Bohemia; and that opposite Hiller there was only such force as could be readily retarded. Several manœuvres against the French army had been discussed and abandoned; but locating it somewhere between the rugged mountains on the Bohemian frontier and the great river, he had retired, by no means as fast as the real danger to his capital demanded, along the post-road and across the mountains from Ratisbon to Budweis, expecting by this longer route to reach Vienna in ample season. After some days he became aware of his error; yet, though he heard of the passage of the Inn by the French army, he remained from the 4th to the 7th of May at Budweis, when he should with part of his army, at least, have been speeding by forced marches toward the capital. It is only six marches from Budweis to Vienna, and the archduke could readily have been there May 10, and Hiller one day before him; but though his idea had been to reach Krems via Zwettel, and there cross to Hiller's aid, when he heard that Napoleon had anticipated him by his rapid marches, he saw that the utmost he could now accomplish was to reach Vienna, or else occupy the islands back of the city; and Hiller was accordingly ordered to cross at Stein and press on the capital along the north bank, lest he be drawn into unfavorable battle before he reached it along the south bank. This was well enough for the purpose of saving Hiller from Lannes and Massena; but if it was desired to save the capital, it would have been better for Charles to speed his march on Vienna, while Hiller, even to his own destruction, should defend the defile at Siegartskirchen long enough to enable the main army to get there.

If he could not save Vienna, Charles' next idea was to demonstrate on Napoleon's communications. Kollowrath, he purposed, with twenty-five thousand men, should march on Linz, and there seize the bridge, while John should draw in Jellachic, who was at the upper waters of the Enns, and with fifty thousand men march down to join Kollowrath; but the Aulic Council — always at odds with the commanders of its armies — had permitted John to retire into Hungary, on a line eccentric to Vienna, and the excellent plan was but half carried out. It was this that the emperor had feared, and had been providing against by holding Linz in force.

Lefebvre, to whose corps Wrede had again returned, was now ordered to make Salzburg his base for a movement into the Tyrol, as the insurrection there was threatening to run over into Bavaria, and to become dangerous to the French communications.

On May 9 the emperor told Berthier to write him: "That I hope that during the day of yesterday he will have marched on Kufstein and overturned all those Tyrolians; that is of the greatest necessity; . . . that he is to put himself in correspondence with Munich and Augsburg, and that if he learned that incursions were made into Bavaria, he is to march on Innsbruck, leaving a strong garrison at Salzburg, and a corps of observation to hold in respect what is at Rastadt; that his operation is to blockade Kufstein and to impose on the Tyrolians, that he has been there four or five days, and this end is not accomplished."

By the 7th, although Bessières wrote that "all the reports announce that the enemy is preparing to receive battle at St. Pölten," Hiller, along the main road through that place, had retired to Mautern; and Charles finally left Budweis, and got to Schweinitz. The emperor had passed Enns and transferred his headquarters to the monastery at Mölk, near which were also Lannes and Bessières, to whose cavalry corps Espagne and Montbrun were added. Massena reached Amstetten, followed by Nansouty and St. Sulpice. The Guard was at Strengberg. As the emperor moved away from his base, his mind constantly reverted to the security of his communications, and in addition to the Corps of Observation he had established at Hanau, he ordered a reserve division to be organized at Augsburg, under Beaumont.

The question of victual was one to which he devoted much time. He had organized a flotilla on the river by which he could send down bread, and on May 6 he wrote Davout: "We shall be to-morrow at Mölk. Send down your three hundred thousand rations of bread in three convoys. . . . Put intelligent men at the head of each; order them never to land on the left bank, but always on the right bank. Let the first convoy land at Ips, the second farther back. . . . Independently of having bread, we shall also be able to make a bridge at Krems with these boats, which is of great importance." Similar instructions constantly appear in the Correspondence.

It must not be supposed that Napoleon knew much of Charles' movements. On May 6, at 9 A. M., he wrote Davout, "I much need information of what Prince Charles is doing." "I suppose that he will have taken to-day the direction of Krems or Vienna."

And on May 7, at 10 A. M., he wrote that "the emperor of Austria is stated to have remarked a few days ago at Amstetten to a deputation from Linz, that he was certain that Hiller would hold on three days, which makes me suppose that to-day or to-morrow Prince Charles will arrive near Linz. If he comes on in force, I need not tell you that you are to burn the bridge, and you will inform me; but I suppose that he will direct himself on Krems, where I hope you will arrive before him. I hope to have there enough boats to throw a bridge, and perhaps I shall decide to manœuvre on the two banks. . . . Be in readiness to leave at any moment to come in two days to Mölk."

But by reconnoissances across the Danube, led by Savary and Marbot, and the capture of some prisoners opposite Mölk, Napoleon learned that Hiller had retired to Mautern, which meant that he would cross, and that Charles was aiming to join him there. Bessières had pushed out towards Mautern with orders to destroy the bridge, so as to prevent the Austrian main army from falling on the French flank while advancing on Vienna; and on May 8 Lannes followed to St. Pölten. Massena was ordered early May 9 to place his headquarters at St. Pölten, and especially to watch Ips and Mölk, where roads from Bohemia ended, and posts were established at these places. Still news about Charles was scant.

At 4 A. M., May 9, the emperor wrote Davout that "the three-quarters of this army" (Louis and Hiller) "have passed the bridge at Krems, the other quarter is moving on Vienna. . . . If from Budweis, where it seems Prince Charles was a few days ago, he wished to manœuvre on our rear, he could debouch by the points of Mauthausen and Enns. Vandamme, who will be charged to watch this point, ought to have the command of Enns. . . . I think that your own presence is still necessary at Linz. . . . The second debouch by which the enemy can march on us is Krems or Mölk, which may be considered as a single one; but both are so near Vienna that this is almost like the centre of operations. One of the things that can embarrass us is bread. Send us by water and have disembarked at Ips and Mölk all the bread you can." Berthier added: "Lefebvre is moving on Innsbruck, Massena is at St. Pölten with Lannes, Oudinot is within four leagues of Vienna."

Hiller being beyond reach, Napoleon ordered Lannes to push on to Vienna — which he did at 2 A. M. of May 10; in order Colbert, Tharreau, St. Hilaire, Claparède, and Bessières and Massena were to follow him. Napoleon wrote Colbert at daylight, May 9: "Give me news of Vienna. At Siegartskirchen they must have news of yesterday. What works, what batteries have been made? What gates of the town are they going to defend? What proclamations have they issued? You have told me nothing of all that. Send me also whatever you find in the post-office." He also wrote Berthier to make Bruyère, who was scouting out towards Bruck, "understand the importance I attach to intercepting an Italian mail for Vienna." There was now nothing between the Army of Germany and the Austrian capital save ten thousand of Hiller's force, detached thither before crossing.

At 6 P. M., May 9, the emperor wrote Davout: "The enemy has cut the bridge of Krems. To-morrow at noon I will be at Vienna. The inhabitants are armed and seem to wish to defend themselves. We shall see if it will be a second scene of Madrid. I shall assemble under Vienna the corps of Lannes and Massena. I desire that you should assemble yours at St. Pölten, having light cavalry and an infantry regiment at Mautern," and the same at Mölk: "If there is nothing new in Linz, I wish you to be to-morrow in person at St. Pölten, where Friant and Gudin are assembled."

Napoleon had been careful to send large cavalry parties backed by foot, under Lauriston, Montbrun and others, out to Bruck, Mariazell and beyond, and towards Hungary, to be sure no danger was coming from those quarters. Neustadt was to be the centre of operations, and the parties later sent down river under Marulaz and Colbert were to keep in touch with those operating along the foothills.

Leaving St. Pölten, whither he had come from Mölk during the night of May 9–10, Napoleon hurried to the head of Lannes' corps, and on the forenoon of the 10th, stood in front of Vienna, just one month since Charles had invaded Bavaria. Massena followed hard after Lannes; Davout was marching from Enns on St. Pölten; Bernadotte had reached Passau, where Dupas joined his corps. Vandamme was at Linz. He had moved large parties into Bohemia, and sent one of them on Krems, to which the emperor sharply objected; writing Davout, May 13: —

> "The movement of Vandamme on Krems has not common sense. Being at Freistädt, he should have stayed there and continued to scout the road to Budweis. If, unluckily, a party of the enemy had come on, this column would have been cut off. This manner of making war lacks wit. Recommend to Vandamme to stick to his instructions, which are to hold Linz and to scout all that country. If he can push on to Budweis, it can only be useful."

Hiller had crossed to Stein opposite Mautern, between daylight and noon of May 8; Charles had reached Zwettel. Vienna had twenty-five thousand men as garrison, half landwehr, under Archduke Maximilian, with a light division in support. It was a question whether the capital would be defended.

Although it was as essential for the French to get possession of Vienna as in 1805, it was not now as easy. The suburbs were defended by breastworks only, and were soon abandoned for the main city. This was defended by a bastioned rampart and surrounded by a glacis or esplanade one thousand feet wide, which separated it from the suburbs. There were forty-eight guns mounted, and an abundant garrison, and Tharreau was received by salvos. Lannes withdrew the troops beyond fire, and placed a line of posts around the town from river to river. The French occupied the suburbs in part, and "the day of the 10th was passed in cannonading, on the one side to prevent the preparations of attack, on the other side to protect them." During the evening the emperor summoned Maximilian to surrender. The French field guns were of no value against the walls, and for moral effect Napoleon threw some shells into the city, to which the garrison responded without sparing the buildings or inhabitants outside. The 7th Bulletin claims that "at nine o'clock in the evening" (of the 11th) "a battery of twenty mortars, set up by Generals Bertrand and Navelet at one hundred fathoms from the place, commenced the bombardment; eighteen hundred shells were thrown in less than four hours, and soon all the town appeared in flames." Other means must be tried, and the emperor sent a force to the Jägerhaus island above the town, to seize the Tabor or long bridge, and cut off Maximilian from the north bank. During the forenoon of May 11 he also rode around Vienna, and with Boudet prepared to cross into the Prater just below the city. Two officers, with several voltigeurs and pontoniers, swam across, and seized some boats and rafts, on which a company moved over and occupied a stone villa — the Lusthaus — near where a bridge was to be thrown. On May 12 Maximilian sent two battalions to attack the Lusthaus, which had been got ready to protect the bridge-building, but they were thrown back, and at eleven o'clock Boudet, followed by Legrand and St. Cyr, crossed and occupied the Leopoldstadt, Molitor covering the road to Presburg. "Maximilian, losing hope of defending the town, which he saw was afire, and fearing to be made prisoner there, employed the whole morning in sending over his troops and all that could flee before the passage was entirely closed," says the Bulletin. The Tabor bridge (which had been so smartly seized in 1805) was then broken, "and the few troops that remained in the town ran up the white flag." This was at noon, and negotiations were prolonged to two o'clock next morning, when the town surrendered. Oudinot



Vienna.

marched in at six o'clock. Maximilian joined Hiller near the Bisamberg.

News about Charles was still scant. On May 15 the emperor wrote Davout: —

> "The opinion in this country is that Prince Charles is seeking to give battle. You must therefore keep your troops reposed so as to be able to march wherever it becomes necessary, and have three or four days of bread. Do not worry your troops by useless fatigues. . . . Bernadotte will arrive at Linz this evening. I have added to this command Dupas' division, which will make a considerable corps, and I have given him orders to make a stout reconnoissance into Bohemia."

The means of crossing the Danube to march against the army of the archduke was now Napoleon's chief consideration; and, judging the fact by the event, he has been blamed for pushing forward too soon. Master of the capital and of half the kingdom, why not wait for the Army of Italy and the other corps, especially as John's army was retiring on Hungary? Napoleon had for many days been out of touch with the enemy, and knew nothing of his doings or purposes; and the French army was not yet concentrated. On May 19, "This is to-day the position of the army," Napoleon wrote. "The corps of Massena and Lannes and the corps of grenadiers of Oudinot are at Vienna as well as the Imperial Guard. The corps of Davout is stretched between St. Pölten and Vienna. Marshal Bernadotte is at Linz with the Saxons and Wurtembergers. There is a reserve at Passau. Marshal Lefebvre is with the Bavarians at Salzburg and Innsbruck." Yet even with small forces, it was Napoleon's method not to remain idle. If the French army was scattered, so must be the archduke's; and why should Charles be given time to assemble the militia of Bohemia and Moravia, recover his morale, and double the task of defeating him? In either success or failure, indeed strategically, a foothold on both banks was important, for based on Prague, the emperor saw that Charles could advance on Linz and neutralize his hold on Vienna. A bridge would give Napoleon scope for action, as in 1805; now he was limited to one bank, and could neither attack the enemy nor gauge his operations. Every day lost gave Charles time for the preparation of a battlefield, or to fortify positions opposite all the known crossings. Napoleon believed he could now cross without difficulty; a week or two later he might have to fight for a place to throw a bridge. To cross was no new idea; the letters of May 6 and 7 to Davout, and others, show that he had constantly proposed to manœuvre on the left bank.

No operation in war is more intricate than the passage of a river in the face of the enemy; ever since the day when Alexander forced the Hydaspes, every such passage has been celebrated. And yet, the operation is equally difficult to resist, and nearly always succeeds. Frederick, we remember, was of the opinion that a river which had a fifty mile course without natural obstacles could not be successfully defended; one must concentrate to fight the enemy during or after crossing rather than oppose his attempt. Napoleon could not wait. Even if his present crossing were opposed, it would consume time, for here were unusual difficulties.

From Passau down to within a few miles of Vienna the Danube flows in something like a gorge, with its channel narrowed by the mountains on either hand. At Nussdorf the channel opens out into a series of arms containing numberless small and several large islands, affording many places for crossings; but above Nussdorf the higher bank makes the passage more easy from the south side, the swift current being the main obstacle. Opposite Nussdorf is an island to serve as a bridge-head for the passage of the wide southerly arm, and then to protect troops during the passage of the narrower and easier northerly arm, which has a quiet current. Below Vienna there is one very large island, Lobau (Lob-Au, Praise Meadow, Praise-God Green, our Puritan ancestors might have called it), nearly three miles wide east and west by a less average north and south, and separated from the south bank by several other large islands, among which runs the main current, much shallower and slower here than in the confined bed above the city. Two main bridges were necessary to reach Lobau, the first about fifteen hundred feet long, the second about eight hundred feet: "One more than two hundred and forty, the other more than one hundred and thirty fathoms, communicating between them by an island," says the emperor. Between Lobau and the north bank, the arm is about four hundred feet wide; the island being a species of citadel with a broad ditch in its front. The passage at Nussdorf called for only half the boats; but opposite lay the Bisamberg, on either side of which ran the roads from Vienna to Bohemia and to Moravia, and these were held by the enemy. Had Napoleon been able to seize this hill before the archduke, he would have won a point, as it commanded the two main approaches to the capital; but as the Austrians reached it first, Lobau became the more available point; and it afforded shelter for a much larger force. Being below the city, the boats found in and above the capital were more readily brought down; but on the other hand, the enemy could float down logs and heavy matter to break the temporary bridges on which the French must rely.

It was unfortunate that the Tabor bridge had been destroyed, for boat bridges had to be improvised. The river had been reconnoitred on the 11th, and three places considered. Fischamend below the city was too distant, but bridges were ordered for Massena at Kaiser Ebersdorf, and for Lannes at Nussdorf, that one to be used which should be ready first;

and to build two would puzzle the enemy, who would not know by which one the French would debouch in force. Five hundred men from St. Hilaire's division, who were thrown over to protect the Nussdorf work, were after a handsome fight captured by Nordmann, and this bridge abandoned; but the lower bridge was pushed under Massena's own eye. The three sections being composed of fifty-four big freight boats, mostly found at the city wharves, and of varying sizes, called for a good deal of adjustment; the spring freshets from the snows of the Alps were just now higher than usual; and the lack of big anchors, for which cases filled with cannon-balls had to be substituted, consumed more time than was expected. The pontoniers needed all their skill and energy.

On May 16–17 important Austrian masses coming down from Bohemia were by outlying parties reported to the north of Korneuburg, and Berthier wrote Lefebvre, May 17, at 9 A. M.: "We hope to be able to debouch this evening by the bridges we have thrown on the Danube, to march and attack the Austrian army, which seems to have assembled on the left bank." The same day the emperor wrote Eugene: "I hope to pass the 18th or the 19th and dissipate the armies which are assembling between the Danube and Moravia." On the 18th Berthier wrote Poniatowski that "his principal aim was to contain an equal number of the enemy and to move towards the main army, which probably would cross the Danube next day." But it was the 20th before the crossing could be begun.

On May 19 Massena and Lannes and Oudinot's grenadiers were in and about Vienna, as well as the Guard, Davout between St. Pölten and Vienna, Bernadotte at Linz with Vandamme and the Saxons, and a reserve at Passau; Lefebvre with the Bavarians was at Salzburg and Innsbruck, and Prince Eugene, having pushed back John to Völkermarkt, had reached Villach, and was instructed to join the emperor in Vienna. Colbert was sent to watch the roads from Hungary, and reported to Lannes "that people well informed assure us that the Hungarians will remain at home." Lauriston and Bruyère seem to have cleared the country in the foothills to the south of Vienna, and Vandamme was to do the same at Mariazell. On May 19 the emperor wrote Davout to send some cavalry to the aid of Vandamme, who was opposing the passage of the enemy near Mauthausen, that he might have to march thither with his divisions, and was to hold himself in readiness. This was the futile attempt of Kollowrath to break the French communications near Linz.

There was issued a —

PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY.

IMPERIAL QUARTERS AT SCHÖNBRUNN, May 13, 1809.

Soldiers ! a month after the enemy passed the Inn, on the same day, at the same hour, we entered Vienna. Its landwehr, its levies in mass, its ramparts, created by the powerless rage of the princes of the House of Lorraine, could not look you in the face. The princes of this House have abandoned their capital, not like soldiers of honor who cede to circumstances and to the reverses of war, but like perjurers who are pursued by their own remorse. In fleeing from Vienna, their adieux to its inhabitants were murder and arson. Like Medea, they murdered their children with their own hands.

Soldiers ! the people of Vienna, . . . deserted, abandoned, widowed, will be the object of your regard. I take all the inhabitants under my special protection. As to turbulent and bad men, I will make of them an exemplary justice.

Soldiers ! be good to the poor peasants, and for this good people which has so much right to our esteem, let us conserve no pride in our success. Let us see in it a proof of that divine justice which punishes the ingrate and the perjurer.

The old disciplinary troubles were ever present, as is testified by the following : —

ORDER OF THE DAY.

IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS, SCHÖNBRUNN, May 14, 1809.

The emperor sees with pain the disorders which are being committed in the rear of the army. They become such that they must arrest all his attention. Bad men are seeking to dishonor the army, and instead of being present with their flags and before the enemy, they remain in the rear, where they commit all kinds of excesses and even crimes.

Mobile columns of one hundred and fifty men are then created to scour up the stragglers, and military commissions to try these misdemeanors.

"Every straggler who under pretext of fatigue shall have left his corps to commit pillage shall be arrested, judged by military commission and executed at an hour's notice."

The order of May 14 is interesting as a picture of the usual method of cantoning the men: —

"Art. 1. The troops will be fed in their lodging according to the ancient usage established in Germany; the officer at the table with his host, as has been ordered in preceding campaigns. The sub-officers and soldiers will receive, in addition to their rations of bread (of seven hectogrammes and a half, or twenty-four ounces): at breakfast, soup and a sixteenth of a pint of brandy; at dinner, soup, ten ounces of meat, vegetables and a half-pot of beer or wine; at supper, vegetables and a half-pot of beer or wine.

"Thus the ration of the soldier will be composed of twenty-four ounces of munition bread, four ounces of soft bread, sixteen ounces of meat, two ounces of rice or four ounces of dry vegetables, a sixteenth of a pint of brandy, and a pint of beer or a bottle of wine, according to the country.

"Art. 2. Messieurs the general officers will see to the carrying out of the above prescribed regimen, and will punish those who break the present order, whenever the local authorities shall report the breach.

"Art. 3. The inhabitants will furnish to the French troops eatables and drinkables of good quality. . . . The emperor recommends to his faithful soldiers the greatest regard for the subjects of the States of the Confederation."

The French soldier had little cause to complain of his rations.

Napoleon used every means to weaken his enemy. On May 15 a proclamation was issued to the Hungarians inciting them to rise: —

"Hungarians, the moment has come to recover your independence. I offer you peace, the integrity of your territory, of your liberty and of your constitution, such as they have existed. . . . I ask nothing of you. I desire only to see you a nation free and independent. . . . You have national customs, a national language. You boast an illustrious and ancient origin. Take back again your existence as a nation. Have a king of your choice who reigns only by your wish, who lives among you. . . . Hungarians! This is what is asked by all Europe, which is looking upon you. This is what I also ask. . . . Let me know your resolve."

The following items may be interesting: —

It was expected of French officers that they should act with discretion as well as courage. A certain major had scouted beyond authorized limits and fallen into an ambuscade. On May 15 Napoleon wrote Davout: "I have read with much pain the report of Major ——. This man is a fool, to whom must not be given the command of an expedition in chief. His expeditions have no common sense. It is by thus playing with the lives of men that one loses the confidence of soldiers."

Even Napoleon had difficulty in having his instructions obeyed. On May 19 he wrote Berthier: "My Cousin, give the most formal order to Kellermann to shunt aside nothing for the corps in Hanau, all that is destined for the army, neither troops, nor artillery, nor military equipage. If he does not execute this order rigorously, I shall be obliged to take from him the command of this corps."

From Braunau, May 1, Napoleon wrote Fouché: "I can see only with pain that the journals print French proclamations taken from German translations, so that what they say is not French. . . . They ought to wait and not make me talk like a translator."

To Josephine, Enns, May 6, he wrote: "Mon amie, I have received your letter. The ball that touched me did not wound me. It scarcely razed the tendon Achilles. My health is very good, you were wrong to be worried about it. My affairs here go very well."

A letter to Barbier, the Imperial Librarian in Paris, dated May 14, states that the emperor finds his library badly organized, and orders a number of other works, including the Bible, the Iliad, Tasso, the Æneid, Milton and Gibbon.

French Elite Hussar Officer.

XLIV.

ESSLING OR ASPARN. MAY 21–22, 1809.

Charles remained at the Bisamberg watching the French and waiting to hear from Kollowrath at Linz. On May 20 the bridges across Lobau were completed, and Molitor was thrown over from the island to the north bank. The first thing to do was to fortify the villages of Asparn and Essling, which stood like redoubts in front of the crossing; but this was not done. By evening of May 20 Molitor and Boudet were across, and after noon on May 21 Charles attacked in five columns. Asparn and Essling went lost, and had to be retaken at a great sacrifice, which would not have occurred if the villages had been prepared for defense. The Austrians outnumbered the French, for difficulty with the bridges prevented troops getting over rapidly, and Lannes and Massena had a task in maintaining themselves. The fighting lasted all day. During the night more men were got across, but still the Austrians remained superior, and at 2 A. M., May 22, Charles again attacked. The fighting was desperate, but the bridges being patched up, Napoleon believed he could get over Davout's corps, and, perceiving a weak spot in the Austrian centre, he proposed to thrust a column under Lannes through it. Lannes started at 7 A. M., but the bridges again broke, Davout could not get over, and the French army was in the utmost peril. The French had to hold their own the rest of the day, so as to retire at night, and this at exceptional loss they did, Asparn and Essling being fought for with the utmost tenacity. Lannes was mortally wounded. Napoleon called together some marshals, and all were for retreat to the south of the Danube. This Napoleon showed them was a weakness, and all he did was to retire into the island of Lobau, to begin preparations for another crossing. The battle of Essling or Asparn was one of the most bloody in French annals.

As in 1805, Napoleon had taken up his headquarters at Schönbrunn castle, and on the 19th he went to Kaiser Ebersdorf to watch proceedings. In the previous night there had been thrown over to Lobau — "the big island," Napoleon calls it — a force of eight hundred of Molitor's riflemen, who drove off the Austrian outposts that Charles had left there;

the division was ferried over, and the throwing of the bridge was begun. To prevent delays, every division had been given orders dictated by the emperor. Massena's corps was to be ready to cross at daylight of May 21, Bessières was to come on towards Kaiser Ebersdorf and hold Espagne's and St. Sulpice's divisions, and Nansouty's heavy cavalry, ready to cross at 5, 6 and 8 A. M., while the light horse under Marulaz and Colbert, and a new division under Lasalle, were to be on hand; Lannes was to wait for 9 A. M., and, the bridge at Nussdorf having been abandoned, Davout was to come on later. To fend the enemy off from any attack along the Danube up to Krems, Bernadotte had been ordered to debouch into Bohemia, either on Budweis or Zwettel, at the same time leaving Linz well protected; and so soon as replaced by Bernadotte, Vandamme was to come on to Vienna.

On May 15 Charles had reached the Bisamberg, and as he could readily watch the French operations, he rested his troops until the 19th, so as to hear from Kollowrath, who, as already narrated, had been ordered on Linz as a diversion, but who, unsupported, on May 17 had been thrown back with some loss by Vandamme, happily sustained in season by Bernadotte. Meanwhile Charles joined Hiller and took up a position from Strebersdorf through Ebersdorf, with his left sweeping out along the higher ground towards Wagram. The Linz attack and the presence of Charles proved the division of the Austrian army, and as the main force, for aught he knew, might be assembling at Linz, Napoleon all the more pressed the crossing. On May 19 Charles learned of Kollowrath's failure, and that John was not marching on Vienna; on the 20th, at the head of Klenau's van, he reconnoitred the French position, and determined to open operations next day; for having from the Bisamberg seen Davout filing down the right bank, and knowing of the force at Linz, he also could see that he would have to meet only part of Napoleon's army, what part he did not know.

On the left bank of the Danube opposite Lobau lies the Marschfeld, a wide, slightly rolling plain, cut only by the Russbach, ten miles to the north and east, back of which is higher ground, but scarcely more than a roll in the surface. On the north shore of Lobau is a reëntering curve of the Danube arm, five hundred yards wide and equally deep, admirably adapted to protect a bridge thrown at its bottom; while, lying like two big redoubts a mile and a half away and about as far apart, the villages of Asparn and Essling, each built of stone along a single street, are calculated to act as defenses for an army debouching here. Asparn had a brickyard, a church and a cemetery, Essling a brickyard and a big wheat storehouse suited for defense; and farther to the right lay Gross Enzersdorf, also capable of good defense.

By noon of May 20, Molitor having been passed over in rowboats, the two bridges from the south shore to Lobau were completed, — "composed of sixty-eight big boats of the country and nine rafts, whose total length was three hundred and eighty-seven fathoms," says Chapuis, major of pontoniers, — the van crossed Lobau, and by 3 P. M., under the emperor's own eye, a party of voltigeurs was thrown over to the mainland, and the bridge in the curve mentioned was begun, protected by a stretch of woods in its front; and as soon as this — "composed of fifteen Austrian pontoons and three trusses, with a total length of fifty-four fathoms," says Chapuis — was completed, at 6 P. M., Molitor, followed by Legrand, and Bessières with Lasalle's light horse and Espagne's cuirassiers, passed over, and moved out to clear the ground towards Asparn and Essling. Beker, Massena's chief of staff, reports that, on May 20, "the corps took position, leaning its right on the village of Essling, its left on that of Asparn." The crossing went on during the night, Boudet's division getting over to sustain Molitor; but as the material used was far from sound and the bridge needed constant repairs, the troops passed slowly. Batteries of over fifty guns were brought to bear on the farther bank, and a bridge-head was begun. The reconnoitring light horse brought in such conflicting news that about midnight Napoleon sent Massena out to ascertain what was in his front, and thus learned that the enemy lay beyond the Russbach; and about one o'clock the light of his numerous campfires showed the presence of an army. "Massena mounted the clock tower of Asparn and satisfied himself that this was so," Lejeune tells us. The archduke had determined to let at least part of the French army cross and then attack it with the river at its back; and he was marshaling for the purpose. The Austrian front was covered by a network of cavalry, and before the emperor could ride forward to the higher land near Asparn to view the field, he had to send Espagne's cuirassiers forward to clear the way. Then, at daybreak, he rode out with Berthier, Lannes and Massena; and after his reconnoissance concluded to advance by wheeling forward to the left.

It was manifest — a glance at the map shows it — that the first and most essential thing to do was to occupy with a heavy force the two villages of Asparn and Essling, which were the key-points of the battlefield, and then hold Enzersdorf, on the right. It was out of the question for the army to debouch from the bridge and to deploy into fighting order, unless Asparn and Essling were occupied by bodies capable of holding them against all comers. A small force would not suffice: the villages needed to be defended by many battalions, and the houses prepared for stubborn fighting. Less than two miles apart, they would block the French movements unless so defended, and should the Austrians seize them and the slight roll in the land between them, they would have the French troops already over in a species of trap, out of which they could make their way to the front only at heavy loss, if at all. But curiously, no orders appear to have been given to thus occupy the villages, — there is no record of such orders, except in after reports, — and what troops were advanced towards them seem to have thrown only a small body into each. How Napoleon could have neglected so essential a precaution is not to be explained.

An account of the battle of Essling, compiled at the Department of War in 1810, tells us that at daylight, May 21, the emperor, accompanied by Berthier and Massena and Lannes, "having reconnoitred the position of the left bank and fixed his battlefield, to wit, the right at the village of Essling and the left at that of Asparn, these two villages and the intermediate ground were at once occupied by the different divisions of the 4th Corps, which at nine o'clock crossed the last arm of the river." On May 21 "Boudet was charged to protect on his right the movements of the cavalry, and to occupy in force the village of Essling;" Beker's report says: "Carra St. Cyr guarded the centre of the line, Molitor the left, having a regiment at the debouch of Asparn, and Legrand was temporarily placed in second line," where he stayed until 3 P. M., when the battle broke out; Bessières was "charged with the defense of the right, with the cavalry and Boudet." Substantially the same statement is contained in the 10th Bulletin; but this is not evidence of the moment, and the course of the fighting and other testimony is not fully in accord with it.

Charles was likewise in movement, proposing to throw his mass against Napoleon's left flank and cut him off from his bridges. Leaving Reuss on the Bisamberg to contain Davout up river towards Korneuburg, the Austrian army broke up May 21, between 1 and 2 P. M., and advanced, as Angeli tells us, in five columns: three, the corps of Hiller, Bellegarde and



Battle of Essling or Asparn.

Hohenzollern, respectively by way of Stadlau, Hirschstetten and Breitenlee on Asparn, sustained by the corps of grenadiers at Gerasdorf in reserve; these three were to strike Asparn on right, centre and left. Half of Rosenberg's corps, under Dedovich, debouched from Aderklaa and Rahsdorf direct on Essling, and Klenau's other half, led by Rosenberg, by a circuit through Gross Enzersdorf, into which Boudet threw a few troops; while Lichtenstein's cavalry via Neu-Wirthshaus went in between the 3d and 4th columns. Thus some eighty thousand men, with three hundred guns, were about to fall on part of Massena's corps, supported by part of Bessières' cavalry, considerably less than half that number. At the moment of the advance, the French appear to have had only Molitor's division behind Asparn, with no great force in the village. Molitor was sustained by Legrand's division in the rear and to the left; and Boudet was behind Essling, with the village held by but a small part instead of by the entire division. The cavalry, under Lasalle and Espagne, was skirmishing out between and in front of the villages. According to Pelet, at 1 P. M. there were on the left bank only these troops. An hour or so later Marulaz got over and took place on Molitor's left.

Napoleon was aware of the close proximity of the Austrians; he had personally viewed the ground; and it argues either unmilitary contempt of his gallant adversary (already expressed, for in the 9th Bulletin he says that "these able manœuvres" — his own — "had ended by destroying the reputation of the opposing general"); or else it exhibits a decided lapse in his usual activity, that he merely observed to Massena, as Pelet testifies: "My intention is to refuse my left wing and to advance by attacking with my right," — this was to attack Charles' strategic flank, so as to cut him off from John; and that his only order was "to cross the Danube and march against the enemy." He may have expected that Massena or Lannes would, as a subsidiary matter, order the occupation of these villages, but so long as he was present, was it reasonable to rely on this, when one word would insure it being done? At other battles — Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland — he had been more careful. Or had he, as many contemporaries allege, been spoiled by success so far as to believe that he could not fail in any undertaking, that no enemy could stand against him, whether he took proper precautions or not? Still the same man as of old when aroused, as we shall shortly see, he was less easily put on his mettle than a few years before. His health was good, but, in a way weakened by excesses, he needed the excitement of battle, or of danger near at hand, to lend him his ancient activity. To his immediate entourage, it is abundantly testified, his bearing gave the idea of a certain weariness of war. the feeling that he conducted it only to accomplish results, while the exertion went against his grain. He was in a sense growing careless in war — not of its grand aspect, but of its tiresome detail. He never lost, although at times he failed to use, the wonderful *coup d'œil* which could grasp the broadest problem and gauge its proper perspective; nor indeed, when roused, had he less of the astounding pertinacity which forbade his seeing when he was beaten, as another would view it, and this he distinctly proved on this day and the morrow. What he now lacked was a good general staff. He had never sought to build up such a body to a state of high efficiency; for years he had been his own general staff; now he was unwilling or unable to exert himself as he had formerly been wont to do, and no one took up his work where he dropped it.

There had been abundant time, and there were men enough, to occupy Asparn and Essling in sufficient force, and to get these villages ready for a vigorous defense; and the chances were that, so prepared, they could have been held by the French against all the troops Charles could throw upon them. The bridge had been finished at 6 P. M., May 20; the Austrian attack did not come until the afternoon of the

21st. Yet all too little appears to have been done; and when, by 1 P. M. of the 21st, the heads of the Austrian columns began to appear over the ridge, and Hiller and Bellegarde within an hour or two fell on Asparn, it was too late, and almost at once the village went lost, as it could not have done had it been suitably prepared for defense. The careless manner of debouching across the river at this time stands out in singular contrast to the wonderful care and skill exhibited in debouching from Lobau six weeks later. To the hero-worshiper this error has its sad side, as a prophecy of worse to come.

Their initial success encouraged the Austrians to braver efforts than they could have put forth had they at the first been thrown back. Molitor was sent forward to retake Asparn, which he did an hour later, with grievous loss; and from here could also be seen Hohenzollern and the cavalry deploying on the line Hirschstetten-Neu-Wirthshaus. Shortly a much stouter attack came. Massena commanded Molitor's division in person, and was sore put to it to hold the village, but with his usual persistence, and with Legrand in reserve, he managed to do this in whole or in part, at heavy cost, the rest of the day.

" From three to four o'clock the light troops of the enemy took possession of Asparn, but they were soon driven back by the first brigade of Molitor," says Pelleport, then a major serving in the division. And the " Historique " of Molitor's division says that at 3 P. M. the greatest part of the Austrian army advanced on Asparn and before 4 P. M. attacked it. " The village was a good place to defend, and covered our bridge on the Danube. Molitor, despite his protestations, had been obliged to evacuate it, according to the formal order which was given him. He made haste to reoccupy it as soon as the enemy appeared. He defended himself there, at first with one battalion, and as soon as he had assembled there the 37th and 67th regiments, he charged and routed the enemy's columns, which had advanced as far as the village." "It was only towards 8 P. M. that the division, having left on the battlefield near half its number, was relieved by Legrand; it then placed itself in reserve behind Gross Asparn," occupying the left of the army, with its own left thrown around to the Danube behind Asparn, its right on the brickyard. The

Archduke Charles.

above does not look as if the village had at the beginning been suitably held. Nevertheless, the French fought well. In 1847 Molitor wrote that "if in the heat of the action the immense superiority of the Austrian artillery succeeded in making untenable certain parts of the village, the troops never abandoned the principal part of Asparn."

Meanwhile the Rosenberg columns fell upon Gross Enzersdorf, which, all too feebly held, was vacated, and upon Essling, where Lannes, whose own divisions were delayed by a break in the bridge, and who was left with Boudet only, had equal difficulty to fend off the smart and repeated attacks. The Austrians have always fought well, even against defeat and discouragement; and here they were gaining. What had won French victories against them so far had not been superior fighting, but truer strategic manœuvres, followed by sounder grand-tactics, and especially greater numbers at the point of contact. Here all these French advantages were lacking; and the Austrians could cull the fruit. The fault had not been in too early crossing the Danube, but in the lax method of doing it.

Opposite the space between the two villages, which was held by Bessières with Lasalle's and Espagne's cavalry, and later Nansouty with St. Germain's, Hohenzollern had established a strong line with a number of battalions, and as a means of defending the villages, Bessières boldly rode forward, but failed on the first charge. Later came up the cuirassiers, and by a brilliant onset drove off the Austrian guns; but the infantry in the rear, ployed into squares and backed by Lichtenstein's cavalry, again threw Bessières back. Espagne was killed. There remained but a struggle with teeth clenched for Asparn and Essling. In fact the battle was now waged solely for the possession of these two places. Had the French devoted time before it opened to occupying and strengthening these villages, its entire course might have gone differently. But thirty-odd thousand French could not, unintrenched, face near eighty thousand Austrians; for, brave as they were, they had not the adamantine quality of Frederick's grenadiers, who attacked and conquered at Leuthen against equal odds. Yet they fought gloriously, and met every assault by the fresh troops the archduke continually sent in. At 5 P. M. Essling was still in French hands, despite Rosenberg's best efforts; parts of Asparn had been taken over and over again; the enemy for a while held the cemetery, and the rival forces were contending through its length and breadth. Charles had ordered Hiller and Bellegarde to take Asparn at any cost; but Massena fought in every lane, in every house, behind every garden wall. Legrand was called in to resist a last Austrian effort, and Carra St. Cyr took his place in reserve; "he gave the means of keeping the western part of the village and there passing the night." This division was the last the French could put in; for Lejeune tells us that "the Danube had already risen more than three feet and made the bridges very shaky;" and the long one had given way at three o'clock under pressure of the rising water and of the wreckage, flotsam, tree trunks and other drift which had lodged against it; and despite its never ceasing repairs, up to midnight no further troops could be got across.

The 1810 account ascribes the French difficulties to their numerical inferiority.

> "The enemy is driven back, but he returns to the charge, and being superior in number, he succeeds in mastering the head of the village. The French obstinately strive to retake the ground they have lost, the Austrians show fierceness in holding it. The village becomes not only a single battlefield, but the theatre of a thousand little bloody and determined combats. Every street, every house, every barn, views a scene of carnage. The wagons, the carts, every harrow, the flails, the pitchforks, the axes, are used, either to cover and intrench themselves, or to destroy

the enemy, along with the guns and the sabres. They combat in the church, in the cemetery, around the big trees. Each party seems to say to the adverse party that to become master of the village it must become so of the interior of all the houses. Aspern is taken and retaken six times. Finally, it is only the profound obscurity that separates the combatants."

At nightfall, when the fighting quieted down, Essling and half of Asparn were still in the possession of the French, who had brilliantly maintained their national repute for holding a strong place against odds. More or less contention continued during the night, and the troops slept on their arms wherever they stood, the outposts close to each other. "The enemy retired to establish his bivouacs at four cannon-shot lengths to the rear," says Lejeune.

Napoleon, who had remained at the Essling brickyard, taking short time for sleep, spent the most of the night in striving to get over the troops. At 9 P. M. he reassuringly but positively wrote Davout: —

> "The bridge being broken, time has been lost. The enemy attacked with all his forces, and we had but twenty thousand men across. The affair was hot, the battlefield remained to us. You must send us here all your park, and the most ammunition possible. Send here the most troops you can, keeping those essential to guard Vienna. Send us food also. Have come on, in echelon, from St. Pölten, what is needed to guard Vienna."

Until after daybreak there were able to "cross the bridge without interruption, by braving the greatest difficulties," as says Lejeune: St. Hilaire and Claparède, Tharreau, thus completing Lannes' corps (Demont did not get across), Oudinot, Nansouty and part of the Guard, making on the north bank about fifty-five thousand men. At 3 A. M. the French army formed line: the right (under Lannes), Boudet in Essling, and on his left St. Hilaire, Tharreau, Claparède, in echelon; the left (under Massena), Legrand, Carra St. Cyr in

Asparn, Molitor on his left. The cavalry stood in several lines behind the foot, and was so marshaled as to be able to debouch in the intervals, says Pelleport, of Legrand's division. The Guard was in reserve at the edge of the little wood in front of the bridge.

It was in Asparn that the battle again broke out. Shortly after 2 A. M. of May 22, Charles in person made a renewed effort under heavy artillery fire to seize Asparn, and partially succeeded; but Massena, by bringing up St. Cyr, countered the assault, forced the Austrians out of the village, and held the cemetery. Reinforced from the 2d and 3d columns, the Austrians again charged and took the church, but once more lost it. Four times more the Austrians made a lodgment in a portion more or less great of the village. "To its possession seems to attach the honor of the two nations; victory here lies in the balance." "Massena with his lieutenants, Legrand, Molitor and St. Cyr, hurried to all the most menaced points and sustained the courage of the troops by their presence," says Pelleport.

The Austrians strove to seize the little island back of Asparn, called the Gemeinde-Au, to cut off the army from the bridge. Molitor headed them off. A number of burning rafts were sent down to set the bridge afire, but Molitor's men intercepted them by swimming, and hauled them to the bank. For a good part of the day Marulaz was near Asparn, and on several occasions Molitor moved forward to the charge with his squadrons, but it was all he could do to hold the position, and later Marulaz joined Lasalle.

At Essling a similar effort was later made, and Boudet lost the northerly part of the village, but when St. Hilaire came up, he stood firm in some stone houses, and drove the enemy back.

At the first fire Napoleon rode to the front. With Davout's expected arrival, he believed himself in force to take the offensive, and get out of the low and crowded position back of the villages, where the Austrian artillery was pouring in its concentric fire. He had noticed that the enemy's centre was occupying a thin front, and conceived the idea of cutting his line in two. This work he confided to Lannes, who drew up between the villages. The several accounts, official and otherwise, vary as to the composition of Lannes' column. The 10th Bulletin states that Oudinot was on the left, St. Hilaire in the centre and Boudet on the right. Lejeune puts Tharreau and Claparède on the left, with Oudinot in support; but it would seem, by weighing all the accounts, that the main charge was made by St. Hilaire and Oudinot, with Bessières' cavalry in masses in the intervals, Boudet remaining behind to guard Essling, and Tharreau and Claparède not advancing far beyond Asparn.

Napoleon again took up his stand at the Essling brickyard; Massena was to see to the holding of Asparn and Essling as support, although the Austrian artillery fire made them almost untenable; and when by 7 A. M. Davout was beginning to cross to Lobau, he gave the signal. He pointed out the direction to Lannes as Breitenlee, the archduke's headquarters, at a point between the cavalry and the columns which had moved on Asparn; and he counted on Davout to get over to give the final blow, by which the Austrians could be thrown off up the Danube. With Davout over, such an equality would be established that he believed his original manœuvre of pivoting at Asparn, and swinging his right against Charles' left wing, — which was not only the strategic, but the weaker point, — could be carried out.

The archduke had not failed to notice the preparations made by Lannes, and he at once reinforced his centre and took command there himself.

The French attack was opened by artillery fire. A brigade on St. Hilaire's right was ready to deploy to fend off any attack by Rosenberg; the several divisions were echeloned from the right back. Savary says: "I marched with Marshal Lannes, who remained with St. Hilaire's division. As we were traversing an immense plain, all the troops were formed according to the deep order, some in squares, others in columns." "The enemy was also formed in squares check-



Lannes' Charge.

erwise." The Austrian artillery opened as soon as the column advanced, and though Lannes went forward with a will, and his vigorous onset broke through Hohenzollern's first line, the Austrian grape and musketry tore such holes in his deep formation that Napoleon sent an aide to suggest that he should deploy as he could gain front. "The shock is terrible between two armies which honor and love of glory exalt to its greatest passion. But the French are combating under the eyes of Napoleon, and they have the confidence that they must be invincible." The fight was maintained at frightful loss on either side, and with equal courage. But the French foot soon came to a pause. Bessières rode through the French intervals and forced his way into the gaps of the Austrian foot; and with rapid swing the eager French horsemen forged forward on Breitenlee, which place, indeed, the most impetuous squadrons reached. Amazed at this sudden rush of the French, whom he believed he had reduced to a defensive rôle, Charles drew from his right to sustain his centre, gathered his reserves, and, himself seizing a flag, rallied the breaking Austrian battalions and led them once more against the foe. The fresh Austrians, animated by his splendid example, rushed into the fray with ardor, and falling on the French columns, brought them to a standstill. The French cuirassiers made several more charges, but were always driven back.

It was the decisive moment. Could Napoleon have thrown in Davout's four divisions, he might yet have snatched the victory, for the Austrian centre had been weakened, though it is probable that Lannes alone would have failed against the Austrian numbers: but at the critical instant, somewhat after 8 A. M., notice came that the main bridge had again broken, this time by freight vessels lashed together, fire-ships and other heavy floating masses sent down to keep back

French accessions. Thus cut off from reinforcements, and worse still, ammunition, the matter was in effect settled. The emperor had undertaken tactically to assemble too near the enemy, and had struck before he was assembled. He "judged it prudent to suspend the movement of Lannes, and ordered this marshal to fall back and take a position on Massena's right, stretching between Asparn and Essling," says the 10th Bulletin.

The situation was desperate. If it had been hard for a part of the army to debouch from Lobau, and hold itself while awaiting reinforcements, now that these could no longer come up, it would be a task indeed to retire to the island. The hope delayed of fresh accessions had been taxed to its limit the day before; and the morale of the troops was now at stake. It needed all the nerve of Napoleon, and of Massena and Lannes, to hold the French line to its work, for the Austrians were not lax in following up their gain. The blow first fell on St. Hilaire, who was struck to death; Lannes personally headed his first echelon, and steadied it back on Essling; Oudinot fell back on his left. The Austrians, for the first time scenting victory against Napoleon since the early hours of Marengo, pushed on, and the fight for Asparn and Essling was renewed. For grand-tactics there was no chance. Into each village the deadly concentric artillery fire was poured, and the butchery grew worse. But these places must be held. To retire in plain day before an enemy of twice their number and with thrice their guns, fully supplied, meant destruction at the bridge; and the generals knew it, if their men did not. The Austrians again strove to turn Asparn by way of the Gemeinde-Au, but were met by Molitor with his division reduced to three thousand men, and by the aid of Massena's example, checked; while Legrand defended the village with brilliant tenacity, and after losing and taking it a number of times, finally kept it for the French. Rosenberg fell with fury on Essling, and Charles sustained him by a brigade of grenadiers. Four times he took the village, and four times he was again thrust headlong out. The village was a slaughter-pen. Boudet's division was thrice decimated, but he finally held himself in the massive granary, which he had converted into a redoubt. The fighting of the French was quite beyond words to praise. Abashed at the repulse of a dozen assaults by his best troops, Charles essayed a blow against the French centre, and Hohenzollern, supported by twelve battalions of grenadiers, moved forward about 2 P. M. between the two villages. Should the Austrians break through here, the French would be annihilated at the bridge-head, and the divisions in the villages abandoned; and to this threat Napoleon opposed Lannes, Bessières and such batteries as he could gather. Lannes met the Austrians with such a determination that Hohenzollern was checked; and although the grenadiers again took the lead, headed by the archduke himself, and the Austrian cavalry strove to force its way between Essling and the river, the work of this superb French handful arrested the Austrian onset.

Lannes.

That Napoleon, though firm, was fully aware of the danger, is shown by the letter to Davout at 12.30: "The interruption of the bridge has prevented our supplying ourselves. At ten o'clock we had no more ammunition. The enemy noticed it and marched against us again. Two hundred guns, to which since ten o'clock we could no longer reply, have done us much harm. In this situation of things, to mend the bridges, to send us ammunition and food, to keep an eye on Vienna, is extremely important. Write to Bernadotte, so that he shall not get too far into Bohemia; and to Lauriston to be ready to get near to us. See Daru so that he shall send us medical materials and food of all kinds. As soon as the bridge shall be ready, or during the night, come and talk with the emperor."

Charles now saw no means of battering down the French defense, which for thirty hours had resisted his men's best courage. Only artillery fire was heard: both sides were for a time too much exhausted to come again to close quarters. But early in the afternoon the archduke made a last effort to drive the French out of Essling, and did gain a foothold about 3 P. M. This village could not be given up by the French; recaptured and held it must be. To the Austrian onset Napoleon opposed intrepid Mouton at the head of the fusiliers and tirailleurs of the Guard, while "from the morning, the Old Guard formed in second line a last reserve," says Roguet. Nothing could resist the tremendous fury of Mouton's counter-blow. He stopped the Austrians, but they were at once reinforced, and Rapp tells us that "I was charged to take two other battalions of the Young Guard and fly to the support of ours. . . . Our five battalions start, overturn and disperse everything with the bayonet; we are masters of the village." All Essling was recovered after this hour's desperate struggle; and Charles, who had really put in his last man, could see that he must rest content with the laurels already won. The artillery fire continued, and a stray ball, towards the last, struck both the knees of gallant Marshal Lannes, who died of this, his thirteenth wound, on May 31, a grievous loss to his master and his country.

The French guns had mostly been dismounted or the horses killed; munition could be got over only by ferrying. It was a question of holding the defeated army at the bridge until night enabled it to seek refuge in Lobau for reorganization. Savary tells us that "the enemy was not enterprising in our retreat, they left us the whole afternoon between Asparn and Essling, and it was only towards four in the evening that we withdrew to the wood which covers the extreme edge of the river." Napoleon began by slowly withdrawing his centre, still holding the villages, and on riding back to Lobau, and ascertaining that it would take time to durably repair the main bridge, he returned to the Asparn crossing and called in Lannes and Massena for consultation. The former lay bleeding on the field; the latter arrived at dusk; Davout was on hand; and Napoleon, adding Berthier and his staff, asked the opinion of each. All were for giving up Lobau and retiring to the right bank. After listening silently to what they said, Napoleon, as Savary tells us, summed up the matter: —

> "But, Messieurs, that is as if you gave me the advice to go to Strasburg; if I recross the Danube, I must vacate Vienna, because the enemy will cross behind me, and then perhaps they will push me back to Strasburg. In the position I am in, the only defense I now have against them is the possibility of going over to the left bank if they should come over to the right bank, and thus manœuvre about Vienna, which is my capital and the middle point of my material. If I should go back across the Danube, and the archduke, for example, should break up to cross it at Linz, I should have to march to Linz; whereas in the position I am in, if he undertakes it, I shall cross and follow him until he turns and faces me. It is impossible to leave the vicinity of Vienna without a loss of twenty thousand men left behind there, of whom ten thousand in a month will return to the front."

He also added that a retreat could be made only by crossing in boats, by abandoning the wounded, the guns and the horses, that is, by disorganizing the army; that great resources were yet left, which could be used in a fresh offensive operation, or in a retreat in good order; that Eugene would shortly descend from the Styrian Alps; and half of Lefebvre would come on from the Tyrol. Even if the enemy should cut the line of communications, there would still be one through Italy, and this with eight corps — Davout, Oudinot, Massena, Bernadotte, Lefebvre, Macdonald, Marmont, Eugene. To remain in Lobau was the only present safety, and to debouch again from it when ready the only true strategy.

No answer could be made to this conclusive reasoning, which demonstrated the immense superiority of the emperor's make-up to that of any one near him, and it was determined to utilize Lobau as a bridge-head, and to make rapid preparations for another crossing. Massena was given command of the Lobau work, and Napoleon rode to the rear. When he saw the wreck of the bridges over the main stream, he wrote Massena to break the one at Asparn as soon as possible, and send the material to eke out these; and as the work proposed would take much time, Massena was to prepare for a stout defense of Lobau. The troops were quietly drawn in after nightfall.

Pelleport tells us that "at the beginning of night the emperor repassed into the island of Lobau, and charged Massena to make necessary dispositions for the retreat, which commenced at eleven o'clock in the following order: the sick or wounded, the train, the Imperial Guard, the heavy cavalry, the divisions of Molitor, Boudet, Oudinot, the light cavalry, the tirailleurs of the Guard. While these corps, more or less mutilated, defiled on a single bridge, Legrand and Tharreau covered the movement. They passed only after the other troops. Massena stood at the bridge-head on the left bank to see to the execution of the orders he had given. Each corps carried the wounded unable to march. Towards half-past three the bridge was withdrawn. I did not leave the left bank with the voltigeurs of the 18th until four o'clock, after having exchanged some balls with the light troops of the enemy. Two big barques had been put at my disposition to cross the last arm of the Danube, whose width was about sixty toises."

On the succeeding days the boats were kept busy in bringing up munitions and supplies, and removing the wounded from Lobau.

Davout's papers state that "The major part of the population of Vienna left the town and the faubourgs, and were near Ebersdorf. The battle had commenced with the day, and was very lively. Each minute raised the spirits of the inhabitants. Under these circumstances the marshal mounted everything that remained of Nansouty's division and which had not crossed, directed it on Vienna with orders to make the population go back again, and sent also into the town a part of his infantry."

The conduct of the French divisions at Essling had been irreproachable. On the first day thirty thousand men had resisted the onset of eighty thousand; and on the second day fifty thousand had opposed seventy. Nor can this detract from the gallantry of the Austrian army, whose officers and men had behaved with equal steadiness and ardor; ably used by its splendid chief, it had won a notable victory, in strong contrast to Eggmühl.

The losses had been exceptional. The Austrian killed and wounded, out of eighty thousand, all on the field at once and engaged, were over twenty-two thousand. The French had been able to get over and into actual contact, in detachments, not over sixty thousand men. Of these a nearly equal number had bitten the dust. The difference between the morning reports before and after Essling is nineteen thousand men, and there appear to have been in the Vienna and Ebersdorf hospitals considerably over twelve thousand wounded, while the chief surgeon notes fifteen thousand wounded in the hospitals on the 1st of June. The ninety thousand French present and forty-two thousand killed and wounded, as given by Berndt, convey to the reader a quite erroneous impression.

For two days the French suffered much for want of victual, as communication with Lobau was cut off. The ammunition was almost gone; but Charles had no thought of attacking. He could have concentrated only artillery fire on the island, and this would have done scant harm; for though the island was flat, it was spacious, and there were woods to afford protection. To cannonade troops at a distance annoys, but does not destroy them; and the French would have met any attempt to cross to Lobau with hearty valor. By May 25 the bridges had got repaired, and everything could be done to care for the wounded, and to repair the enormous breaches made in the ranks.

Essling was one more proof of Napoleon's theory of the equality of thousands. To Frederick there was no such theory: he increased his numbers by tactical skill and fighting fervor to a point where the enemy's superiority ceased, and he was fighting the same Austrians whom Napoleon here fought. In the emperor's calculations, however, numbers were real factors; and while here he held his own for many hours against superior forces, he was none the less defeated in the end, and this for no lack of good fighting. He succumbed to his own theory. Like Eylau, Essling was a battle where Napoleon failed to win, partly from his own fault, partly from adverse circumstances; but as on either field any other commander would have been destroyed, the emperor deserves abundant praise for his determined resistance. Yet Essling was not a type of the Napoleonic battle: it has been much criticised, particularly for forcing the offensive before the entire army was across or at hand. But if Napoleon was justified in beginning to cross, he can scarcely be blamed, except for the failure to intrench the divisions in Asparn and Essling as the opening step. His only excuse is that he may not have believed the enemy in full force. Rivers must be crossed, and when eight divisions have been put over, and four more are ready to follow, the offensive rôle is safer than the defensive. Only by an advance, indeed, can ground be gained to deploy the rest of the army, and here it was especially needful to occupy the villages for the purpose.

Lannes' attack has been likened to the English column at Fontenoy, and called a hazard; but the two differ in that the Fontenoy column had the enemy's fire on either flank, while to Lannes both Asparn and Essling were protection. Hohenzollern's return attack between the villages was more nearly its counterpart. In debouching from a bridge there is small choice of manœuvres, and as a rule, with the enemy in front in superior force, the army crossing has to form a salient to protect its bridges. That Lannes and Massena had abundant chances of success if Davout could come up is scarcely disputable. While no doubt it was the breaking of the bridges that lost Essling, yet, had the villages been prepared for defense, even those troops that were got over could probably have held themselves until repairs had been made and others brought up to their aid.

It required much skill in statement to transform the defeat of Essling into a victory. But the emperor was equal to the task.

In the 10th Bulletin we read: "The passage of a river like the Danube, before an enemy perfectly acquainted with the locality and having the inhabitants on his side, is one of the greatest operations of war. . . . The emperor . . . reconnoitred the position of the" (enemy's) "left wing and established his field of battle, the right at the village of Essling and the left at that of Asparn, which were at once occupied." This statement is inexact, but shows Napoleon's appreciation of what should have been done. "At 4 P. M. the enemy showed himself, and appeared to have the intention to overturn our vanguard and throw it into the river. Vain project! Massena was first attacked at Asparn by the corps of Bellegarde, but . . . throughout the evening he turned to the confusion of the enemy all the attacks which were undertaken. Lannes defended the village of Essling, and Bessières with the light cavalry and Espagne's cuirassiers covered the plain and protected Enzersdorf. The affair was lively. The enemy deployed two hundred guns and nearly ninety thousand men, composed of the débris of all the corps of the Austrian army." For débris they fought well. And referring to the second day: "Seeing that the enemy occupied great space from right to left, the project was conceived to pierce it through the centre. Lannes led the attack. . . . The centre of the enemy's army did not sustain the view of our troops. In a moment everything was overturned. Bessières had several fine charges made, which all of them had success. Three columns of the enemy's infantry were charged by the cuirassiers and cut down. The Austrian army was being destroyed, when at seven in the morning an aide came to announce to the emperor that . . . the bridges had just been broken. . . . The enemy was in the most appalling rout when he learned that our bridges were broken. The slowing up of our fire and the concentrated movements which our army was making left no doubt of this unforeseen event. All his guns and his artillery equipage which were in retreat reappeared on the line, and from nine o'clock in the morning till seven o'clock at night he made unheard-of efforts, seconded by the fire of two hundred guns, to overturn the French army. The efforts resulted in his shame. He attacked three times the villages of Essling and Asparn, and three times he filled them with his dead. . . . In the evening the enemy took up the old position he had left for the attack, and we remained masters of the battlefield. His loss is immense. Those military men whose *coup d'œil* is most experienced have valued at more than twelve thousand the dead he left on the battlefield. . . . The loss on our side has been considerable. We have had eleven hundred killed and three thousand wounded. . . . When in the morning of the 23d the army was notified that the emperor had ordered that it should cross again into the great island, the astonishment of these brave men was extreme. Victors in the two days, they thought that the rest of the army was to join them, and when they were told that the heavy waters, having broken the bridges and gaining constantly, rendered the supplies of ammunition and victual impossible, and that every movement in advance would be insane, there was difficulty in convincing them. It is a very great misfortune . . . that the bridges . . . should have been carried away, but it is a great fortune that the emperor did not learn it two hours later. The army pursuing the enemy would have exhausted the ammunition, and would have been found without means of replenishing."

To the Prince Royal of Bavaria, May 22, Napoleon wrote: "I had passed the Danube, and was on the point of destroying what was left of the forces of Prince Charles, when the flood in the Danube broke my bridges." And to Bernadotte, May 24, "We have had, the 21st and 22d, Prince, a quite serious battle on the left bank of the Danube at the villages of Essling and Asparn. The enemy was in the most perfect rout at eight o'clock in the morning, when our two bridges on the two great arms of the Danube were carried away by the flood."

Lannes was a more serious loss than the battle.

In the 10th Bulletin we read: "Lannes had his leg taken off by a ball about six o'clock in the evening of the 22d. Amputation was made and his life is out of danger. At the first moment he was believed dead. Carried on a stretcher beside the emperor, his adieu was touching. In the midst of the solicitudes of this day the emperor gave way to the tender friendship he had borne so many years to this brave companion in arms. Some tears flowed from his eyes, and turning to those who surrounded him, 'It remains,' he said, 'in this day, for my heart to be struck by so severe a blow, for me to abandon myself to other cares than those of my army.' Lannes had lost consciousness, but the presence of the emperor revived him. He fell on his neck, saying, 'In an hour you will have lost him who dies with the glory and the conviction of having been and of being your best friend.'"

Other contemporary testimony is to the effect that Lannes told the emperor that he was being carried too far by his ambition, and that if he were not careful, he would ruin his own career and the safety of France. The marshal's chances of recovery were for a while considered good, for Napoleon wrote to Fouché, May 25: —

"Lannes will be quit with a wooden leg," and he remembered the splendid services of Caffarelli. But blood poisoning set in, and to Cambacérès, May 31, Napoleon wrote: "Lannes died less from his wounds, than from a pernicious fever which grew up with the sickness."

On May 31 the emperor wrote to the Duchess of Montebello: "My Cousin, the marshal died this morning of wounds that he received on the field of honor. My pain equals yours. I lose the most distinguished general of my armies, my companion in arms for sixteen years, him whom I considered my best friend. His family and his children will always have particular right to my protection. It is to give you this assurance that I have wanted to write this letter, for I feel that nothing can assuage the proper grief which you will feel." And in the 14th Bulletin, June 1: "His Majesty ordered that the body of the Duke . . . should be embalmed and transported into France, to receive there the honors which are due to elevated rank and eminent service. Thus has ended one of the most distinguished soldiers that France has had. In the numerous battles where he had been, he had received thirteen wounds. The emperor has been much touched at this loss, which will be felt by all Frenchmen."

The emperor had written Lannes October 1, 1808, in answer to a letter saying that the czar had sent him the Grand Cordon of the Order of St. Andrew, "You have merited it on the fields of Friedland and on those of Pultusk. The esteem of one of our ancient enemies, to-day our intimate ally, honors you and pleases me. Entirely yours, my dear Lannes,

NAPOLEON."

Strategy on the grand scale varies not with centuries. Grand-tactics always varies with the topography, and in the course of generations as weapons are improved. From the earliest times discussion as to the relative value of the deep and the shallow order of battle has gone on. Epaminondas showed the value of a heavy column directed on one point in the enemy's line, and the French had for fifteen years been demonstrating the superiority of the modern column over the rigid line of Frederick's successors. On the other hand, Gustavus Adolphus' shallow line was more mobile, and therefore better than the deep "battles" of Tilly; and at this time in

Spain, Wellington was proving that with a two-deep line of British troops in a good defensive position, and with sufficient reserves, he could defeat the French line of battalion columns. The rules of strategy remain the same; the rules of grand-tactics vary, as Jomini says, according to the terrain, the morale of the troops, and the demand of the instant (*l'à propos*). At the period of which we are treating, there was much discussion as to the deep or the shallow order; and Napoleon's throwing forward Lannes in deep formation against a concentric fire has been much criticised. Because Wellington made use of a shallow, *i. e.* a deployed, formation against Napoleon's marshals and beat them, this has been lauded as better than a heavy line, say of regimental columns. But on the rough ground of Portugal and Spain a shallow defensive formation, relying on its fire, might be advantageous, when on a broad plain country, or in offense, it could not resist the impact of a deep column. Momentum is the value of the latter; and this value always remains if used "*à propos*," although ground or the peculiar value of the enemy's fire, or, as at Waterloo, mismanagement or mud, may largely neutralize this value. The English in Spain sometimes made a line of battalion squares, which was not without its advantages.

It had been common for the French to use the column of Folard (though indeed it is older), of a number of battalions deployed and standing at a given distance behind one another. It was a little before this time that Jomini proposed a better means of making a heavy line of foot by ploying each battalion or regiment into column on the two centre platoons or companies, and forming the line of battle of a series of these columns, with intervals. Although a line of battalion columns had long been used, the fact that each battalion in this line was in the easiest order to be handled by its officers, to manœuvre or to deploy, has kept this common since. But at Albuera, Borodino and Waterloo, a division was ployed into column by forming all its battalions, say a dozen, in line, one in rear of the other, and was thus used in mass. Lannes' column at Essling does not appear to have been this.

Jomini also suggests that on each flank of such a column a battalion should march by file, right or left in front, so as by coming to a front to fend off attacks from left or right; and in commending the English battalion squares, he suggests the formation of an eight-platoon battalion into a square of three platoons front, and one platoon marching left, or right in front on each flank, as being able to deliver more fire than the battalion ployed on the two centre platoons, and being subject to less danger from the enemy's fire. And in effect it is heavy enough, and more adaptable to every kind of ground.

Jomini's *résumé* of what he deemed, with the weapons of his day, the best formation is worth summarizing: —

1st. For a defensive battle in position, the first line deployed, and the second in a line of battalions in column on the centre.

2d. For an attack, two lines of battalions in column on the centre, the second line placing its battalions opposite the intervals of the first, *i. e.* checkerwise, filling the intervals with artillery or sharpshooters. This formation would suffer less from artillery, and allow the second line to come forward through the intervals.

3d. To make marching easier and to give more front to the line, the foot to be in two ranks. This would give eight ranks of depth, which is sufficient.

4th. To facilitate easy command, each brigade to have its own first and second line, so that each general should have his own reserves to call on.

5th. On a flat terrain, battalion squares can be used offensively or defensively. They have less momentum than battalion columns, but are better against cavalry and musketry. The oblong square is too narrow at the ends, but it has more mobility, fire and front than the even square.

6th. Deep column of battalions deployed one in rear of the other would be used only when there is not room enough for extension. These columns should have the battalions marching by files on either flank, and plenty of skirmishers out on the flanks.

7th. These variations of formation are only details, and vary in nothing the effect of the principles of grand-tactics on the different orders of battle.

Molitor.

XLV.

THE ISLAND OF LOBAU. MAY 23 TO JULY 5, 1809.

Napoleon's preparations in Lobau were of the most careful description. He drew in all the troops he could possibly collect, leaving outside matters to take their own course. The chief accession was Eugene, who recovered himself after Sacile, drove back John and followed him across the mountains to Hungary, and shortly defeated him in the battle of Raab, June 14. North Germany and the Tyrol threatened trouble, but Napoleon knew that a victory at Vienna would settle all these matters. Marmont came up from Dalmatia, Bernadotte came down the Danube, and in Lobau and on the south bank from Vienna to Presburg the whole French army was concentrated, a quarter million strong. Charles still lay on the plain north of the river, watching but not divining the French work in wooded Lobau. To make no mistake in debouching this time, Napoleon constructed a number of bridges as well as gathered munitions and victual. Early in July everything was ready, so that troops at a distance could come up, and those in Lobau could debouch; in the night of July 4–5 the crossing was completed, and early next day Napoleon, with his whole army, stood on the Enzersdorf plain ready for battle.

So soon as the troops had been housed in Lobau, the essential thing was the reinforcement of the army to an effective able to cope with what the Austrians, near their home supplies, could put in line: for material, the arsenal of Vienna afforded all Napoleon could ask. Chief among accessions was the army of Eugene, for which good conduct and good fortune had hewn a path towards the Austrian capital.

After his defeat at Sacile, which the emperor had so seriously criticised, Eugene was reinforced by a division from southern Italy, while John, although depleted by details, had advanced on Caldiero; but news of the battles near Ratisbon shortly determined him to retreat, lest Marmont should debouch from Dalmatia, and in order to aid Charles, whom he believed Napoleon would push back on Vienna. Following John, Eugene crossed the Piave in his teeth and threw him back on Conegliano and towards the Noric Alps; and pressing up the Austrian retreat along several lines, took Trieste, cutting Austria off from the English fleet and approaching Marmont; whereupon John fell back on Grätz instead of on Linz, as Charles had hoped, when he sent Kollowrath thither. Eugene was thus able to cut off and almost entirely capture Jellachic in the Tyrol; deprived of whom, John retired on Kormond with heavy losses. Had he reached Linz, it might, after Essling, have caused the French some inconvenience; although, well echeloned along the Danube, Napoleon could probably have disposed of him, followed as he was by Eugene.

Having thus neutralized his adversary, Eugene, by way of the Sömmering, advanced on Vienna to join his chief, leaving a division to guard his communications.

"The viceroy showed in this whole campaign a *sang-froid* and a *coup d'œil* which foretell a great captain," says the 13th Bulletin; and the emperor wrote May 27 to Josephine: "I send you a page to tell you that Eugene has joined me with his whole army, that he has perfectly carried out the object that I had demanded of him, that he has almost entirely destroyed the enemy's army which was before him."

On the same day there was issued a

PROCLAMATION.

Soldiers of the Army of Italy! You have gloriously gained the object that I had marked out for you. The Sömmering was witness of your junction with the Grand Army. Be welcome. I am content with you. . . . Soldiers! That Austrian army of Italy, which for a moment soiled by its presence my provinces, which pretended that it would break my iron crown, dispersed, beaten, destroyed, thanks to you, will be an example of the truth of its device: "God gave it to me. Let him beware who touches it!"

In Prussia and north Germany, meanwhile, there had been in May a half-hearted rising, promptly crushed by the moral effect of Ratisbon. Clarke, minister of war, seems to have feared a serious trouble in Prussia, but on May 17 the emperor, full of the comprehensive sense of his power, wrote him: "The idea that Prussia is declaring war is folly. Should the case arrive, I alone know how I wish to march and what the dispositions I have to take. Never occupy yourself with Germany, and in unforeseen cases take only measures for my frontiers." On May 19: "You have quite too much alarmed Paris about the affairs of Prussia." And on May 20: "Once more, Prussia will not budge. If she moves, I am there to punish her. . . . I am in condition to care for everything. The only thing that you could do without my order would be to make dispositions, in case of unforeseen events, for Wesel, Mainz or Strasburg. For the rest of Germany, do not think of it." Lefebvre had retaken Innsbruck May 19; and the insurrection fostered by Chasteler seemed partially to subside. In Poland, Ferdinand had captured Warsaw; and when Poniatowski retired on the Narew, the Austrians moved to the Vistula. Instead of aiding the north German uprising, Ferdinand took position at Thorn, and Poniatowski, after a few minor victories, marched on Galicia to threaten his communications, and the Russian army of thirty thousand men under Galitzin appeared at Lemberg. Its action was half-hearted, but nothing noteworthy occurred.

From a military standpoint Napoleon never doubted he could repair his recent defeat; yet politically the outlook was not promising, for Abensberg and Eggmühl had been quite offset by Essling. The Tyrolese again rose and drove out Deroy; and until the victory of Raab, Wurtemberg had much ado in keeping turbulence out of its own territory; Am Ende seized Dresden, and moving on Leipsic, forced the King of Saxony to flee to Frankfort; an Austrian army entered Bavaria by the Egra pass and overran the Bayreuth-Nürnberg country; the malcontents became rampant in every land bearing the Napoleonic yoke. England put a new and enormous fleet on a war footing. The pope again broke out into anathemas against Napoleon; Murat was ordered to arrest this violence, and Pius VI. was transferred to Savona.

The following Decree is interesting: "Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, etc. Considering that when Charlemagne, Emperor of the French and our august predecessor, made a gift of several counties to the Bishops of Rome, he did not give these to them except as fiefs and for the good of his states, and that by this donation Rome did not cease to be a part of his empire; that since, this mixture of spiritual power with temporal authority has been, as it still is, a source of dispute, and has too often carried the pontiffs to employ the influence of the one to sustain the pretensions of the other; that thus spiritual interests and the affairs of heaven, which are unchangeable, have become mixed with terrestrial affairs, which by their nature change according to the circumstances and the politics of the time; that all that we have proposed to conciliate the security of our armies, the tranquillity and well-being of our peoples, the dignity and the integrity of our empire with the temporal pretensions of the pope, has not been realized; we have decreed and do decree as follows: Article 1. The estates of the pope are reunited to the French empire, etc., etc. Given in our Imperial Camp of Vienna, the 17th of May, 1809."

After the Essling disaster, to any one but a great captain the whole horizon would have looked so black as to warrant a backward step before the storm broke: but this was not the emperor's view; obstacles never daunted him, and the greatest factor in his favor was that he could work twice as fast as his enemies.

As Eugene approached, Napoleon gave him full instructions. These have a peculiar interest.

On June 6 he wrote: "The first of all things you have to do, is to march together and assembled. . . . In plains like Hungary you must manœuvre in another fashion than in the gorges of Carinthia and of Styria. In the latter, if you win from the enemy by speed a point of intersection" (cross-roads) "like St. Michel, you cut off a column of the enemy; but in Hungary, on the contrary, the enemy, as soon as he shall have had a point taken from him by speed, will move upon another." On June 7 he wrote him: "In your pursuit of Prince John from the Tagliamento you did not march concentrated enough, and you might have had some accident; in fact, if Prince John had assembled his forces at Tarvis, it is possible that you could not have beaten him. . . . You understand that I make these observations for your guidance. You must march well assembled and not in little parcels. This is the first principle of war. A corps of twenty-five or thirty thousand men may be isolated. Well led, it can fight or avoid battle, and manœuvre according to circumstances without meeting an accident, because it cannot be forced to an engagement, and in any event can fight a long time. A division of nine or twelve thousand men can be left isolated for an hour without danger. It can contain the enemy, however numerous he may be, and give time to the army to arrive. Thus it is usual to form a vanguard of not less than nine thousand men, to make its infantry camp close together, and to place it at least an hour distant from the army. You lost the 35th because you did not understand this principle. You formed a rearguard composed of one regiment, which was cut out. If there had been four regiments, they would have formed such a mass of resistance that the army would have arrived to their succor in time. . . . Generally, in a level country, cavalry should be alone, because alone, at least if it is not a question of a bridge, of a defile, or of some great position, it can retire before the enemy's infantry can arrive. To-day you are about to enter a regular operation. You ought to march with a vanguard composed of much cavalry, a dozen pieces of artillery and a good division of infantry; and the rest of your corps should bivouac an hour in the rear with the light cavalry covering it. . . . Prince John, when he sees that you are marching on him from one side and Macdonald from another, will march on one of you; and as he has the advantage of the people with him, he will march assembled, not reconnoitring with his light cavalry, and may fall upon you without your knowledge. You must consequently well organize your march. Let the artillery be in the divisions and every one at his post on the march as in bivouac; one must bivouac as in time of war, and so as to take arms and fight at daylight. It is not impossible that Prince John will have chosen a good position and await you. . . . In this case I recommend to you to reconnoitre it well, and to establish your system well before attacking. A movement in advance without strong combinations can succeed when the enemy is on the retreat, but it never succeeds when the enemy is in position and decided to defend himself. Then it is a system, or a combination, which wins the battle."

With all there was to do to place the army on a footing to meet the Austrians afresh, the emperor worked day and night. Some of his orders are worth noting: —

To Clarke, Minister of War, May 29, he wrote: "Every day I am convinced of the great harm that has been done to our arms in taking away the regimental pieces. I desire, therefore, that in the organization each regiment should have two three-pounders."

Napoleon intended that his men should have abundant drinkables. On June 26 he wrote Berthier: "My Cousin, I come from the island. There is there neither wine nor brandy. Present to me measures to place there to-morrow three hundred thousand bottles of wine and six hundred thousand rations of brandy." And two days later: "Repeat the order that all the soldiers of the army who are in Vienna shall receive every day a bottle of wine. The cellars of Vienna are full. It is ridiculous that my soldiers should be short of wine."

"The enemy is quiet," says the 14th Bulletin. "Bread and wine are abundant, but meat, which this capital drew from the confines of Hungary, commences to become rare. Against all political reasons and every motive of humanity, the enemy are doing impossible things to starve their fellow citizens and this capital, which nevertheless contains their wives and children." "The rage of the Princes of the House of Lorraine," says the 13th Bulletin, "against this city of Vienna can be painted by a single stroke. The capital is nourished by forty mills established on the left bank of the river. They had them carried off and destroyed."

To Clarke the emperor wrote: "It is useless to speak in the 'Moniteur' of the artillery broken and lost. That is only good to excite the numerous enemies whom we have everywhere."

The main demand for the renewed crossing of the Danube was proper bridges and superior forces well equipped. The emperor drew in all troops that could be assembled in season, well aware that to win here was to win everywhere. The Tyrol was left to do its worst, and Wurtemberg had to protect herself. Lefebvre and Wrede were ordered from Innsbruck to Linz; Marmont was on the way from Dalmatia, which was abandoned; Bernadotte was within two marches, and Eugene was debouching from Styria and nearing Neustadt. On the Main, Junot was assembling a corps to aid Jerome in covering Saxony and Westphalia. Passau was put on a strong footing of defense. The French communications being secure, Davout was echeloned along the Danube to Presburg, to head off any Austrian crossing to the right bank, and a division under Bianchi was promptly checked by him in this attempt.

It was equally essential to prevent interference with the work in hand. Even in Hungary John remained a menace, and to rid himself of this, Eugene was ordered to neutralize definitely the archduke. Believing John would stay at Kormond rather than retire to Raab, Napoleon directed him, from the Neustadt country, to march on Güns, and thence on Sarvar, or on Stein am Anger. Although closely watching Eugene's operations, he never loaded him with details.

Charles had harbored the idea of bringing John on to Presburg, and there creating a position like Napoleon's at Lobau, by occupying a large island near by; but he did not act in season. Eugene marched toward Kormond, and John retired on Raab, where the Hungarian Insurrection was organizing, to an intrenched camp whose right was united to the town, the old walls and bastions of which were still of some value. Here Eugene attacked him June 14, the anniversary of Marengo and of Friedland, and after a hot battle, in which the Austrian superiority at first threatened disaster, defeated him with much loss. John retired on Komorn, and the danger of his taking part in the coming operation was lessened.



Eugene's Manœuvre.

On June 16 Napoleon wrote Eugene: "I felicitate you on the battle of Raab. It is a grandchild of Marengo and Friedland. . . . As you attacked in echelon on the right, why did you not put twenty-five guns at the head of your echelon? That would have fortified your attack and intimidated the enemy. Like all other arms, guns ought to be assembled in mass if one wishes to obtain an important result."

John had left twenty-five hundred men in Raab, and as this place must not be left as a base from which the enemy might cross the Danube, the city was besieged and taken June 24. Presburg was for the same reason important; and when the Austrians began throwing a bridge there, the city was bombarded, and on June 30 Davout seized the Presburg bridge-head and the Stadtau island which flanked it.

Marmont with his ten thousand men had been slow in his march to the Danube. On learning of John's retreat he marched towards the Save, and after some opposition reached Laybach June 3. Here he delayed two weeks, when with more rapidity he could have cut off Chasteler, just escaping from the Tyrol. Giulay had been detached by John to Croatia, and reaching Marburg June 15, with twenty thousand militia, he almost succeeded in blocking Marmont; but catching the alarm, the latter speeded to the Drave at Völkermarkt, crossed June 22, and reached Grätz the 24th, to find Broussier besieging the citadel. Giulay manœuvred to keep the French columns apart, but after a handsome fight of the 84th of the line, for which they earned a new standard inscribed *Un Contre Dix*, Marmont and Broussier joined hands, Giulay retiring into Hungary, while Marmont marched on Vienna. The emperor found fault with his delays: —

> "On the 27th you were not at Grätz," he wrote. "You have committed the greatest fault that a general can commit. You ought to have been there the 23d at midnight, or the 24th in the morning. You have ten thousand men to command, and you do not know how to make yourself obeyed. . . . What would it be if you commanded one hundred and twenty thousand men? . . . . Marmont, you have the best corps of my army. I desire that you shall be at a battle that I wish to deliver, and you retard me several days. To make war, one needs greater activity and more movement than it seems that you have given yourself."

While in Lobau all preparations had gone on with speed and vigor for securing beyond a peradventure a passage of the Danube, the difficulties had been many. Scarcely had the long bridge been repaired than, on May 23, it was again broken, and the army, including some twenty thousand wounded, was isolated in Lobau. Only on the 24th could the wounded begin to come over, and next day the troops. To prevent further damage by the floating down of hulks or logs, a stockade with a foot bridge was built above the main bridge of boats. Six rowing gunboats and a floating battery were also launched to combat interference and command the Danube up and down. Aware that one decisive victory would end any minor uprisings, Napoleon neglected these, and steadily kept at his preparations for a fresh crossing. From Kaiser Ebersdorf, where headquarters had been some time, he moved on June 4 back to Schönbrunn, to divert Charles' attention from the island; which, as Massena was alone in Lobau, and the operations at Raab and Presburg were made much of, it sensibly did. The light cavalry protected the army in a vast circle to the south; and the centre was pushed out to Neustadt, with the heavy cavalry in reserve.

However active the numerous enemies of France might be, it was good policy to let nothing interfere with winning a decisive victory here, in the heart of Austria, and the several corps continued their march towards Vienna. Bernadotte relieved Vandamme at St. Pölten, who then came on to Siegartskirchen, while Lefebvre took the place of Bernadotte at Linz. Oudinot succeeded Lannes. Everything was subordinated to concentrating the mass for a great struggle, and on July 1 the Army of Germany numbered not far from as follows: —

The Guard	11,000 men.	Massena	30,000 men.
Davout	35,000 "	Oudinot	24,000 "
Eugene	56,000 "	Bernadotte	24,000 "
Marmont	10,000 "	Vandamme	16,000 "
Lefebvre	22,000 "	Bessières	12,000 "
		Total	240,000 "

The means of crossing the Danube had been made as secure as possible. On July 3, in the 24th Bulletin, speaking of the main bridge the emperor says: —

> "Finally the Danube exists no more for the French army. . . . At present, as the passage of the Danube is assured, and all our bridges are safe from every attempt, the fate of the Austrian monarchy will be decided in a single affair. . . . Bertrand has had works executed which excite astonishment and inspire admiration. On the most rapid river in the world, of a width of four hundred fathoms, he has in two weeks constructed a bridge formed of sixty arches, where three carriages can pass abreast. A second bridge of piles has been constructed eight feet wide for infantry only. After these two bridges comes a bridge of boats. We can therefore pass the Danube in three columns."

The Austrian army still lay behind the Russbach on the line Neusiedl-Wagram and out to the Bisamberg, with Klenau (vice Hiller, sick) between Asparn and Essling. Charles had been active in preparing for a fresh struggle. As he had heavily fortified this position, Napoleon determined to cross elsewhere; and selecting the east side of Lobau, he prepared to strike the archduke's left flank, and by wheeling in on him to roll up his line. To make the passage so quickly as to form line without interference, a number of bridges were needed for exit; and to so command the Enzersdorf plain as to cover the debouching troops, one hundred and twenty-five guns were mounted, of which ninety-two covered the plain opposite the bridges, fifteen the north front and eighteen were in reserve. The island on the southeast of Lobau, known as the Hansel Grund, was connected with Lobau by a bridge of boats near the main Danube stream; and from here to the plain three small bridges were got ready to throw. In the northeast of the Danube arm around Lobau lay four islands of an average of five hundred yards long, and three smaller ones. These were occupied and named Ile du Moulin, Ile d'Espagne, Ile

Lannes, Ile Alexandre; the others Pouzet, St. Hilaire, Massena; and under their cover boats and timber were collected for bridges. Behind the Alexander island was material for five bridges: one of pontoons could be rapidly swung. The Mill island was likewise equipped, and the old Essling bridge place



Lobau.

was utilized, principally to engage the enemy's attention. Thus from Essling to Mühlleuten, there were five excellent crossings, which would insure a rapid debouching of the Army of Germany to the Enzersdorf plain, or a secure means of retreat in case of fresh disaster. The lesson of Essling was not lost. Woods on Lobau concealed the operations; and staff officers, mounted on ladders such as were used for trimming trees, and placed in a safe position, could observe the surrounding flat country.

Although, after Napoleon went to Schönbrunn, he did not see the work again until June 18, he received daily reports of its progress. On this day he inspected the work and found it complete. Yet until his ammunition chests were full, he would not think of crossing; and especially his protecting batteries had to be well supplied for either advance or retreat. On June 23 he wrote the commandant of artillery: "The battle which is to take place will be opened by a great cannonade from the island. It is a cannonade of eighty-six guns, which are to be provisioned each one with at least three hundred rounds. That, then, makes twenty-five to thirty thousand rounds. Have you the necessary powder?" As a first step, to further attract the enemy's attention, on June 30, in an hour and a half, Massena under cover of his guns threw a bridge at the old Essling location, and putting over Legrand's division, pushed back the Austrian outposts, and began a trestle bridge. The weak opposition convinced Napoleon that he might now succeed at this place by the manœuvre which had failed in May. On July 2 an Austrian detachment was driven from the Mill island by Massena and a pontoon bridge thrown. This activity led Charles to look for a new crossing opposite Asparn and Essling, and he hoped, as before, to attack the French when half over. The space between the two villages was strengthened by breastworks and palisades, with a hundred and fifty guns; but only Klenau was watching the island. Had Charles expected a crossing south of Enzersdorf, he would not have strung out his army from the Bisamberg to Glinzendorf; for in his great work on Tactics he selected the Wagram plateau as a typical place to defend a river.

The Army of Germany, preparing for battle, on July 1 lay as follows: —

Headquarters and the Guard were in Vienna.

In the north part of Lobau stood Massena with Legrand, St. Cyr, Molitor, Boudet; and Lasalle's light horse division, then at Raab, was ordered up for the battle. In the south part was Oudinot, with Tharreau, Claparède and Grandjean. On the right bank Davout's divisions, Morand, Friant, Gudin, Puthod, were all near Vienna. For the battle he was to have Montbrun's light horse and Pully's from the Army of Italy. Near Raab were Eugene's divisions, Macdonald, Grenier and Baraguey d'Hilliers, the last of which was to remain opposite Presburg. Marmont's divisions, Montrichard and Clausel, were on the way from Grätz.

At Linz was Lefebvre with the crown prince, Deroy and Wrede, of whom only Wrede got up to the battle. Vandamme came on to Vienna so as to relieve the Guard. Bernadotte, with the Saxons and Dupas, was at St. Pölten. Bessières, with the cavalry of Nansouty, St. Sulpice and Arrighi, was near Vienna.

A force of over two hundred thousand men was thus ready to take part in the battle of Wagram.

On July 1 Napoleon left Schönbrunn for headquarters under canvas at the outlet of the bridges in Lobau. Here in the night of July 2–3 he prepared in his most careful manner his Orders for the Passage of the Danube. There was to be no mistake on this occasion. On the 4th Oudinot was to cross through the Hansel Grund to the plain, posting a division at Mühlleuten, with a second in support. As soon as the artillery fire was heard, the five bridges of the Alexander island were to be thrown, and the crossing was to begin, Massena and Davout leading, Bernadotte, Eugene, Marmont and the Guard in second line, Bessières in third. During the crossing the emperor was to remain on the Alexander island.

Early July 3, from the Mill island, Napoleon scanned the terrain out towards Essling, and having suggested some change in the defenses, rode back to the south bank and issued the Orders for all troops to move over into Lobau: the Guard to start at 8.30 P. M., and Bernadotte three hours later; Bessières to start at 4 P. M. of the 4th, and at 8 P. M. Davout; Eugene was to follow at daybreak of July 5; Marmont and Wrede whenever they arrived. Montbrun's and Lasalle's horse, the hospital and commissary train were to use the hours of the night. All troops were to move, and by daylight of the 5th, the Army of Germany was to have debouched upon the plain south of Enzersdorf, ready to advance on the enemy.

The night of July 4–5 was dark and tempestuous. Some voltigeur battalions having been rowed over into the Hansel Grund to form the van, and the boat bridge having been thrown, Oudinot crossed thither before midnight, and, debouching by his three smaller bridges, deployed on Mühlleuten. So soon as Oudinot was across, the other pontoon bridges were thrown under cover of a continuous artillery fire, mainly directed against Enzersdorf, which was soon set on fire by the shells, and lighted up the scene. Six bridges, thrown in a couple of hours, were next ready. The main boat bridge was so contrived that the hither end was fastened in place, and so soon as the farther end, which was anchored along shore and upstream, was released, the current threw it into position across the river. By 2 A. M. of the 5th the troops began to cross. The emperor was everywhere, as of old, encouraging the pontoniers of this bridge, and hurrying forward the troops on that, until the army was well started, when he snatched a short sleep while the divisions filed into place on the other side. Everything went well except for an unusual error of Berthier's. Davout was to form the right flank, Oudinot the centre; but Berthier arranged for Davout to cross on the centre bridges, while Oudinot was passing through the Hansel Grund, and Davout had to file across Oudinot's front.

By 4.30 A. M., Massena stood with the left leaning on the Danube, opposite the northern point of the Alexander island; and Legrand's division, which, with Reynier in support, had faced the Austrian van under Klenau at the old crossing, here joined him. Having marched over the lower Alexander bridge, Davout drew up with his right on Wittau. Only Nordmann's light division, sustained by horse, disputed the passage, and this was quickly brushed away. After the all night's tempest, the day opened fine and clear, and at 8 A. M. Oudinot came up so as to deploy between Massena and Davout. Everything had moved smoothly: the archduke had for some days been misled by Legrand's appearance on the old battle-ground, and on July 1 had advanced on Asparn and Essling, sending a strong corps out as a flying wing to Wittau; but two days later, as no further French operations were perceived, these latter troops were called in; and while Napoleon was debouching from Lobau, the Austrian army was still in position back of the Russbach, extending out its right to the Bisamberg. The Essling-Asparn defenses erected by Charles proved useless, for —

> "On the 5th, at the first rays of the sun," says the 25th Bulletin, "every one recognized what had been the project of the emperor, who had placed himself with his army in line of battle on the extreme left of the enemy, having turned all his intrenched camps, having rendered all his works useless, and thus obliged the Austrians to leave their positions and come and deliver him battle on the ground that suited him. . . . From noon till nine at night we manœuvred on this immense plain and occupied all the villages; and as we arrived on a level with the enemy's intrenched camps they fell of themselves, and as by enchantment."

By ten o'clock on July 5 the French first line was pushed forward to the front Enzersdorf-Rutzendorf. Out of the latter village Nordmann was driven by Oudinot, and fell back on Rosenberg on the Austrian left. Bernadotte had now got across, and came up between Oudinot and Massena. Lasalle was out on the left flank, and Montbrun was dispatched across the Russbach towards the right, to glean news of John, who



Debouching from Lobau.

might appear from that direction. Napoleon had drawn in Eugene only in season for the battle, and his absence from Hungary was not at first noticed: Charles could not draw in John so speedily — as the latter was under the orders of the Aulic Council.

When Eugene and the Guard had got over and deployed into second line, it was noon; and as Bessières' reserve cavalry rode up into third line, Napoleon, shortly after noon, set the army into motion forward, with what the reports call a slight left wheel, but what was scarcely more than an extension of the left of the line to the west; Massena through Gross Enzersdorf towards Neu-Wirthshaus, driving an Austrian outpost before him, while Davout moved on Glinzendorf, towards Neusiedl. As this spreading of the corps gave more room, Eugene came up from second into first line, and by 2.30 P. M. had got in between Oudinot and Bernadotte, thus ocupying the centre of the army. From left to right the line was formed by Massena, Bernadotte, Eugene, Oudinot, Davout. The French advance took Klenau in reverse, and after slight defense he fell back on Stammersdorf, while Rosenberg retired through Glinzendorf. Rarely has a river been crossed by a large army in the face of the enemy with as much success. Charles had been too much surprised by the change of plan and its rapid execution to do anything to arrest it; and one hundred and eighty thousand men with four hundred guns, collected from Presburg, St. Pölten, Linz, Vienna, had assembled in and debouched from Lobau, and had deployed on the Russbach plain without opposition. It was a notable opening. In line stood: —

Davout	36,000	men.	Bessières	7,000	men.
Oudinot	24,000	"	Guard	11,000	"
Eugene	32,000	"	Marmont	11,000	"
Bernadotte	20,000	"	Wrede	6,000	"
Massena	33,000	"			
			Total	180,000	"

Before sundown, say about 6 P. M., the light horse of Pully and Grouchy's dragoons had followed Montbrun out to the Russbach at Leopoldsdorf; under constant Austrian artillery fire Davout had reached Glinzendorf, Oudinot with his right on Grosshofen was in front of the space between Baumersdorf and

Neusiedl; Eugene opposite Wagram-Baumersdorf, Bernadotte facing Aderklaa and Süssenbrunn; while Massena, who had really wheeled to the left, extended from the Danube well in front of Asparn to opposite Breitenlee. The Guard was posted in the rear, at Rahsdorf, sustained by Bessières; Marmont and Wrede were still at the bridges. This left a marked gap in the line between Bernadotte and Massena, whose corps was a species of flying wing; but as the Guard, Bessières, Marmont and Wrede could be brought up in case of need, it was not



Battle of Wagram, 5 P. M., July 5.

for the moment dangerous. The French secrecy and speed had been such that the enemy, instead of interfering with the operation of crossing, was now compelled to receive battle; and the sooner the push was made, the greater the chance of success.

Opposite this threatening advance, early July 5, had stood the Austrian army, whose total force nearly equaled the French; but as John had not yet joined, and Reuss had been detached to keep an eye on matters up river, it was not by any means as strong in effective on the field. Charles had on his right near the Bisamberg the corps of Klenau, Reuss and Kollowrath, respectively, at Stammersdorf, Lang Enzersdorf and Hagenbrunn, the grenadier corps back of Gerasdorf, supported by the Lichtenstein reserve cavalry, and in the left wing three corps under Bellegarde, Hohenlohe and Rosenberg, behind and along the Russbach from Wagram to Neusiedl; in all one hundred and forty thousand men, and four hundred and fifty guns.

Vanguard :	Nordmann	16,000 men.
1st Corps	Bellegarde	21,000 "
2d "	Hohenzollern	25,000 "
3d "	Kollowrath	17,000 "
4th "	Rosenberg	19,000 "
5th "	Reuss	10,000 "
6th "	Klenau	14,000 "
Res.	Lichtenstein	18,000 "
	Total	140,000 "

Having placed the corps on the right to protect the main roads to Bohemia and Moravia, and having urged John at Presburg to come in on and sustain his left flank, Charles would have preferred not to fight until the 6th; for he hoped John could reach the battlefield early in the morning, and believed he could certainly do so by ten, which would give him eight Austrian corps in line. Had it not been for the delay caused by Davout and Oudinot crossing each other, Napoleon might have fallen on Charles' weak centre and left by the middle of the afternoon, for half of the Austrian corps were not near enough to put in; as it was, Charles had time to meet the oncoming French by strengthening his line. Some of the grenadiers were drawn in to the centre; and artillery was distributed along the Russbach, which, deep and hard to pass except with bridges, was of itself a good defense.

Napoleon was puzzled at encountering no opposition in crossing; but though he knew little in detail about the enemy's position, he learned towards the middle of the afternoon that John had not yet come up, and as he might do so during the night, the emperor proposed an attack that, by driving Charles' left wing back from behind the Russbach, should keep John away. He selected Wagram as the point; from the report of the light horse on his right, he expected here to strike the Austrian left wing. Meanwhile the French left was to hold the Austrian right in check. Had the emperor reconnoitred the Austrian position, he would have selected Neusiedl for attack, instead of Wagram. But the general scheme was good. Just why Charles had not more closely drawn in his corps on first seeing the French advance, one cannot say: he expected no attack that day.

Before the battle it was ordered that "the wounded who cannot withdraw by themselves will remain on the field of battle. It is forbidden in the name of honor to abandon the battlefield to conduct the wounded, so long as the battle shall be disputed."

Sword of the Period.

XLVI.

WAGRAM AND ZNAIM. JULY TO NOVEMBER, 1809.

At 6 p. m., July 5, hoping to forestall John's arrival from Hungary, Napoleon attacked Charles, but was driven back. During the night he centred his troops for a similar attack at daylight, but Charles advanced at 3 a. m. Rosenberg fell on the right under Davout, who stoutly held himself. Kollowrath and Klenau attacked Massena on the left, drove him in, and threatened the Essling bridge; Bellegarde maintained the centre. Charles was showing able tactics, and the Austrians were in good heart. Napoleon's battle plan was anticipated and his left turned. Still, equal to the danger, he hurried up Bessières with what cavalry he could collect, and hurled him on the approaching Austrian centre; this he followed up by a hundred guns under Lauriston, and, putting in what infantry he could quickest handle, he stopped Charles' advance. But for victory, which Napoleon saw was to be won on the right, Davout needed powerful assistance. Better concentrated than Charles, and bringing up available reserves, he formed a heavy foot column with cavalry on each flank, and launched it forward under Macdonald towards Süssenbrunn. Austrian gallantry brought this to a pause: it was not on this the battle hinged. Davout kept up his advance, and forced back Rosenberg; Eugene and Bernadotte pushed across the Russbach, and soon the French right won. Macdonald's column resumed its advance, and Charles fell back from a lost field, but in good order. John had not got up. Charles retired to Znaim, Napoleon followed, and fighting occurred there July 11 and 12; but the Austrians proposed a truce, and Napoleon, with many serious problems on his hands, was glad to accept it. Meanwhile England sent an expedition to Walcheren, which came to nothing. The truce led to the Treaty of Vienna, October 14. Wagram was one of Napoleon's great victories, but also one of Charles' most skillful battles. After Wagram, Charles' health forbade further active service, but he was long at the head of the Aulic Council.

Shortly before 7 p. m. the emperor ordered the attack. Between Wagram and Baumersdorf, and extending on to Neusiedl and back from the Russbach, runs the low plateau which dominates the country to the south. Against this, between the first two villages, Eugene was to advance, while on his left Bernadotte, through Aderklaa, should attack Wagram, Oudinot on his right Baumersdorf, and Davout Neusiedl. At the foot of the slope ran the Russbach, fordable at only a few places. The moment was auspicious, for more than a third of Charles' force was out of reach, on the right, guarding the roads to Bohemia and Moravia and the river above the Bisamberg.

Opening the battle, Eugene threw one of his divisions across the brook, Bernadotte's Saxons forced their way into the edge of Wagram, and Oudinot attacked Baumersdorf, but without success. Charles, who from this point had been watching the French all day and bringing up from the right such troops as he deemed essential, drew from his reserve fresh battalions, and throwing them against Eugene's division, hustled it back. The other Italian divisions, coming up successively to the support of the first, suffered the same fate, and Eugene withdrew again to the south of the brook. This also worked disaster to Bernadotte, who had already given up Wagram; and at nightfall he retired behind Aderklaa, which the Austrians reoccupied. Bernadotte, it was alleged, had not sharply pressed his attack; between his and Eugene's advance there was no coherence, but which of the two first fell back is disputed. The 25th Bulletin tells us that "The attack on Wagram took place. Our troops carried the village, but a column of Saxons and a column of French mistook each other in the darkness for the troops of the enemy, and the operation failed." Neither had Davout pushed home in season to make a serious impression on Neusiedl. Thus, owing to the late hour and hap-hazard work, the French, though all told superior in force, at the point of contact had proved inferior in numbers and manœuvring; and Charles had the advantage of position. This preliminary attack, intended to break down the Austrian left wing and prevent its reaching out to John, was clearly defeated, and the several positions to which the French corps had advanced by 5 P. M. were practically those to which they retired at night, and in which they slept on their arms. There can be no denying the good fighting of the Austrians, nor their able management, against odds, by the archduke. All had been cheered by their victory at Essling; and they had clearly outfought the French. The loss had been some four thousand men on either side; and Baumersdorf and Wagram were set afire.

Disappointed as Napoleon was at the outcome, it was clear that nothing further was to be done that night; but he determined on the same attack again for the morrow, though he believed it would be against greater forces. According to his usual method he had striven, irrespective of tactical difficulties, to break down the enemy's strategic flank, that is, the wing John was apt to reinforce, and he was unwilling to alter his plan. He had supposed the bulk of the enemy's forces to be behind the Russbach; but ascertaining that a large force was where it could move down upon his own left, he now deemed it wise to concentrate his corps toward the centre, so as to be able to deliver a massed blow in whichever direction might prove most useful; and he ordered Massena, after nightfall, to edge to the right through Breitenlee on Aderklaa, leaving Boudet in Asparn, and gave instructions to Davout to come in with the bulk of his foot through Glinzendorf on Grosshofen. To the emperor's bivouac on the road between Rahsdorf and Grosshofen, most of the corps commanders came during the night for final instructions for the 6th, and after giving these Napoleon sat until daylight by his camp-fire, with little sleep. "It seems that the dispositions of the French general and of the Austrian general were inverse," says the 25th Bulletin. "The emperor passed all the night assembling his forces on the centre. . . . The Austrian general, on the contrary, was weakening his centre to garnish and augment his extremities, to which he gave a fresh extension."



Battle of Wagram, 3 A. M., July 6.

At first streak of morning light Napoleon was in the saddle, to give the signal for a general advance.

But Charles anticipated him. He also had given midnight orders for an attack at dawn, and had moved his troops into the desired positions. Reuss' corps was left at Bisamberg, Klenau, starting at 1 A. M., was to march down the river road on Stadlau and attack Asparn, and Kollowrath at the same hour was to march on Breitenlee. This was a bid to cut the French from their bridges, and while Charles could scarcely expect to accomplish so much, yet that to break the French left and even threaten the bridges was a manœuvre dangerous to the French was well shown later by the panic which occurred at the end of the battle for a much less cause. The grenadier corps was, about 3 A. M., to advance towards Süssenbrunn; the cavalry reserve corps to keep up connection between right and left by marching on a point west of Aderklaa; Bellegarde at 4 A. M. was to be under arms and hold Aderklaa and the ground in its vicinity; Hohenlohe was to hold himself behind the Russbach in reserve until the others had pushed beyond Aderklaa, when he was also to cross to the attack; Rosenberg was to keep Napoleon's right busy and to hold the road open for John to come up in line from Presburg. Charles was pivoting on his left to advance the right and centre. The plan was good, but the length of the line was too great for the troops holding it.

In accordance with instructions, at about 4 A. M. Rosenberg unexpectedly debouched through Neusiedl on Glinzendorf, surprised Davout, who was engaged in the manœuvre ordered, and for the moment threw his leading troops back. Napoleon, speedily apprised of the attack, and fearing it was by the van of John's corps, hurried up with the Guard, Nansouty and Arrighi, lest his right should be turned and the army cut off from Lobau; but as usual Davout was prompt in his measures to meet the danger; Gudin was sent to Loibersdorf to threaten Rosenberg's flank, and before the emperor's arrival he had already won the upper hand and was forcing the Austrians back to the Russbach. Gudin had alarmed Rosenberg, who declined to push his attack.

At this moment equally startling news came in from the left. In connection with Davout's capture of Neusiedl, it had become essential to recapture Aderklaa, which Bellegarde had occupied after the battle of the evening before. To this task Massena had been assigned, with Bernadotte in support on his right; and this marshal, although injured by a fall from his horse the day before, and compelled to ride to the field in a carriage, had marched with three of his divisions through Breitenlee on Aderklaa, where his van struck Bellegarde, who had strengthened himself there during the night. Launching St. Cyr on the village, it was taken with a rush; but it was lost again to the second line, and was then put in the hands of Archduke Louis, to be held to the last extremity. In the onset by Bellegarde, Massena had been forced back towards Rahsdorf, and he was preparing to renew the struggle for the possession of Aderklaa, when the two Austrian right corps, Klenau and Kollowrath, fifty thousand strong, came in on his left and rear. Kollowrath struck Hirschstätten; Klenau, who was in the lead, fell on Boudet, who had just debouched from Asparn, and vastly outnumbering him, threw him after a fierce struggle back into, and then out of, the village, drove him rearward to the old bridgehead, and was on the point of seizing the bridge itself. Kollowrath, feeling that this could be done later, and that his first duty was to join in the affray towards Wagram, then wheeled to the left, formed the bulk of his line facing northeasterly, and marched up to take Massena in reverse, heading for Breitenlee and Neu-Wirthshaus, on which also part of his corps was debouching from Leopoldau, while the grenadier corps was taking the direction of Süssenbrunn. Here was activity far superior to that at Ratisbon, and it looked as if Charles had seized and would keep the initiative. Massena threw Molitor and Legrand against this oncoming tide, in front of Neu-Wirthshaus, but to no effect. The Austrian grenadiers had only one line, but sustained by the reserve cavalry in their rear they kept on their advance, and the French divisions were forced back. If not rapid, the enemy was alert and in the best of heart, and every whitecoat was convinced that the day could again be won. The whole face of the battlefield had changed. Napoleon's attack on the Austrian left and centre had been anticipated by an Austrian attack on his own left wing, which hour by hour had grown more dangerous; and this was all the more credit to the enemy, whose line, with much less force, covered much more ground. Charles had proved himself a master tactician.

Bernadotte, on Massena's right, to coöperate with his brother marshal, had also put in part of his corps against Aderklaa, but not with the vim the emperor deemed equal to the demand; his attack had also failed, and his men were falling back in some disorder. By 10 A. M. the Austrian right had almost broken the French left, and had surrounded it from Aderklaa through Süssenbrunn and Breitenlee to a point well out towards Neu-Wirthshaus. Victory was apparently within their grasp. But the Austrians were too deliberate in following up their advantage.

Meanwhile Napoleon, whose plans had been quite changed by Charles' sharp offensive, relying upon Davout to handle Rosenberg in his front, giving him Neusiedl as his objective, and not altering his determination to crush the Austrian left, had ridden to Oudinot, and then over to Eugene, and had shown each the line along which, as soon as he should give the order, he was to direct his attack, on the ridge between Wagram and Baumersdorf; and he had instructed each constantly to bear somewhat to the left so as to keep up touch with the centre, and to maintain in the interval a heavy cannonade to occupy the enemy; having done which, by 10 A. M. he galloped over to the left, followed by the Guard and Nansouty. It was time he did, for his left wing was at a point where it would take little to bring about a fatal disaster. If without demoralization the left could be held where it stood, no harm need ensue: should the Austrians advance too far, the attack of the right, upon which he relied for victory, must fail.

The 25th Bulletin strives to give a different complexion to the affair. "While this was going on, news ran in that the enemy was attacking with fury the village that Massena had captured, that our left was turned by three thousand fathoms, that a lively cannonade was already heard at Asparn, and that the interval from Asparn to Wagram appeared covered by an immense line of artillery. There was no more doubt left. The enemy was committing an enormous fault: it was only necessary to profit by it."

In reality, grasping the gravity of the situation, Napoleon ordered Massena, with his three divisions and in as good order as possible, to retire to the river to protect the bridge and hold Essling, and if possible rescue Asparn; and then he turned to the question of meeting the threatening masses still coming on from the west, slowly but remorselessly. In fact, the whole Austrian line from Wagram through Aderklaa, Süssenbrunn and Breitenlee was advancing in good order on Neu-Wirthshaus against his own almost ruptured left. It must have been a strange sight to the emperor, and one to which he was unaccustomed. But he rose to the occasion, as he never failed to do upon the battlefield. There was a choice of two operations to counteract Charles' manœuvre: to break the bridges, and by reinforcing Davout on the right, annihilate the Austrian left, and run the chance of Charles' following down the Danube, where he would then have to fight with his back to the river; or to mass Eugene, Bernadotte, Oudinot and Marmont against the Austrian centre, and break through that. The first would require too much time; Napoleon chose the second. But to accomplish even this he must first arrest the progress of the Austrian right wing. Hurrying up all the cavalry Bessières had at Rahsdorf, he added to it that of the Guard and Nansouty, and hurled the mass upon the Austrian line; and while Bessières rode forward, he collected under Lauriston the sixty guns of the Guard, and the other batteries at hand, about a hundred pieces, ready to train them on the enemy. Out through the retiring divisions of Massena Bessières drove home at the Austrian line, as the sole means of arresting the fatal onset. His charge began with fair success; but his horse being killed in the first impact and he stunned by the fall, Walther took command, and the cavalry, weakened by its leader's fall, arrested the advance of Kollowrath for but a brief period. Falling back, the cuirassiers uncovered the artillery. "Lauriston at the head of this battery of one hundred pieces marched at a trot on the enemy, advanced without firing to half-range, and there commenced a prodigious fire, which put out that of the enemy," says the 25th Bulletin. In effect, the sharp and unexpected fire of these massed batteries sensibly checked the Austrian ardor; and although Charles was present everywhere, despite a slight wound received the night before, and kept his brave battalions to their task, the moments gained enabled the emperor to bring up some foot, which he had been intent on doing from the moment he had assigned their tasks to Bessières and Lauriston. Macdonald, of the Army of Italy, was nearest at hand, and this marshal, wheeling to the left, came into action southeast of Süssenbrunn, followed shortly by some of Eugene's regiments and part of the Guard. These troops, put in by the emperor in person, had, at no great cost, the desired effect against the somewhat tired Austrians, who came to a standstill; and by 11 A. M. the immediate danger was over. The left flank had been temporarily reconstructed. A lull ensued. Charles paused for a new effort.

But this was not all that was needed. The Austrian line must be ruptured to draw the pressure from Massena on the left and to win the victory. To follow up the work just admirably done by the three arms, the emperor had all along designed to drive a column through the Austrian right wing,



Battle of Wagram, Noon, July 6.

and he chose Macdonald for the task. Meanwhile he had kept a keen eye on Davout and the town of Neusiedl, where he had earlier said and still felt that the battle was to be won. He had full faith in the hero of Auerstädt, who had so often upheld his hands in critical moments. Davout had already thrown across the Russbach, below Glinzendorf, Morand and Friant, who debouched between Neusiedl and Siebenbrunn, while with his two other divisions he attacked Neusiedl. Here ensued a deadly struggle. Rosenberg understood the importance of the place, threw a crotchet to the rear to meet Morand and Friant, and made a bold bid to retain the village, finally asking fresh troops from Hohenzollern in the centre. Davout, however, was too strong, and the onset of his divisions was pronounced. He had placed some of his guns on a slight eminence where they could enfilade the crotchet of Rosenberg; and he had been aided by an advance of Oudinot, who by heavy cannonading had contained Hohenzollern at Baumersdorf, but carried away by his desire to ease Davout at Neusiedl, had advanced a column across the Russbach. Rosenberg, attacked in front and flank, and unable to rally on Hohenzollern, yielded up Neusiedl and retired towards Bockflies. Napoleon could see from the smoke of the guns that his right was still advancing, for as noon struck, Davout had passed Neusiedl.

By this time, after his effort in checking the advance of Kollowrath, Macdonald, with Broussier's and Lamarque's divisions, had been ployed into one heavy column by Napoleon, and to protect its flanks was added Bessières, with Nansouty sustained by Durutte on his left, and the light cavalry of the Guard sustained by Pachtod on his right; and he was closely followed by Serras and Wrede in his rear, the mounted grenadiers and infantry of the Guard in reserve, while Marmont and two divisions of the Army of Italy remained at Rahsdorf in case of need. Macdonald's column was not the later usual line of regiments, each ployed into double column on the centre, and followed by a second similar line; but it was a column made up of regiments in line, one in rear of the other. While it was marshaling, Eugene with Grenier, and Oudinot in the centre, were sent orders to advance at the same moment. Oudinot, as we have seen, had already done so, and the viceroy, though at first thrown back, headed a second column, and in connection with Davout forged to the front.

So soon as formed, Macdonald's column was launched forward; and leaving Aderklaa on his right, he pushed on towards the clock tower of Süssenbrunn, which the emperor had indicated as the point to reach. Here Kollowrath's left joined the corps of grenadiers. Likewise steadily advancing, Davout's corps, with the cavalry of Grouchy, Montbrun, Arrighi and Pully, by a left wheel pushed through Neusiedl on Wagram; Oudinot swept the Austrians in his front along the Russbach; and Eugene, with Grenier's division, moved forward on the same objective.

It was nearly one o'clock. In Macdonald's column, deeper and heavier than Lannes' at Essling, huge gaps were torn by the Austrian guns in front, while the batteries beyond Aderklaa enfiladed it and swept away whole ranks of men. Before a quarter-hour had elapsed, two thousand men had bit the dust, and the column dwindled every moment as it advanced. At length it was brought to a standstill; but it was not broken, and the line of its advance had forced the enemy to abandon Aderklaa and Breitenlee. Süssenbrunn was held with tenacity by Kollowrath and the grenadiers; and the French column had hard work to maintain itself. Here stood the archduke, and his presence held the Austrians to their work despite a number of hearty charges by the French cavalry on right and left.

Alone, Macdonald's charge would undoubtedly have failed;

it was not here that the battle was won. The emperor's attention was fixed on Neusiedl and Baumersdorf. When an aide from hard-pressed Macdonald rode up to him for further orders, he answered no word. But when he began to see the fire of Davout's troops advancing well beyond Neusiedl, he turned to the aide with: "Tell the marshal the battle is won!" and sent him orders to advance again in full force, heedless of what was in his front. Pressing on, Eugene had now got to Wagram and seized the town. Between him and Davout the French right wing and centre were much stronger than the Austrians opposed to them, and were pushing them back step by step, in spite of handsome resistance. As the French centre could now spare some troops, Napoleon saw that he might aid Macdonald, so bringing back Grenier's division from Eugene, he threw it on the left of the Austrian right wing, which was giving Macdonald most of his trouble, and at the same time ordered Wrede up into first line, and the Young Guard close up as reserve. Part of Marmont, and Bernadotte with the Saxons, meanwhile charged in on Bellegarde. Between these several efforts, and especially because their front was turned by Davout, the Austrians retired from the Russbach villages, yielded up Süssenbrunn and gradually fell back on Gerasdorf. The Austrian victory had been turned into defeat: Charles saw that he must withdraw from a lost field, and issued orders accordingly. The 25th Bulletin claims that "from ten o'clock the enemy was only fighting for his retreat. From noon on this was pronounced and made in disorder, and long before night the enemy was out of sight." This is inaccurate, but the victor may lawfully claim all he will.

The front of advance of Eugene, Macdonald and Wrede was now nearly on a line. Once started in a successful onset, there was no staying the French divisions; and they pushed the Austrians back towards the road to Brünn, where they called a halt about the middle of the afternoon. On the French right Davout had by this time advanced almost as far, and Oudinot, after taking Baumersdorf and the plateau, pushed on, and thus relieved the pressure on Marmont and Bernadotte. Part of Davout's corps joined Oudinot at Wagram; part followed Rosenberg's corps, which retired on Bockflies. Had he been in time to march the entire corps on Wölkersdorf, he might have cut off the Austrian retreat, but he was but partially acquainted with the country. Thus was the region northeast of the Russbach cleared of all the forces of the enemy; and Davout and Oudinot finally halted on a line from Wagram along the brook north to Bockflies. Massena had meanwhile recaptured Essling and saved Boudet; so soon as the Austrians fell back, his corps could again come up into line, and by evening he had advanced to Leopoldau, driving back Klenau's rearguard in some confusion. The Austrian troops formed squares in the plain, but these were unable to resist the charges of Lasalle, who gallantly fell at the head of his men.

It had been not long after two when Archduke Charles gave the final order for retreat. Far from John's coming up to sustain his left, this wing was being annihilated by Davout and Oudinot; Macdonald's column threatened to rupture his centre; the initial success against Massena had been turned against himself; and he deemed it wiser to conserve a beaten but by no means disorganized army than to risk all for all. He was no gambler in war, but rather a conservative prince, looking for the ulterior safety of his house. As a matter of fact, at 4 P. M. John's main corps was still ten miles from the battle-ground, and could not be counted on at all. Charles had put in all his men. On the French side, Marmont and the Guard, over twenty thousand men, had substantially been kept in reserve. The emperor's bivouac remained between Rahsdorf and Aderklaa.

Now, despite their absolute victory, ensued a curious panic among the French troops, which testifies to a manifest lack of discipline. Fire discipline they had in plenty, and they could march far and fast; but Napoleon's soldiers were never under the best control. The circumstances were these. The troops had begun to bivouac, when some small bodies of light horse preceding the van of Archduke John's army came riding up, and a cry arose among the camp followers that the enemy was reaching the bridges. A general stampede among the trainmen, the wounded who could still walk and the stragglers took place, and for a while even the line was doubtful of its victory. But matters soon quieted, and as it happened, this particular panic had no further results. In his Memoirs, Marmont says: "Panic fears are a sad sign of the moral condition of an army. They have sometimes happened in the French army, but never in its good days. The army of Austerlitz and that of Jena showed no such example. Panic fears are a proof of a strong neglect of discipline, of a want of confidence and of a lack of pride in the military virtues." As a fact, so long as his men would march and fight, Napoleon cared for nothing else, and left the troops unbridled. They were allowed many personal excesses, to reconcile them to their hard work and frequent sufferings. Plunder, arson, rape, were every-day crimes which, despite flaring Orders of the Day, went unpunished. The French soldier had come to look on these as a right he possessed; and he was fast degenerating into a military machine, excellent in success, but by reason of this very looseness, of more questionable value in a grave disaster.

Rosenberg, on the extreme Austrian left, had retired to Wölkersdorf; the rest of his army Charles assembled at nightfall along the Brünn road and at the Bisamberg. He had given up the battlefield, but he had not been disastrously beaten, for his army was still in good organization and heart; and as Napoleon had not won an overwhelming victory and had suffered heavy losses himself, he was scarcely disposed to push on in pursuit that day, nor indeed to renew his attack, — one of which things he would certainly have done when in his old form. Both forces lay on their arms the night of July 6–7, close to each other, the emperor uncertain whether the Austrians would retreat towards Znaim via Korneuberg, or on Brünn via Wölkersdorf. By early morning of the 7th the latter seemed the more probable; though as a fact, Davout all but barred the way.

The Austrian loss had been nearly twenty-five thousand men, including twelve generals *hors de combat;* but they left few trophies except some dismounted guns. The French loss was not less. Each army took some seven thousand prisoners. Charles made ready to retire towards Znaim on the way to Bohemia; Rosenberg along the road to Moravia. The Emperor of Austria, who had been with Charles' army, made his way to Hungary.

Tactically, Charles had conducted the battle on an excellent plan of concentric attack, such as had succeeded so well at Essling; but he had thereby weakened his line, and had enabled Napoleon, by massing his forces, as from his convex position he could more readily do, to rupture his centre and to roll up his left wing. Charles had, however, a good right to expect his brother John to reinforce this wing in season, and thus enable him to hold Neusiedl, or certainly Wagram. His conduct of the battle had been excellent. Had John not been delayed at Presburg, the emperor's task, to say the least, would have been much harder.

To Cambacérès, from his bivouac, the emperor wrote: "I send you from the battlefield my page, La Riboisière, so that you shall be without disquiet, and that you may know in general the result of the battle of Deutsch-Wagram. The Austrian army is in full rout and pursued in all directions. I am so tired that I do not write you more. Let it suffice that I tell you that everything marches according to my desires."

To General Clarke the emperor wrote, July 8, from Wölkersdorf: "The Bulletins will have told you the result of the days of Enzersdorf and of Wagram, memorable battles, in which all the forces of the Austrian empire have been destroyed. I have my headquarters in the house which was occupied by the wretched Francis II., who contented himself with watching the whole affair from the top of a tower" (belvidere) "four leagues from the battlefield. I estimate that the enemy fired upon us seven or eight hundred guns. As to me, I had also many, for I had five hundred and fifty pieces. I fired on them one hundred thousand balls or rounds of grape. The artillery of the Guard rendered me most eminent service, and as in my organization this artillery really forms the reserve of the artillery of the army, I believe that I will decide to increase it to one hundred and twenty pieces." Says the 25th Bulletin: "Such is the recital of the battle of Wagram, a decisive battle and one forever celebrated, where three or four hundred thousand men, twelve or fifteen hundred guns, fought for great interests on a battlefield studied, meditated, fortified by the enemy for several months. Ten flags, forty guns, twenty thousand prisoners . . . are the trophies of this victory. The battlefield is covered with dead. . . . Our loss has been considerable, it is valued at fifteen hundred killed and three or four thousand wounded." "A particular circumstance of this great battle is that the columns nearest to Vienna were not more than twelve hundred fathoms away. The enormous population of this capital covered the towers, the belfries, the roofs, the hillocks, to be witness of this great spectacle."

On July 9 Napoleon wrote Alexander: "Monsieur my Brother, I thank Your Imperial Majesty for your amiable attentions during these three months. I have waited to write you because I first wished to write you from Vienna. After that I was not willing to write you until I had chased the Austrian army from the left bank of the Danube. The obstacles that the enemy opposed to the construction of my bridges have obliged me to make them of piles; that retarded me until now. The battle of Wagram, of which Your Majesty's aide-de-camp, who was always on the battlefield, can render you an account, has realized my hopes. The Austrian army, cut off from Hungary, has retired on Bohemia. I am pursuing it."

The three lines of retreat open to Charles, from his first position back of the Russbach, were to his left on Hungary, where he could best defend the Austrian hereditary possessions; back of his centre on Moravia, whence he could reach Hungary, unless interrupted by a French advance up the March, along the chord of the arc he had to describe; and to his right on Bohemia, where Prague would furnish him a base rich in material, and near the allies in north Germany, who were rising in favor of Austria. For Napoleon it was best to cut Charles off from Hungary, as his power lay in controlling the Austrian capital and its resources; and in his plan of the battle of Wagram this idea had been uppermost. Frederick's battles were generally founded on a tactical plan, Napoleon's on a strategical plan. Frederick, never equal to the enemy in numbers, had to rely on grand-tactics to defeat him, and moreover, though always on the offensive, he was waging war to defend his kingdom, and needed not the broad strategic method to which Napoleon, who always waged wars of conquest, resorted. Frederick's difficulties were usually tactical. Napoleon, on the contrary, with his superior numbers, paid rare heed to these. He moved on the enemy from such an intelligently conceived direction as strategically to compromise him, and would not acknowledge that any minor logistical or tactical difficulties could arrest his blow when delivered. At Wagram Napoleon saw that to cut the enemy off from Hungary as well as prevent the junction of John, he should manœuvre to turn Charles' left flank. On the other hand, Charles doubted his ability to recover Vienna except by a victory; he would not risk the only army on which the Emperor Francis could depend; and therefore, looking to his means of retreat, and feeling that he was strong in Bohemia, he stood astride the roads to that state and to Moravia, and then not only reached out to John, but also strove to turn the

French left by way of Asparn in search of a tactical victory. He was thus too extended. As it happened, Napoleon's concentrated grand-tactics was correct. The tactical as well as strategic key of the field was Neusiedl; Charles relied on



Vienna-Znaim Country.

John to come up and hold it; to Napoleon it seemed essential to capture it; and his so doing before John arrived decided the battle.

Immediately after the battle the archduke had drawn all his forces except Rosenberg back to Korneuburg, on the Znaimroad. On the 7th Davout and Marmont, accompanied by headquarters and the Guard, were pushed out to Wölkersdorf, with the idea that the Austrians would retreat on Brünn; Massena took post at Jedlersee to hold the road to Vienna, and late at night was ordered to follow the enemy on Stockerau. Oudinot remained at Wagram. Eugene, whose corps had suffered most, was left on the battlefield to watch John and cover Vienna, with the Saxons, Wurtembergers and one division of Bavarians added to his command; for as the relics of the armies of Chasteler and Giulay, after the evacuation of the Tyrol, had reunited in the Grätz-Leoben country, and John was still afoot, though after failing to reach the battlefield he had crossed into Hungary, Eugene needed a substantial force. On July 9 he was ordered to move on the river March.

> "Yesterday morning there was nothing new opposite Presburg," wrote the emperor; "where then was Archduke John? It seems he wanted to join Prince Charles, and that the issue of the battle prevented him. What is most probable is that Archduke John will have left a corps of observation on the lower March, and will have moved with the rest of his forces and the Hungarian Insurrection on Göding to maintain the communication of Prince Charles with Hungary, and to disquiet the right of our army should it march on Brünn."

Macdonald, Marmont and Oudinot were created marshals. Napoleon had been dissatisfied with Bernadotte's conduct at Wagram, as before at Jena, and his corps was broken up and partitioned among the others.

During the night of July 7–8 Marmont, with the rest of the Bavarians and Montbrun added to his corps, as van of the army was pushed on Nickolsburg. "The emperor thinks that with a vanguard of about twenty thousand men and thirty-six guns you can do much harm to the enemy. I count on your talents as on your zeal. Have a care to report to me twice a day." Davout advanced beyond Wölkersdorf. On July 8 Massena was ordered in pursuit; but all this was a weak operation compared to the whirlwind after Austerlitz and Jena.

Before he had gone far, Marmont on the 8th ascertained that Rosenberg, intent on rejoining his chief, had filed off towards Laa; and he followed thither as far as Mistelbach, while Davout in his rear got to Wülfersdorf. When Massena's leading division, Legrand, reached Korneuburg, it was ascertained that the bulk of the Austrian army had gone on through Stockerau, which being reported to headquarters, Massena was ordered beyond towards Znaim, and Legrand got into touch with Charles' rearguard on the 9th at Hollabrünn; but though he pushed it hard, he was blocked by its stern resistance. Reaching Laa, Marmont found his troops too much exhausted to get across the Thaya this day, but from his presence here and that of Massena at Hollabrünn, Charles feared he might be anticipated at Znaim, and the Austrian army hurried its retreat. Davout's cavalry reached Nickolsburg. On the 10th Massena again pushed Legrand and St. Cyr in against Hollabrünn, and though he forced the Austrian rearguard out, he found the enemy drawn up at Schöngräbern, not far beyond, where despite several attacks he was held back all day. Near this place it was that Bagration had fought so well in 1805 against Murat. Meanwhile Marmont from Laa reached the vicinity of Znaim, and recognizing that he had the bulk of the Austrian army in his front, took up a defensive position on the ridge right and left of Zukerhändl, and sent Wrede in to capture Teswitz. This he did, and although driven out, he recaptured and maintained it against a number of sharp Austrian attacks. Davout got to Nickolsburg, and as soon as Napoleon, from the news coming in, learned that Charles had retired on Znaim, was ordered over to back up Marmont.

During the night Charles' other divisions came up, and with these he reinforced the troops already in place on the hills in front of and near Znaim. Personally Napoleon transferred headquarters to Wülfersdorf and thence to Laa, followed by Nansouty with the Guard cavalry, and Oudinot with the Guard foot. On the 11th Marmont waited for Davout, while the Austrians defended the Thaya crossing at Schällersdorf, south of Znaim, having already thrown back an attack by Massena, who had followed on their heels.

From all indications, the knot of the problem was now at Znaim, and Napoleon on riding thither found that the Austrian army was ready, if need be, for another battle. Znaim is situated in an amphitheatre on the final slopes of the Böhmerwald, and the vine-clad, terraced hills like Elchingen afforded Charles' army a position of so great strength that even the victorious French troops might fail in an attack. It was a place to turn, not assault. It had been fortunate



Battle of Znaim.

that the Austrians did not fall in force on Marmont, who was not sustained as Charles believed him to be. The strategical status was, moreover, not satisfactory. Davout and Oudinot could not all get up until next day, and should Charles, instead of battle, elect to retire on Bohemia, he could force the French, with a part of their effective only, to follow him on what was almost a wild-goose chase. Considering the safest policy to be one of offense, and to forestall Charles' operations, Napoleon ordered both Massena and Marmont to get into contact with the enemy, but not to be drawn into a pitched battle; and meanwhile the reinforcements coming up might strive by a circuit to seize the road to Prague.

It was difficult for the French marshals to avoid a serious fight, which went on under the emperor's eye on either side of the Thaya and along the ridges and among the vineyards of Znaim, with alternate success and failure. The troops on both sides felt embittered; so did the leaders, and Znaim fell little short of being a pitched battle. A thunder-storm, indeed, scarce created a pause in it, and all old soldiers remember the relaxing effects of a heavy downpour.

But better was to come. The night before, a message proposing an armistice had been handed in to Marmont, and now Prince Lichtenstein came to talk for the Emperor Francis. Napoleon was wise to accept the proposal, though his marshals all felt that Austria should be humbled in the dust, and prevented from further interference with French projects. Indeed, ill-feeling was rampant. But Napoleon viewed the situation from a broader standpoint, which his marshals could not fathom. Germany was a serious question, the news from Spain was bad, Great Britain was making huge preparations; he saw the wisdom of stopping operations. "Enough blood has been spilt; I accept the armistice," said he.

To the Bishops of France, from the Imperial Camp at Znaim, July 13, Napoleon wrote: "The victories of Enzersdorf and of Wagram, where the God of armies has visibly protected the French arms, must excite the liveliest thankfulness in the heart of our peoples. Our intention then is, that on the receipt of the present, you take common action with the proper persons to assemble our peoples in the churches, and address to Heaven acts of grace and prayers conforming to the sentiments which animate us."

After the armistice and until peace was concluded, the French were to hold Znaim and Brünn, thence down the March and to Presburg, thence along the Danube to Raab, thence along the frontier of Styria and Carniola to Fiume; and the Tyrol and Voralberg were put into French hands. The possession of Fiume cut Austria and England quite asunder, and shut off the sending by Great Britain of arms and ammunition into Austrian territory. All the terms were in favor of Napoleon, and though the Emperor Francis at first hesitated, the armistice was ratified July 18.

It was wise to end the campaign of Wagram with an armistice: France had enough to occupy its energies in other fields.

As usual, Napoleon kept his eye on all departments of the army. On July 14 he wrote the Intendant General: "Monsieur Daru, I can see only with the greatest surprise that the eighteen thousand prisoners who are in the Ile Napoleon" (Lobau) "are dying of hunger. This is inhuman and unpardonable. Send there, during the day of to-morrow, twenty thousand rations of bread. Send there also flour to keep up the supplies. I have ordered that bread for four days should be there, and there is none."

On July 16, to Clarke: "I have received your letter of July 9, . . . by which you inform me that Colonel Deriot would like to reject eleven hundred men for lack of height. I am of your opinion, height is not necessary."

And on August 1: "Every military officer who issues cartridges not of proper calibre, who issues useless guns or those out of service, or carriages out of condition to go through the campaign, merits death. I can only be extremely dissatisfied with the principles contained in your letter of July 25 ; when one has no artillery in condition to serve, one does not issue it, for it is better not to have artillery than to have what is bad, which compromises the lives of men and the honor of arms."

As some of the engineers had been suggesting strategical operations, the emperor, on August 9, ordered : "When the army marches, the geographical engineers, who shall have reconnoitred the country, shall always be with the staff, so as to give all necessary information. Their notes of reconnoissances are always to be in the simplest style and purely descriptive. They will never depart from their subject to present strange ideas."

Napoleon never lost his interest in the peasantry. On September 6 he wrote Berthier : "My Cousin, write to the different commanders of provinces, that at the approach of winter, poor people will need wood. Let them cut in the forests which belong to the emperor the wood which is necessary for the needs of the country." And on September 23 : "My Cousin, express my discontent to the colonels of the corps, who in this season leave the soldiers clothed only with linen trousers. Order that under whatever pretext it be, the soldier should not be left without his cloth breeches or trousers. . . . It has exposed them to sickness."

On October 1, to Clarke : "Our military man is little instructed. You must occupy yourself with two works, one for the schools of Metz, one for that of St. Cyr." Then follow Napoleon's ideas of what should be done in these schools.

The most interesting feature of the battle of Wagram is that its conduct was in natural sequence to the battles in front of Ratisbon. Neither at Eggmühl nor at Wagram had the enemy been followed up and annihilated. In three days after the latter, Charles was again ready to meet the French, and would have given a good account of himself. There were perhaps valid reasons why pursuit could not be undertaken on the evening of either battle ; but prior to Ratisbon such reasons had not affected Napoleon. He had never rested until his work was finished ; and even at the risk of losing what he had already accomplished, he had pushed on to the bitter end. In this campaign he had not done so ; and the Austrian army was still afield, even after the armistice. Constant tells


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ARI
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
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us that after 1805 Napoleon said, "One has only a certain time for war; I will be good for it six years more, after that even I must cry halt." Was the time coming sooner?

On August 21 Napoleon wrote to Clarke, from Schönbrunn, while criticising the conduct of affairs in Spain, "Battles are not to be delivered if one cannot count on seventy chances of success out of one hundred in his favor; so that one should deliver battle only when one has no further lucky chances to hope for; for in its nature the event of a battle is always doubtful." This is not the Napoleon who was wont to use battle to decide every question. He does not seem to exhibit as much moral and physical strength as years before, yet his health was still good. To Fouché, September 9, he wrote: "I do not know where you have gone to find out that I am sick. I have never been better. Corvisart came because I wanted a doctor of superior merit, in this season especially, which is subject to give sickness." He was well, in a sense — but was it the crisp mental and physical health of 1805?

Bernadotte had issued an Order to the Saxons complimenting them on their conduct of the 5th and 6th of July. On August 5, in an Order of the Day, "His Majesty conveys his dissatisfaction to Marshal Bernadotte for his Order of the Day of July 7, which was inserted at the same time in nearly all the journals. . . . Independently of the fact that His Majesty commands his army in person, it is for him alone to distribute the degree of glory that each one merits. His Majesty owes the success of his armies to the French troops, and not to any foreigners. The Order of the Day of Marshal Bernadotte, tending to give false pretensions to troops which are at least mediocre, is contrary to truth, to politics and to national honor. The success of the day of the 5th was due to the corps of Marshals Massena and Oudinot, who pierced the centre of the enemy at the same time that the corps of Marshal Davout turned its left. . . . The corps of Bernadotte did not remain 'immovable as brass;' it was the first to beat a retreat. His Majesty was obliged to have it covered by the corps of the Viceroy, . . . by Marshal Macdonald, by the cavalry of Nansouty, and part of that of the Guard. . . . His Majesty desires that this testimony of his discontent shall serve as an example, so that no marshal shall attribute to himself the glory that belongs to others. His Majesty nevertheless commands that this Order of the Day, which might afflict the Saxon army, although the soldiers know well that they did not merit the praise given them, shall remain secret, and shall be sent only to the marshals commanding army corps."

The feeling was strong, as is shown in the letter to Fouché of September 11 : "I have been discontented with the Order of the Day of Bernadotte, who would make it believed that I have only fifteen [*sic*] thousand men, whereas I have the interest to persuade people that I have two hundred thousand. The vanity of that man is excessive. I have ordered the minister of war to recall him. He has mediocre talents. I place no manner of faith in him. He always has his ear open to intriguers, who inundate this great capital. In war he is the same. He just missed making me lose the battle of Jena. He conducted himself in a mediocre manner at Wagram. He was not on hand at Eylau, when he might have been there, and did not do at Austerlitz what he might have done."

During these days a correspondence had been going on among the three emperors.

To the Emperor Francis, Napoleon wrote, July 22 : "If this fourth treaty of peace, which will succeed those of Campo Formio, Lunéville and Presburg, can finally be the last, can reëstablish in a durable manner tranquillity on the Continent, and be safe from the clamors and intrigues of England, I shall regard this moment as very happy ; for out of the four wars which Your Majesty has made on France, the last three were superfluous, and have been useful and advantageous only to England, just as they were only counseled and raised up by her partisans."

On July 30 the Emperor Francis wrote to the Emperor Alexander with relation to the truce: "Peace will be forthwith established between France and me, if its sovereign wishes peace. If this is not the result of my efforts, let Your Imperial Majesty not seek the cause other than in demands of the Emperor of the French opposed to my duty as sovereign, and contrary to the independence of the state." To this the czar replied: "I have seen with a lively satisfaction the resolution of Your Majesty to put an end to the war. You know how much I had at heart that peace should not be broken by you. I have never hidden from you the evils that I could foresee from it." And on the same day the czar wrote to Napoleon, sending copies of the letter of Francis and his reply. "The possibility of peace," said he, "makes me feel a real satisfaction. My interests are in the hands of Your Majesty. I like to place entire confidence in your sentiments for me." He then refers to the Polish matter, and adds, "Your Majesty will render me the justice that in commencing war against Austria, I have made no demands in advance for myself; that I began this war while I had four others to manage, two of which were in consequence of my alliance with you. My greatest desire is that all which can harm this alliance should be put aside, so that it should be consolidated more and more. I repeat to Your Majesty, I like in so important a circumstance to count formally on your friendship for me. Your Majesty sees all the frankness and all the abandon of confidence that I put in you. I must expect that you also will act towards me in a similar spirit."

The Polish operation came to an end by Poniatowski moving towards Moravia, while Ferdinand retired towards Hungary, and by the Russians advancing their forces into Galicia. In north Germany Jerome coöperated with Junot and the few Saxons still on foot, to counteract the Austrians. Am Ende, joined by Kienmayer and Brunswick near Dresden, was faced by the King of Westphalia. The Austrians under Radivojevich, in the Bayreuth country, were met by Junot. At Gefrees, July 9, Junot was thrown back, but rallied at Erfurt; and after Wagram the Austrians withdrew to Bohemia. Brunswick retired on the English, who had made a descent in the Netherlands, and after some minor adventures, took refuge in Heligoland.

In the Tyrol matters were troublesome, and Lefebvre was sent back there; but defeated, August 11, at Steinach, he retired to Bavaria. Negotiations had no better results. The Tyrolese were in a fever of opposition.

Meanwhile the treaty of peace went on slowly. The Austrian Court at Buda was in no hurry, owing to the landing of the English in Belgium, the march of Wellington on Madrid, the Tyrol imbroglio, and a new plan of operations submitted by the Aulic Council. Though defeated, Austria was still active in opposing Napoleon's harsh terms, and despite probable peace, Napoleon none the less kept up his military preparations with vigor. Each city and bridge-head he held had its fortifications either perfected or prepared for demolition, according as to what might eventuate. Pontoon trains were equipped in great numbers. A big Danube flotilla grew up. The conscript reserves, the provisional regiments, the smaller contingents of the Confederation, were added to Junot's, the 8th Corps, and ran its total up to thirty thousand men, not including the Westphalians, or 10th Corps. The Army of Germany had received back thirty thousand men from hospital, and six thousand men from depots. Neither was Austria idle, and the field armies were increased by a large number of men from the landwehr.

During this time England had aided the several enemies of Napoleon on lines which contributed to her own profit, though had she done fewer things, she might have injured Napoleon more. She had raised one hundred thousand men, and accumulated immense stores of ammunition, arms and artillery: the entire island was a vast workshop. But too much effort was directed against the French colonies, and too little against the Spanish peninsula, and to add to her burden, she invaded Belgium. In April, 1809, her fleets were ready in the home ports. Wellesley, who had been ordered home after Vimiero, was sent back to the Peninsula, with twenty thousand men, to repair the defeat of Moore. In mid-April an English fleet set fire by Congreve rockets to the fleet at Rochefort, hoping to destroy the shipyard. In June another fleet sought to raise an insurrection in Naples, but failed, for Murat suited this giddy people well. The attempt on Antwerp looked more threatening. Forty vessels of the line, thirty-six frigates and forty thousand men were directed against this port. The victory of

Wagram did not deter them. Chatham disembarked, July 30, on the island of Walcheren and laid siege to Flushing. He might better have landed at Blankenburg, and marched overland on Antwerp, slenderly garrisoned. Flushing was taken August 16, with its four thousand men.

A levy of all available troops was made in the north of France for the relief of Antwerp, and by the Council in Paris Bernadotte was put in command of what reached thirty thousand men. Napoleon replaced him by Bessières. Allied to the army was the marshy climate of Walcheren, which soon affected the British forces; and shortly the expedition returned to Eng-



French Empire, 1809.

land, after destroying the shipyards of Flushing. At the same moment, the army under Wellington in the Peninsula, after winning the victories of Oporto and Talavera, came close to being compromised on the Tagus. This double retreat of his worst enemy no little aided Napoleon's negotiations on the Danube. The English ministry was changed, and Perceval became Prime Minister. On September 23 Napoleon wrote Francis, by the hand of Bubna, the Austrian minister: —

> "Your Majesty menaces me with reopening of hostilities. You are right, Monsieur my Brother. This menace goes straight to my heart. It will bleed to think that blood and tears are again to flow. The day when Your Majesty shall give the signal of war will be for me a day of mourning. And yet pray remember that this signal has often been given by you, and that the result has always been the defeat of your armies, the conquest of your provinces and the misfortune of your peoples. God and men are my witness, that in the midst of the greatest prosperity, at the head of the greatest armies, less exposed than any other in the world to the chance of war, I have desired to put a term to the victories of France, and that I have disdained vain laurels wetted with the tears of the peoples."

Under all these adverse conditions Austria determined on peace.

The Treaty of Vienna cost Austria three and a half million inhabitants. Bavaria received Salzburg, the Inn Viertel with Braunau and Hausrück, which gave her a fine frontier against Austria. Part of Carinthia, Carniola, Dalmatia and Croatia were made into the Illyrian Provinces, and not only cut Austria off from the Adriatic, but provided France with a frontier up to the Drave, and within one hundred and twenty-five miles of Vienna. Contrary to the Treaty of Tilsit, which forbade the aggrandizement of the Duchy of Warsaw, Galicia in part was ceded to it. By secret articles the Austrian army was cut down one half, and all officers and soldiers born in countries under French rule were to be dismissed. An indemnity of eighty-five million francs was to be paid. In appearance most favorable to France, the anti-Russian flavor of the Treaty of Vienna was a grave error, for it led Alexander to see that Napoleon would some day reconstitute Poland. By good policy, neither should Austria have been humiliated, nor Russia offended.

On October 14, Napoleon wrote Clarke: "Peace was signed at nine o'clock. Have one hundred guns fired at the Invalides, and order that the same salvo shall be fired on my coasts. Send the news at once to Spain, to Holland and to Naples." And the same day to Berthier, in orders for the movements of the army, he gave a "General rule: My intention is that the army shall retire methodically, so that it shall not be a single instant exposed to the caprices of bad faith." "On October 15, without waiting for ratification, there will be blown up the ramparts of the city of Vienna. The citadel of Brünn will be blown up four days after the exchange of ratification. The works of Raab and Grätz will be blown up twenty-four hours before leaving them." This last act of the campaign was far from wise.

The Tyrol remained to be subjugated, and Napoleon directed against it several strong columns, up the Inn, the Drave and the Adige, under Baraguey d'Hilliers; but it was only with great difficulty that this brave people was forced to submit. Resistance was protracted until January, 1810.

Napoleon had conducted the campaign against one of the best soldiers of that era. A word recapitulating his life may be pardoned. Charles, or Charles Louis (1771–1847), Archduke of Austria, was the third son of the Emperor Leopold II. Beginning active service against the French at the age of twenty-two, he distinguished himself at Jemappes and Neerwinden, Landrecies, Tournay, Courtray and Fleurus; in 1796 he was intrusted with the supreme command of the Army of the Rhine, conducted a campaign in Germany noted for its fine strategy, and obtained handsome advantages over Jourdan at Teiningen, Amberg and Würzburg, and over Moreau at Rastadt, Emmendingen and Schliengen. In 1797 he captured Kehl and held the command against Napoleon in Italy; in 1799 he defeated Jourdan at Osterach and Stockach, and operated against Massena in Switzerland. Ill-health forcing him to retire from service, he was appointed governor of Bohemia; but it was not long before he had again to oppose his old enemy Moreau, and concluded the basis of peace at Lunéville. The Diet of Ratisbon, which met in 1802, resolved to erect a statue in his honor, and to give him the title of Savior of his Country; but Charles refused both distinctions. He was for some time president of the Aulic Council, but in 1805 he was once more in Italy, where he won the victory of Caldiero over Massena. On his return to Austria he became commander-in-chief and again president of the Aulic Council. He employed his time in organizing the army and establishing a strong reserve force, until, in 1809, he took the field against the French army commanded by Napoleon in person. At the end of the campaign he gave up all his military offices, and spent the rest of his life in retirement, with the exception of a short time, when on the return of Napoleon from Elba, he become governor of Mainz. The Archduke Charles fell little short of being one of the great leaders of history. His military works are well known.

Napoleon started from Munich October 22, on the road to Paris. On November 15 he entered his own capital — for the last time as conqueror.

Sword of the Period.

XLVII.

OPORTO AND TALAVERA. 1809.

After Napoleon left, Soult moved south with some difficulty, and captured Oporto, March 28. Victor was supposed to move down the Tagus, and Lapisse from Salamanca, to coöperate with him, but Cuesta kept Victor busy, despite a handsome victory at Medellin. Owing to the rabid population, the marshals had no news of one another, and Ney, in Galicia, was too busy to help Soult. Wellesley now returned from England, and, moving against Oporto, cleverly surprised Soult about mid-May, and drove him back across the mountains with loss of all his train. To forestall Wellesley's further advance, Ney and Soult again marched south, but did not long coöperate. Wellesley had no idea of following Soult into Spain, but with Cuesta turned against Victor, who was being starved on the Tagus, and instead of moving down, had withdrawn to Talavera, while Vanegas was to advance on Madrid. Meanwhile Soult, with Ney and Mortier, was moving down to join Joseph, but Victor was eager to fight before he arrived, and in the battle of Talavera, July 27–28, Wellesley, by crisp, defensive tactics, defeated the French. But he did not pursue. By August 4 Soult reached Plasencia, and when Wellesley heard of his oncoming he decamped, crossed the Tagus, and with difficulty reached Badajoz. He had escaped from a trap. Soult desired to concentrate all troops and march on Lisbon, but Joseph refused. Talavera enabled Wellesley to gauge the French, but had no strategic value. Late in 1809 the main British army was transferred to the Mondego valley, and Wellington began a huge intrenched camp at Torres Vedras, as a base for further operations. On the Mediterranean coast, the French had taken Saragossa, Taragona and Gerona, but the population was still in arms.

When, in the early spring of 1809, Napoleon, after his Spanish campaign, was preparing to accept the Austrian challenge, Joseph was in Madrid with the reserves; Gouvion St. Cyr was at Taragona, all but blockaded by the Catalonian population in arms; Junot was camped on the ruins of Saragossa, striving to pacify Aragon; Mortier was marching from this province up the Ebro; Victor and Sébastiani stood along the line of the Tagus; Ney occupied Galicia; Soult was about to march on Portugal; the division of Lapisse was at Salamanca; Kellermann's at Valladolid; the cavalry was distributed among the corps; and other troops were stationed on the Biscay coast and in the provinces of Navarre, Castille and Leon. All were striving to patch up a French régime out of the wreckage of the Spanish people's ancient rights. This force of over three hundred thousand men had Madrid as a military centre, and the emperor had left an apparently feasible plan of operations; but it was based on the mistaken belief that his own campaign had practically choked off opposition.

Prominent among the French operations was the task of Soult. As quiet in Spain was dependent on what the English undertook, an operation against Portugal was first in order; and although the value to the French of any coast city was minimized by the British control of the sea, Soult was instructed to move down from the Corunna country, capture Oporto, and make it a secondary base for a further advance on Lisbon. This manœuvre was to be sustained by Victor, descending the Tagus to Abrantes, moving by way of Merida and Elvas, and by Lapisse, who should advance from Salamanca through Almeida; both to coöperate at the decisive moment. This looked well on paper, but it was a concentric operation the emperor should not have prescribed to his lieutenants, without a chief. Like most such, — like his own at Pultusk and far more difficult, — it was bound to fail.

Turning over Galicia to Ney, Soult with some twenty-six thousand men marched along the great coast road to Valenza, hoping to cross the Minho at Tuy; but from the swollen stream part of La Romana's irregular command had removed nearly every boat; so that Soult, after one attempt had been foiled, leaving his train at Tuy, was compelled in mid-February to turn up river to Orense. Here he crossed, and driving La Romana out of Monterey, captured Chaves March 12. He now found himself in the midst of a population savagely active to the last man; the irregular Portuguese troops, though lacking in discipline, were fruitful in patriotism; and boldly demanding battle to drive out the hated invader, they forced their leaders to meet Soult near Braga, where on March 20 they were utterly routed, and the town was deserted by its inhabitants.

Oporto was reached March 26, and here the Portuguese had assembled nearly fifty thousand strong under their bishop, who had whipped the people into frenzy, had made the generals his lieutenants, intrenched the neighboring hills, and placed two hundred guns on the city ramparts. Although his eventual objective was Lisbon, knowing nothing of Victor's or Lapisse's doings, and thus confined to his own line of operations, Soult could not well leave this city of sixty thousand inhabitants in the rear; nor could he detail forces enough to observe it. The terms he offered Oporto were rejected; on March 28 the city was stormed, captured, sacked; and the Portuguese army with many citizens fled south towards Coimbra. The French loss was some five hundred men; the enemy's is said to have reached ten thousand souls, mostly drowned by the breaking in their flight of the Douro bridge. While Oporto yielded an immense supply of military stores, victualing soon became difficult, because, as usual, the country local authorities could not be organized to collect provisions. The train was brought on from Tuy, where it had been blockaded by the natives. Although strategically sound, Soult's operation was paralyzed by the popular uprising, and lack of communication with his colleagues.

The victory of Uclés in January had neutralized the Spanish Army of Andalusia, and Sébastiani was containing it, while from Almaraz, Victor faced the Army of Estremadura under Cuesta. Napoleon assumed that by March Victor would be ready to move towards Soult; but Cuesta, encouraged by the French want of activity, boldly marched upon Almaraz, where, blowing up the bridge, he took position behind the Tagus. Victor, however, crossed, and pushing him beyond the Guadiana to Medellin, defeated him March 28 at Mengabriel, with heavy loss; while as a pendant, on the day before, Sébastiani had beaten the Army of Andalusia at Ciudad Real and driven it back into the Sierra Morena. Thus on almost the same day, three brilliant French victories were won, — Oporto, Medellin, Ciudad Real. But unlike what occurred in every other land, victories in Spain appeared to decide nothing: after an apparently total defeat there always reappeared, as from the soil, a fresh army to dispute the gain; every city in the Peninsula might be captured, and yet the people would show no signs of subjugation, nor lack leaders. By the end of April Cuesta had again gathered thirty thousand men, of a fanatical indiscipline, but still a menace: and Victor could not march down the Tagus on Abrantes, with a force larger than his own ready to debouch from Badajoz on Alcantara and work havoc in his rear. Yet Soult in Oporto was waiting for news of this advance, as well as that of Lapisse, and was depending upon them.

Each marshal's knowledge of the whereabouts of the others was naught, — a factor on which Napoleon had not reckoned. No aid which the people of Portugal and Spain could yield to their British allies equaled that afforded by the concealment of information, and the closing of roads to couriers. Indeed, it occasionally worked against the British; to the French it wrought untold injury. Although Soult had reached Oporto March 26, there was but a rumor in Madrid on April 22 that he was there. At this moment Victor was at Merida, Napoleon fighting near Ratisbon.

Not only was Soult deprived of Victor's aid, but Ney, on whom he also relied, had all that his eighteen thousand men could do to hold Galicia with part of La Romana's forces moving around Asturias, an insurgent population, led by the bishop of Orense, watching his detachments from every hilltop, and the English threatening from the Biscay coast. Half his corps would have helped Soult too little; to detach more would have disgarnished the province he had orders to hold. There was lacking one head to combine operations; each marshal was left to his own devices, and Napoleon's lieutenants were wont to be jealous of one another. Thus Soult, stranded in Oporto, was waiting in vain for aid, and despite a barren victory over Silveyra at Amarante on May 2, he had only thrust aside the Portuguese to reach Oporto, and had then been again inclosed by them. He controlled but the ground on which stood his dwindling forces; and meanwhile, although the Corunna army had sailed to England, Craddock and Beresford had collected another to hold head to him. It was at this critical moment that Wellesley, justified for his share in the Cintra matter, returned to the Peninsula to take command of the allied forces.

The English had entered Portugal in 1807, when everything was in disorder, and a regency represented the royal family. The regular army had barely twelve thousand ill-equipped men; militia existed only on paper, every peasant was a guerrilla, and the clergy had kept the land ignorant and savage. The English had changed all this. Their officers organized and drilled fresh troops; soon the Portuguese army under Beresford exceeded fifty thousand men; and although disliking regular service, the territorial troops (Ordenanzas) grew to be fairly efficient.

After Vimiero, part of the English troops had remained in Lisbon under Craddock, and the rest had marched with Sir

John Moore; when Soult's advance became known, reinforcements from Gibraltar and England were sent to Lisbon. Although the troops were a mixture of English, Scotch, Irish, Portuguese, Spaniards, each with his national characteristics and notions, yet Wellesley knew how to shape them to his uses, and men and officers, despite the poor reputation his dispatches gave them, showed courage, tenacity and cool heads.

After Cintra the British Cabinet had come close to evacuating the Peninsula, but a memorandum of Wellesley's had encouraged it to fresh efforts; and as the threatening Austrian campaign was apt to monopolize Napoleon's attention, the chances of success were improved. Reaching Lisbon April 22, 1809, Wellesley took over the command, began to mobilize the troops, and was made Marshal-General of Portugal. He had twenty-six thousand British and Hanoverian troops as a nucleus.

Wellesley's papers show his ideas as to what the defense of the country should be. He thought that thirty thousand English, with the Portuguese militia, would be able to defend Portugal, and that unless the French came on with at least one hundred thousand men, such an army could maintain itself. On his arrival Soult was bottled up in Oporto, Victor watched by Cuesta in Merida, and Lapisse on the way to Victor; and although conditions had much changed since the days of Cintra, he saw no reason to alter his opinion.

It was evident to Wellesley that Soult and Victor were too far apart, and that his chance lay in operating from his central position against one or the other. He would have preferred to move against Victor, but felt that his first duty was to free Portugal. Taking the easiest means to retard Victor by urging on the Spaniards a fresh show of force, to leaven which he sent a force under Mackenzie to Santarem and Abrantes, he assembled at Coimbra twenty-five thousand men, of whom ten thousand were Portuguese, and advanced to the Vouga to operate against Soult. Beresford with six thousand Portuguese was to cross the Douro near Lamego,



Wellesley-Soult Campaign.

march on Chaves and, aided by Wilson's light corps, strive to cut Soult's line of retreat. The plan was excellently conceived, and the aid of the people insured its success. Soult's position was desperate, and before he was aware, the enemy was upon him: the Portuguese had kept the secret even better than the Spaniards. On hearing, May 8, of Wellesley's presence at Coimbra, he drew in his outlying forces, after a smart exchange south of the Douro, to be prepared for either defense or retreat.

Soult's corps was not in good heart: this sort of work was not suited to the Gallic temperament. Brave and enduring on the battlefield, ever ready to bear hunger, hardship, cold or heat when glory was to be won, this daily struggle with a rarely seen guerrilla enemy disheartened the French soldier; and the news of another Austrian war led him to believe that his comrades on the Danube would win all the laurels, while he would find a grave in Portugal. The discipline of the Napoleonic rank and file left, as we know, much to be desired. The details of service were neglected, and each one believed that constancy on the march and bravery on the battlefield were all that was required. What was more, Soult had conceived an ambition to be king of Portugal, deeming his services to have merited so great a reward; and this gave rise in the corps to a faction which eventually went so far as to hold communication with the enemy. Under the conditions, Soult determined to retire behind the Tamega, so as to reach out towards Lapisse, whom he supposed yet in the Almeida country. Loison, who had beaten Silveyra at Amarante, was notified, and Lorges ordered down from the Minho. This done, and drawing in his outlying brigades, Soult broke the Douro bridge and drew all boats to the right bank, hoping to retire at his leisure; for he expected his opponent, having the aid of the English fleet, would pass below Oporto.

Trusting to the coöperation of the Beresford column, Wellesley crossed the Vouga May 11, and advanced on the Douro, the left marching straight on Oporto, the centre following under Paget and Hill on Villanova, and the right under Murray on Avintas. The inhabitants aided them to procure some ill-guarded barges and boats, and the French picketing of the river above Oporto was lax, while the high banks at the spot chosen for crossing hid the manœuvre. Paget, under cover of artillery, threw over a body of men, and seizing a large walled seminary inclosure, covered the passage of several battalions under Hill, which was quite unopposed. Murray then joined him. Soult should certainly have gleaned more news of Wellesley's movements; but he remained in ignorance of his danger in Oporto until the Portugese boatmen had carried many of his barques over to the English, when he at once evacuated the city, May 12, it is said in such haste that the English commander sat down to the dinner which had been prepared for the French marshal. Oporto received the allied troops with open arms, as they filed in but a few hours after the French had filed out.

Instead of taking the road to Braga, Soult set out to cut his way through to Loison's troops near Amarante. Wellesley's lieutenants essayed to stop him, but not being in force, although the French column was in wretched order, they made no headway, and Soult filed on towards Penafiel. Meanwhile Beresford, aided by Silveyra, had performed his task; Loison had been forced out of Amarante May 10, and had marched on Guimarens, omitting, or being unable, to inform his chief of his disaster. Soult got news of this fact when he was well along on the road; and as between Wellesley, now in his rear at Oporto, and Beresford in his front at Amarante, he was being closed in by superior numbers, and he did not deem that he had at hand a sufficient force to attack either allied army singly,—although this was the only safe course,—he weakly abandoned his guns and train, and marched from Penafiel by a mountain road, where wheels could not follow, to join Loison at Guimarens.

Wellesley's operation had been organized and carried through with admirable skill and discretion: Soult had been caught napping: that the success was owing largely to the inimical population saves the marshal from but a part of the blame. Yet he was fairly bottled up by the natives, and his opponents not only outnumbered him, but outclassed him in ability. In excusing Soult, no part of the credit can be taken from Wellesley for his handsome operation, in which he had barely lost five hundred men.

That even a junction with Loison might not save him, Soult readily saw; for had the English marched at once on Braga, they could have established themselves on his main route; fearing which, although Wellesley contemplated no such manœuvre, Soult abandoned Loison's artillery, and again marched through the mountains to regain the road to Chaves. Even with his lesser forces, he might have utilized them better; but his natural vigor was at this moment absent, and his army was in no condition to cut its way through and save the guns and train. He had met more than his match.

Wellesley took no immediate steps to profit by his success; believing he had accomplished enough in thus freeing Portugal, he lost an unusual opportunity of surrounding the French army and compelling its surrender. Although, having abandoned his train, Soult might have outmarched him, a prompt pursuit opened the door to another Baylen.

The French marshal regained his line of retreat, and continued on towards Salamonde and Ruivaens; but when he heard that the bridges in his path had been cut, and that Beresford was marching on Chaves, he still again faced the mountain roads, and after forcing several bridges and ravines well defended by the native troops, finally reached Montalegre. From here he marched to Orense, the allied irregulars harassing his rear. In revenge for their massacring the stragglers, the French shot every one they captured. Soult had lost his artillery, baggage-train and five thousand men, and was fortunate to have made his escape at all. He reached Lugo in sorry condition.

News of these operations reached Napoleon in a partial and belated manner, but they excited grave annoyance. His crisp military sense could not tolerate the ill-combined manœuvres of his Spanish army corps.

He instructed Clarke from Ebersdorf, June 3, to "write to the King of Spain that I understand nothing in the inactivity in which my forces remain, while the enemy is seeking to crush Soult; that nevertheless I have not ceased to repeat to him that he must reopen, at whatever price may be, the communications with the north; that it is long since that Victor ought to have undertaken movements; that instead of that, I see with lively pain that they are remaining in the greatest inaction, and that they let the enemy manœuvre at his ease against Soult; and that if this marshal meets a check, the loss of Spain will follow. You will no doubt have sent to the king English papers as fast as they reach you, and you will have ordered movements to make a diversion and assist Soult."

Despite his busy work on the Danube, — he was now in Lobau, — Napoleon gave thought to Spanish affairs, though not interfering with the method of carrying out his general instructions. It was under his direction that Ney from the Corunna region and Kellermann from Leon were to coöperate against La Romana in Asturias, Ney with half his corps marching east on Oviedo, Marchand's division being left to guard Galicia, Kellermann marching north across the mountains. In this operation topography played the French an odd trick: while Ney along one valley was forcing his way to Oviedo, La Romana along a parallel valley, entirely hidden from the French, was marching on Lugo, where he at once blockaded and had nearly captured the city, when Soult appeared upon the scene. Other Spanish columns had at the same time threatened Corunna, but Ney returned in season to join Soult, and clear the situation in Galicia. La Romana again retired to Orense.

The French situation was far from promising, for, encouraged by success, the allies might march on Almeida or up the

Tagus, to open the road to Madrid. Such a manœuvre must be counteracted by some operation to attract the allied attention, and Soult and Ney agreed to join in a fresh advance into northern Portugal, to surround La Romana on the Minho. But the two marshals failed to coöperate. Soult descended the Minho, but instead of attacking Orense, obliqued towards Zamora, and Ney, moving from Corunna through Santiago, found himself stopped at Vigo; and as Soult did not appear, he returned to Santiago, left a strong garrison in Corunna and Ferrol, and then advanced on Astorga, which he reached July 8. Thus Galicia was evacuated: Ney's occupation had not subjugated the province, nor could he have retained it long.

Shortly, as we shall see, the several corps were ordered down to Plasencia to meet Wellesley's threat to the capital. On June 11, from Schönbrunn, Napoleon gave new orders to his Spanish marshals, acting on mid-May news of the situation, and knowing nothing definite about Wellesley's movements.

He wrote Clarke: "Inform Marshal Jourdan that I find the affairs of Spain ill-conducted, so ill-conducted that I foresee catastrophes, if more activity and more vigorous impulse is not given to the movements of the columns. Time has been afforded the English to reform an army at Lisbon. They have been culpably negligent in leaving Soult three months without communication. I have nevertheless not ceased to order the communications with the marshal to be reopened. With the forces there are in Spain, they should not have been interrupted a week. . . . The indolence of the staff of the Army of Spain is such that it remained several months without communications with Ney, and that it was necessary, I believe, to send from Paris the order to Kellermann to march towards him. It is difficult to conceive such weaknesses. . . . An army is nothing except by its head, and one must here confess that it has none. Recommend them to attack the enemy wherever they shall meet him. Let them reopen communications with Soult; let them sustain him on the Minho. Only the English are redoubtable. If the army is not differently directed, they alone will before many months lead to a catastrophe. One should

> not act on all the points of the circumference when one has no communications, but one must form a big corps against the English, not let them breathe, and fall upon them the moment they become disunited."

In the matter of Soult's ambitions, Napoleon had either to laugh at him as a fool, or to shoot him as a traitor. He did the first, and wrote him from Schönbrunn, September 26: —

> "My Cousin, I have been discontented with your conduct." This referred to Soult's silly hope to reign in Portugal, which Napoleon characterized as *lèse majesté.* "It is with such foolish conduct that discontent has grown, and that people thought you worked for yourself and not for me, or for France. . . . I saw with pain that you had let yourself be surprised at Oporto, and that my army, without fighting, had fled almost without artillery and without baggage. Nevertheless, after having long time hesitated as to the part I ought to take, the attachment I have for you and the recollection of the service that you rendered to me at Austerlitz, and under other circumstances, decide me. I forget the past. I hope it will serve you as a rule, and I confide to you the post of major-general" (chief of staff) "in my Army of Spain. The king not being experienced in war, my intention is that until my arrival you shall be responsible to me for events."

Soult was to lead the army, but in a way subject to Joseph's and Jourdan's orders. As senior, it was proper to place Ney's and Mortier's troops under him, wherewith to hunt down the British army and drive it out of Portugal; but after his Oporto failure, it was not a good example. The emperor was wise to lessen the number of heads in Spain; but he was in the highest degree unwise to dictate operations from the other end of Europe.

Let us go back to the Tagus. Intending to coöperate with Soult, Victor early in May was at Alcantara on the Portuguese frontier, where he held the old Roman bridge on the high road from Estremadura north; but his only news was what they had at the capital; none could reach him from

Oporto direct; and owing to the inimical population, he found himself starved out. His men fell in their tracks from inanition; by mid-June he was compelled to withdraw towards Lisbon, and by June 26 he had reached Talavera. Soult had long been beyond aid.

Although unable from the capital of Austria to direct the Spanish operations, and not always heeding the peculiar conditions, the emperor could still manœuvre intelligently on the map; and from Schönbrunn, June 21, he wrote Clarke: "Why from Madrid do they do nothing? . . . It seems that the English are reinforcing themselves in Portugal. It is from there that will come the evil, if they do not manœuvre properly in Madrid." And from Wölkersdorf, July 8: "As to the affairs of Spain, send word to Madrid that a treacherous blow (*le coup de Jarnac*) will reach them from the English, if affairs are not better managed. I tremble lest the English, debouching from Portugal by way of Abrantes, should surprise the king in Madrid, by movements which they would have hidden." This was a clear prophecy of Talavera.

Meanwhile Wellesley, satisfied with having chased Soult out of Portugal, was wise not to follow him into the pathless border mountains, but retired from the Douro towards the Tagus to operate against Victor. The campaign had cost him four thousand men invalided; in his conservative opinion the ill-clad, ill-shod soldiers needed rest; reinforcements were required, and the military chest was not kept full. Wellesley was a careful organizer. He was not conducting a war of invasion, but defending Portugal by offensive measures. At Abrantes he spent a month in preparations, and in establishing his footing with the Spaniards; he formed his battalions in divisions on the French system; and then, with twenty-two thousand men, starting upstream early in July, — about Wagram days, — he reached Alcantara, where Cuesta had thirty-five thousand men, of whom eight thousand cavalry. Wellesley expected the command-in-chief of the Spanish and Portuguese armies, but jealousies intervened, and he had to work in such concert as was possible with his suspicious colleagues.

The first plan between Wellesley and Cuesta had been a march by way of Badajoz on Victor, then still in Estremadura; but on the starved French army retiring up the Tagus, it was agreed to march on the capital, whither Vanegas should advance via Toledo or Aranjuez with his twenty thousand men, while Wilson's light corps raided around the north of Madrid to threaten the communications and unsettle the French morale, and Beresford with the Portuguese irregulars, and Delparque in the Almeida region with his force recruited in northern Portugal, contained Soult and Ney on the Douro and near Salamanca, and forestalled their interference. The plan was excellent: had the operation been executed by one commander in June, Madrid would surely have fallen. But there being no one head, disagreements soon arose between Wellesley and Cuesta, and each nation believed its own commander in the right. The unpractical Spaniards were ill-suited to serve for any period with a requiring soldier like Wellesley, and such delays occurred that Napoleon was led to ascribe to Wellesley less hardihood than judgment. He was later to change his mind.

The ignorance of either party as to the other was the most marked feature of the Spanish manœuvres. On July 9 Joseph wrote the emperor that no threatening movements had been made by the British, though he heard of some troops out beyond Alcantara; and yet Wellesley was at Plasencia, and Cuesta at Almaraz. Even Wellesley knew not what efficient service his allies were rendering him. Joseph received news of Soult's defeat at Oporto about the same time — a month after the event. The emperor got his news later, but understood the situation far better.

From Schönbrunn, July 18, he wrote Clarke: "Recommend to the King of Spain that if the English should debouch into Spain, he is not to deliver battle to them unless he is concentrated. . . . He can give battle to the English with one hundred and ten thousand men. These will be sufficiently notified and will not hazard such an adventure." And again, August 7: "A letter from the king, dated July 25, sends me word that Wellesley has arrived with twenty-five thousand English at Talavera de la Reina, and has joined Cuesta. It is very unfortunate that Marshal Soult has manœuvred so ill as not to have joined the king. I hope that the king, with the garrison of Madrid, the 1st and 4th Corps, forming fifty-five thousand men, will have taken position to prevent the enemy from making enterprises against Madrid, and have had himself joined by Marshal Soult. He would thus have more than one hundred thousand men. It would be a fine occasion to give a lesson to the English and to finish the war." All this is good military sense, but the head was lacking.

The armies came in presence July 22, on the Alberche, where Victor, with twenty-three thousand men, was posted, with his left on the Tagus and his right on a wooded hill. Wellesley was anxious to attack July 23, when he and Cuesta could have thrown fifty thousand men upon Victor's small force; but the Spaniard was uncontrollable; and on the morrow, recognizing his danger, Victor had retired towards Toledo. Wellesley remained at Talavera, where he judged the position good: Cuesta followed the French some distance.

Sébastiani was ordered on Toledo by the king, who was much alarmed; and this concentration unavoidably opened the road to the capital to Vanegas. To the two French corps Joseph proposed to add the Madrid reserve and the Royal Guard, and attack the allies, leaving Belliard with a very small force in the Retiro to hold the city — which was practically in a volcanic state. In this movement Joseph was much at fault. Soult, Mortier and Ney had fifty thousand men, and were all marching on Plasencia, that is, towards him. He should have manœuvred so as to join all his corps, even at the risk of temporarily losing Madrid. Had he led the allies by a pretended retreat to follow him to the north, he might have turned on them with such overwhelming numbers as to settle the English question once for all. Had they not followed, he could still have sought them out, beaten them and followed them to Lisbon. But Joseph had been pestered by exorbitant demands from Soult for men and money; he was at the end of his patience with this marshal; he was no soldier, and between Jourdan and Victor he lost his power of discrimination. Jourdan indeed advised the waiting policy,



Talavera Campaign.

so that Soult might come down on the English left and rear; but the French marshals feared lest their own left should be turned by Vanegas, and the allies win the road to Madrid. Remembering the easy triumph at Medellin, and forgetful that he now had quite another class of troops in his front, not to speak of their leader, Victor insisted on the offensive. Heeding this advice, Joseph determined to march on Wellesley and give him battle with what force he had at hand. Three thousand men were left in Toledo to hold the bridge, a regiment of dragoons was sent across to watch Vanegas, and the French army, confident of victory, moved forward towards the Alberche.

As stated, Cuesta had followed up Victor, but when the latter met his reinforcements, he turned on the Spanish leader, and after a sharp fight at Salina, July 27, Cuesta fell back into the position Wellesley had chosen at Talavera, and occupied the town.

Wellesley was well placed. For some days he would not have stirred from his position, for he was unaware of Soult's advance on Plasencia, and had the king been willing to wait for his lieutenants, the fate of Spain might have been sealed. Indeed, Soult sent Foy to Joseph, urging him not to fight until he himself could reach Plasencia. But wait the king would not: he was bound to do battle for Madrid, and crossing the river next day, the French came upon the allied position late in the afternoon.

The allied right rested on Talavera. Cuesta occupied the town and the ground to the north of it, which was covered by olive groves and inclosures, with walls and hedges, easy to defend with his thirty-two thousand men. His horse stood behind his left; and he had a force on the other bank holding the road down river. He covered somewhat less front than the English, who numbered over twenty thousand men.

On Cuesta's left was open ground, intrenched in places, and then came the Medellin ridge, rising to a sharp height, with a sloping gap cut through it by the Portina brook. Back of this brook, and with his left posted on the ridge, Wellesley drew up his regiments. Beyond the ridge was a valley which he held by cavalry, and beyond the valley ran the Sigurilla mountains. On the Spanish left came Campbell and Sherbrooke, Mackenzie in reserve; Hill was on the ridge, the English cavalry at first behind their right. The whole line in a way resembled that part of the Union position at Gettysburg which ran from the village to Roundtop. The Medellin hill was the key of the position at Talavera, as Roundtop was at Gettysburg. If the French got a hold there, they could enfilade the allied line.

About 7 P. M., on July 27, the French army reached the front of the allies. The line was formed on open ground, the right leaning on the Cascajal hill, the interrupted continuation of the Medellin, where artillery could be posted to advantage. In attacking the Medellin hill the French would have to cross the brook and mount a slope which would tire out any troops moving at a rapid pace, a fact on which Wellesley counted as much in his favor. Out of common prudence, no fighting should have been allowed by Joseph until everything was ready, especially as the new enemy was an unknown quantity; but Victor was not to be held back. A slight attack was made on the Spanish position, which produced a nearly fatal panic among Cuesta's troops, but was not pushed home. Victor then determined on a night attack. He had become familiar with the country while recently at Talavera, and knew that if he could seize the Medellin height, the battle of the morrow would be won. At 9 P. M. Ruffin was sent in where Hill's troops were getting posted, and came close to winning, as little Roundtop nearly fell to the Confederates on July 2, 1863; but in the dark the attack failed, as night attacks are wont to do, and Medellin hill was made safe by the English before day. There were occasional exchanges between the close lines of outposts. The cavalry was moved over to the left.

This backset should have led Joseph to wait for Soult; but Victor was bound to beat the English, alleging that a defensive would dispirit the troops, who were accustomed to victory: "I will give up war, if I cannot take that hill!" quoth he; and the king gave way.

The allies had ten thousand more men in line than the French, but the majority were Spaniards. Facing the Anglo-Portuguese stood Victor; opposite the Spanish, Sébastiani. The only point in the allied line worth capture was Medellin hill, and this might be turned by the valley north of it. It was clearly the key of the position, and if captured would throw back the allies, or force them to change front so as to back on the Tagus. It was also the strategic flank, because Soult was approaching through Plasencia on Almaraz, and to turn it left open a retreat for the French on Avila and the Escurial. The right should have been made the strong French flank, with orders for the rest of the army to manœuvre towards the right in support of a success; only a small force was needed to contain the allied right and centre, where the Spanish were sure to stand on the defensive, especially after their panic. A single division with some horse, employed with hardihood in making feints, could have done this duty. With Cuesta thus contained, a heavy column might turn Medellin, and either force the British out, or compel them to shift to less favorable ground. There was a good chance of victory by such tactics; there was none by the method adopted.

Wellesley had drawn up his forces skillfully. He could see Victor's line, while Victor could not his, except at the low land in the centre. He had chosen to fight a defensive-offensive battle, as did Napoleon at Rivoli and Austerlitz. This was his peculiar type of battle against the French. It suited his character to await the enemy in a position with which he was familiar, to tire out their advancing troops, first by artillery and then by skirmish and platoon fire; and at the moment of the enemy's stoutest onset, to anticipate him by a countercharge, in which fresh troops of the character of the British should easily win. To oppose this simple but most efficient tactics, the last thing should be a French attack all along the line. If ever battle manœuvring is essential, it is under such conditions, and the assailant can always manœuvre. Either a flank should be turned, or a column of sufficient weight to rupture the enemy's line be launched against one particular spot, or a feigned attack made so as to disgarnish the place selected for the real one. Joseph did none of these things.

In the morning Victor determined to send Ruffin in, and if he succeeded in capturing Medellin heights, to follow him up with Villatte and Lapisse, who had Latour-Maubourg and Beaumont in support. Such a partial attack was sheer folly, and shows that Victor had learned none of Napoleon's lessons. At 5 A. M. the French guns opened. As their smoke lay on the ground and obscured the view, the columns mounted the slopes of the hill without much loss; but when they got within a short distance of the sky line, Hill, whose troops had been lying down, sounded the bugles and started them forward. Coming into action with the utmost coolness, at the crest they delivered a volley so sharp that it quickly brought the columns to a standstill, and as these partially deployed, for some moments heavy firing ensued. Ruffin had five thousand men, Hill four thousand, but the fire of the English line at the deep columns was the more deadly. The French were gradually weakening, when Sherbrooke, sallying out with a small force, attacked them in the left flank, and they fell back down the hill. In forty minutes Ruffin had lost one



Battle of Talavera.

quarter his strength. The French had attacked with habitual gallantry, but not in force enough to carry a position defended by such good troops. Ruffin having failed, Lapisse and Villatte, who had begun their advance, were put in but feebly. Victor's second and partial attack had met its natural fate.

A pause ensued, and groups of the French and English came down to the Portina brook to get water, and by tacit understanding, permitted the removal of many wounded. For two hours the soldiers of both parties mixed, as the Confederates and Unionists frequently did during the Civil War, to save the wounded, or to swap "sure-enough" coffee for tobacco. "This," says Oman, "was the first example of that amicable spirit which reigned between the hostile armies all through the war, and which in its later years developed into that curious code of signals (often described by contemporaries) by which French and English gave each other notice whenever serious attack was intended, refraining on all other occasions from unnecessary outpost bickering or sentry shooting."

Victor was still of a mind that he could capture Medellin. Jourdan and Joseph held back, but as news ran in that Soult was yet distant and Vanegas about to march on Madrid, it became manifest that the French must win a victory here, or else retire to protect the capital; and although the latter course was even now preferable, it was finally decided that Sébastiani with his fourteen thousand men should attack the allied centre, while Victor with the sixteen thousand men he had left should, by a turning manœuvre, essay to capture Medellin heights.

Wellesley was exhibiting battle tenacity and skill of the highest order; he had now gauged the value of his enemy, and had put the hill beyond capture by a frontal attack. Victor's turning manœuvre was by the valley, with the relics of Ruffin's division and part of Villatte's, and as his movements could be seen, Wellesley drew up his men to hold the hill against an assault from this direction also. After his *fiasco* of yesterday, Cuesta proved more tractable, and lent him Bassecourt's division of five thousand men, some guns and Albuquerque's cavalry division, which Wellesley posted in the valley and on the slopes beyond. About 2 P. M. the French guns opened from Cascajal hill, and proved much more effective than the allied. An hour later, that weakest of all attacks was made by the French — one substantially all along the line.

The first division to strike was Leval's, at the field-works on the low land, where Spanish and English joined; but after fighting which did credit to both sides, the onset was repulsed. Lapisse and Sébastiani, in the usual line of columns, crossed the brook and advanced up the moderate slope towards the position of the red-coats. Sherbrooke, who was here in command, coolly held his men until the French were within fifty yards, when he delivered a single volley and charged. Checked at once, the French, after a brief further resistance, were forced behind the Portina. Following too far, in their eagerness to finish the day, the English almost forfeited the gain they had made, the French reserves driving them decimated to the rear. It looked as if the allied centre might be ruptured; but Mackenzie brought forward reserves, and at heavy loss stopped the French, he himself falling in the fray. The fighting had been admirable. Sébastiani had lost all his colonels, half his battalion chiefs and over two thousand rank and file, and Lapisse one quarter of his division, while in forty-three hundred British troops opposed to Lapisse, there were sixteen hundred casualties.

No serious attack on Medellin hill was made. The advance around the allied left down the valley by Victor's spent troops was checked by Bassecourt and the cavalry. The allied squadrons were indeed so well handled, although they were almost broken by a ravine across their path, that the French were forced to form square. Some twelve thousand French reserves did not get put in.

Wellesley made no attempt to turn a common victory into a decisive one by a sharp advance on the broken French. Night was near at hand. He could not follow up a shaken enemy with the tremendous blows of Napoleon.

Next day the two lines remained opposite each other, but the rumor that Wilson's partisan column was at Escalona, threatening the capital, led Joseph to order the retreat. This minor part of Wellesley's plan had borne good fruit. Victor retired August 29 behind the Alberche; Joseph and Sébastiani marched on Illescas and threw a division into Toledo, which Vanegas, who had taken no advantage of his opportunities, held back, it was claimed, by the Junta, was leisurely approaching — a common result of concentric manœuvres. Wellesley, though Craufurd's light division came up (after a march of forty-three miles in twenty-two hours, one of the best in history) did not stir. A smart advance even on this day would have done much harm, while merely to win a defensive battle without pursuit could yield but scant results. The allies did not agree, and Wellesley's casualties had been over five thousand men. Hill had lost one man in four; Mackenzie one in three; Sherbrooke two out of five. The Spanish losses had been under a thousand men. Wellesley had won glory enough, and he cared not to risk the advantage he deemed he had already gained, although it would be hard to define it. The French casualties were over seven thousand men.

For Wellesley, Talavera was a fine defensive battle, which, had he been resisting invasion, would have availed; but which, not capped by pursuit, seems wasted. For the French, Talavera was a battle of discussion and indecisive attack. Had they waited for Soult, they must have won: with a fine body in front of the allies, and a larger body taking them in reverse, the game was theirs. In a note to Clarke, August

18, Napoleon said about this battle: "What a fine chance they have missed, — thirty thousand English at a hundred and fifty leagues from the coast, in front of a hundred thousand men of the best troops in the world! My God, what is an army without a chief!" He was the chief who was needed.

Discussion as to what the French should have done is academic. As a fact, Wellesley had squarely beaten Jourdan, Victor and Sébastiani: his defensive tactics had been admirable. But he would not see that he had won a victory; and instead of pursuing, he remained in his lines until August 2. "The extreme fatigue of the troops, the want of provisions and the number of wounded to be taken care of, have prevented me from moving from my position," he wrote home. Although his caution happened to stand him in good stead, for he shortly learned of Soult's advance, yet his delay in following it up was a weak sequence to his superb victory.

> Guillon says of the English leader: "His tactics consisted in circumspection. He knew how to wait rather than act, retire rather than attack, win without profiting from victory. His system was always the same. He chose the battlefield where we were to attack him. It was almost always on a plateau that he disposed his lines, at a certain distance from the crest, covered by sharpshooters and protected by auxiliary troops. Our columns attacked with ardor. Arrived on the crest out of breath, they were received by a violent fire, which threw them into disorder. The English lines then moved forward and threw our soldiers back down the slope which they had just mounted. They returned to the charge, met the same resistance and fell back again, not to return. The battle was lost, and Wellington left to the auxiliary troops the care of hastening our retreat."

Oman says that his method was to conceal his main line as long as possible by a dip in the land, a hedge, or a wall, or to keep it behind the crest of the position he was holding. To face the French tirailleurs, each battalion sent out its light company. This gave a line of skirmishers strong enough to hold them back till the columns came up, when the skirmishers retired and left the deployed battalions to advance firing, or to receive the French with volleys. The French and English opinions fairly coincide. It does not, however, seem clear that Wellesley had discovered, as a new military principle, that, broadly speaking, the line was superior to the column. He did prove that the British line, as he could use it on the defense, was superior to the French line of columns in partial attacks. The French line of columns against any other line had long been and continued to be the better. Improperly directed, it had certainly no advantage, its chief value being to enable the leader to throw a heavy mass at a vital spot.

As already pointed out, and now repeated because the matter has been made so prominent, it must not be assumed that the line against the column meant that a single two-deep line was pitted alone against a line composed of battalion columns closed in mass — or one two deep against one a dozen deep. The French battalion columns were separated by intervals technically supposed to be at something like deploying distance. Only a part of the French line advanced at any one moment, while the whole English line was in place to receive it. Taking the entire armies at Talavera, allied and French, each was distributed along an equal front, but drawn up on a different tactical plan. Or leaving out the Spanish line, as some authorities do, on the plea of their being worthless, the English twenty thousand men and the thirty thousand French opposite them, each occupied about the same front. Back of the two-rank line were reserves cleverly distributed and ready to sustain the front line of fire; and as except on the last afternoon the French attacks were not made by the whole force as a body, but by partial bodies at different times, an equal or even superior number of British were in the contact. Talavera principally shows able defensive battle-tactics on the English part, and gallantry ill-directed on the part of the French.

Joseph sent a stupidly false report of the battle to the emperor, which the latter at once saw through, and promptly calling for precise facts, criticised the entire operation with his usual clearness.

To Clarke from Schönbrunn, August 21, he wrote: "Make Jourdan understand my extreme discontent as to the inexactitude and false statements which are found in his reports of the affairs of July 26, 27, 28 and 29; that his dispatches do not make me understand the events as they took place, and that this is the first time the government has thus been held cheap. He says that on the 28th they seized the battlefield of the English, that is, Talavera and the plateau on which its left leaned, while subsequent reports and those of officers say the contrary, and that we were repulsed all day. Make him understand that this infidelity towards the government is a veritable crime, and that this crime might have had fatal results, because having learned the news that the English had been beaten . . . it was about to influence my determination, when happily I learned in time that my army had been beaten, that is to say, that it had taken neither Talavera nor the plateau. That he might say whatever he chose in the journals of Madrid, but that he had not the right to disguise the truth to the government. In a separate letter you will make Jourdan know that affairs have been ill-directed, that Soult ought to have come from Salamanca through Avila towards Madrid, and that the corps having marched isolated, the head would have arrived the 27th or 28th; that during this time they" (the main army) "should have fallen back by slow marches, and not have given battle near Madrid until all our forces had been reunited. That the march of Soult and of his three corps on Plasencia was dangerous, and especially useless, dangerous because our army might be beaten at Talavera without his carrying succor to it, and that thus the security of all my armies in Spain was compromised, while the English had nothing to fear, for in three hours' time they could place themselves behind the Tagus; and whether they passed it at Talavera or they passed it at the bridge of Almaraz, or whether any other place, they had their lines of operation on Badajoz protected. They have thus compromised my best troops and the fate of Spain, from ignorance of the rules of war, and without that, in case of success, a result might be obtained. That, finally, as they had committed an enormous fault of dividing into two armies of fifty thousand men each, separated by mountains and a great stretch of country, at least they should not have delivered battle except at about the same time. . . . That finally, arrived before Talavera, they knew that they had the English army before them. . . . It is then of the last absurdity to have attacked them without reconnoissances. . . . They should have made certain whether the plateau could not have been turned ; that this position of the enemy demanded reconnoissances beforehand, and that my troops were led without any discernment, as to a butchery. That finally, having resolved to do battle, it was given weakly, because my arms have suffered an affront, and the twelve thousand men of reserve none the less remained without firing; . . . that once battle is resolved on, one is to win or perish, and that the French eagles are not to retreat until all have equally used their efforts. That this manner of conducting my armies excites all the more my discontent, because I know that Victor believed that if the reserve had been put under his orders, he would have carried the position of the English. That the union of all these faults was essential before an army like my Spanish army could be thus dared by thirty thousand English ; and that so long as they propose to attack good troops like the English troops in good positions, and without reconnoitring these positions and assuring themselves that they can be taken, so long they will lead men to death with no gain." And again, August 25 : "You will see by the relation of the English General Wellesley that we lost twenty guns and three flags. State to the king my astonishment, and my discontent to Jourdan, that they should send me a song-and-dance report" (*carmagnoles*), "and that instead of letting me know the true situation of things, they should present to me school-boy essays. I wish to know the truth. Who are the cannoneers who abandoned their guns, the divisions which let them be taken? Let it be seen in your letter to the king that I have observed with distress that he should say to the soldiers that they are victors: that this destroys the troops ; that the fact is, I lost Talavera. That nevertheless I need to have true information, the number of killed and wounded, the guns and flags lost. That in Spain affairs are undertaken without maturity and without knowledge of war; that on the day of battle they sustain each other without *ensemble*, without project, without decision. Write to Sébastiani that the king has sent me his report on the battle of Talavera, that I did not find in it the tone of a military man who renders an account of the situation of things, that I only saw in it pompousness; that I should have desired that in it he had made me know the losses, and had presented precise details, but true, of what had passed; for after all, it is the truth that is owing me, and that the good of the service demands. Make one and all feel how much it is to fail the government to hide from it things that it learns from all the individuals of the army who write to their relatives, and to expose it to giving faith to all accounts of the enemy."

This long extract is given as characteristic of the emperor's just views and frank criticism. It is a sample of many similar ones that cannot be quoted.

Meanwhile Soult was marching towards Plasencia. Had Wellesley anticipated this manœuvre, he would scarcely have adventured as far as Talavera, and now it proved advantageous that, instead of pursuing the French, he had remained at Talavera. Joseph's orders to Soult to approach the Tagus had been belated, and it had required time to gather his own, Ney's and Mortier's divisions, to collect artillery sufficient, and to complete his preparations, while Napoleon had warned him to march closed-up. Paying scant heed to Beresford and Delparque (for if the allied army was beaten, they could do naught), Soult masked Ciudad Rodrigo, and moving with Mortier's seventeen thousand men in the van, his own eighteen thousand next and Ney's thirteen thousand in the rear, reached Plasencia August 2 to 4. Though the Spaniards had agreed to arrest Soult at Baños, in the mountain passes, whatever was there retired as he approached. Reconnoitring parties were sent ahead by Soult, and found the Almaraz bridge broken, and gleaned news of the allies at Naval Moral. Wellesley had been told that Ney and Kellermann had moved to the Douro, and thus concluding that Soult had a bare fifteen thousand men, he projected a march against him, leaving Cuesta to face Victor, and get the wounded out of Talavera. With his own force and Bassecourt's he started for Naval Moral; but on August 3 each commander captured one of the other's couriers, and Wellesley woke up to his actual danger. The allies had a choice of two operations: to throw themselves in force on Soult's head of column, leaving a skeleton line to contain Victor, or promptly to retire behind the Tagus. To accomplish either, the better plan was to concentrate on the highway from Plasencia through Almaraz to Badajoz, so as to secure an easy line of retreat. With Cuesta, Wellesley had forces enough to risk a battle if he came in contact with Soult and Mortier, for Ney did not get to Plasencia until the 4th; and had he seasonably pushed on, he could have been at Almaraz long before Soult's arrival. A second victory here would have greatly heightened his fame, as well as improved his position. But safety was Wellesley's prime consideration, and his strategic manœuvres were always deliberate. Moreover, he deemed it unwise to risk a battle with Soult, when Victor might again come on; and when he learned that this marshal was more than a match for him, and that he was probably marching on Almaraz, he feared that he would not have time to repair the bridge there, and took post instead at Arzobispo. What he then knew led him to believe that Naval Moral was already held in force by the French, and that he could not reach Almaraz without a dangerous conflict. From that standpoint he was right.

Had Cuesta remained at Talavera, Wellesley might have decided otherwise, for the Spaniards would have fended off Victor; but Cuesta had felt compromised by the French in his front and rear, and had come on to Oropesa, August 3, to keep nearer Wellesley, whom he believed to be at Almaraz, as well as to be close to the crossing at Arzobispo, for the passage at Talavera led into a mouse-trap. In this movement Cuesta seems justified from a military standpoint, although the English expected him to protect their Talavera hospitals, about which Wellesley was anxious.

Between Wellesley and Cuesta little action in concert was taken, yet each crossed the Tagus at Arzobispo the 3d and 5th, and Cuesta held the bridge. Here the allies lay between the river and a spur of the Guadalupe mountains, with a bad road back to Badajoz. Had not Soult been delayed by the breaking of the bridge at Almaraz, Wellesley might have been seriously compromised, and as Soult was sure soon to force the Tagus, he was still in a questionable position; but setting the Spanish peasants to mending the road across the mountains from Azutan via Meza and Deleytosa, he opened the one to Truxillo, which, had he passed at Almaraz, would have been at once available. To prevent the French from crossing by the Almaraz ford, he sent Craufurd thither in light marching order.

When, late August 6, Soult advanced to the line of the Tagus, he found the allies gone, and Cuesta ready to defend the Arzobispo bridge. It consumed the 7th to find a ford near Azutan, and this he forced August 8, at the siesta hour, while Mortier captured the bridge. Ney was ordered to ford the river near Almaraz and cut the road to Badajoz. But no ford was to be found, neither were there boats; and Craufurd held the south bank in sufficient force. Wellesley was given time to mend his road; and he got his artillery over the mountains with immense labor, and finally reached Truxillo, from which place the way was clear to Badajoz. The Spaniards, after a smart combat, withdrew in bad order. Tired of his fruitless labor, Cuesta ceded the command to Eguya, who led the right wing towards Toledo to succor Vanegas, while the left, under Albuquerque, rejoined Wellesley at Deleytosa. Wilson, after running some chances of being trapped, but having opportunely threatened Joseph's communications, escaped in Soult's rear through the mountains of Gredos to the Tormes valley, and later reoccupied Baños.

Wellesley having disappeared, Joseph returned to Toledo to find Vanegas bombarding the town from the left bank, and seeking a crossing. Sébastiani, followed by Desolles, passed the Tagus August 9, and meeting Vanegas at Almonacid, attacked him with vigor. Outnumbered largely, Sébastiani came close to failure, from which Desolles' on-coming saved him, and the Spanish line was broken. Abandoning artillery and train, Vanegas fell back on the Sierra Morena, with heavy loss. This victory was in part a compensation for Talavera; but the Frenchman had found in the Briton a soldier whose equipoise even a desperate charge would not unsettle, and had lost his feeling of invincibility.

Sébastiani.

Soult now proposed to march on Abrantes, to reach which place before the English would have been a dangerous threat to Portugal; but Joseph and Jourdan would not permit him to move to a distance. They sent Ney back to protect Leon, and, released from Soult's control, he moved north, and driving Wilson out of Baños, marched on Salamanca to contain Beresford. Not only was Soult unable to carry out his plan, but by this dissemination of the French forces Wellesley was released from danger. Had Joseph kept his forces together, he might have made a difficult campaign for Wellesley south of the Tagus. He had five well-led corps — Soult, Ney, Mortier, Victor and Sébastiani; but nervous about Madrid, and unduly fearing

Vanegas and Beresford, he ended by thus detaching Ney against one and Sébastiani against the other, retaining no sufficient mass with which to act. There was perhaps danger of Beresford's moving into Castile to cut the ill-protected communications with France; but had Joseph marched in a body on Badajoz, success there would have neutralized every other operation of the Anglo-Portuguese. Such another occasion he did not have. Joseph was no soldier. Under parallel circumstances Napoleon would have followed Wellesley to Lisbon or Cadiz, aware that a victory over the main allied army would draw all the offensive out of the others. Soult indeed suggested the march on Lisbon, but the enemy's army and not his capital was the true objective. This was perhaps the most important moment of the Spanish war; and its promise was not embraced. At the same time, as Wellesley had a retreat open on Cadiz, if Lisbon was taken; as the Napoleonic scheme in Europe was no longer on the increase, while the English resources were unlimited; and as above all the English held the sea, the eventual result would scarcely have been different. Yet had Wellesley at this moment suffered a decisive check, the English ministry might have decided to evacuate the Peninsula; and, from a military standpoint, Joseph lost his opportunity.

Soult succeeded Jourdan as military adviser of the king; and Ney, who, however brilliant a corps commander, could never agree with any superior except Napoleon, shortly left for France rather than further serve under Soult, and was succeeded by Marchand.

At one time Wellesley intended to recross the Tagus, but he did not agree with the Junta, which supplied scant provisions for his army; and he made up his mind that he would be better off in Portugal. La Romana was at Corunna, Beresford was near Ciudad Rodrigo, defending the frontier, and

Delparque was striving to induce him to undertake wild operations near Salamanca. While the campaign against Madrid had failed, the French had profited naught.

In this first experience Wellesley lost confidence in the Spanish troops. The cavalry, he said, was excellent to look at, but only played at war; the artillery was good, but the infantry worthless against the French. His eventual retreat, like Victor's in June, was, however, from short supplies; but it was after the Wagram campaign that, from Badajoz, he moved back into Portugal. Joseph remained king in Madrid, but the English cloud in the Peninsula was none the less black.

For his services Sir Arthur Wellesley was created a peer as Baron Douro of Wellesley and Viscount Wellington of Talavera; and he later received large grants. Of all nations the English have best appreciated and rewarded military success.

The conduct in Spain of Massena, Soult, Ney and other French marshals gauges their ability in separate command. As corps commanders they have rarely been equaled; but Napoleon's training of his marshals was not such as to make them good all-round leaders to oppose the superior generalship of Wellington. When the new emperor created his marshals, he considered only Massena, Soult and Davout equal to the command of an independent army; and both the former failed in Spain, though it may be said that few generals have succeeded against a people in arms, in a mountainous country almost devoid of victual. This low estimate of the marshals in no sense militates against Wellington's standing, for they were proportionately as staunch opponents as Napoleon usually had to contend with, and skill must to an extent be measured by opposition encountered. Grant, purely as a soldier, may not have been the equal of Lee: but what a task was his, to crush that wonderful body of men, the Army of Northern Virginia, under its redoubtable leader!

Meanwhile Delparque moved towards Salamanca, and beat Marchand at Tamames October 19; but making no use of his victory, he sat down at Alba. Kellermann replaced Marchand, and finding the Spanish army drawn up on the Tormes, attacked with his cavalry. This alone struck the enemy, who fled, losing three thousand men, fifteen guns and two thousand prisoners. Eight regiments, with a loss of eighty men, had defeated an army. Kellermann rescued Salamanca, Delparque retired to Ciudad Rodrigo.

Dissatisfied with the late failures, the Spanish Junta consolidated the armies of Cuesta and Vanegas under Areizaga. He, proud to command fifty thousand men, advanced on Aranjuez, where Sébastiani checked him November 12; Soult and Mortier came up, and on November 18, at Ocaña, the superior Spanish army was routed with a loss stated as high as twelve thousand killed and twenty thousand prisoners, fifty guns and thirty flags. Again the Spaniards fled to the Sierra Morena.

During this time Wellington did little for his Spanish allies. He could not agree with them; he was hampered by home instructions; and it was not of vital importance to his general scheme for holding Portugal whether they were beaten or not, so long as this did not react on him, and he could pursue his own plans. Had the Spanish Junta intrusted Wellington with supreme command, we might have seen another and more active conduct, for no one doubts his ability to solve a large proposition. But Wellington was prone to insist on having his own way, or lacking this, to limit his undertakings, and he was wise to run no serious risk. While Napoleon was still at the height of his power, it was no part of his aim to chase the French out of Spain; his scheme was restricted to holding Portugal, and incidentally aiding the Spaniards to fight their own battles. To arrange a more comprehensive system for the war, he now went to Seville, where his brother, Marquis Wellesley, was accredited to the provisional Spanish government; and returning to Lisbon in October, he determined to move the theatre of action to northern Portugal, where Delparque and Beresford were still resting on their arms at Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, much short of victual.

It was late in 1809 that the main British army was transferred from Badajoz and Elvas to the Mondego valley. Here also Wellington was content to defend Portugal, his campaign against Madrid having brought such scant success. He was reasonably sure of Portugal; Spain had refused him access to Cadiz, and held him responsible for the Talavera failure. La Romana alone seemed frankly helpful. With so little coherence between him and Spain, he was reduced to relying upon himself, and to make future operations more safe, he determined to create a more solid base. With forty thousand English and Hanoverians and as many well-organized Portuguese, and sustained by a bellicose population, he had in his favor three out of four chances in a defensive campaign against the French, whose difficulty in victualing and in covering their long line of communications would, in Napoleon's absence, rarely enable them to operate in one body. But Wellington believed that the French would again invade Portugal, and his conservative method called for a base with ample stores, from which he could receive reinforcements, annoy and wear out the French, and at call embark a force by sea to operate in some other spot on the coast; and for this purpose he began an immense fortified camp on the heights of Torres Vedras, extending from the mouth of the Tagus to the sea, and cutting off from the mainland the peninsula in which Lisbon is situated.

While Wellington was preparing to receive the French in

Portugal, Spain was not easy for the new king to manage. The capture of Saragossa had not reduced Aragon, and no sooner had Napoleon returned to Paris, and Mortier left the province, than a fresh army under Blake arose, to drive back the 3d Corps, work up the Ebro, and threaten the French communications by arousing the masses. Satisfied that little could be accomplished with a regular army, Blake encouraged the towns to arm; and before long, from every side, guerrilla bands harassed the French fresh levies which were left to pacify Aragon. Just before Essling, Suchet had succeeded Junot in command at Saragossa.

Blake's first exploit was to attack Laval at Alcaniz, and to capture a small French force; joining Laval, Suchet attacked him without success, and returned to Saragossa in unenviable case. His men were ill-disciplined; he could not give up Saragossa; and concentrating near the town, on Mount Torero, he undertook to improve his men for a fresh operation. Blake next threatened the road to Tudela, leaving his main force at Maria; Suchet attacked this with vigor, and defeated it June 15. Blake retired; Suchet followed, and at Belchite again met and drove him back to Tortosa.

Meanwhile, Gouvion St. Cyr, in Catalonia, had similar success. To remain at Taragona he must capture Gerona. The siege, begun June 4, was as noteworthy as that of Saragossa: Blake essayed to relieve the place, and gave much trouble. Surrounded by hills, Gerona had a garrison of six thousand men under Castro, and inhabitants so eager to defend their own that women served in the ranks. On the northeast, Fort Monjuich dominated the town. Harassed by guerrillas, the siege was ill-conducted, and two assaults were driven back. The French then took Fort Monjuich, and one by one the several forts surrounding the town, but only after two or three changes in command was the place taken, December 11. This secured the communications with France, and Catalonia and Aragon were now fairly in hand.

With Napoleon absent, little can be said for the management of the Spanish campaign. Joseph was too fond of playing king to attend to the military problems; nor had he the ability, and the French corps were employed too much in detail. French failure was, however, due no more to the want of unity in command and adverse conditions, than to the diligent, long-headed, conservative leader who opposed them.

Although during 1809 the Russians had continued the 1808 campaign against the Swedes, the English fleet counteracted progress from Finland; but with infinite patience Shuvalov moved around the north of the Gulf of Bothnia, and during the cold winter of 1808–9 marched, on the ice, one corps under Bagration across from Finland to the island of Aland, opposite Stockholm, and one, under Barclay de Tolly, to meet his own army at Umea, which he had reached by his circuit. As the ice covering the gulf would have disappeared with a southwest wind, this march of the two corps, with all their guns, train and impedimenta over one hundred miles across the sea, was original in conception and wonderful in boldness. Peace ensued, and Sweden lost its part of Finland.

During 1809 the Russians also carried the war against the Turks so far as to cross the Danube, near its mouth.

Although, early in the year, the task had seemed doubtful, Napoleon had managed to hold himself in Spain, and to defeat the Austrians on the Danube. The year could not be said to have lacked success — but it was not as decisive as 1805 and 1806.

The following items about Spain are of interest as illustrating the emperor's views: —

To Clarke, October 10, 1809: "I desire you to write to the King of Spain to make him understand that nothing is more contrary to military rules than to make known the forces of his army, be it in the orders of the day and proclamations, be it in the gazette; that when one is induced to speak of his forces, one is to exaggerate them, and to present them as redoubtable by doubling and trebling the number; and that when one speaks of the enemy, one is to diminish his force by one half or one third; that in war everything is morale; that the king departed from this principle when he said that he had but forty thousand men, and when he published that the insurrectionists had one hundred and twenty thousand men; that it is carrying discouragement to the French troops to present the number of the enemy as immense, and it is to give to the enemy a feeble opinion of the French in presenting them as few; that this is to proclaim in all Spain its feebleness; in a word, to give moral force to his enemy, and to take it from himself. That it is in the spirit of men to believe that in the end the lesser number must be beaten by the greater. The most experienced military men have difficulty on a day of battle to value the numbers of men which compose the enemy's army, and generally natural instinct leads one to judge the enemy that one sees more enormous than he actually is. But when one has the imprudence of letting ideas circulate, of authorizing one's self exaggerated calculations on the force of the enemy, it has the difficulty that each colonel of cavalry who goes on reconnoissance sees an army, and each captain of voltigeurs battalions. I view with pain the bad direction that they gave to the spirit of my Army of Spain, in repeating that we were only forty thousand against one hundred and twenty thousand men. We have obtained but a single end by this declaration: it is to diminish our credit in Europe. . . . And we have weakened our moral strength in increasing that of the enemy. Once again, in war, morale and opinion are more than one half the reality. The art of the great captains has always been to publish and make appear to the enemy their troops as very numerous and to their own army the enemy as very inferior. This is the first time that one sees a chief lessen his means below the truth, in exalting those of the enemy. The soldier does not exercise judgment. . . . I intend that such inadvertences shall never again happen. . . . I intend they shall take measures . . . to give the highest opinion of my forces. I have of French troops in Spain double and treble in consistency, value and numbers, that I can have in any other part of the world. When at Eggmühl I vanquished the Austrian army, I was one against five, and yet my soldiers believed themselves to be at least equal to the enemy; and to-day, despite the long time which has passed since we were in Germany, the enemy does not know our real force. We studied to make ourselves more numerous every day. Far from confessing that I had at Wagram only one hundred thousand men, I strive to persuade people that I had two hundred and twenty thousand men. Constantly, in my Italian campaigns, where I had a handful of men, I exaggerated my forces. That served my projects and did not diminish my glory. I hope that faults so enormous and so prejudicial to my arms and my interests will not be repeated in my armies in Spain."

On December 13 the emperor wrote Berthier: "Make it known to the king that the flags taken by my troops at the battles of Medellin, Ocaña, etc., are to be sent to France, to be presented to me and to serve to ornament French monuments. You will write the same thing to Soult." On January 23, 1810, he again wrote: "Send the order to the King of Spain to have dispatched, twenty-four hours after receiving this order, the flags which were taken in the battles of Medellin, Ciudad Real and Ocaña, and other affairs which have taken place since my departure. These trophies are not to stay in Madrid. They belong to France."

English Hussar.

XLVIII.

BUSACO, FUENTES, ALBUERA, BADAJOZ. 1810–11.

JOSEPH desired to reduce Andalusia. Napoleon agreed, though he preferred to have Massena march on Lisbon from Salamanca, and Soult down the Tagus to join him. In January, 1810, Joseph overran Andalusia, and with Soult sat down to pacify it. In May Massena reached Salamanca. Ney captured Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo in July and August; then Massena advanced and Wellington retired, devastating the land. On Busaco ridge he paused for battle. Massena attacked September 27, but was defeated by defensive tactics. As Wellington did not pursue, Massena then turned him out of the position, and Wellington withdrew to Torres Vedras. Massena followed and found impregnable lines. The English were well fed by sea, the French starved. Soult could not communicate with Massena. During the summer of 1810 the French on the Mediterranean coast captured a number of towns, but the whole Spanish situation was at loose ends. In 1811 Soult too slowly worked towards Massena, capturing Badajoz March 11; but just before then Massena had retired. Wellington pursued him back to Salamanca early in April, and besieged Almeida. Massena advanced again to meet him, but was defeated May 5 at Fuentes d'Onoro, and Portugal was rescued from the French. Beresford was sent to recapture Badajoz, and in a bloody battle at Albuera maintained the siege against Soult, May 16. Marmont succeeded Massena, joined Soult in mid-June, and raised the siege. Wellington returned to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo, and Marmont to oppose him. Napoleon now began to withdraw all good troops from Spain for the Russian campaign. On the Mediterranean coast Suchet took Valencia, January 9, 1812. Wellington had conducted two slow campaigns, but early in 1812 he vigorously marched on Ciudad Rodrigo, captured it January 19, despite Marmont's presence at Salamanca, and quickly transferring his forces to Badajoz, on April 4 also captured this fortress. Soult arrived two days too late.

IT was in 1810, after the divorce of Josephine, and upon considering and declining a matrimonial alliance with Russia, that Napoleon, aware that on his own death his dynasty could not of its native strength survive, allied himself with the Austrian royal family by marrying the emperor's daughter, Marie Louise. The ceremony took place in Paris April 2, and on March 20, 1811, a son was born of the union. On the part of Napoleon this alliance was a fine stroke of policy; and yet, after the passing of its great head, how could the House of Bonaparte hope effectually to resist the Bourbon princes, and the hundred thousand families still resident in France, whose creed was legitimacy? In this connection the following letters are of interest: —

February 23, 1810. To the Archduchess Marie Louise: My Cousin, the brilliant qualities which distinguish your person have inspired us with the desire of serving and honoring you. In addressing to the Emperor, your father, the prayer to confide to us the happiness of Your Imperial Highness, may we hope that you will accept the sentiments which induce us to take this step? Can we flatter ourselves that you will not be determined solely by the duty of obedience to your parents? If only the sentiments of Your Imperial Highness have some partiality for us, we will cultivate them with so much care and take it for a task to so constantly please you in everything, that we flatter ourselves that we shall succeed in being agreeable to you some day. That is the goal we wish to reach, and for which we beg Your Highness to be favorable to us.

NAPOLEON.

March 29, 1810. To the Emperor Francis: Monsieur my Brother and Father-in-law, Your Majesty's daughter has been here two days. She fills all my hopes, and for two days I have not ceased to give her, and to receive from her, proofs of the tender sentiment which unites us. We are perfectly suited to each other. I will make her happiness, and I shall owe mine to Your Majesty. Permit me then to thank you for the beautiful gift you have made me, and may your paternal heart rejoice in the assurances of the happiness of his cherished child. We leave to-morrow for St. Cloud, and on April 2 we shall celebrate the ceremony of our marriage in the Tuileries.

At the same time a number of orders of the Legion of Honor were sent to Vienna. On this occasion also Napoleon wrote to the Archduke Charles: —

My Cousin, I owe many thanks to Your Imperial Highness for having kindly represented me at my marriage with the Archduchess Marie Louise. She has been here two days, and I have from my very heart renewed to her the promises that you made in my name. Your Highness knows that the esteem I bear you is already old, and founded on your great qualities and actions. I am very desirous of giving you authentic proof of this, and I beg you to accept the Grand Eagle of the Legion of Honor. I beg you also to receive the Cross of the Legion, which I wear, and which is worn by twenty thousand soldiers who have been mutilated, or who have distinguished themselves on the field of honor. The one is a homage to your genius as general, and the other to your rare value as a soldier. NAPOLEON.

There is no question that Napoleon desired peace, and he again approached England with proposals to end the European strife for which he was generally held responsible. Although England was bravely bearing up against the Continental System, and her trade and manufactures still throve, yet she suffered much; but she would listen to no proposal which should not strip France of most of her conquests. Could Napoleon have had guaranteed to him and his house, as representing France, a material part of these, he would have been foolish not to welcome peace; but England could not see why France should hold Italy or the Netherlands; neither could Napoleon see why they should be given up. The emperor and the English cabinet were radically — racially separated.

After the splendid Wagram campaign Napoleon might well have returned to Spain; but the Continental System detained him in Paris; with ever growing love of comfort, he did not like to leave Marie Louise, and he disliked the kind of struggle which a great victory would not end. He was no longer acting on military grounds, and his natural impatience was growing of things which did not work his way; Wellington more than once remarked upon this weakness in Napoleon's character. And, never doubting eventual success in Spain, he put

Soult, and later Massena, in command there, with abundant reinforcements, including part of the Old and Young Guard under Bessières. Thus reorganized, the Spanish army consisted of eight corps: Victor 1st, Reynier 2d, Suchet 3d, Sébastiani 4th, Mortier 5th, Ney 6th, Augereau (later Macdonald) 7th and Junot 8th. A 9th under Erlon was forming at Bayonne. These were later distinguished by names: Augereau's became the Army of Catalonia; Suchet's the Army of Aragon. The other corps made three armies: the Army of Andalusia under Soult, with Victor, Sébastiani and Mortier; the Army of Portugal under Massena, with Reynier, Ney and Junot; while Joseph had the Army of the Centre, with only Desolles' division, and some parade troops.

The king now enjoyed a few months of peace. Although better than his Bourbon predecessors, he had not the hereditary right to be ignorant and arrogant, nothing in his make-up captivated the Spanish eye, and, equally against his good standing and his will, much of the revenue of Spain was diverted to Napoleon's treasury, on the plea that it cost money to conquer the land. Joseph now desired to bring his kingdom under control; and although Napoleon pointed out that it was not Spanish provinces, but the English Army, that was the true objective, he finally yielded to Joseph's desire to reduce Andalusia. This was a grave strategic mistake of which he should not have been guilty. Portugal should have first been freed, for the half-year's respite afforded Wellington after the battle of Talavera had enabled him to prepare for fresh hostilities. Napoleon's original plan was to send an army north of the Tagus on Lisbon, while Soult should march thither south of the river; and as the English were dispirited by their Walcheren failure, the operation might have proved effective. But to keep a separate command, Soult was eager to operate in Andalusia, and Joseph, from his short-sighted standpoint, was persuaded to agree to his plan. The rich southern provinces promised fresh sources of supply from which Napoleon could draw — indeed, it was this which won his consent to the Andalusian project; but this policy antagonized numerous Spaniards who were beginning to adopt the new régime, and to Joseph's protest Napoleon replied that he would use Spain for his own purposes.

For many months before the 1810 campaign had opened, in discussing the Andalusian expedition, Napoleon had placed more reliance on the operation into Portugal from Salamanca, to be aided by Soult — if only he could find the leader. Junot, a brilliant but unsteady officer, had in 1808 overrun, but not held, Portugal. Soult had twice manœuvred in north and west Spain and Portugal, but had shown lack of energy. Ney possessed vigor, but he was restless in temper: able to execute orders as no one else, he had no clear military conceptions. Massena seemed to be the only man. He had gone to sea in his youth, and had served in the army ranks, until the Revolution gave him his chance. Italy, Switzerland, Genoa, Austerlitz, Friedland, Essling and Wagram had shown his worth. The marshal held back; he was tired of war, and had accumulated a large property; but Napoleon insisted, and, promising him all the troops he wanted, with Ney and Junot as lieutenants, Reynier from the Tagus, part of the Young Guard, and Erlon with the 9th Corps, he appealed to his ancient fealty. Massena consented, and carried with him a number of good officers, among them Eblé and Marbot.

Soult set about his work too deliberately. Speed was essential to reduce Andalusia, and especially to seize Cadiz, without which port the province could not be held, it being, next to the capital, the most important place in Spain, and the refuge of the Spanish Junta. In mid-January, 1810, with

Joseph nominally in command, Soult assembled his corps, the Guard, and Desolles' reserve, a total of fifty thousand men, south of the Guadiana, to operate against Areizaga, who, with the relics of the army beaten at Ocaña, was intrenched in the defiles of the Sierra Morena. A part of the Court of Madrid accompanied the king.

The Army of Andalusia passed through the rugged mountain roads with faint opposition; Victor debouched on Cordova; Joseph with Mortier and the reserve advanced on Andujar; Sébastiani's objective was Ubeda, where Areizaga had concentrated his main forces on the heights of Montizon. Turned on his right, and with his centre pierced, the Spanish commander was signally defeated. Sébastiani entered Granada January 28, after a combat at Alcala Real, and Malaga a week later; Joseph reached Andujar January 21, and Victor Cordova the next day. To secure Seville and cut off Albuquerque's force near Zafra, the French right should have pushed on through Ecija; but, tickled with his triumph, Joseph paused and allowed the Zafra forces to pass through Seville; and these reached Cadiz February 4, although the French might well have got there first, and quarrels among the Spanish authorities on political and military plans promised a chance to win it. Forgetting Cadiz, the king slowly marched on Seville, which was defended only by peasantry when, on February 1,

Joseph Bonaparte.

he arrived, but was shortly reinforced by regulars. Yet despite these backsets, the whole operation had been easy and brilliant; the main prize, Cadiz, had, however, not been won.

Satisfied with this parade manœuvre, Joseph returned to Madrid. The Spanish authorities wavered long between Gaul and Briton, but finally the latter triumphed, a division under Graham was admitted to Cadiz, and La Romana returned to serve Wellington in Estremadura. This was a marked blow to the French standing. If Spain could be made anti-British, Napoleon cared little whether Joseph or Ferdinand were king; to close the ports of the Peninsula to British commerce was his main object, and this now appeared farther off than ever. Yet even if he could see that Ferdinand, as king and ally, was better than Joseph and war, he would not act up to this belief, and give the Spaniards back their native sovereign. He probably had little faith in Ferdinand's stability.

As Napoleon's plan contemplated, and to work in coöperation with Massena, Soult should at once have turned towards Badajoz, which, moreover, in subduing Andalusia, was a constant threat to his rear; but he was slow. Neither was Wellington ready to take advantage of the dispersion of the French divisions. From his central position at Ciudad Rodrigo, between Ney at Salamanca and Soult far beyond Badajoz, he could easily have snatched a success against each in turn, as he had done in 1809. But Wellington had small thought of a bold strategic offensive: he had often to wait on the cabinet in London; like Marlborough, he rarely had his own way; he never reached that opportunity which is essential to yield the highest repute in arms. Talavera was a good lesson: it taught him what he could venture and what he could not, and he kept busy fortifying Torres Vedras and perfecting his Portuguese troops. These latter Napoleon believed would never amount to anything. Had Wellington's object been what it later became when Napoleon had lost strength and prestige, — the expulsion of the French from Spain, — he might have shown more enterprise; but his policy now was to defend Portugal, and his cautious method sufficed. Meanwhile Soult blockaded Cadiz, arming his contravallation lines with three hundred guns captured in Seville and the Sierra Morena. This was a waste of men and material. Such a siege rarely avails, for with the open sea and the British fleet behind them, the allied garrison might defend itself or move at will to any other port. Like Acre, it was bound to fail; and the French troops were needed to advance on Lisbon and assist Massena.

These errors were not hidden to Napoleon; but he now interfered little, except by an occasional hint, as, in a note to Berthier, the emperor suggests that in any movement into the south of Spain care should be taken to provide against a movement of the English on Salamanca or Talavera, and adds: "His Majesty is not satisfied with the projects submitted to him; they do not present strong combinations. There is in Spain nothing dangerous except the English. The rest cannot hold the field. Communication from Lisbon to Seville and Cadiz is very prompt. If you leave on the Tagus too weak a corps, you will compromise the operation." Having sent to Spain, except Davout, the only marshals he considered equal to commanding armies, and having ordered Massena to reduce Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and Soult to coöperate with him by moving on Badajoz, and both to work towards Lisbon, he left them to complete the problem, satisfied that patience would eventually win. It did so; but it was Wellington's patience, not his own. Though he objected to devoting too much time to Cadiz, the emperor aided Soult by sending him a new mortar which carried six thousand yards, for Cadiz could at least be kept from doing harm. Victor took charge of the blockade; Mortier stood at Seville; Desolles' division held Cordova and Jaen; Sébastiani occupied Granada, watched Gibraltar and kept an eye on the region towards Murcia and Valencia. This was a good enough disposition to hold the land; but what was left to coöperate with Massena?

While in pacifying Andalusia Soult was using up the season of 1810, he afforded Wellington leisure to perfect his plans in Portugal. If Wellington had so far shown no remarkable enterprise, all the more had Soult not learned the Napoleonic speed, for it was he who was supposed to take the offensive; and the only manœuvres at this time were small war by La Romana, Ballesteros and others on the Portugal frontier; by Blake and others near Murcia; by sundry British parties which raided the coasts, and by an unfriendly population everywhere. In believing the Spaniards would eventually be worn out, Napoleon had misconceived the national character, as well as the latent strength of the English, and of their strenuous commander.

As Wellington's friends now controlled the British ministry, he was unapt to be taxed with slowness, and believing the French Empire but a temporary one, his idea was to hold Portugal as a safe base, and wait until Napoleon was compromised by his other Continental wars before going farther. He had the sea at his back, Galicia, which the French had abandoned, on his left, and Andalusia, which was holding head against them, on the right. To make Lisbon safe, the Torres Vedras lines were secretly constructed; and receiving full control in Portugal, Wellington made personal service obligatory, and, with the consent of the regent, got ready to lay waste the land to oppose Massena's advance. In April he had thirty thousand English and forty thousand Portuguese, all under command of English officers, not counting the militia, half of which was well equipped, the other half a species of levy in mass.

In the north, Junot had retaken Astorga; Ney had returned to Salamanca and was watching Beresford, who was Wellington's outpost; Reynier was opposing Hill and La Romana, on the left bank of the Tagus. Before the end of May, 1810, Massena reached Salamanca, where his former comrades found him "grown old;" but he went to work with vigor to organize his three corps. The Army of Portugal soon became a vital force, with sixty-five thousand men in first line, and nearly as many back on the communications.

But the proposed operation was serious: Massena had before him a resourceless mountainous country, a nation in arms and a regular army superior in size to his own; and in front of his objective, Lisbon, an inexpugnable set of defenses — although this last fact he did not yet know.

From the start there was friction, for, despite his strong qualities, Massena was disliked. Ney and Junot wished to march straight on Lisbon, while Wellington was in the south. This might have been successful, but the emperor had decided that Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo must first be taken, and this was now not easy, as Wellington had for a year been perfecting the frontier defenses; but, intrusted to Ney, it was well done, although siege-material had to be brought a great distance through a population whose chief delight was to pillage convoys.

The seat of one of the old Spanish artillery schools, Ciudad Rodrigo had a tenable enceinte, with eight thousand men in garrison. The commander, Herrasti, devotedly resisted the French bombardment, which destroyed many buildings and blew up the arsenal, but after twenty-five days of constant fire, on July 10 surrendered the garrison as prisoners. Ney then advanced on Almeida, where six thousand Portuguese, half regulars, and a small English force were prepared to make a desperate defense; but the explosion of its magazine crumbled the citadel and hastened a surrender on August 27. The militia was sent home; the regulars were unwisely incorporated in the French army. Thus Ney seized the most important door in the north of Portugal.

Albeit urged by his allies to go to the relief of these strong places, though the French had but thirty-five thousand men, half of them engaged in the works, Wellington, from the Guarda-Celorico country, watched the two sieges without moving. Left for some months to his own resources by the half-hearted British cabinet, and lest for some failure the entire army should be ordered home, he preferred the safety of a defensive rôle. But this rôle he carried out with remorseless severity. Aware that French success depended not only on good roads to march over, but victual along these roads, he devastated the entire district where they were to operate. Mills and bridges were destroyed, cattle were driven away, and all provision was carried off by the population, which retired towards Lisbon. The orders of Wellington of August 2 and 3 produced a desert. Poor Portugal suffered worse from her allies than she would have from her conquerors — at least for the time being.

The English forces were not concentrated. Thirty thousand men under Wellington were at the head of the Mondego valley; the reserve of ten thousand men under Leith was far in the rear, at Thomar, near Abrantes; Hill, with fifteen thousand men, was at Portalegre, south of the Tagus, facing Reynier; and twelve thousand Portuguese were operating on their own hook on the frontier. Had these been in one body, more could have been accomplished to counteract the French work; but as Wellington kept up his defensive preparation, towards mid-September Massena drew in Reynier, and, with sixty thousand men and eighty-four guns, began his advance. He expected to make Coimbra a secondary base. He should have marched down the Mondego, but some traitorous Portuguese led him by the nearest route, which was thoroughly bad, and he did not reach Viseu until September 23. Despite several good defensive lines behind affluents of the Mondego, Wellington slowly withdrew.

Napoleon had been wearied by the delays of the marshals, who under his eye had done such rapid work. He wrote, on September 19, to Berthier: —

> "My Cousin, send to-morrow an officer, bearer of a letter for Massena, in which you will make him understand that my intention is that he should attack and overturn the English. That Lord Wellington has not more than eighteen thousand men, of whom, I think, fifteen thousand are infantry and the rest cavalry and artillery; that Hill has not more than six thousand men, infantry and cavalry; that it would be ridiculous if twenty-five thousand English should hold in the balance sixty thousand French. That in not fumbling, but in attacking them frankly, after having reconnoitred, they can be smartly checked. . . . I am too distant, and the position of the enemy changes too often, for me to give counsel on the manner of delivering the attack, but it is certain that the enemy is out of condition to resist." He was in error.

As the morale of his allies, if not of the British troops, had already suffered by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and they needed success to cheer them up; as this would not permit Wellington to retire farther, and as he had not yet completed the devastation of the country in front of Lisbon, and was not ready to reënter the Torres Vedras lines, he determined to defend the Mondego at Coimbra; and Hill and Leith were drawn in to the plateau of Busaco, which, lying three hundred feet above the valley, he had selected as a battlefield. Cavalry parties held the roads on right and left. The position admirably suited the tactics which had served so well at Talavera, and the junction of his divisions was effected September 26, just as Massena put in his appearance. At this time Wellington's army consisted of the divisions under Spencer, Hill, Picton, Cole and Leith, and Craufurd's Light Division. The cavalry was under Cotton.

From Viseu, the Army of Portugal advanced on the enemy. Ney, on his arrival with the van, was for immediate attack, as it was thought that Hill and Leith were not yet all up, and as the English seemed, from their movements to and fro on the hills, to be still engaged in taking position; but the army waited for Massena, who should have been in the lead, and who on arrival deferred the attack until the morrow. By that time the English were concentrated in a position of difficult approach; Busaco crest gave room for the British first line, five miles long, and hid the second line and reserves. Forty thousand men were on the ridge, and, as usual, the troops were concealed behind rocks and by a natural scoop of the ground. Woods covered the field in places. There were but two roads up the plateau, one leading to the Convent and one by way of San Antonio; nowhere could forces be massed for an assault, and columns would necessarily be broken by the rugged ground. The position was one which should have been turned, not attacked. But luckily for Wellington's defensive plans, Talavera had been forgotten, and the French were eager for battle. Ney and Reynier were selected to assault the position, with Junot in reserve. They were to operate together, but Ney was delayed. Early in the morning of September 27, Reynier advanced in two columns up the San Antonio road. His assault was delivered in excellent heart, though as the ground permitted an attack only by successive brigades, it was in far from effective order. The impact was sharp, but so soon as the French reached the summit, in broken order and out of breath, they were met by a concentric hail of grape and canister, and immediately after by platoon fire and the vigorous countercharge of the fresh English battalions. They clung to their work like men; for a brief moment there was hope of rupturing Picton's line,



Battle of Busaco.

but Leith restored the battle, and Hill, in reserve, came from the right to secure it. There was no grand-tactics. It was merely the assault of a fortified position, where fresh troops of exceptional bravery and coolness, by their heavy volleys succeeded by a stout onset, checked and drove back the assailants. In three columns, Ney attacked, more than two hours later, along the Convent road. As only foot could move through the woods or scale the rocks, his guns were left behind. The attack was all that could be expected on the broken ground, and was delivered with Ney's usual *élan.* Wellington ably used his lines of red-coats, and smartly threw regiments on the flanks of the French battalions, or poured a withering fire into them from his point of vantage. No one could have employed defensive tactics better. At Vimiero and Talavera he had tested his scheme for utilizing Saxon phlegm against Gallic ardor; it had succeeded, and well served the purpose he had in view; and he clung to its use with consummate discretion. Here again the fresh defenders were too strong for the brave assailants. After a noble struggle Ney's columns were hurled back down the slope, which there were only slight partial efforts to recover. The French loss was six thousand men, including several general officers, the allied loss less than fifteen hundred men, but half of the force having been put in.

This defeat wasted the entire moral effect of the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and of the advance into the heart of Portugal; and it stands out in singular contrast to many a battle of Frederick's, where heights as bad had to be captured by his grenadiers.

Massena was ill-placed. Denuded of victual, the country was bad for an advance, and a retreat at this moment might be turned into a rout. Neither could he regain the left bank of the Mondego, as Wellington held the direct road. Luckily — it is said before the battle — he discovered another road leading across the hills by the Boyalva Pass to the west, and tapping the main road from Oporto to Coimbra, which by some misadventure the allies had neglected to hold. To conceal the turning march, Massena indulged in some skirmishing in front of Busaco next day; but the British commander made small reply. To march on Coimbra between the English army and the sea was a bold operation, and Wellington could well have fallen on the flank and rear of Massena's army: but he preferred his defensive scheme, and quietly retiring, he marched south, and reached Torres Vedras October 10, fully aware that the French were advancing into a country where they could not subsist. At Coimbra as at Viseu, not an inhabitant was to be found; every one had left under pain of death, and from Celorico to Lisbon there was not a mouthful, except what the fleeing Portuguese had been unable to carry away and had buried or hidden. Much of this was unearthed and gave a few weeks' subsistence, but the promise of a successful campaign seemed poor.

Wellington's withdrawal after Busaco illustrates the small gain of a defensive victory without pursuit. Though defeated, Massena turned his opponent out of his position, and forced him into retreat.

The French army followed the allies through Leyria and Villafranca towards Lisbon. Wellington's secret had been kept as usual. Until he reached Leyria, Massena heard nothing of the Torres Vedras lines, on which Wellington had been laboring for nearly a year. Even in England their construction was not generally known.

Lisbon is situated on a peninsula between the Tagus and the sea. Back of the city, across this peninsula, rise two low ranges some twenty-five miles long. It was on these that the lines were constructed, with a third one in the rear to protect an embarkment, should the other two be forced. These extraordinary works — the revival of an antiquated system, but well adapted to the conditions — consisted of eighty-seven connected redoubts mostly closed by palisades, held by sixty thousand men, and mounting two hundred and ninety guns. Hill was on the right, Craufurd in the centre, Leith and Picton on the left. With the sea for base, sure of food and supplies, the allies within these lines could laugh the French to scorn. While Wellington showed little of the tremendous activity of a Bonaparte, he yet was right in his management of the Portugal campaign. Fabius was a modest captain compared to Hannibal; so was Scipio; and yet each, properly utilizing the existing conditions, managed to worst this greatest of all soldiers. In Wellington's case discretion was the better part of valor. Against the French leaders in his front, and with the British cabinet in his rear, he was not able to play the part of a great captain. In gauging him, one must always remember that, until the allies had forced Napoleon back into France, his self-imposed rôle was the defensive, which, however, he often made of an offensive nature. And the value of his method soon appeared. After Massena had advanced to Leyria, Coimbra, with his four thousand wounded, fell into the hands of the Portuguese irregulars; the French army dwindled to fifty thousand hungry men to face the allied well-fed sixty thousand; the French were harassed by constant small war, and to live they were making the desert behind them, through which they must eventually reach their base, a yet more howling waste. The Torres Vedras lines could not be attacked: the army could not be subsisted in their front.

It was folly to attempt to take them. Massena sat down in front on a line concentric with the outer lines of the enemy, separated only by a narrow valley; and the troops were so posted as to be assembled in four hours. Reynier held the left, Junot the centre; and on the right, with some cavalry, Ney was at Villafranca, watching the Tagus, which the enemy commanded by his gunboats; Montbrun's cavalry was on the

Zezere to observe Abrantes, and protect the rear. Thus the two armies stood on the 12th of October, the French waiting for news from Soult.

Massena had small choice. He must either attack the lines, which was folly; or retire whence he came, which was to give

Massena.

up the campaign; or cross the Tagus to occupy the left bank facing Lisbon. His lieutenants at once wanted to retreat, but Massena had his orders, and with his old Genoa obstinacy would not do so until they were countermanded. In the St. Helena papers Napoleon unfairly criticises Massena: "This campaign was not reasoned out, therefore it was not methodical," he says.

Wellington's plan was simple: to stay where he was, and let short victual and disease break down the enemy. This was not strategy, but it was good common sense. In a few weeks Massena had exhausted the country, and drew back to Alenquer, which was nearer the valley of the Zezere, whence mostly came his scant provisions. Marauding grew. What had been left by the fleeing population was soon consumed. Foraging parties beat up and down every valley, seizing whatever was found. Every living thing was eaten up. Discipline almost ceased; it could not be enforced when men were starving. From seizing provisions they went on to seizing occasional women left behind, and the camp was filled with unfortunates. It was hard to keep the men together, as parties had to be sent out to collect food, and Massena's army soon began to disintegrate. On the other side the reverse was the case: the men were well cared for, they had meat and liquor every day, they would go fishing when not on duty, and gayety reigned in the camp. For some weeks good nature was kept up on the outposts, and the enemy's sentries exchanged friendly words and drinks. Late in October Massena sent Foy to Paris for orders, as the reinforcements promised down the Tagus did not come, and what arrived under Erlon merely made more mouths to feed.

Napoleon's reluctant acceptance of the Andalusian expedition had been on condition that Soult should aid Massena, and he now sent him renewed instructions to march on Santarem. Though he started from Seville as ordered, Soult stopped to besiege Olivenza and Badajoz, and the result of his manœuvre was that Massena was assisting him in Andalusia by containing Wellington instead of his assisting Massena to overcome Portugal.

The French army had done wonders in subsistence; even Wellington, in a letter to Lord Liverpool in December, said that he could not have victualed a single division where the French had fed sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals more than two months. Retreat was a hard word; but it had shortly to be uttered; and after seeing Foy, — as he could not come to Spain himself unless he neglected the Russian business, — Napoleon sent Massena power to act as he deemed wise. There was one scheme left which might work. If Massena could throw a bridge at Santarem, and Soult could come up from Badajoz to the Setubal country, Lisbon might be bombarded from the left bank. After a month at Alenquer the army moved to Santarem, in six weeks a bridge equipage was created out of nothing, and Massena awaited news of Soult; but as the latter had not yet taken Badajoz, — the distant sound of the guns at which was heard at Massena's headquarters, — the scheme fell through.

Napoleon never wavered in his faith that eventually the English defense of Portugal would wear itself out. His original plan of coöperation between Soult and Massena was now shown to have been sound, but Badajoz was its key; this should have been taken when Ciudad Rodrigo fell, and it had not been. At the same time, had the scheme been carried out, nothing warrants the belief that Wellington's careful defense in the Torres Vedras lines would not have checkmated all the French could do; and after the Russian disaster, Spain was bound to be wrested from their hold, not by the strength of the British offense, but by the weakening of the Napoleonic power.

Massena's position was reduced to retreat or starvation. Late in December La Romana joined Wellington, and the allies stepped just outside the Torres Vedras lines to Cartaxo, where they again intrenched. The French had accomplished nothing towards driving them from Portugal; all that could be done was to blockade them in their lines; and this promised no result, with an army already on the brink of indiscipline from hunger; while Wellington was well fed and could transfer his army to any other part of the coast by sea, should his defense prove weak.

To offset this stalemate on the Tagus, the Army of Aragon was more fortunate. After driving Blake from Saragossa, Suchet had done much to pacify the land; and after Joseph's parade manœuvre on Andalusia, he was in March ordered down to Valencia, which the king expected would open its gates. But Suchet found no such reception, and returning, sat down before Lerida. Here he was opposed by O'Donnell from Tarragona; but in April he signally defeated him, and on May 13, after a well-managed siege and an assault, Lerida and its citadel succumbed. Mequinenza was taken June 8, and this freed the navigation of the Ebro from Saragossa down. Augereau, not doing as well in Catalonia, was replaced by Macdonald, who contained the enemy while Suchet besieged Tortosa, which, after a long operation, he took January 2, 1811. These successes looked brilliant, but they seemed in no degree to make towards subduing these provinces, whose efforts were constantly fanned by the British.

In the rest of Europe the Napoleonic System still went on, not always to French advantage. Inasmuch as Charles XIII. had no heir, Sweden elected Bernadotte prince royal and successor to the throne; and though at Jena and Wagram Napoleon had shown his disapproval of this marshal, he now confirmed his election. But Bernadotte never forgot the injury he felt had been done him. Eugene was this year elected Grand Duke of Frankfort. The Hanseatic towns, and the mouths of the Ems, Weser and Elbe to Lübeck, were incorporated with France. Holland, in consequence of King Louis' failure to carry out the Continental System, and the Roman states were likewise formally brought into the empire, and the Prince Imperial invested with the title of King of Rome, although this last act raised the voice of the clergy against Napoleon. During the year the Russians advanced their affairs on the Lower Danube but little.

While 1810 closed with marked French successes in Aragon and Andalusia, and by the retreat of the allies to the lines of Torres Vedras, thus apparently releasing Portugal from the British grasp, yet Napoleon's situation was far from satisfactory. The Continental System was still extending, to the grief of many of the countries involved, and had excluded British commerce from the ports on the North Sea and the Baltic; yet the Peninsula in part and all America were still open. The English fleet was active in fighting the French all over the world, and gradually captured all the French colonies, except Martinique. Austria was but half-hearted in keeping up the System; the Russian friendship had been strained by the treaty of Vienna and the marriage of Marie Louise; Prussia was bound only by nominal peace; Spain was in arms. It had been a grave mistake on Napoleon's part not to bind Prussia to France by some community of interest, when it could readily have been accomplished; but Napoleon had quite estranged this central power of northern Europe, and could now rule her only by force; and although Frederick William proposed to Napoleon a treaty offensive and defensive, the latter comprehended that he would by such an alliance gain only the king and not the people.

Russia was beginning to protest against the inconvenience of the Continental System; she could buy no manufactured goods, nor sell her surplus grain. To evade the effect of the closed ports, smuggling on her frontier had grown to enormous proportions, and ill-feeling was increased by the foothold Napoleon gained in the Baltic in seizing Lübeck, and especially by the provinces added to the duchy of Warsaw. The

Treaty of Tilsit was already a dead letter, and at the end of 1810 France and Russia were antagonistic, the one having the war in Spain as almost the sole incentive to keep the peace, and the other the war with Turkey.

Napoleon hoped to end the Spanish struggle in 1811. He should himself have gone to the Peninsula, but was unwilling to defer his Russian preparations. Joseph was at odds with the independent marshals, who felt responsible only to the emperor, and his efforts to convoke the Cortes in Madrid to counteract the Cadiz Junta were shattered by Spanish procrastination. But Napoleon still deemed the Spanish question a minor one, not demanding his personal attention; and his ease was becoming more dear to him than of old.

In March, 1811, Massena had been five months in front of the Torres Vedras lines; how the army had subsisted is a mystery; it was evident that he must retreat. The French had begun the campaign in a devastated country; matters had steadily become worse, and for many weeks they had been compelled to rob to eat; discipline had fled. Half the men were at all times out foraging, the other half were in no condition to fight, and yet Wellington, with his fresh army of forty thousand well-drilled English and forty thousand Portuguese inside the lines, not counting Portuguese militia afoot outside, made no effort to attack them, but waited for their retreat before he would act. The people, herded together inside the lines from the entire devastated country side, suffered severely from hunger and disease; but the troops had plenty, and were fit for any work. On the other side, there was nothing to hope for: without aid from Andalusia, Portugal could not be held. That Soult was already at his task, though he had undertaken it too late, was not known to Massena, who practically received news from no source.

Leaving Sébastiani to watch Murcia and Gibraltar, and

Victor to blockade Cadiz, contain Tarifa and hold Seville, Soult had finally advanced on January 2, 1811, with Mortier and his reserve, some twenty thousand men, on Olivenza. Ballesteros retired into the mountains, and Olivenza was surrendered January 22, after a ten days' siege. Soult now turned against Badajoz, the most important place in Estremadura, and confided the siege work to Mortier. La Romana was on the way to relieve the place, when he suddenly died, and Mendizabal succeeded him. Soult had not sufficient forces; as all his victual and material came from Seville across the Sierra Morena, he had to detach large parties to cover his convoys, and was left with barely fifteen thousand men for the siege, — a fact that was distinctly due to forgetfulness of the emperor's orders.

Badajoz lay on the left bank of the Guadiana, with a bastioned wall strengthened by redoubts, and a stone bridge crossing the river, protected at the other end by the fort of San Cristobal, and an intrenched camp. With ten thousand garrison under Manecho, it had victual and munition for six months. On the right bank lay Mendizabal. In the night of February 19 Soult crossed, and cut the Spaniards off from the fortress, while Latour-Maubourg attacked their flank. Almost the entire relieving force was captured, Mendizabal escaping with a handful. Manecho was shortly killed, and on March 11 Badajoz surrendered. Although eminently successful, the operation had been undertaken too late to be of use to Massena at Santarem. Had Soult had enough men to mask Badajoz, he could have reached Abrantes in season, and the two marshals have laid plans for the future; but knowing no cause for hurry, he kept at the siege until March 10, and a week before that time Massena was beyond aid; the winning of Badajoz was at the expense of Portugal. Massena had suffered, as Soult in 1809, from lack of news.

It has been said that had Soult acted promptly, he might have released Massena, who could then have crossed the Tagus to join him; but for Massena to transfer his army to the south of the Tagus would open along the north bank a road straight on the capital. Soult had but a third of his force at hand, the rest being distributed all over Andalusia; and Wellington would scarcely have crossed the Tagus to meet Soult and Massena in a decisive battle, when he had so long stayed behind the Torres Vedras lines with Massena alone in his front, and when so much better an operation was opened for him by Massena's withdrawal. The difficulty lay deeper. To aid Massena effectively, Badajoz should have been taken earlier, as prescribed by Napoleon; to aid him now meant to abandon all Andalusia. The scheme of one march on Lisbon and another on Cadiz had proven a strategic error, for which the possession of Estremadura did not compensate: the mass of the forces in Spain should have been used in one body opposite Wellington.

Meanwhile Graham and La Peña had essayed to relieve Cadiz by a debarkment at Tarifa. Victor advanced against them, and was defeated at Chiclana, March 5; but though Graham retired when Victor was himself contemplating retreat, so threatening did the situation appear that Soult left Mortier near Badajoz, and marched back to Seville. Had Massena still been at Santarem, Soult would not have joined him. The emperor's scheme of coöperation was nullified by this marshal's vacillation, and his failure to keep a sufficient force in hand for manœuvring.

On March 2, his army having neither food, nor health, nor morale, Massena had retired from Santarem. Wellington would not come out and fight him, and nothing else was left to do. There was small choice of lines of retreat; he chose the route along his line of communication with Salamanca, though it was through a country devastated by the English and eaten bare by his own forces. Much material had to be abandoned, and though scant consideration was shown to what was left of the population, or to the country, it was the enemy's land, and the English had done as badly by their allies when they had left it. On March 4 the train was sent ahead to Thomar, and in the night of the 5th–6th the retreat began. Ney commanded the rearguard. The column headed via Thomar, Pombal, Redinha, on Coimbra.

Now came Wellington's chance, and he improved it well, starting in pursuit March 7, and smartly following up the retreating French. Massena paused too long at Pombal, where the allies attacked Ney on the 11th, and almost won time to turn his right and anticipate him on the Ceira. At Redinha, March 12, Ney, with Marchand's division, held back the stout allied attack, and enabled the French columns to file past. The rumor that Coimbra was held in force by the enemy, the Mondego bridge broken and the valley shut induced Massena to move by way of Miranda. The allies followed hard upon, again striking the French rear at Casal Nova on the 14th. The French retreat was now up the valley of the Ceira, which it crossed at Foz de Arronce, and here only Ney's firm countenance held the French from a fatal panic. On May 21 Massena reached Celorico, and later Guarda, demoralized and with an army sadly reduced.

Finding no food, Massena purposed to retire on Coria, where he might hold himself until Joseph and Soult could send him reinforcements, or aid him by their operations on the Tagus and Guadiana. This looked less like abandoning his campaign, and kept up the appearance of a flank manœuvre. Ney was for retiring on Almeida, where provision was more abundant, and, refusing to obey orders, Massena supplanted him by Loison. Crossing the Guarda mountains, Wellington followed up the French closely, forced Massena back behind the Coa, and defeating Reynier afresh at Sabugal on April 3, compelled the Army of Portugal to retire on



Massena's Retreat.

Ciudad Rodrigo, which was reached April 7. Here the one month's retreat ended. After a short rest, Massena fell back to Salamanca, and put his troops into cantonments. Ney had been right: the mountain country Massena had chosen was untenable. Wellington reached Almeida before the French, and invested it. In following up Massena's retreat, he had shown abundant energy, long as he had remained inactive in his Torres Vedras lines. Yet Massena had not been beaten by Wellington, but by circumstances. He had been promised reinforcements, which had not come, and the coöperation of Soult, which was delayed too long. His laurels, so ably won in the past, none the less faded.

In the Salamanca region Massena found reinforcements, reorganized his forces, and with thirty-five thousand men advanced, May 2, across the Agueda at Ciudad Rodrigo, to the succor of Almeida. Wellington, who had found his defensive battles so successful against the over-eager French, took up a position for the protection of his works, with thirty thousand men, on the table-land at Fuentes d'Onoro, in front of the Coa, between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. At the moment of Massena's approach he was absent, and the plan of the battle may not have been his. It was a good defensive position, covering the bridge over the Coa at Castella Bom; but it was not good in case of reverse, as the bridge might go lost, and the Coa runs through a ravine not easy to cross: he was fighting with a defile in his rear. The 5th division on the allied left was at the old fort of La Concepcion; the 6th division in the centre held the plateau of Almeida; the main force — 1st and 3d divisions — was on the plateau of Fuentes d'Onoro; the Light Division was out in the plain; a Spanish flying corps covered the right. In front of the position was the brook of Dos Casas, hard for the enemy to cross to its assault; but there was a chance for the French to turn the allied right, as indeed Massena at once perceived; and Wellington pushed out this wing as far as Nava d'Aver.

At Talavera, French discord and lack of one head had helped the English to the victory; the same thing was to occur here. On this position, on May 3, the French made a partial attack. Loison effected a lodgment on the plateau of Fuentes d'Onoro; but the English divisions and guns behind the village held him at bay, and finally drove him back across the brook. During the 4th Massena steadied his troops, reconnoitred, and making up his mind that the allied right was the only place he could attack, during the night of May 4–5 he moved over to the right Loison's corps, a division of Junot's, and Montbrun's cavalry, seventeen thousand men in all. This was the movement he should have undertaken on the 3d. On the 5th Massena renewed the attack, sending Loison and part of Junot around the allied right, while attacking the centre with Erlon's corps and containing the left at La Concepcion with Reynier. With his troops in good heart Loison took Poco Valho, and aided by Montbrun's cavalry, drove in the allied right. The French success was notable; Wellington seemed on the point of being turned out of his position, although the French onset was gallantly met by Craufurd advancing across the open ground. Had the French been able to hold the pace, they would have won; but by some conflict between Montbrun's and Bessières' cavalry, Wellington gained time to steady his right, bring up his reserves, and the attack could not be renewed. Despite the fine bearing of their new commander, the men of the 6th Corps missed Ney; and the allies again fought their defensive battle nobly. By clever handling Wellington withdrew his advanced right from the plain and took up a new position along a ridge west from Fuentes d'Onoro, which he stubbornly held, so as to cover the approaches to Almeida, and his main bridge at Castella Bom, for the Spanish corps had retired from the field. Loison's further progress was checked, and this gave the allies time to oppose him by fresh troops; and the attack by Erlon on Fuentes d'Onoro, which had begun two hours later, finally failed. The French army retired beaten, with a loss of three thousand men out of over forty thousand, to eighteen hundred of the allies out of ten thousand less.

The rival armies remained facing each other. On the 6th and 7th Wellington continued to strengthen his position, Massena feeling at all points of the line. His subordinates were not acting with him. Junot had leave of absence; Reynier had asked for another command; Loison knew that Marmont was coming to take command; Bessières had failed his chief. Massena ordered a retreat, and abandoned Almeida. Both sides claimed the victory; but though Wellington said that "if Bony had been there, we should have been beaten," he had maintained his siege operations. The garrison of Almeida cut its way out by a bold sortie and rejoined the French army, by way of Barba del Puerco; and Salamanca was again regained by the Army of Portugal, in a pitiable condition. Massena, who had lost the confidence



Battle of Fuentes d'Onoro.

of the army, somewhat owing to his quarrel with Ney, was, on May 11, replaced by the much less able Marmont, who was to work under Soult's orders.

Measuring Massena's attack by the very moderate losses, one is tempted to ask what had become of the general who won the battle of Zurich, of the man who had defended Asparn. It was an ill ending to the career of a fine soldier, and yet in the advance and retreat he had done all any one could do. As the emperor did not perform his part, the task was an impossible one; Soult failed him utterly, and his lieutenants were at odds.

Wellington's skillful management, added to his ability to wait, in which useful quality he has rarely been equaled, had secured Portugal. From now on the English kept the country, and in the coming years made it their base; and it is probable that the French failure in this campaign encouraged the czar to defend his rights.

When Wellington heard of the capture of Badajoz, he sent Beresford towards Elvas; and on his approach, Latour-Maubourg, who had succeded Mortier, retired from Campo Mayor March 23, and leaving small garrisons in Badajoz and Olivenza, retired on Llerena. Joined by Castaños and Ballesteros, Beresford crossed the Guadiana on rafts, and followed the French beyond Zafra, whence returning, he took Olivenza and invested Badajoz. Here Wellington personally joined him April 21, inspected the works, planned the siege operations and again left for the north, to meet Massena's renewed advance on Almeida. To relieve Badajoz, Soult drew troops from the north. He needed thirty thousand men, but could with safety spare only twenty-two thousand men and forty guns; and with these he marched on Badajoz, reaching a point within twenty miles of the city May 15, and writing Berthier that he would deliver battle, and "even if the whole English army on the Continent should be concentrated, I will beat them."

Beresford, joined by ten thousand Spaniards under Blake, coming from Murcia by sea, drew up to defend the siege on the plateau of Albuera, thirty-two thousand strong, of whom seven thousand British and eight thousand Portuguese troops, and thirty-eight guns. Soult had either to attack or retire, for Badajoz was not victualed for a long siege. He thought Blake had not yet come up. The allied left leaned on Albuera, and the centre and right lay along a ridge, of which the face towards the French was difficult and covered by the Albuera River, and the rear slope allowed easy communication along the allied line; but the position being a prolongation of the road to Olivenza, Beresford's main line of retreat, a successful attack on his right might cut off his centre and left. On this idea Soult acted, by feigning to debouch on Albuera while delivering his main attack by his left. The idea was sound, the execution proved faulty. The movement against Albuera was weak, the main attack precipitate. Over a field obscured by rain, Gazan and Girard, on the left, mounted the plateau May 16, and drove in the first line. The Spaniards who stood here made a brave show of resistance, but could not manœuvre, and soon fell back from the French impact. This afforded Soult a standing from which to use his batteries, but the British regiments would not budge, although the allies had to form a new front to the right. The superior French cavalry came into action, seriously threatened Beresford's rear, and cut up two regiments, the success here being so notable that, comprehending his peril, Beresford was on the point of ordering a retreat. But the advance of part of the English reserve arrested this onset, and as at Vimiero, Talavera, Busaco, Fuentes d'Onoro, the waiting tactics and countercharges were again successful. Hardinge then brought forward the fusiliers on the French flank, and the columns, unable to resist their fire, began to waver. Soult came up with his reserve, but could not turn the tide. The English charge drove the French back, until stopped by the French artillery. Godinot took Albuera too late to be of use. The casualties on each side were about six thousand men. The loss of the six thousand British who drove the French columns back is given as over four thousand killed and wounded — a superb record. Never had a body of men more fairly earned their laurels.



Battle of Albuera.

Next day the tired armies faced each other across the

Albuera. Had Soult again attacked, Beresford must have withdrawn; but at night Soult beat a retreat to Llerena, his cavalry being defeated on the way at Usagre. At Llerena he was joined by the 9th Corps, which had been with Massena.

On learning of the defeat at Albuera, Napoleon ordered Marmont to operate towards the Tagus to aid the Army of Andalusia.

Expecting that Soult would concentrate all his forces to relieve Badajoz, Wellington left Spencer with eighteen thousand men near Sabugal, and with two divisions marched down to the aid of Beresford, reaching Elvas May 19. The parallels of Badajoz were opened June 2, and the fire began. Owing to the rocky ground, the batteries were protected by epaulments of wool-sacks instead of earthworks; and here it was first found that cast-iron guns heated less and were more serviceable than bronze guns. The attack and defense of Badajoz were admirable, and an assault on San Christoval was driven back with loss. As ordered by Napoleon, Marmont had revictualed Ciudad Rodrigo, and marched via Plasencia and Almaraz to Merida. Soult reached out to meet him, and the two marshals joined hands June 17, and now had sixty thousand men with whom to advance on the allies. Ascertaining this fact, and especially as a fresh assault had failed, Wellington determined to raise the siege rather than encounter unnecessary risk; and accordingly, on the night of June 16–17 he retired by way of Olivenza, and the French marshals entered Badajoz June 20.

It has been pointed out that Wellington had lost the opportunity of utilizing his central position at Badajoz to strike Soult and Marmont separately, in which Spencer, who had come down on a parallel line with Marmont, could have coöperated. Before the marshals united, he might have thrown up the siege, as Napoleon did that of Mantua, and marching promptly on Marmont, with his own forces and Spencer's, have overwhelmed this marshal, forcing him behind the Tagus. Badajoz might have been revictualed meanwhile, but after an operation against Marmont, Wellington could have turned against Soult and beaten him in turn, as Napoleon beat Wurmser and Quosdanovich at Castiglione. But it is scarcely fair to expect of the English commander's patient discretion in the Peninsula anything resembling Napoleon's fiery strategy in Italy. The conditions were as different as the men.

Wellington halted at Portalegre. Had he remained in command, Massena would have attacked him, to wipe out the stigma of Fuentes. Soult and Marmont did not do so, though when the two armies were united was the moment to deliver battle. The rival armies faced each other two weeks, when Marmont marched back to the Tagus, Soult to Andalusia and Wellington, whose munition was exhausted, finally retired to Portugal.

When Soult withdrew so many troops from Andalusia, the Spaniards embraced the opening, but upon Wellington's retreat, Blake and Ballesteros again retired into the mountains. Threatened Seville was thus saved, and Soult marched on Granada, where Sébastiani was in bad case. On August 9 he beat Blake, and later followed Ballesteros to Gibraltar.

Marmont retired to Salamanca, and Wellington returned with the bulk of his forces to Beira, and having sent to Lisbon for siege artillery to come via Oporto, on September 5 he undertook the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which had been revictualed. To deliver Ciudad Rodrigo, Marmont called in a division he had left near Alcantara, and some of the forces from Leon and Galicia which had fallen under Dorsenne, when Bessières had returned to France to join the Russian expedition. On September 22 the French advanced, but only a combat at El Bodon enlivened the operation.

Wellington's full force had not come up, and not caring to risk a battle for Ciudad Rodrigo, he retired, and when Marmont followed, he fell back to Sabugal. Satisfied with a species of offer of battle on September 28, which was not accepted, only the outposts being engaged, Marmont withdrew and put his troops into cantonments. The French veterans were now replaced by recruits, and went to France to swell the army destined for Russia, which materially lightened Wellington's task. The British established themselves on the Coa, with headquarters at Fresnada, and renewed the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo.

Suchet.

Meanwhile Hill had fallen on Girard between the Tagus and the Guadiana, and the latter escaped to Merida. Guerrilla warfare continued in every part of Spain, but with no marked result.

Suchet continued his successes, and was preparing to reduce Tarragona, when the Spanish irregulars, having surprised Figueras and cut the road to France, Macdonald from Lerida marched to its relief. In June Suchet opened the siege of Tarragona, which was a notable one on both sides. Assault after assault was given and repulsed. For fifty-four days the troops were constantly under fire, and on July 28 the place was stormed and sacked. Suchet was made marshal and placed in command of all operations on the eastern coast, and the emperor ordered Soult and Marmont to send him troops.

To reach Valencia Suchet moved on Murviedro (Saguntum), which had been recently fortified, as had also Valencia. Marching to the aid of Murviedro, Blake met Suchet; but being beaten October 25, the place capitulated. Suchet then marched against Valencia, which, despite Blake's resistance, also capitulated, January 9, 1812, with twenty thousand men.

On his side Soult had won no such easy triumph against Wellington. With Cadiz and Gibraltar on one side, Badajoz on the other, and guerrilla bands all over Andalusia, he had his hands full.

Despite his over-deliberate habit, Wellington could at times act with rapidity and decisiveness. He was convinced that he could get Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz; he had improved the roads between the two, and completed every arrangement for having his siege-trains secretly transported and stored near either place. When Marmont sent ten thousand men to Valencia, and went into cantonments near Salamanca, the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo being reduced to eighteen hundred men, Wellington concluded, despite the rigor of the season, to open a winter campaign. Crossing the Agueda, January 7, 1812, he laid siege to Ciudad Rodrigo, speedily operated breaches in the wall, assaulted and captured the fortress on January 19, at a loss of twelve hundred men and ninety officers, Craufurd among them. The news did not reach Marmont until too late to save the place; and although he assembled at Salamanca, he took no efficient steps to counteract the British success. Ciudad Rodrigo was a marked loss for the French. It should have had a heavier garrison. Leaving the care of the country to Castaños, Wellington transferred the bulk of his army to the Guadiana, and appeared before Badajoz March 16, having already secretly collected all his siege-material at Elvas. He had fifty thousand men, thirty thousand being his best British troops.

In front of Picurina and San Roque, Beresford opened the parallels, March 18, under the enfilading fire of San Christoval, while Hill and Graham headed a covering army to protect the operation from Erlon, who held the road to Cordova, to keep in touch with Soult. The siege work was severe, on account of the weather and delayed supplies, and the commandant, Philipon, had made Badajoz strong — though he lacked munitions. A sally on March 19 was driven back with loss, but the river, overflowed by the incessant rains, carried away the bridges, and at one moment it looked as if the siege must, for the third time, be raised. Leith came up and invested San Christoval and the bridge-head on the right bank. On the night of March 24–25 the Picurina was stormed



Badajoz.

and captured, and Wellington pushed the siege with determination.

Soult, meanwhile, expecting the town to hold out indefinitely, relied on Erlon to help keep open communications with Marmont by way of Medellin; but Hill and Graham forced Erlon into the Sierra Morena. A number of minor operations delayed Soult. Marmont's concentration at Salamanca led Wellington to fear for Ciudad Rodrigo, and induced him to push to an end the siege of Badajoz. Early in April three breaches were practicable, and when Soult advanced from Cordova towards Llerena, time became precious, and the city was stormed, April 5, several columns advancing from different directions. Leith feinted against Pardelaras and San Vincente. The resistance was as heroic as the assault, which lasted many hours; and though that of the main breaches, by Cole's and Craufurd's divisions, failed, with heavy loss, an entrance was effected at San Vincente, and Picton escaladed the castle, taking the breaches in the rear; and, after murderous work on both sides, the allies forced the town, which was pillaged in its worst sense. The British casualties were five thousand men, of which thirty-six hundred in the assault.

Soult joined Erlon, and pushing back Hill and Graham, reached the vicinity, but he was two days late.

Thus the two most important places held by the French at the end of 1811 — Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, the two gates of Portugal — fell to the allies early in 1812. Marmont and Soult had not sufficiently coöperated. Had it not been for Suchet's success, Napoleon would have opened the Russian campaign under marked discouragement. Wellington had abundantly proved his ability to act with vigor when the conditions appeared to him to promise worthy success, and Spain had shown that the French were not unconquerable.

In a raiding operation in May, 1812, Hill broke the bridge over the Tagus at Almaraz, cutting the best road from Andalusia to Madrid. The French had deemed this bridge secure, as it possessed good works on either bank, and was sustained by the fort of Miravoles in a defile on the Truxillo road; but Hill cleverly turned this fort by mountain paths, and surprised the bridge-head May 18; whereupon the garrison of the works on the right bank decamped, and the bridge and magazines were destroyed. After this handsome performance Hill retired to Badajoz, escaping from forces which both Marmont and Soult sent againt him. The bridge at Alcantara Wellington repaired, and the navigation of the Douro and Tagus was improved so as to make an easier line of communications between the allied forces of north and south. On the whole, it was hard to say whether the French or the allies had made the more headway in the Peninsula up to this point.

In 1811 the Russians made great efforts on the Danube against the Turks, and were rewarded by fair success. In July Kutusov drove back the Turks, who attacked Rustchuk, but later crossed to the north bank of the Danube. The Turks followed, and were shortly penned up and besieged in their fortified camp, and their supply train having been captured by a Russian operation on the south bank, the Turkish army surrendered. Peace ensued. It is well, according to the old Roman saying, not to have two wars at once upon your hands; and Napoleon was about to undertake a Russian campaign while the Spanish campaign was in full blast. The war in Turkey had generally been less of a tax on the Russians than that in the Peninsula on the French, and in 1812 it was practically at an end.

Although at this time the greatness of Napoleon seemed still at its height, there were serious symptoms of decline. He had subdued every nation, or was at peace with it, except England; and England herself was feeling ill effects from the war, as well as from the trouble with the United States. Yet those who properly weighed the affairs of Spain, who gauged the restless opposition of Prussia and the questionable friendship of Austria, who valued at their proper figure the attempts of the emperor to carry through plans that ran counter to all the European national instincts, felt that, despite his marvelous power, he was on the eve of failure.

Prussian Tyrolese Company.

XLIX.

THE INVASION OF RUSSIA. 1811 TO JUNE, 1812.

To control England, Napoleon had created his Continental System, which excluded her from European markets, and Russia had maintained it since Tilsit; but Russian good-will grew less, Alexander distrusted Napoleon more, smuggling was rampant, and only force could insure its continuance. The emperor should have himself gone to Spain to finish matters there before undertaking a Russian campaign, but he believed in his lieutenants, and was unwilling to wait. His preparations were enormous, his grasp of the general scheme and the details was extraordinary, but he no longer accurately gauged facts. Austria and Prussia were lukewarm allies, and though suspicious of the other, each furnished a quota. Foreseeing war, Alexander made a treaty with Turkey and raised troops, while England strove to create another Coalition. Napoleon left Paris May 9, the Grand Army being already on the Oder, in eleven corps of over a half million men, fully equipped. In 1807 he had tested the Russian roads, but still believed he could wheel supplies to his moving troops. Alexander collected three armies under Barclay, Bagration and Tormasov, of about a quarter million men, and erected a huge intrenched camp at Drissa. He understood that with a retreating campaign no force could conquer Russia, but had no systematic plan. Napoleon strove to use the Poles without giving them independence. Russia had but three frontier entrances through which she could be invaded from Germany, and until the Dvina-Dnieper line is reached one is not in Russia proper. Each entrance was blocked by troops. The Russian generals disagreed. Chichagov wanted to march up the Danube into Italy, Bagration to hold the Niemen and invade Warsaw, Barclay to defend the frontier. Alexander waited on events. Napoleon advanced on a wide front, to prevent the enemy from guessing his purpose, but proposed to cut Barclay from Bagration. He himself commanded the left, Eugene the centre and Jerome the right. He should have placed Davout on the right: Jerome was no soldier. The Grand Army had long been advancing through Germany, the Austrians and Prussians as flying wings, and on June 24 headquarters was in Kovno. Transportation difficulties were little heeded. The Russians retired from Vilna, burning immense stores, and the French reached it June 28. Jerome's laxness was giving trouble. Napoleon remained too long in Vilna: he would have done better nearer the front. None of his lieutenants was independent, and time was consumed for reports and orders to go to and fro. Matters did not advance, and information was as scant as rations; but owing to the immense theatre, this could not be corrected.

Scant space can be devoted to the political events which led up to the Russian war. These were the outcome of what Napoleon had accomplished in the past, as they were the foundation of his failure in the future; and as elucidating the military narrative during this, his first great year of defeat, they are briefly referred to.

So long as Napoleon could neither influence nor coerce the British cabinet, and the British fleet commanded the seas, so long was he compelled to oppose his island enemy with his Continental System, and to sustain this by arms. The effect of the System was to oppress the English working-classes, though commerce still held itself fairly well; and while finances were in poor condition, and many failures occurred, for its then population English agriculture was better than to-day. Not only this, but the Continental manufactures were damaged, many towns were ruined, merchandise coming by sea was so expensive as to breed discontent, and articles of English commerce entered France with enormous duties.

Napoleon saw no reason why he should not reign thirty years, and during this time consolidate his empire, for he had back of him a strong body of peasantry, to whom he had assured its holdings of land taken from the ancient feudal owners, and a strong bourgeoisie, whose position under the empire was better than before. Meanwhile the terrors resulting from the Revolution had been forgotten.

Napoleon's Code and administration were strong and sound. The quarrels with the pope had not disturbed the ancient faith, education advanced under a good school system, and finances recovered an outwardly prosperous aspect. He had rehabilitated so far as possible the old nobility, and employed many of its members; he had also created a new nobility, hoping to weld the two into one body; but this proved impossible, despite the prominence given to the titles of his marshals and companions in arms. Paris was made the centre of this great empire, which was upheld by nearly a million men under arms, and was decorated with the spoils of all the countries overrun; and yet, despite the grandeur of the Napoleonic court, the new brand was apparent.

Napoleon had really abolished the privileges of feudalism to the great increase of Continental liberty; abuses were far less, and the poor man could see a future before him; yet this huge structure, outwardly so prosperous, did not possess a healthy body. No country so drained of its working element to furnish soldiers could long prosper, and even the army was no longer the splendid force of Austerlitz, while the French body politic had grown so fast that it might disappear in some new crash. The structure of the emperor's creation was not as solid as it had been. The legislative bodies were more under his control, and less real; the judges were not as independent as they had begun by being, and ministers had become mere clerks to register his will. An independent thinker like Talleyrand was removed from office, and a good servant, however full of faults, like Fouché, was shelved. At the top was much that was unhealthy; but the worst feature was the protest of the lower classes against the constantly growing severity of the conscription; and the far-seeing man could divine that the French Empire depended solely on the life of Napoleon.

In addition to the evils of the Continental System, France had annexed what neighboring states did not carry out its terms. It is a question whether any scheme which should make France extend beyond her so-called natural boundaries could be permanent, and France was striving to overrun Spain, had taken Italy and added to it the Roman states and the Illyrian provinces; she had extended her boundaries along the North Sea and Baltic to a point east of Berlin; she had practically annexed western Germany under the name of Confederation of the Rhine, as well as Switzerland, and had recreated Poland, while the so-called kingdom of Naples was a mere suburb of France. It was only a question of time when this great dream must dissolve. It trenched upon the rights of races.

Next to England, Russia was hardest to control; and her good-will was unfortunately slipping away. Alexander had been more frank at Tilsit than Napoleon, and had better kept faith since, but the treaty was outworn; and when Russia ceased adherence to its terms, the Continental System was bound to break down. That Napoleon intended to recreate Poland as a means of controlling Russia, the treaty of Vienna proved; and to this threat was added the hardship on a grain-growing people, which under the System could not export its chief product.

Napoleon had thus overrun all Europe, except Russia and Great Britain. He could not expect to conquer and control the land of the czar; but he believed that he could force Russia to keep out of European politics by creating a new Poland as a buffer-state for his Austrian and Prussian allies. According to him, Russia had demanded that France should guarantee that the Kingdom of Poland should never be reëstablished — in its nature an impossible thing; and Poland could be peacefully rehabilitated only by ceding to Russia and Austria valuable provinces, a thing Napoleon was not willing to do.

The warmest relations had existed between France and Russia. In fact, the emperor, in May, 1808, wrote to Berthier that too much heed had been paid to Russian requests; but as smuggling grew, amity gave place to irritation, for Napoleon insisted on his System as an article of faith. "The decrees establishing the Continental System are fundamental laws, having their origin in the nature of things," he said. "If English commerce triumphs on the sea, it is because the English are strongest there. It is, however, probable, inasmuch as France is strongest on land, that she can there cause her commerce to triumph; without which all is lost."

The negotiations for a Russian princess as Empress of the French had neither been conducted with diplomatic complaisance, nor to a happy issue; and when Napoleon dispossessed the Duke of Oldenburg, the czar's brother-in-law, he upset even the temperate mind of Alexander. Not because of this, but just a month afterwards, was issued the czar's ukase of December 31, 1810, which was in effect a declaration of independence, and in European courts portended a growing hostility to France and friendliness to England. What France had gained in the Austrian alliance was more than lost in Russian disaffection, and it was not long after Wagram that the emperor foresaw the inevitable clash.

The Tilsit status should have been maintained to give Napoleon time himself to finish the Spanish war; but he feared that in such an interval Russia would tamper with north Germany, or England with St. Petersburg, Berlin, or Vienna. On the other hand, Prussia had proposed an alliance; Austria was by marriage tied to France; Sweden, despite Bernadotte's ill-will, could, the emperor thought, be pacified by helping her to regain Finland; Turkey's peace with Russia had not yet come to a head. To delay with Russia was dangerous; and Napoleon was loth to go to Spain. Diplomacy seemed to retain him in Paris, and he never ceased to believe that the Spanish war would wear itself out. The difficult conditions in Spain would require many months, even for him, to close the war; and what might meanwhile happen elsewhere? Had he gone to Spain, with the forces he could have placed there, England would no doubt have been compelled to leave the Peninsula; once driven out, she could not have again regained her footing there; and meanwhile no great harm would probably have happened. But Napoleon decided that Spain could wait rather than Russia; Wellington had for years been cautious, had generally maintained the defensive, and Napoleon underrated him.

There lacked not prominent Frenchmen to decry a Russian campaign, and, with Charles XII. as an example, to show that Russia could not be brought to terms, should she conduct a retreating campaign. Others approved both the project and the time. Napoleon weighed both opinions, but consulted only himself. He had studied all the pros and cons; but years of success in overcoming difficulties as they arose had led him into the habit of less closely gauging them. He deemed it certain that Russia would give way long before he reached St. Petersburg or Moscow; and that he could march so far, he never doubted. At least he was willing to take the risk. His failures on the difficult theatres of Egypt and Syria had been obliterated by recent successes, and he believed the Russians would again fight a general battle near their own frontier. Could he but win another Austerlitz on the Russian steppes, would not all Europe be at his feet? The chances seemed to him more favorable than in 1807, when Austria might have fallen on his rear, and have roused Prussia to fresh resistance; for in this campaign he had, from a military standpoint, the right to count on both Prussia and Austria as being helpful; and he overrated Poland.

Of cabals at home Napoleon had no fear: he could govern France from his Russian headquarters as securely as in Paris.

Though France had already furnished her best blood, yet men were still to be had; England would be kept busy in Spain; Austria and Prussia would each furnish a strong corps as a hostage; victual was in plenty, for Russia and Poland had for years not marketed their surplus grain, and Prussia could pay her indemnities in breadstuff; beeves roamed in droves in Galicia; and a well-operated supply-train, organized in battalions, had already been created. The worst that could happen was to fail and retire intact to the Vistula. Napoleon had gauged everything properly except the transport of supplies; in his account he falsely weighed the Russian soil and the Russian roads; and he had forgotten the difficulties of 1807.

Napoleon would have preferred peace on his own terms.

On April 2, 1811, he wrote the King of Wurtemberg, "I believe and I hope, as does Your Majesty, that Russia will not make war." Yet "the King of Prussia let things go to war when war was far. . . . It was the same with the Emperor of Austria. . . . I am not far from thinking that the same thing will happen to the Emperor Alexander. This prince is already far from the spirit of Tilsit. All the ideas of war come from Russia. If the emperor wishes war, the direction of public spirit conforms to his intentions. If he does not want it, and does not promptly stop this impulsion, he will be drawn into it next year in his own default, and thus war will take place despite him, despite me, despite the interests of France and those of Russia. . . . All this is a scene of the Opera, and it is the English who run the machines. . . . Why should I make war? Would it be to reëstablish Poland? I could have done it after Tilsit, after Vienna, this year, even. I am too good a tactician to have given up such easy opportunities. Therefore I do not wish it. Finally, I have the war of Spain and Portugal . . . which occupies enough men and means. I cannot wish another war. . . . Shall we keep peace? I yet hope we shall, but it is necessary to arm."

On April 5, 1811, through the Minister of Foreign Relations, he instructed Lauriston, in St. Petersburg, to talk clearly with the czar, and to say that the emperor "would not make war for Poland . . . that he would not make war except in case Russia, tearing the Treaty of Tilsit, should make peace with England." And next day he wrote in the same vein to Alexander: "Monsieur my Brother, as soon as I learned . . . that the choice of Count Lauriston was agreeable to Your Imperial Majesty, I gave him an order to leave. I do not send to Your Majesty a man perfected in affairs, but a man true and straight, like the sentiments I bear you. And yet I receive, daily, news from Russia which is not pacific. . . . For me, I shall remain the friend of the person of Your Majesty even if the fatality which is dragging Europe should one day put arms in the hands of our two nations. . . . I shall never attack, and my troops will not advance until Your Majesty shall have torn the Treaty of Tilsit."

Inasmuch, however, as the language of diplomacy is a lying tongue, and the emperor was no exception to the rule of that day, it will not do to lay too great stress on his utterances thus made. Some of his less official sayings have more weight.

That by his abnormal triumphs Napoleon had lost that hard hold on fact which in earlier life distinguished him from all other men, is unquestionably true. Facts, as the common assertion runs, may no longer have meant to him what they were, but what his imagination desired them to be. Yet it is easy to go too far in this direction; for by taking here and there from Napoleon's voluminous correspondence letters supporting any given theory, one might prove that the emperor had quite lost his balance. From Bayonne, for instance, on July 17, 1808, he wrote the Imperial Librarian: "The emperor also desires that Monsieur Barbier will occupy himself with the following work, with one of our best geographers: get up memoirs on the campaigns which have taken place on the Euphrates, and against the Parthians, beginning with that of Crassus up to the eighth century, including those of Antony, Trajan, Julian, etc., tracing on maps of a convenient size the road followed by each army, with the ancient and new names of the countries and the principal towns, and geographical remarks about the territory, and historical narratives of each expedition, taken from the original authors." And yet this letter does not prove, as has been asserted, that the emperor was contemplating an attack on the British possessions in India. It rather proves that he was anxious to learn how the ancient leaders conducted operations in campaigns over a vast territory. Evidence of this kind may be carefully weighed, but must not be exaggerated. The words that Constant puts into the mouth of the dying Lannes have been used to prove Napoleon's boundless ambition, which many believed would lead him to eventual ruin. Marmont tells us that shortly after Wagram, Decrés, Minister of the Navy, said: "The emperor is mad, completely mad, and will destroy us all; all this will end in a horrible crash." These quotations contain truth, but too much weight must not be given them. So far as any dared, Napoleon had plenty of people about him to hold him back, but he never wavered in his faith in his destiny: "I feel myself driven towards a goal which I do not know," Ségur quotes him as saying; "when I shall have reached it, so soon as I shall be no longer useful to this end, an atom will suffice to throw me down; until then, all the efforts of men can have no effect against me." Nor would he listen, as he had used to do, to those who told him facts which did not chime with his preconceptions; even to Davout, who sent him a report made by Rapp with regard to an English pamphlet on Portugal, the emperor wrote, December 2, 1811: "I beg you not to put such rhapsodies under my eyes. My time is too precious for me to lose it in occupying myself with such twaddle."

It is true that Napoleon misinterpreted more things than formerly; and that he leaned less on actuality. But it will not do to assert that he was drawn on solely by belief in his destiny, or his love of gigantic conflict. This may in part be true; but for all that, his military skill was fully tested in

1812, and his preparations for the struggle with the Russians were in the highest degree sane. Had he used his opportunities in 1812 with the judgment and energy of 1805, the armies of Barclay and Bagration would have been destroyed in July, and a glorious peace have ended the operations before the Grand Army had reached Smolensk. Indeed, had he arrested his advance here for the winter, he might eventually have won. It is not so much a fact that Napoleon undertook too gigantic a task for his power at its best, as it is that he did not show in its doing his ancient power of body and character. It is equally unsafe to draw too broad a conclusion from Napoleon's weaknesses, for though it is not within human powers to remain unspoiled by such abnormal successes as he had won, yet, up to July, 1815, he continued to be the greatest man by far in Europe.

Meanwhile the master's eye was on everything, civil and military. The diligence and care of detail shown by the Correspondence can be appreciated only by reading several of these amazing volumes, although they cover but a small part of the emperor's daily work. As a rule, the man who writes much, acts little; or conversely, the man who is great in action has little time to write. But Napoleon did both.

At the risk of surplusage, a few items are now and then quoted, all tending to show how carefully this master of war laid the foundations of his success. These are but samples of thousands, and help to illustrate the organization and status of the Grand Army.

On July 23, 1811, he complains to Lacuée of badly made saddles, with short skirts and ill stuffed : "Hold back payments from the contractor culpable of fraud. I disburse much money, I pay promptly, I intend that contractors shall deliver good things. I should prefer to have nothing than to have bad things." On August 27 the emperor sends Mortier three sample shirts : "They only cost 4 francs 7 sous. They seem to me much finer than those of the Dutch, which cost 6 francs 10 sous. . . . Make me a report on this." And so with hundreds of details.

Despite his autocratic power, the emperor apparently could not control the army contractors. He wrote on November 12 to Lacuée: "In the visit I have made to the different corps of the army, I have found that the troops were better clad than in the Revolution, . . . but I have been far from satisfied with them, in view of the enormous sums which they cost me. . . . Generally speaking, the cloths are bad, and the shakos are of bad quality; or sometimes they are of good quality, but badly made up. It is the same with the knapsacks. No reproaches can be made to the corps, because they answer to everything that 'the Administration of War has sent them.' As to the cloths, the greatest portion that I have seen are much worse than that which I have observed in regiments which bought them themselves." On November 14 he wrote Clarke "to issue a circular to the different majors to make them responsible for the supplies received by the regiments . . . so that they will have nothing to allege whenever the regiments are in a bad condition. That the supplies cost His Majesty a great deal, and that the payments are promptly made; that the supplies then should be of good quality and excellent for service."

On November 30 Napoleon wrote Berthier to see that the regimental flags bore only the names of battles in which the regiments actually took part: "I give but one flag for an infantry regiment, one for a cavalry regiment, one for an artillery regiment, one for a gendarme regiment, none to departmental companies, or Guards of Honor, or otherwise. No one is to have an eagle that has not been received from the hands of the emperor. Every other corps is to carry a banner." On January 14, 1812, Clarke was ordered to see that the eagles should be made handsome, and that the standards attached to the eagles should be inscribed with all the battles. That the battalion banner was to be made simply, so that in case it fell into the hands of the enemy it would not appear of much value.

On November 30 the emperor wrote Berthier to make a narrative of the campaigns of Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Eggmühl and Wagram. "It is necessary that you should busy yourself without stopping with this duty . . . without which nothing will remain of these campaigns." He then ordered him to edit the Bulletins so that they should be a proper army diary, with the errors corrected, and with suitable vouchers, showing day by day where each corps was and what it did.

Beyond this Berthier was to begin a more serious work on the campaigns of the Grand Army.

On December 2 Napoleon wrote Davout that the Germans were complaining that the marshal had said at Rostock that he would know "how to prevent Germany from becoming a Spain, and that so long as he commanded there, they would dare undertake nothing." "There is nothing in common between Spain and the German provinces," said the emperor. "Spain would have been reduced long ago without her sixty thousand English, without her thousand leagues of coast. . . . But in Germany there is nothing to fear, even were the Germans as lazy, slothful, murderous, superstitious, and as much given over to monks as the people of Spain. . . . Judge, then, how much there is to fear from a people so well behaved, so reasonable, so cold, so tolerant, so far from all excesses, that there is not one instance of a man being assassinated in Germany during the war. It is annoying . . . to circulate in the country comparisons which can only do harm." Yet Napoleon had misunderstood the German character: he had cowed but not broken it, and it was soon to turn on him with double fury.

On August 31 he wrote Lacuée: "The bread distributed to the troops at Boulogne is very bad. Take measures to remedy this abuse." On the same date to Decrés against employing sailors as servants, while the pay and rations of these men were charged up as if on duty, and on October 7 to Decrés about a navy paymaster who was occupying Marshal Soult's house in Utrecht, while Ney was lodged in the citadel, like a captain: "You do not treat my marshals right. This is not the way to give them consideration and attach them to the service. There is no choice to make between the Marshals of the Empire and the employees of finance."

On October 30 he wrote Davout, ordering the young soldiers to have fire drill: "It is very important that the soldiers should do target firing;" and November 1 about fifty young soldiers illegally imprisoned in Wesel, ordering their cases to be at once examined. On November 3 he wrote Cambacérès, complaining that the prefects of provinces had guards of honor and gave the rank and uniform of colonels to the commanders, and stating that this must be regulated.

It seems that Davout had taken into his staff some officers who had served in Austria, probably in the notion that they would be more useful. On November 30 Napoleon wrote him: "I am entirely opposed to your idea. . . . Leave those men in the regiments where I placed them. I will have in the staff only men who since 1789 have not quitted the French flag." On December 16 Eugene, whose troops had the longest distance to march to join the army, was ordered to see that they started with a pair of shoes on the feet, two pairs in their knapsack and one or two pairs in the train. "By this means one can hope that they will arrive on the Vistula with two pairs in the knapsack and one pair on their feet."

And the following has peculiar interest: —

On January 6, 1812, he indicated to Davout the desirability of the heavy cavalry learning to manœuvre on foot, "so that if they found themselves in a village, and dismounted to file through it, they would know how to work together." He had also discovered that the cavalry should be armed with a good carrying carbine or musket, and had written Clarke November 12: "I cannot accustom myself to see . . . men *d'élite*, who in an insurrection or a surprise of light troops could be carried off by a partisan, or in a march stopped by a few bad sharpshooters behind a brook or a house. That is absurd. My intention is that each man shall have a gun. Let it be a very short musketoon carried in the most convenient way by the cuirassier. I care little about that." "War is composed of unforeseen events. It is to have small ideas of it to suppose that . . . heavy cavalry can always be kept in such a manner as to be covered." What we soldiers of the second half of the nineteenth century think that we originated, Napoleon, though no man dealt more in massed cavalry charges, or pinned his faith more fully on their momentum, had discovered, viz.: that two pistols did not suffice, that every mounted man must have a firearm which would carry to a distance, and that he must know how to fight on foot. Dragoons were not the only mounted infantry.

In 1811, while Napoleon was making his Russian preparations, although Austria and Prussia privately leaned to the side of the czar, with the fear that the brunt of the struggle would fall upon the fatherland, each chose a temporizing policy. It was only after the campaign of 1812, which proved to both that future wars against Napoleon would be waged on other territory, that these countries were willing to act together. Napoleon's rise to power was due, primarily, to his astonishing military skill, secondarily to the fact that each of his enemies, until after 1812, in seeking his own purpose was afraid of his neighbor. England had constantly preached the common cause, but the Continental coalitions were broken up by mutual jealousies. During 1811–12, both Prussia and Austria would have been glad to join Russia, but each was afraid of the other's staunchness. The Prime Ministers, Hardenberg and Metternich (the latter of whom distrusted the Russian Chancellor, Rumantzov), were fully agreed as to the desirability of acting in concert, but each in a way suspected the other. Austria was still strong; but Prussia had been ground down at Jena; since then she had fed enormous French armies, had had her fortresses occupied, and her army limited to forty-two thousand men. Her king was not a strong man, and had it not been for the wonderful reforms of Stein and Scharnhorst, she could not have arisen from her ashes, as she did in 1813. Because Austria and Prussia could not coöperate, the Russian campaign became possible.

In February, 1812, a treaty was made by Napoleon with Prussia, and the land of Frederick paid the uttermost farthing of the debt she had incurred by her vacillating policy toward France from the opening of the Revolution. Austria could scarcely refuse an alliance when it was suggested. Metternich, who had been much in Paris, had gauged the emperor well, and early in 1811 reported to Francis that a Russian war was certain; but although England exerted her influence on Austria, the latter saw no outlet except to join France, while doing a minimum of harm to Russia. Schwartzenberg, Austrian ambassador to Paris, believed in the French alliance. Napoleon could not invade Russia unless Austria, which would lie on his flank, were his ally. Metternich, knowing that if Poland was reconstituted, Napoleon would want to add Galicia to that kingdom, made a claim that, should this occur, Austria should be indemnified in Illyria, which was more valuable; this was in a way recognized, and by treaty in March, 1812, Austria agreed to furnish thirty thousand men, to act in a separate body under Napoleon's general direction, and to make war upon Russia only; and this force assembled at Lemberg by the middle of May. Archduke Charles having refused the command, it fell to Schwartzenberg. The secret conditions were, however, such that Austria scarcely considered herself at war with Russia.

In the lukewarm aid of Prussia and Austria lay one reason for the failure of the coming campaign, in the status of Poland another. While Napoleon was ready to use the Poles in any helpful way without binding himself, they were counting on him for the restoration of their kingdom. Napoleon sent to Poland his own agent, de Pradt, and his scheme for reëstablishing the ancient kingdom reads like the previously prepared minutes of a primary meeting. He proposed to have things all his own way. As de Pradt said, Napoleon "never saw in man anything but projectiles made to be launched against his enemies."

Alexander meanwhile, who, though deprecating war, was ready to engage in it rather than to yield any further to Napoleon, said and did little. It had been agreed at Tilsit that Russia might conquer Finland and the provinces of the Danube. The former had been done in 1809. Sweden was weakened by Denmark owning Norway, and her hold of part of Pomerania did not add to her strength. So soon as Bernadotte deemed Sweden's interests to be anti-French, he took that direction, and soon sought Russian help to subject Norway; and when in April, 1812, Napoleon seized Swedish Pomerania, the ground for quarrel was complete. Bernadotte scarcely believed Alexander as staunch as he was; and, uncertain whether he could rely upon the Russians, he also made overtures to England.

Having got Finland, Russia had turned on Turkey. The Russian armies overran Wallachia and Moldavia, and frightened Austria as well as France by approaching the mouths of the Danube. When war with France began to loom up, Alexander saw that he must make peace with Turkey, and in May, 1812, he concluded a hasty treaty at Bucharest, retaining but a small part of his conquests. So dilatory, however, was the action of Turkey, that even at the beginning of August Chichagov was still at Bucharest, just starting his army northward, and was not on hand to help resist the first French advance.

Early in 1812 England and Russia began to draw together, and in midsummer Cathcart started for Russia as ambassador.

Meanwhile a war footing had long been in preparation. On April 20, 1811, in a letter to Clarke, Napoleon directed the organization of the "Army of Germany," and —

On May 7 he wrote Davout: "My Cousin, all the news that is received from Russia is full of protestations by the Emperor Alexander for the continuance of peace and of the alliance. Nothing leads me, then, to think that Russia has the will to commence hostilities. However this may be, all preparations to put your army corps in condition, instead of being slowed should be continued." This letter shows how Napoleon's ideas as to the size of armies had grown. "If your regiments had in line six battalions, that would make a fine brigade, which would allow the composition of your sixteen regiments and the three you are organizing . . . into six fine divisions, each division with three brigades, and each brigade with six battalions. That would make one hundred and eight battalions, or nearly ninety thousand men. That would really be an army."

On June 23 he wrote Clarke: "During the course of July, August and September, all the companies of infantry will be put at full strength of one hundred and forty men, excluding sick, by sending to them refractory conscripts, who will be drawn from Walcheren and other depots. The Observation Corps of the Elbe alone will form an army of six infantry divisions, four brigades of light cavalry, and four divisions of heavy cavalry, making a total, including artillery, of one hundred and twenty thousand men, independently of what is used for the garrisons of Danzig, Stettin, Cüstrin and Glogau. The army of the King of Saxony is ready to move, twenty thousand infantry and four thousand horse strong. The army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw has twenty-four thousand men of infantry and ten thousand cavalry. The army of Westphalia has twelve thousand men of infantry and three thousand of cavalry. In case anything happens, all the troops will be under the orders of Davout. Thus there are assembled at this moment under his command one hundred and forty-five thousand infantry, forty thousand cavalry, fifteen thousand artillery, total two hundred thousand men. . . . There is nothing urgent, but my intention is that should anything extraordinary happen, this corps, in twenty-four hours, is to start and move to the Vistula."

Here we have the wonderful spectacle of an army of two hundred thousand men under a lieutenant. The days had indeed changed since the Great Captain had won Rivoli with twenty-two thousand men.

Each and all of the details of the service passed under Napoleon's eye.

On June 23 he wrote Davout, who still remained in Hamburg: "My Cousin, so large a quantity of horses has been bought in France, as much for Spain as to remount the corps of the interior, that France is exhausted of horses. You must seriously work to make purchases in Hanover, Mecklenburg and Holstein." And on July 7 he wrote that he noticed sergeants and corporals of less than two years' service. These men were all to be sent back to the ranks, and to be replaced by sub-officers from Fontainebleau, or by men drawn from old regiments. And again, July 20: "Watch closely so that no sergeant or corporal shall be made who has not been at Wagram, that is to say, who has not seen war. . . . It is ridiculous to see colonels make sergeants out of soldiers of six months."

So far there had been no breach with Russia. There had been vague complaints and explanations; each monarch dreaded a rupture. Alexander complained of the increase of Polish territory, Napoleon of infractions of the Treaty of Tilsit. On the face of things the Continental System was beginning to bear fruit, and from Napoleon's standpoint it was the moment all the more stringently to enforce it. If Russia would not do so in good faith, Napoleon could see naught but war; for should Russia act with England, a worse contest must ensue. He was in no mood to abate jot or tittle of his requirements; and it was because smuggling went on in Pomerania, especially at Stralsund, that he had, in January, 1812, occupied this Swedish territory. This aggression, the heavy increase of the garrisons of Danzig, Stettin, Cüstrin and Glogau, and especially the alliances with Prussia and Austria, demonstrated to Alexander that war was certain. Yet Napoleon made one more effort to get what he wished without war, and sent Colonel Chernishev, one of Alexander's aides, who had long been in Paris, with a pacific mission, agreeing to add no more territory to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and to give indemnities for recent seizures; but with scant faith left in Napoleon's promises, Alexander deliberated some weeks.

A final effort was made to bring about an understanding with England. During 1811 Napoleon had considered an attack on Ireland or England, going so far as to plan for three hundred ships to carry forty-thousand men across the Channel. "Nothing more easy," said he, "than to destroy the navy yard at Chatham." This attack, however, did not argue an intention to give up the struggle against Russia, so much as it did a desire to divert the attention of Great Britain from the Peninsula. England had been desirous of peace, but she has never claimed much less than the lion's share, and in any peace she expected to have her own way. Many Englishmen appreciated the good bred of the French Revolution, but the British character was not one to be overridden by even a Napoleon, and England confided in her naval strength and insular safety. Napoleon never gauged England at her true worth. In working out results of the Revolution, his gigantic imagination created too big a scheme. Even had England been quite reasonable, as she was not, the maintenance of the Treaty of Amiens or of any later peace, until one or other had been crushed, was practically impossible. Once roused, it is hard to quiet British antagonism; Napoleon was equally uncompromising, and the "irrepressible conflict" between Gaul and Briton was bound to go on.

England's policy had been to create and maintain a coalition against France which would hang together, and in a minor way, this was Wellington's policy in the Peninsula. If the conflict was kept up until all Napoleon's enemies would hold together, the Napoleonic scheme could be crushed. Extravagant in her outlay of men and money at sea, England has always been parsimonious in sending land troops to the Continent; but at this time she paid enormous bills for the troops of other nations. Had the sea controlled the Continent, England would have sooner triumphed, but in the end the sea did its full share. If we cannot blame England for opposing the Continental System, neither can we blame Napoleon for clinging to it. England had merely met a man of transcendent ability and equal doggedness. Within his limits Napoleon did his best to avoid war, and on April 17, 1812, he yet again made overtures for peace, on the basis of the independence and integrity of Spain under the existing dynasty, the rehabilitation of Portugal under its old rulers, Murat to keep Naples, the Bourbons Sicily, the rest to stay on the basis of "let him keep who can." In a way he cared little who was monarch in Madrid. But the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz encouraged the British and made this proposal unsatisfactory; and towards the end of April both Russia and England declined to treat.

Napoleon left Paris May 9 for Dresden. He gave no official notice of a great campaign, though everybody knew the facts, until the 1st Bulletin of the Grand Army, of June 20, was published in France two weeks later. The people accepted blindly whatever he saw fit to order, and as the war would not be on the soil of France, and meant probably new triumphs, there was little open comment.

According to universal testimony, after his hard work in preparing for the war, the emperor was peculiarly cheerful and confident. In Dresden he gave audience to the rulers of Austria, Prussia and other allied potentates, who willingly or unwillingly were about to fight his battles. By nature keen at gauging values, he was not now abreast of the real restlessness of all, and the hatred of some, of those who formally bowed to his will. Almost the only reliable ally was the King of Saxony, who had full compensation in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.

The army was already on the Oder. As a last mission to Alexander in May, through the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, remained fruitless, and Bernadotte demanded too much for his coöperation, Napoleon contented himself with the allies he had, and left Dresden May 29 for headquarters at Thorn, on the Vistula. Poland was ready to second him; but the Turks, who had formerly proposed a diversion on Russian territory, were already making peace.

Preparations were complete. In June, 1811, two hundred thousand effective had already stood in Germany, and for months the so-called Observation Corps of the Elbe, of the Rhine and of Italy, in reality large armies, had been afoot. No detail with regard to this force escaped Napoleon's eye; and his power to organize was as superlative as his power to direct on the battlefield. He had studied the new theatre he was about to enter. His librarian, Barbier, had collected books and maps exhibiting eastern Russia in detail, and such histories of Charles XII.'s campaigns as could be had. "The emperor demands a history of Courland and everything which can be found, historical, geographical and topographical, about Riga, Livonia, etc.," his secretary wrote Barbier, January 7, 1812.

With maps of Russia proper Napoleon was less well equipped. The Russian government had recently completed a map of the empire, on a scale of about eight miles to an inch, and a copy had reached his hands. From St. Cloud, November 25, he wrote Berthier: "I have a very fine map brought in from Russia. It will be necessary for you to procure yourself a similar one." Defective in many ways, this map was none the less of the greatest use: nothing procurable in any other fashion could have done as much. Yet on July 7 Davout complained that he had but seven maps in his corps, and was obliged to make, for the light infantry officers, sketches which there was no time to prepare properly.

On the 3d of March the Grand Army ready for the invasion of Russia was thus organized: —

	The Emperor, and his Chief of Staff, Berthier.	
Headquarters and Staff.		4,000 men.
The Guard.	Old : Lefebvre. Young: Mortier.	
Div. Cdrs.	Delaborde, Roguet, Claparède, Curial.	
	Cavalry, Bessières.	
Div. Cdrs.	Walther, Grenadiers ; Guyot, Chasseurs ; St. Sulpice, Dragoons.	
	Durosnel, Guard ; Colbert and Krasinski, Light Horse. Artillery, Sorbier.	47,000 "

Corps		No.	
I.	Davout	Div. 1 Morand.	
		" 2 Friant.	
		" 3 Gudin.	
		" 4 Dessaix.	
		" 5 Compans.	
	Light Cav., Pajol, Bourdesolles.		72,000 "

Corps		No.		
II. Oudinot.	Div.	6	Legrand.	
	"	8	Verdier.	
	"	9	Merle (Swiss).	
Light Cav., Corbineau, Castex, Doumerc.				37,000 men.
III. Ney.	Div.	10	Ledru.	
	"	11	Razout.	
	"	25	Crown Prince (Wurts).	
Light Cav., Mouriez.				39,000 "
IV. Eugene (Junot 2d).			Lecchi (Roy. Gd.).	
	Div.	13	Delzons.	
	"	14	Broussier.	
	"	15	Pino (Ital.).	
Light Cav., Guyon, Villatte.				45,000 "
V. Poniatowski.	Div.	16	Zayonchek (Pol.).	
	"	17	Dombrovski (").	
	"	18	Kamieniki.	36,000 "
VI. Gouvion St. Cyr.	"	19	Deroy.	
	"	20	Wrede.	
Light Cav., Preysing.				25,000 "
VII. Reynier.	Div.	21	Lecoq (Sax).	
	"	22	Funck (").	
Light Cav., Gablenz, Thielemann.				17,000 "
VIII. Vandamme.	Div.	23	Tharreau (Hes.).	
	"	24	Ochs (Westph.).	
Light Cav., Hammerstein.				18,000 "
IX. Victor.	Div.	12	Partounneaux.	
	"	26	Daendels (Ger.).	
(came up later)	"	28	Girard (Ger. Pol.).	
Light Cav., Fournier.				33,000 "
X. Macdonald.	Div.	7	Grandjean.	
			Gräwert — later Yorck (Prus.).	32,000 "
Aust. Auxs. Schwartzenberg.			Trautenberg.	
			Bianchi.	
			Siegenthal.	
			Frimont.	30,000 "

Cavalry Reserve.		
Murat	1 Corps Nansouty.	12,000 men.
(Belliard,	2 " Montbrun.	10,000 "
Ch. St.).	3 Grouchy.	10,000 "
	4 Latour-Maubourg (Sax. Pol.).	8,000 "
	Total,	475,000 "
XI. Corps, Augereau.	Div. 30 Heudelet.	
In reserve.	" 31 Lagrange.	
	" 32 Durutte.	
	" 33 Destrées.	
Cavalry Cavaignac.	" 34 Morand.	47,000 "

The divisions of Durutte, 16,000, and Loison 13,000, plus 65,000 unattached men, joined the Grand Army as reinforcements during the campaign.

On August 1, from the notebook of the emperor, there appear to have been, as aides of the Chief of Staff, 1 gen'l, 1 adjt com^{t}, 2 cols, 3 majs, 6 capts, 2 war coms, and several other officers. In the General Staff were also 3 gen's of division, 19 gen's of brigade, 15 adjts com^{t}, 1 col, 21 majs, 30 capts, 14 geog. eng's, 3 offs. of gendarmes. Commanding towns within the domain and on the communications of the army, were 17 gens and 4 lesser officers. At headquarters, 9 admin. off's. The General Administration had 9 aides, 23 war com's and 9 ass^{ts}, 3 review inspectors. The Hospital Service had 47 assts and 5 com's. The General Staff of the artillery had 13 aides, from gen's to capt's, 18 officers with the great park, 13 with the bridge equipage, and 10 with the siege equipage. The General Staff of engineers had 10 officers from col's down, and 4 in charge of the engineering park.

In the 1st Corps, Davout had 50 officers, from gen's to com's of war, attached to his staff. The other corps was similarly equipped. In the divisions, Morand, *e. g.*, had in his several brigades 16 staff officers. This average held good generally.

On June 25, Davout was equipped with guns and ammunition, as follows: —

	In Divs.	In Res.		In Divs.	In Res.	In Park.
12 pdr. guns.		12	caissons		54	18
6 " "	50		and other	75		38
3 " "	64		wagons.	95		8
6 in. mortars.		4			12	8

	In Divs.	In Res.		In Divs.	In Res.	In Park.
5 in. mortars.	20			40		40
			Inf. caissons.	147		40
12 pdr. ball cartridges.					2,400	1,000
6 " " "				9,000		4,400
3 " " "				20,000		1,800
6-in. mortar "					600	4,000
5 " " "				2,400		2,200
Sundry "				5,000	500	1,300
Infantry "				5,500,000		750,000

The other corps were similarly equipped.

There followed the Grand Army twelve hundred guns (two hundred came up later), three thousand caissons and artillery wagons, six pontoon-equipages, and four thousand commissary wagons, outside the regimental supply. All told, twenty thousand vehicles formed part of the army.

According to the morning reports on file in the War Ministry, the numbers on the dates given were about as below: —

June	25	Davout	70,000	men	11,000	horses	150	guns.
June	1	Oudinot	40,000	"	10,000	"	104	"
July	1	Ney	34,000	"	7,000	"	72	"
July	1	Eugene	46,000	"	10,000	"	116	"
July	16	Poniatowski	33,000	"	9,000	"	48	"
June	30	St. Cyr	23,500	"	4,000	"	58	"
June	30	Reynier	19,500	"	7,000	"	50	"
June	25	Vandamme	17,000	"	2,500	"	34	"
August	30	Victor	25,000	"	4,000	"	42	"
July	1	Macdonald	28,000	"	4,500	"	74	"
July	4	Schwartzenberg	35,000	"	13,000	"		
July		Murat	34,000	"	34,000	"		
July	31	Guard					78	"

Any one familiar with morning reports knows how infinitely varied is their manner of making. The difference between present for duty and aggregate is a great percentage, and between them is room for much honest variation.

Chambray gives the total who crossed the frontiers of Russia as five hundred and thirty-three thousand infantry, ninety-six thousand cavalry, and twelve hundred and forty-two guns. There were one hundred and eighty thousand horses. Even some of the figures from the French archives are not considered accurate. "Situations" are often carelessly made. But the numbers given will serve.

Transportation was organized on the largest scale, and artisans of all kinds accompanied the army. On December 31, 1811, Napoleon wrote Maret: "I should not be disinclined to organize a battalion of military transportation like those in France. Could one get, in Warsaw, horses, harness and wagons? In how many months could these wagons be made? Would the Grand Duchy furnish the men? How much would it cost? This would have to be done under the color of the Grand Duchy, so as to save appearances." Bignon was also ordered to find out all about army subsistence, and to see what could be done to organize a transport service from Thorn, Plotsk, Warsaw and Zamosc on various points. Davout was ordered to arrange with Poniatowski to organize military transports such as was done in the Friedland campaign: "I suppose that wheat and oats will be in abundance this year," said the emperor. Nothing was neglected, and indeed had Napoleon not forgotten his first Russian campaign, and the fact that there are no roads worthy the name in Russia, he would have better succeeded in his victualing. No known source, and no known manner in which breadstuffs, wine and brandy could be gathered, was left untried: contributions came from everywhere. But with the marching columns were later too many wagons, and far too many servants. This was in part necessary in that food was not easy to procure, and officers were allowed a carriage apiece to carry rations. More women were permitted in camp than should have been. The general staff was so enormous that Napoleon in person moved with a smaller body he called "Little Headquarters" — the entire headquarters equaling a division. At the very outset it seemed as if the impedimenta would destroy the expedition. Still, had Napoleon been able to bring on a battle near the frontier, or had he kept within his first plan and not gone beyond Smolensk in 1812, there would have been no failure in the sense of what actually did happen.

In the Grand Army the battalions were supposed to have an average of eight hundred men, but by irregularity in furnishing troops, and later the attrition of service, this number fast dwindled. In the cavalry arm more than half the men were French, in the artillery nearly three fourths were so; but of the whole infantry more than half were non-French. Of this enormous number of foreigners, about a fifth were Italians, and the others were half Germans, half Poles; and there were Swiss, Spanish, Portuguese, Croat and Illyrian battalions. The contingents of Prussia and Austria operated by themselves, on either wing. It would seem as if so heterogeneous a mass could not be held together, but soldiers are soldiers, and discipline is discipline, and once launched on a campaign, the men in the ranks will, under good leadership, go ahead, whatever their nationality. The French element was enough to leaven the lump, and though there had been trouble for years with "refractories," for absconding conscripts had been hunted down all over France, there was none with the bulk of the army during the campaign. Macdonald wrote Maret that his third battalion men fought as well as the others. No part of the Russian failure can be traced to the unwillingness of the men to do their duty, although this was not quite true of some of the marshals and higher officers, nearly all of whom were weary of war and anxious for rest.

In addition to his personal surroundings and numberless minor aides and officials, Napoleon had among his executives: Berthier, Chief of Staff; Generals Lebrun, Mouton, Durosnel, Hogendorp, Rapp, aides-de-camp; Dumas, Intendant (quartermaster and commissary) General; Lariboissière, commanding artillery; Chasseloup, engineers; Eblé, pontoons; Sanson, topographical engineers; Degenettes, chief of medical service; Daru, Secretary of State; Maret, Minister of Foreign Relations; Caulaincourt, Grand Equerry and commander of great headquarters; Duroc, Grand Marshal; Méneval and Fain, private secretaries; Jomini, historiographer.

Of the commanders of the several corps, Davout and Ney were those who had done the most important work in past campaigns. Massena had retired from failure in Spain with broken health; Soult was still there. Oudinot, Bessières, St. Cyr, Victor, Junot, were each in his sphere excellent. Macdonald and Reynier were too far off to control easily. Vandamme, much to the regret of the Wurtembergers, was sent home for an alleged absence without leave. Berthier still remained the efficient mouthpiece of the emperor. Eugene and Jerome were in command because of their relationship, but Eugene was an able leader.

Logistics to-day is simplified by railroad transportation, and communication by telegraph; and in gauging all Napoleon's campaigns, we must never forget that every ounce of food, equipment and munition had to be moved over execrable roads on wheels, on sumpter animals, or by the men themselves; and that every order or report had to be carried on horseback.

On February 9 Davout was ordered into marching shape:

> "All that is to be very secret. Your movement depends on the day when that of the Observation Corps of Italy shall be unmasked. It is necessary that you should be on the Vistula before the thaw, and before the couriers who shall announce that the Corps of Italy has unmasked its movement shall have arrived in St. Petersburg. . . . Issue all orders which demand

no confidence, but confide to no one that you are about to march. On the contrary, spread the rumor that everything is being adjusted."

On March 10 the emperor wrote Berthier: "Communciate my annoyance to Junot that he should have reached Munich before his troops, and that thus he unmasked my movement two days too soon. The result of which was that the Russian courier, who would not have left until March 2, did leave February 29. I desire that he shall not go to Dresden, and that he shall remain constantly with his troops, marching with the first division."

On March 16 there were issued to Berthier orders about Davout's movements, so that on April 10 or 12 headquarters should be in Thorn. "Let me know if you have a cipher with Davout. If you have none, establish one with him, and with all the army corps, because it is my intention to have orders in cipher reach them for the most important movements."

During the early months of 1812 this gigantic force had been advancing towards the Vistula, and Napoleon never ceased accumulating food, which he recognized would be the chief difficulty.

He wrote Davout May 26: "I cannot too much recommend you to take the most efficacious measures to keep with you the least baggage possible, and that all the clothes, shoes and saddles that the corps have with them should be sent to Marienburg and Danzig, so that all the caissons may be employed and charged with flour, bread, rice, vegetables and brandy, beyond what is necessary for the ambulances. The result of all my movements will reunite four hundred thousand men on a single point. There will then be nothing to hope for from the country, and you must have everything with you. The baggage left behind can rejoin after the first expedition." And to Eugene: "The whole army will end by being concentrated on one same field; each corps, crowded elbow to elbow upon the other, will soon have exhausted the supplies of the country."

Sufficient victual was got together; but the difficulties of distribution were not overcome. There was no precedent; what apparently should succeed did not; and failure was the result.

Bavaria fed Eugene's troops moving from Italy to join the Grand Army, and cleared the snow from the Alpine roads.

Saxony suffered less and gained more than any other vassal state. Being isolated, Austria did not suffer; Bavaria, Baden and Wurtemberg bore their burden with questionable patience; Prussia, nominally independent, was ground down by the moving army; everything was seized, from the peasant's wagons and horses to his very food; her strong places were occupied, and in every fashion she suffered more than any country. Napoleon's purpose to control the whole theatre of operations is shown in his issuing a decree by which "every insult made to my soldiers in the territory of the Grand Army is made subject to the judgment of the French military commission." The word "insult" covered a multitude of sins.

As, in the Jena campaign, Napoleon had not started with a sufficient pontoon-train, so now he was doubly careful. On May 26, 1812, he wrote Davout: "Everything is subordinate to the arrival of the bridge equipage, for my whole plan of campaign is founded on the existence of this equipage, well harnessed and as mobile as a gun."

There had been constant communication between czar and emperor. Alexander was neutral, resolved solely on defense; Napoleon wished to bring the matter to a head. Alexander listened, but said little. In April he sent a note suggesting that if all French troops were withdrawn from Prussia, so as to leave a neutral zone between them, he would do what was reasonable in commercial matters; to which Napoleon made no reply. The Grand Army kept on moving through Germany, and before the grass was grown enough to forage the horses, was most of it near the Russian border.

Although negative in utterance, Alexander had been active in preparing resistance. Like every other country, Russia had its parties. The war party was for getting Austria and Prussia as allies, and for promising Poland national freedom, with the czar as king, if she would join Russia; another party, led by

Chancellor Rumantzov, desired to keep up the French alliance and the *status quo;* the peace party, still aiming to get Constantinople, desired any reasonable means of staving off the war, delayed preparations, and made Austria and Prussia suspicious of Russia's constancy.

Napoleon had not gauged Alexander's character with accuracy; naturally amiable and yielding, with his mind once made up he was immovable, and it is not impossible that the Prussian Stein, who, fallen under Napoleon's displeasure, had been expatriated and was now at the Russian Court as a sort of unofficial adviser of the czar, may have fostered this persistence. Alexander kept abreast of Napoleon's movements, and had the intelligence to understand that if he met a French advance by constant retreat, it was beyond the power of any European army to force him to anything: if Charles XII. had been conquered by the vast territory of Russia, Napoleon could be met in the same way. That such would be the method was assumed by many all over Europe. Alexander had said that he would retire into Siberia before yielding, and we know that he was ready to abandon St. Petersburg, as he did abandon the more sacred Moscow. Still, this was only a policy, not a plan; the Russian generals expected to fight; and as it happened, the unpreparedness of the Russian armies at the beginning brought about a defensive campaign. It has been said that Wellington's resistance to the French hosts by erecting the lines of Torres Vedras had led Alexander to this policy, but the conditions obtaining in the two countries are so essentially different that the czar must have seen the fallacy of comparing them. The lines may, however, have suggested the Drissa camp.

On March 25 Napoleon wrote to Berthier: "The language of Davout is then to be very pacific; he is to avoid every reconnoissance or military movement beyond the Vistula. None of his patrols, even, must go as far as Osterode." And on April 25 Davout was notified that the czar had made fresh propositions, and that if the Russians made no other movement than to occupy the right bank of the Memel (Niemen), he was not to consider hostilities as commenced.

On May 31 Napoleon was at Posen. By long marches the troops had reached the Vistula; Davout was at Elbing and Marienburg, with Macdonald and the Prussians out at Königsberg; Oudinot at Marienwerder; Ney at Thorn; St. Cyr and Eugene at Plotsk; Poniatowski at Warsaw; Vandamme at Gora Kalvaria; Reynier opposite Novo-Alexandria; and Schwartzenberg at Lemberg. This front of four hundred miles was designed to keep the Russians uncertain whether the main advance would be from Elbing against Kovno, or from Warsaw against Grodno, or from the Lublin country against the line of the Bug, and thus tend to separate their armies. The purpose succeeded.

The numbers of the Russian forces are hard to determine. Clausewitz estimates the total at six hundred thousand, of which not much over two thirds were effective; and there were only under the colors: —

First Army in Lithuania	90,000	men.
Second Army to the south of it	50,000	"
Third Army in Volhynia	30,000	"
Cossacks	10,000	"
Total in first line	180,000	"
Reserves	80,000	"
Finland Army	20,000	"
Moldavia Army	60,000	"
In garrison and detached	80,000	"

According to Buturlin, whose account is official, but not necessarily accurate, —



Positions, End of May.

Barclay's paper strength was	111,000 foot.
	20,000 horse.
	13,000 artillery.
	9,000 Cossacks.
The effective was	127,000 men.
Bagration's paper strength was	43,000 foot.
	7,500 horse.
	4,000 artillery.
	4,500 Cossacks.
The effective was	48,000 men.
Tormasov's effective was	43,000 men.
Of which more cavalry.	
Reserves on Dvina and Dnieper	30,000 men.

Thus less than a quarter million Russians were ready to meet half a million invaders under the greatest captain of modern times.

In organization and numbers, the principal Russian armies were approximately as follows: —

First Army, under Barclay de Tolly, consisting of

1st	Corps.	Wittgenstein	23,000 men.
2d	"	Baggavut	16,500 "
3d	"	Tuchkov	18,600 "
4th	"	Shuvalov and Ostermann	13,500 "
5th	"	Grand Duke Constantine (Reserve of Guard)	20,000 "
6th	"	Doctorov	17,000 "
Cavalry Reserve under		Ouvarov	3,000 "
		Korv	4,000 "
		Pahlen	3,000 "
Cossacks under Platov			7,000 "

Total about 130,000 effective, with 600 guns.

Second Army, under Bagration, consisting of

7th	Corps.	Raevski	16,500 men.
8th	"	Borozdin	15,000 "

Reserve	12,000 men.
Cavalry Reserve under Sievers	3,500 "
And Cossack corps	4,000 "
Total about 50,000 effective.	

Third Army, under Tormasov, consisting of

Corps of Kamenski	10,000 men.
" Sacken	6,000 "
" Markov	12,000 "
Cavalry Reserve of Lambert	8,000 "
And Cossacks	4,000 "
Total about 40,000 effective.	

Back of these were thirty thousand reserves, some coming up. The excess of cavalry indicated by Buturlin was serving with the several corps.

The Army of Moldavia and the Finland Corps were shortly to be released from their duty and added to the active forces facing the Grand Army. As Alexander knew all about the French preparations from illicit information obtained in Paris, the troops he put into fighting line seem inadequate.

Barclay de Tolly was a staunch if not a great soldier. Eugene of Wurtemberg says: "He was a man whose efforts had constantly as object to remain faithful to duty. His cold and calm nature created for him few friends among the Russians. With regard to his high military capacity the opinions were much divided, but what his adversaries could not deny to him, without injustice, was his coolness and prudence in danger, his irrepressible perseverance, the exemplary order which he had maintained, as well among authorities called to conduct affairs, as in every part of his troops." Bagration was a fighter, like Ney. Tormasov and Chichagov were good leaders, and Kutusov we remember in Austerlitz days; but none was able to cope with Napoleon. The Russian chiefs had unlimited power, with right of life and death over their troops, and the inhabitants of the countries occupied. Clausewitz was of small rank, and both he and Gneisenau were ignorant of Russian, and apart from jealousy, unsuited for command. There seemed to have been no specific plan of campaign: Alexander had decided to play a waiting game.

The Russian troops were raised by requiring from each land-owner a certain number of serfs. These princes would be apt to send the least useful men, and Russian intelligence was low. Rudely born and nurtured, inured to a hard climate, healthy as a rule, they were able to bear hardships on short rations as no soldier of middle Europe could do. Frederick's campaigns had shown of what the Russian foot was capable. Enlisted for twenty-five years, his relatives and early life were forgotten, and his regiment became his home. Severe disci-

Barclay de Tolly.

pline, and the habit of implicit obedience impressed on the serf, gave him a constancy unknown in other armies; his flag was his one thought, desertion was unknown, and in times of extreme danger he would instinctively seek safety near the regimental standard, having learned in battles with the Turks that every one who skulked or fled was liable to be cut down by hordes of cavalry. Transported to other lands he was the equal of any soldier; on his own territory he was, in a fashion, incomparable. So far as the Cossacks went, the hard little runt of the steppes was well ahead of any horse of middle Europe for the purposes of a Russian campaign; the coarse forage on which a civilized horse would perish was their daily food. The Cossacks were to surprise at night the quarters of the enemy, pillage the convoys, stop the couriers, and do all the harm possible, but so soon as they met large forces, they were to fall in on the army and menace the enemy's flanks and rear. On July 5 an order by Reynier instructs the soldiers "that the . . . Cossacks are dangerous only when they fall on troops who are dispersed without reserve. One should always, therefore, march in the greatest order and ready for any attack." The Russian heavy cavalry horses were acclimated, and better fed than the French.

Roughly speaking, the Russian frontiers ran from the Baltic, north of the Prussian fortress of Memel, to the Memel (Niemen) River half-way to Kovno, up river to Grodno, down the Bobr and up the Narew west of Bielostok to the Bug, and up this river to Brest Litovsk and beyond, and thence along the border of Galicia. That portion of the Niemen from Grodno to the sea was the scene of the most important early part of this campaign. Its channel is sunk, and there are not many places where it can be crossed, even with pontoons. There were bridges at Tilsit and at Grodno; at Kovno only a ferry; between Grodno and Kovno not even this. The


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USHACH
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CHERES
DRUIA
SOMOSHI
DRISVIATI
MIDZI
RYMSHANI
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POSTAVI
GLUBOKOI
KOBILNIK
DOKSHIZI
BERESINO
DOLGINOV
MOLODECHNO
SEMBIN
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JANOV
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SHISMOVI
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GANUSHISKI
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

WESTERN RUSSIA

river was navigable some distance above Grodno. As he had the initiative, and occupied the fortress of Memel, Napoleon was able to use the Niemen for transporting supplies. From Lemberg, where Schwartzenberg lay with his Austrians, to the fortress of Memel, the irregular frontier was about five hundred miles long.

East of the Russian frontier were the old provinces which, in the partition of Poland, had fallen to Russia. Lithuania had a small and poor population, and was full of woods and marshes; the roads were few and wretched, and the soil such that wagons or troops could not move across the country. The Bielostok country was better, but south of the Brest Litovsk-Bobruisk line, marshes made campaigning impossible.

Poland had been so vast that until you reach the Dvina and the Dneiper, you are not in a country quite Russian. Taking the Niemen as the first line, these two rivers form a second line of defense to Russia proper. The Dvina from Vitebsk runs northwest to Riga, and its only bridges were at Vitebsk and Dünaburg. Between Vitebsk and Orsha the Dvina and Dnieper are but fifty miles apart, and through this opening lies the easiest road to the heart of Russia, Smolensk being the first great city in the gap; and here everything is Russian. The Dnieper is navigable far above Smolensk, and the bridges here and at Mohilev were most important. Like a great ditch, the Beresina, with bridges at Borisov and Bobruisk, closes the gap between the Dvina and Dnieper, but in summer time this river is fordable in places.

Thus, for the main part of the Grand Army, there were but three roads leading across the Russian frontier, at Kovno, Grodno and Brest Litovsk. These cities being a hundred miles apart shows the vast extent of the theatre of war.

In his defensive scheme Alexander had begun to fortify Riga, Dünaburg, Bobruisk and Kiev, and had built a bridge-head at Borisov; but most of this work was only half done. At Drissa was a huge intrenched camp, but being on no highway and liable to be turned, it lacked strategic value. The enormous frontier to be covered could not be defended cordon-fashion; nor is it necessary to stand across a road to hold it, for a position enabling the defender to fall upon the flank of an advancing army is the safest defense of any great route.

From a military point of view, the retiring scheme of the Russians against a stronger and more able foe was the best, for the farther this foe advanced, the weaker he would become, from length of communications and difficulty of transportation, while the Russians were gaining strength with every day's retreat upon their reserves. But the czar had to look at some political questions. If a system of retreat was adopted, the Polish provinces would fall away from their allegiance, and the opposition of the anti-war party might be grave, as well as the effect upon friendly nations. A defensive position on the Dvina might do, although the camp at Drissa was ill-placed; but for political reasons the czar established his first depot as far forward as Vilna, and this brought initial disaster. As 1812 opened, the Russian troops were spread all over the five hundred miles from the Baltic to Volhynia; but when in May the French approached the Vistula, the troops drew together into two large bodies, under Barclay and Bagration, with headquarters at Vilna and Lutsk. These two groups were separated by the morasses of the upper Pripet, and their distance from each other was due to the broad front of Napoleon's advance. When it became apparent that Napoleon was to manœuvre on the Niemen, and the czar secretly learned that the Austrians were half-hearted, he strengthened Barclay's army from Bagration's; and as the campaign opened, the former with a hundred and thirty thousand men was near Vilna, with his right at Shavli and his left at Lida; Bagration with fifty thousand men had come up to Volkovisk; and Tormasov with over forty thousand men, not yet fully organized, took his place at Lutsk.

Barclay had the corps of Tuchkov and Shuvalov in front of Vilna, and Baggavut's corps on the Niemen below Kovno; Constantine was in reserve at Sventsiani, and Doctorov at Lida kept touch with Bagration; the cavalry was partly with Baggavut, partly in rear of the left; Wittgenstein was beyond Rossiani as a flying right wing. The Cossacks were advanced towards Grodno, as if to threaten the French advance in flank, but they were unequal to the task. In battle worthless, they later, as light troops, proved invaluable. Bagration lay between Grodno and Brest Litovsk. The First and Second Armies thus stood astride the three roads to St. Petersburg and Moscow.

Napoleon had no preconceived ideas of a plan of campaign, but he was certain that no army the Russians had raised could resist him in battle. Metternich states that the emperor told him in Dresden that in his first campaign he should overrun all of old Poland and not go beyond Smolensk; and in his proclamation Napoleon says nothing to his troops of cities to conquer and sack, as he might have done. He proposed to besiege Riga and Dünaburg, so as to control navigation up to Vilna; but as he could scarcely suppose that the Russians would meet him on the Vistula with a divided army, had he made a plan, he must have changed it. He was conducting what is now called a "war of armies" on an unknown terrain.

Nor was the case different in the enemy's camp: each Russian commander had an idea of his own. On peace being concluded with Turkey, Chichagov wanted to march from Moldavia up the Danube through Illyria into Italy; Bagration, while holding the Niemen, desired to invade the Grand Duchy


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of Warsaw; Barclay was for awaiting the French oncoming on Russian soil, and then fighting; Phull's idea was to hold in force the camp at Drissa, so as to debouch therefrom upon the flanks of the French should they advance beyond it. Knesebeck advised ravaging the country, constantly fighting small affairs but refusing battles, and drawing Napoleon so far from his base as to be in danger. Gneisenau believed in many fortifications for stopping and annoying an enemy flushed with victory. Alexander was proposing to play a game of retreat.

The information Napoleon had secured about the Russian armies was necessarily more limited than that of the Russians about him. He knew Barclay's general location, and that he had been reinforced from Bagration's army; but he did not know that Tormasov was replacing Bagration: he imagined the latter still on the march to join Barclay by way of Brest Litovsk. It was on this assumed state of facts that he formed a plan for breaking in between Barclay and Bagration, by an advance through Kovno on Vilna. He had at first supposed that this would turn the Russian right flank; but although later news proved the Russian army too far north, on either supposition he was manœuvring strategically so as to turn the enemy's flank, as at Marengo, Ulm, Jena, Friedland, or, as at Montenotte or Burgos, to break through his centre, in each case with his mass. The main blow would be delivered by him in person, with the Guard, Davout, Oudinot, Ney, and Nansouty's and Montbrun's cavalry, say two hundred and twenty-five thousand men; and in connection with this Eugene, with his own and St. Cyr's corps and Grouchy's cavalry, eighty thousand effective, was drawn on to Rastenburg, to advance thence on a more southerly line, via Suvalki on Seini, as an echelon on Napoleon's right, to contain any forces from Grodno, and to tear asunder still farther the gap rent in the Russian line by Napoleon. Still another echelon was to consist of Jerome's army at Warsaw and on the Narew, to which belonged Poniatowski, Reynier, Vandamme and Latour-Maubourg, eighty thousand men. Reynier's task was to keep up a touch with the Austrians. Jerome's rôle was to feint on Lublin, to join Schwartzenberg, and thus draw attention from the French left, which was to deliver the main blow. As Napoleon wrote him, June 5, from Thorn: "In this trade and on so great a theatre one succeeds only on a well-established plan and with elements fully in accord. You must therefore study your orders well, and do here neither more nor less than you are told, especially in what is combined movement." But as conditions altered, Jerome's task was shortly changed to a pursuit of Bagration. The extreme right and left of the French army were protected by Macdonald and the Prussians at Rossiani, and by Schwartzenberg, who from Lemberg had come north to Lublin. Napoleon described the operation in a note of June 10 to Eugene: "The march of the army is a movement that I am making by my left, in constantly refusing my right."

The Russians, Napoleon thought, might themselves advance on Ostrolenka or Sierock, or indeed on Warsaw, in which case Jerome would stand on the defensive on the Narew or Vistula, to protect Eugene's communications on Thorn; and the latter would wheel to the right and take the advancing Russians in flank, and Napoleon from Vilna fall upon their rear.

In order to explain the business to Jerome, whose ability he had every reason to doubt, the emperor wrote him on June 5:—

"I think I have made you understand what you had best do at the opening of the campaign. First, make believe that you are going to enter Volhynia, and hold the enemy the most possible on this idea, while, turning his extreme right, I shall have gained on him twelve or fifteen marches in the direction of Petersburg. I will be on his right wing. I will cross the Niemen and will seize Vilna, which is the first objective of the campaign. . . . When this operation is unmasked, the enemy will take one of the two following steps: he will rally in the interior of his state so as to find himself in force to deliver battle, or he will himself take the offensive. Thus, while the extremity of the right would be turned, he might march on Warsaw." And again he sent a dispatch on June 11, 1812, to Berthier, to write to Jerome that "he is always to hold to his line of operation on Modlin, keep constantly assembled, and correspond with the viceroy, so that the latter may fall on the right flank of the enemy. That this movement of attack by the enemy, which is quite natural and which has been foreseen from the beginning, can have no influence on my offensive operations; that the important thing is that the right shall not commit itself against superior forces, and shall manœuvre assembled from position to position; that if the greatest part of the Russian army were present in this flank attack, nothing could ever happen to the right, which would always have for refuge the intrenched camp of Modlin and the left bank of the Vistula. But that just as soon as such a movement of the Russians shall be decided, I will fall with all my army on their right flank and on their rear. That it is very difficult that the enemy should expose himself thus to an entire loss; yet if he should do it, the march already traced must make the king understand what he has to do."

On the same day, writing Eugene, he tells him that Jerome might retire into the intrenched camp of Modlin, but that Eugene's line of operation being on Thorn, he would have nothing to fear from this state of things.

In thus holding back his right, the emperor had the additional idea of preventing Bagration from retiring too soon, which would make it easier for the French left to cut him off from Barclay. If, however, when left behind, Bagration threatened Napoleon's flank, Eugene and Jerome would be ready to fend him off. As a fact, the Russians never definitely intended to strike Napoleon's flank as he advanced on Vilna; Bagration was under orders to move in retreat, and

Platov's Cossacks were ordered back via Lida and Smorgoni. None the less, the precaution was a proper one.

This strategic plan, one of Napoleon's best conceptions, was to be a refusal of the right in echelon, while the left in mass should break through the enemy's centre, thrust aside the right, and move promptly on the communications of the left and centre. Ségur calls it a strategic manœuvre similar to what Leuthen was as a tactical manœuvre, conducted over a front of two hundred miles and a number of days, instead of six miles and a couple of hours; but the two plans, each perfect of its kind in conception, one strategical, the other tactical, can hardly be made the subject of comparison.

From the Vistula, during the first half of June, the French left wing corps thus advanced towards the Niemen, and Eugene through East Prussia. Napoleon spent much time in inspecting and encouraging the troops, reviewing them at Königsberg, Insterburg and Gumbinen. On June 22 headquarters was at Vilkoviski. Here he issued a

PROCLAMATION TO THE GRAND ARMY.

Soldiers! The second war of Poland has begun. The first was finished at Friedland and Tilsit. At Tilsit Russia swore eternal alliance to France and war to England. To-day she violates her oaths. She will give no explanation of her strange conduct until the French eagles have recrossed the Rhine, thus leaving our allies to her discretion. Russia is drawn away by fatality; her destiny is about to be accomplished. Does she believe us degenerate? Are we no longer the soldiers of Austerlitz? She places us between dishonor and war. The choice cannot be doubtful. Let us then march forward. Let us cross the Niemen and carry the war on her territory. The second war of Poland will be glorious for French arms, like the first, but the peace that we shall conclude will carry with it its guaranty, and will put a term to the fatal influence which Russia has exercised for fifty years on the affairs of Europe.

This proclamation, cast in the same mould, has scarcely the true ring of those of former days. Its claims are not as exact, it lacks the blare of the trumpet. Yet it had its effect on the French troops.

From Vilkoviski, on June 23, at 2 A. M., the emperor rode out towards the Niemen at Kovno for a reconnoissance, accompanied only by Engineer General Haxo, and at daylight determined that the best place to cross was at Poniemon, just above Kovno, at a large bend in the river. He had not ascertained that only pickets held the further bank, and retiring to his bivouac, he issued unnecessarily detailed orders for the passage.

Haxo.

Count Soltyk gives us a pleasant picture of the emperor here. Some Polish lancers were in bivouac near the river. The emperor drove thither, and borrowing from its owner the Polish uniform which apparently fitted him the best, changed his suit in the road, and then rode forward to the river, where he used his glass for some time and made inquiries as to the lay of the land. When he came back to the bivouac, some refreshment was brought him, of which, in merry mood, he partook in the middle of the road, and asked the surrounding officers whether the Polish uniform suited him. After eating, he resumed his own suit and rode farther down the river.

The several corps now stood: the Guard at and in the vicinity of headquarters; Davout in front of the forest of Pilvishki, with Oudinot in his rear; Ney in front of Mariampol;

Murat with Nansouty and Montbrun within sight of Kovno, and Grouchy at Piloni; Eugene within a march of Kalvaria, St. Cyr not far behind. Thus the left wing was well massed and covered by Murat's cavalry, while Macdonald and the Prussians formed a flying left wing at Tilsit. On the French right, Jerome and Poniatowski were in Chutshin, Vandamme at Novgorod, Latour-Maubourg out in front at Augustovo; Reynier was near Novo-Minsk, and Schwartzenberg south of Siedlez. The enormous front was measurably reduced, and the right wing could coöperate to a certain extent with the left. Late on the 23d, the bridges at Poniemon were begun by Eblé under Napoleon's eye; by midnight two were completed, and Davout began the crossing. Later, a third one was thrown, a fourth at the ferry, and a fifth at the mouth of the Vilia. By noon of June 24 Napoleon took up headquarters in Kovno. Since the days of Peter the Great, no enemy had trodden the soil of Russia proper; and here was the hugest force of modern days, assembled from Germany, France, Italy, Spain, deluging its territory, under command of the leader who had destroyed the armies of all the other Continental powers. How would Russia meet it?

From Kovno Napoleon sent out reconnoissances in every direction, accompanied by geographical engineers, who were to remit, twice a day, sketches of the country. Each party, on June 24, was given sharp instructions: —

> "It is necessary also that Murat shall be certain that his light cavalry has beaten the whole country between the Vilia and the Niemen, and that it shall be assured: first, that the enemy has no bridge on the Vilia, and second, that there is there neither infantry nor post. I desire that the geographical engineer attached to the king shall not lose a moment in sending you a sketch of the whole course of the Vilia, and of that of the Niemen to the confluence."

Napoleon found that his Russian map, however useful, did not give the small details of cross-roads, villages, forests, streams, etc., so necessary for the movement of troops. Yet while vigorously reconnoitring, the emperor was prudent. To Berthier, June 25, he gave instructions to write to Murat: —

> "Before making a step in advance, the chess-board must be better cleared up. It is especially very necessary to be entirely master of the left bank of the Vilia. The viceroy cannot be up in line for two days. There can be no question of an immediate march on Vilna. To direct so great a movement the emperor will go there personally. Moreover, our left flank must be perfectly secure." "Write to Ney to reconnoitre seriously Janov, to send there a good column of infantry and cavalry, and if it is necessary, to sustain this column with his whole army corps; to know everything that is taking place there . . . and to fully assure himself that the enemy has no bridge nor any posts on the left bank of the Vilia. That I much want a positive report thereon." And to Davout, June 26, he wrote: "Assemble your troops and take some rest. Reconnoitre a good position in case the enemy marches on you. . . . Call in all your detachments so as to assemble your army. You must be on guard against an operation coming from Vilkomir. In any case, I am sending Ney to Skomli and Oudinot to Janov. The result of this operation will commence to clear up our position, and let us well understand the chess-board."

The question of victual had already become difficult; large supplies were coming by water to Königsberg, whence they were to be wagoned forward to the marching armies; the shipping up the Niemen and Vilia was not yet organized; but Napoleon was unaccustomed to wait, and was used to campaigning where some kind of food could always be got. He had ordered the several corps to collect two weeks' rations as they marched through old Prussia, and the doing of this caused vast suffering to the land. Every team that could be seized on the farms that they passed was taken along behind the army; thousands of peasants were compelled to drive them; but the main part of the victual, following the army in endless trains, could not be got along fast enough, proved to be of no avail, and mostly fell a prey to the train-men.

The evil was a crying one, and the emperor, on June 4, instructed Berthier to write Davout that —

> "when you ordered him to procure twenty days' victual, you meant that that was to be done regularly, and without foraging the country; that terror and desolation are in Poland from the conduct of the Wurtembergers. . . . He is to take the most prompt measures not to devastate the country, else we shall find ourselves as we were in Portugal." And on June 22, at Vilkoviski, an order was issued "to keep the army in the greatest order and to prevent the disorders which commence to desolate the country."

Each army corps was to have a provost-commission of five officers to try every straggler, every marauder, every pillager, and every one who molested the inhabitants of the country, all of whom were to be executed in twenty-four hours. Little patrols were organized to scour the country and pick up stragglers. Similar bodies were created elsewhere.

Napoleon aspired to be looked on as the savior of Lithuania; but by mistaken management, too much freedom was given to the serfs, who rose in many places, elected the richest of their number as chiefs, and became so turbulent that the nobles turned against the French, and increased the difficulty of victualing.

The right wing was now ordered on Grodno. Having been held back to contain Bagration, and if possible keep him from retreat, it was now essential for it to follow, when he should fall back in consequence of Napoleon's proposed manœuvre, and push him back on the left wing, which could then overwhelm him. The emperor was not aware that Bagration had already received orders from the czar to retire. From Königsberg, as early as June 15, he wrote Jerome: —

> "As soon as I shall have crossed the Niemen, I shall perhaps resolve to advance on Vilna. I shall then present my flank to the army of Bagration. It will then be essential that you should follow him up closely so that you may take part in the operation I shall make against that army. If I should succeed in separating it from other Russian troops, so as to fall on its right flank, you should be able to attack it at the same time that I do." And on June 21 he wrote: "You are to lean on the centre. In case the enemy turned your right, your line of operations would be on Königsberg. Try to have the Poles reach Augustovo the 23d, and send a vanguard on Grodno with a lot of light troops. Send forward your bridge in that direction. It is probable that I shall give you the order to move on Grodno with all your army. . . . You will be in continuity with the army, so that everything can act together as a mass, and we will then operate against Bagration according to the position he will occupy."

On June 25 and 26 the Niemen crossing was ended. Napoleon and the Guard were in Kovno, Davout in Rumshiski; Murat out on the Vilna road at Shismori. Oudinot, to reconnoitre the country and form the left, was pushed out across the Vilia towards Janov, near which place he ran across Wittgenstein's rearguard. Although Napoleon was anxious to capture Vilna, for navigation extended up so far, and it was a good point to create a big depot, he was anxious to trace the Russian whereabouts before advancing too fast; and he wrote Davout, June 26: "The army is only just concentrated, and one must not march against a yet complete army as one would against a beaten army." The French were still concentrating on the Niemen, and Napoleon abode by his principles of the past sixteen years, and would not advance until he had in hand a sufficient mass. But one thing was notably lacking — his personal supervision; not only his bodily strength failed to respond to his mental activity, but the territory to be covered was so vast that his staff could not do his work for him, and what he well projected lacked much in the execution.

As Barclay had assembled at Vilna only two corps and the

Guard, his position was critical. If he remained there, he must face superior numbers; if he crossed the Vilia to join his right wing under Baggavut and Wittgenstein, he would be cut off from his left wing under Doctorov at Lida. If he retired on Polotsk, his right wing would be cut off. Thus beset, he determined to destroy his vast Vilna magazines, containing breadstuffs, and especially oats, which would have been treasure-trove to the French, and to retire via Sventsiani on the Drissa camp, and here rally the right and left wing columns on the centre. Orders were issued to this effect; and others were sent Bagration to retire on the Dvina via Vileika or Minsk.

When at Vilna, the czar had issued a proclamation to the army stamped with quiet determination; and in another to the nation he used the words: "I will not lay down my arms so long as one soldier of the enemy remains on the soil of my empire." He also sent one of his aides to Napoleon to say that he would still negotiate, if the French recrossed the Niemen; but the emperor looked on this as weakness, or a device to gain time, and even failed to treat the officer with diplomatic equipoise.

On June 26 Murat, the Guard and Davout began the march towards Vilna, and on the 28th reached this town, with Napoleon in the van, which marched the sixty miles in three days, meeting only isolated Russian outposts. As flankers, across the Vilia, Ney advanced via Mieshagola, while Oudinot swept farther, via Shati, and, failing to cut them off, drove the rearguard of Baggavut and Wittgenstein out of Vilkomir, after a lively fight; the Russian corps rejoined their chief, and Macdonald from Tilsit was advancing via Tauroggen and Rossiani. By this time, over execrable roads, Eugene got across the Niemen at Piloni, where a pile bridge was being made, Jerome moved under pressing orders towards Grodno, which Latour-Maubourg had already reached, and Poniatowski and Vandamme were at Augustovo in Jerome's left rear. Reynier, whose orders to cover Warsaw until Schwartzenberg took his place had necessarily delayed him, had got to Sambrov, and Schwartzenberg to Siedlez, to close up Jerome's right and rear.

Owing to the difficulties of distance and country, Napoleon's orders were becoming impossible of execution. On June 20 Berthier wrote Jerome: "The emperor orders that the 5th Corps shall begin its march the 22d, to be at Augustovo the 25th, and that the 8th shall march the 23d to move on Raygrod, having with them twenty days' rations." The distance was over eighty miles, and the rain had spoiled the roads: Jerome reached Grodno on the 30th. Napoleon's belated orders had left him too long in Warsaw for him to join in the proposed pursuit of Bagration. Perhaps these movements were as rapid as could be expected without the master's eye; but Napoleon's hope to anticipate the Russian commanders was not fulfilled. Both armies had retired; for Barclay's orders from the czar were to retreat from the French advance, and Bagration received similar ones when the French crossed at Kovno. This of itself broke up Napoleon's excellent plans. On June 28 Barclay was at Niemenchin, with his right at Perkale and his left at Oshmiana; and though Bagration was yet at Volkovisk, it looked as if he might escape the trap. Barclay's objective was Sventsiani, and calculating that Bagration could reach this place before the French advanced too far, ignorant indeed that the emperor's object was to cut Bagration off, he sent him word to join the main army at this place. What he ascertained of the Russian movements puzzled Napoleon, but he kept on with his own operation, which he knew was strategically correct, and was confident would succeed.



Positions, End of June.

By July 2 Barclay had gathered his army at Sventsiani, without any fighting except Wittgenstein's. Doctorov was farthest off, and had difficulty in rejoining the army. A rear-guard and the Cossacks near Grodno were cut off, and obliged to march south and join Bagration. Barclay reached Drissa July 11. Murat followed along, supported by Ney and Oudinot.

The emperor took up headquarters at Vilna, and there he remained many days, striving to bring order out of chaos, issuing orders to his distant lieutenants on belated information received from them, or on news from the enemy which was more so: he found the direction of operations over so vast a territory different from anything he had yet encountered, and far more uncertain.

On June 29 Napoleon headed Murat, with Friant, Gudin, Nansouty and Montbrun, on Niemenchin; and Davout, with the three divisions left him, on Michalichki and Ochmiana, thus splitting the head of the Grand Army into separate columns so as to reconnoitre a wider space in his front, to keep apart the two Russian armies which he believed he had thrust apart, and to close the road to Smolensk. Had he been able to do the latter, the campaign of 1812 would have terminated in a marked success, for up to this moment Napoleon had shown a much broader view of the strategic situation than the Russians.

Davout soon ran across evidences of Barclay's left wing, under Doctorov, on the way to Ochmiana; this Napoleon took to be the head of Bagration's army marching towards Sventsiani; and on July 1 he instructed Davout, to whom Grouchy was ordered to report, to advance on this body, while Jerome, as he believed, was pushing on its rear, and Schwartzenberg was getting where he could turn its left. Doctorov had already caught the alarm, filed to the right, and escaped by a thirty-mile march, July 1, on Svir. Eugene

Doctorov.

had got concentrated at Kroni; next day Jerome, with Poniatowski, Vandamme and Latour-Maubourg, had fully reached Grodno, where he found only a Cossack detachment, which fell back on Lida; Reynier was passing Sokoli, and Schwartzenberg was opposite Drogichin on the Bug. Oudinot was following Wittgenstein. On this day Barclay had reached Sventsiani with the right at Soloki, and the left under Doctorov all but cut off by Davout. The Russian objective was now Drissa, but Bagration, who was at Slonim, was still in danger of being hemmed in between Davout and Jerome, for Barclay's plan to have him join at Sventsiani had been a miscalculation.

By the evening of July 1 the Guard was still in Vilna, Macdonald had reached Rossiani, Oudinot Vilkomir, and Ney Glinziski; Murat was at Niemenchin, Davout at Ochmiana and Michalichki. From the little information he could gather and the probabilities, Napoleon was convinced that Bagration could still be cut off unless he headed via Minsk towards the Dvina, until, on July 2, the body opposite Davout proved to be Doctorov. This left him in dense ignorance as to Bagration's whereabouts, and he hurried up Eugene towards Vilna, finding fault with his delay, — "notified of the general movement, it is ridiculous that he should have stayed without moving at Piloni," — although the viceroy had been marching over country roads as deep as the worst in Virginia. "It would be difficult," he wrote July 7, "to conceive an idea of the obstacles which this road presented, entirely formed by the trunks of pine-trees placed upon a marshy soil." Corduroy roads were common in Russia, as they are in every new country. The advance had been seriously interfered with by a violent storm on June 29, followed by a five days' rain. Possible bad weather must always be one of the calculations in campaigning; and although this storm did not arrest the troops, it did nearly stop the teaming. The ill-fed horses fell by the thousands, there was no bread, and between starvation and the danger of punishment for pillaging, the soldier did not hesitate. The entire country was ravaged.

Although puzzled by lack of information, Napoleon's effort still was to cut off and destroy Bagration's fifty thousand men, which would leave Barclay at his mercy. But this could be accomplished only by the push of the 1796 Bonaparte. Had his physique been that of his earlier years, he would have ridden to Davout's column — what was forty miles to him? — and ascertained the actual facts; he would have so disposed Jerome's forces, or have had them so commanded, as to hurl them on the rear of Bagration, while Davout cut off his head of column. But the emperor was no longer that Bonaparte. In the midst of his life of hard work, he had found time to indulge his passions, not always in the most creditable way; and now the result of overtaxing his vitality by pleasure, in addition to constant labor, had become apparent in bodily ailments which made him unready to move about, and especially to remain many successive hours in the saddle. His endurance of fatigue and weather had much diminished; the exceptional heat of this July had almost equaled that of Egypt, where many of the rank and file committed suicide — as they began again to do here. Napoleon was no longer the thin, nervous, active general of a dozen years before; instead of seeing things himself, he remained in Vilna directing affairs by couriers, upon information both late and partial; and as might have been expected, his work was ill done.

It may be said that this criticism of the emperor's bodily strength is unwarranted; but there is no reproach intended to be conveyed. Every man must lose his activity sooner or later. The question before us is only whether the growing loss of daily and hourly physical vigor, of the ability to get about, and of the insistence on seeing things with his own eyes, did or did not seriously affect the Great Captain's later campaigns. There is no intention to hold Napoleon responsible for bodily ailments, although much has been written by others on the subject. One purpose of this History of the Art of War, from Cyrus' day down, is to discover to what degree the personal element influences the operations of war. The great captain's equipment consists of intellect, character and opportunity, each to an exceptional degree and all working together. To ascertain how much each has counted in any given operation, and whether each remains at its best, is part of the problem before us. From this point of view the frequent dwelling upon the emperor's inability, from whatever cause, to do as much work as he had formerly done, is a necessary step in our study. That some may not agree in the conclusion drawn is no reason why the fact should not be pointed out.

Nor was this the worst evil. If large and distant bodies were to be subject only to general direction from headquarters, their leaders should be the best men to be had. But here Jerome, solely because he was his brother, had been placed at the head of three army corps; and Jerome was not only devoid of military talent, he was a lover of his ease. How could Napoleon expect him to do the wise, energetic thing? In 1805 he had written Soult from Milan: "There are no princes in the army. There are soldiers, officers, colonels, generals, and the commanding general who must outrank and stand above all." But now the upholding of the dignity of the new imperial family he had created made him forget all this. Later, indeed, he placed Jerome under Davout; but the harm had been done.

On July 3 Napoleon learned that Bagration had crossed the Niemen four days before, at Mosti, as if heading towards Vilna, and this led him to suppose this Russian army at Lida on that day, retiring via Volochin on Molodechno; and he assumed that he was being pushed by Jerome via Minsk.

But Jerome was still in Grodno, closing up his column and looking after subsistence; while Reynier was at Bielostok, and Schwartzenberg crossed the Bug at Drogichin. On this enormous theatre of war the emperor's calculations were all going astray, while owing to the unusual difficulties, only an accurate dovetailing of all the separate manœuvres could save the campaign from failure. Meanwhile Davout was standing at Ochmiana expecting that Bagration would approach his way, and afford him the chance of falling upon him. But Bagration was at Novogrudok, marching eastward to a junction with Barclay, who had reached Davgeliski, with wings out at Rymshani and Postavi. Murat was at Sventsiani, in touch with the Russian rearguard. Eugene, with St. Cyr in his rear, had reached Novo Troki on the way to Vilna, where Napoleon and the Guard still remained. Ney was at Maliati and Oudinot at Avanta; Macdonald still at Rossiani, with orders to march to Ponievesh. As Barclay had manifestly got beyond reach, Napoleon proposed to halt his centre and left a few days and push the operation against Bagration; for if the French head of column could be thrust between the two, the problem was still solvable.

Bagration had been warned not to get cut off from Minsk, and had left Volkovisk on June 28. It is nearly ten days' march to Minsk, but on June 30 he received the absurd orders to march straight to Drissa. Barclay should have known that Davout barred the way, while Bagration might not. The latter was bridging the Niemen when he heard that Hetman Platov had met Davout and was at Volochin. How much force Davout had he could not tell, but though it was probably less than his own, Jerome was following him up; and recognizing that he must make a considerable circuit, he sent word to Platov, who had been joined by the infantry rearguard cut off from Doctorov, to hold head to Davout for a while, and he filed off for Minsk. Platov was unable to hold Davout, and rather than attack for mere temporary gain, Bagration kept on via Niesvish towards Bobruisk, so as to reach the Dnieper at Mohilev. By this time Jerome's van had struck Bagration's Cossack rearguard, which fended it off, and Bagration kept on his way. It seems that each side overestimated the force of the other.

Hetman Platov.

This rapid retreat of the Russians from his advance first led Napoleon to fear that he could not bring them to battle; but if he could only keep the two Russian armies apart, he might be able to handle each separately; and it seemed — as was the fact — that Barclay was taking a false direction. If they could be kept from joining, a time would come when each could be attacked.

As in 1807, the soldiers were getting weary of this long march in a naked country, and to encourage them by putting a goal before them, as well as to lead the Russians to accept battle rather than have the enemy winter on Russian soil, Napoleon announced that he would stop his advance at Smolensk, and prepare to occupy the land he should so far have overrun.

French Line Carbineer.

L.

VILNA TO VITEBSK. JULY, 1812.

The heat was great. The army suffered as never before. Rations could not keep pace with the army, and there was little on the road. Fed on rye straw, horses fell by thousands. The men had no mills to grind the grain they found, and living on boiled rye porridge brought on dysentery. These conditions at the opening of the campaign argued ill. Davout was to head off Bagration, whom Jerome should pursue, but Bagration by a circuit escaped them both, and Napoleon's long pause at Vilna had nullified his first plan. He now began another to contain Barclay by a front attack while turning his left, but he still tarried at Vilna, awaiting news. In mid-July Barclay was in the Drissa camp faced by Murat, Davout was trying to head off Bagration, Jerome was far behind, the Prussians were on the left at Riga, and the Austrians facing Tormasov on the right. Barclay was striving to draw in Bagration. Alexander went back into Russia to rouse the people, and instead of standing for battle, Barclay moved towards Vitebsk. Jerome was placed under Davout, but the harm could not be undone. Napoleon left Vilna July 16, hoping to anticipate Barclay at Vitebsk, but failed. Thrown back by Davout at Mohilev, Bagration made a circuit to Smolensk, and Barclay, after a battle July 25–26, retreated July 27–28 on Smolensk, where he joined Bagration. Napoleon's second plan had miscarried. The condition of the army was pitiable; it was put into cantonments for a few days at Vitebsk, and Napoleon again told the army he would not advance beyond Smolensk.

The hardships and difficulties of the Russian climate and terrain had begun to be severely felt. The train could not be got up. Ney's artillery had not been brought forward for lack of horses. On July 4 the emperor had Berthier write him "that the situation of his army corps seems most alarming from the point of view of the artillery. It is necessary for him not to make a step farther until his artillery has rejoined him. Without artillery his corps would be much compromised." The cavalry was getting dismounted. Napoleon wrote Clarke, July 8: "I do not think it very necessary to augment recruiting for the cavalry; for in this land one loses so many horses that with all the supply of France and Germany, we shall have great difficulty in keeping the actual effective of the regiments mounted." On July 13 Sébastiani reports that the day before he lost forty-two horses from fatigue: "It is in bad taste, I feel, to make such observations at a moment when we should redouble our activity," said he, but without some rest he would lose half of his animals. Excessive rain had spoiled the roads, rations were slack, and the men, as usual, took to plunder, a poor resource in this sparse region, especially just before harvest. Murat reported July 2: "The weather is awful. The soldier has absolutely nothing, and finds nothing. All the villages, or rather all the farms, are abandoned." And about the same time Deroy wrote that "an officer of Italian mounted artillery, who was here a few days ago, assured me that he had not touched bread for twelve days, and that the horse battery had been transformed into a foot battery, so as to haul the pieces with the saddle-horses." This was not the rich valley of the Po or the Danube, with a village and food every few miles. Straggling depleted the ranks: from the Niemen to the Dvina St. Cyr daily lost the equivalent of a battalion. Orders against plunder arrested no man; and all this, at the inception of the campaign and in midsummer, argued an evil future. It is amazing that the emperor did not heed the warning.

Not every one understands what the supply-train of a great army means. Although the Revolutionary armies, in fruitful countries, had cut it down materially, the emperor had grown to permit officers pack-horses and carriages far beyond regulations; the non-combatants were a host; and for every three men in the Grand Army, there was, including the artillery and ammunition-train, at least one animal. Picture to yourself how much roadway a four-horse wagon or a dozen pack-mules need; calculate the number of beasts and wagons required for the Grand Army and the space they would occupy; remember that the main roads were deep in mud and the side roads impassable; and you will understand what feeding the men meant, particularly as the Russians ate out the land they left, and destroyed the magazines they abandoned; and as, unmindful of the hungry fellow soldiers trudging behind them, pillagers uniformly destroy what they cannot consume, more was trodden under foot than eaten.

On this subject, on July 3, the Crown Prince of Bavaria wrote the king: "The successive dissolutions of the troops into a mass of brigands is the worst and most dangerous consequence that we can fear. Seeking for food gives occasion to this, and it is brought about by the complete cessation of all dispositions taken to assure victual." And with regard to some fault found by Napoleon with his cavalry, he continued: "The 25th of last month, in filing at the head of my division in front of Kovno, I met the emperor, who ran to me with a little suite. Without preamble he commenced to tell me that there were great disorders in my division, that he would write on this subject to Your Royal Majesty, that some generals had allowed themselves undue liberties, that he had a mind to have them shot, and that they might go, as he had no need of them. This was said in a raised voice, and so rapidly pronounced, in part screamed, that an answer was for the moment absolutely impossible." Speaking of the French soldiers, the crown prince says: "In general, I have remarked that in some of these regiments, from top to bottom, there is no authority exercised. Between superiors and inferiors there is far too much familiarity, and a show of comradeship reigns and is habitual there. The soldier is so ill brought up and coarse, that since he has been with French generals he passes before me without saluting, unless recalled to his duty. This is not to be denied and explains many excesses."

The Correspondence of these days is full of orders for the erection of bake-ovens, of which the need daily grew. In many towns means for baking was found, but the army suffered as never before. On July 9, in an order from Vilna, the marching ration was ordered cut down to ten ounces of bread, two ounces of rice, one pound of meat; the biscuit was to be reserved and the bread eaten first. In the last days of a march the ration was to be nine ounces of biscuit, two ounces of rice, one pound of meat; and the men by no means got this. Constant orders were issued to keep up the roads.

On July 2 the emperor wrote Berthier: "My Cousin, charge a general officer of your staff to occupy himself solely with the organization of the routes of communication from Vilkoviski to Kovno, and from Kovno to Vilna. From Vilkoviski to Kovno there should be two commandants, and two little garrisons of twenty-five men, with one or two gendarmes. They will protect the post, do the policing, and send regularly news of what happens. They will make the inhabitants repair the broken roads, fill up the bogs, repair and keep up the bridges. From Kovno to Vilna four commandants must be established, and four garrisons of twenty-five men." Then follow instructions as to the duties of these posts. And on the same subject, on July 4, he wrote him: "My Cousin, a single road cannot suffice for an army like this. Moreover, I desire to let the road from Vilkoviski to Kovno rest, so as to give time to reorganize and repair it. Present me a project to establish a road by way of Königsberg, Labiau, Tilsit, in following the left bank of the Niemen. By this means it will be easy to give promptly oats to the horses and bread to the troops." This too was followed by full details.

These orders were much to the point; but the trouble was that they could not be carried out. In other campaigns, the emperor's orders had been such that they were, after a fashion at least, feasible; but here more than half of the orders having to do with the logistics of the army were not executed at all. The emperor's will was law; but even the law fails at times; and this grew rapidly worse as the campaign went on.

The operations of Davout on the upper Niemen now became important. On July 4 Napoleon reinforced him with a Guard division, while Morand at Michalichki reported to Murat. He also ordered Berthier, July 5, to write imperatively to Jerome to get afoot: —

"You will make him understand that I am extremely discontented that he did not put all his light troops under the orders of Poniatowski on the heels of Bagration, to annoy his corps and arrest his march. That, arrived at Grodno the 30th, he should have attacked the enemy at once and pursued him sharply. You will tell him it is impossible to manœuvre worse than he has done. . . . That from his having departed from all the rules and his instructions, has resulted that Bagration will have all the time needed to operate his retreat. . . . Tell him that, had Poniatowski but one division, he should have sent it. . . . That Davout is to-day, the 5th, with a part of his corps in advance of Volochin, but will not be strong enough to stop Bagration. . . . You will tell him that the fruit of my manœuvres, and the finest occasion that has been presented in the war, have been lost by this singular forgetfulness of the first ideas of war."

Next day the emperor placed Jerome's whole command under the orders of Davout.

"Vilna, July 6, 1812. His Majesty orders that in case of the reunion of the 5th, 7th, and 8th army Corps, and of the 4th Corps of cavalry reserve, with the corps commanded by Davout, the command shall devolve upon Davout, as the most ancient general. The emperor orders His Majesty the King of Westphalia to recognize Davout as superior in command, so long as the army corps are united."

But Jerome was not alone at fault: Napoleon's mistake of Doctorov's corps for that of Bagration had led to giving him conflicting orders; and although Jerome had been remiss, what was to be expected of a new made king and a newer made general? Jerome had been told to obey orders specifically, whereas, could the emperor himself have been at hand, he would have risked the improbable attack by Bagration on Warsaw, and have sent Jerome eastward to trap him a week earlier than he did. Jerome was no soldier, and when he had contradictory orders, could not judge which was the more important to obey. Still, he had to pocket his scoldings. Berthier wrote him, July 3: "You must not fall into the snare of the pompous enumerations" (of troops) "which the


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

WEST CENTRAL RUSSIA

Russians make. There are always two thirds to take away." And on July 7: "His Majesty does not find your letters couched in a military style. You should receive the reports of your generals and of your vanguard colonels, and after reading them, you should send the originals to the emperor." He "reads these volumes of reports; and it is there he gets the information according to which he directs his troops."

By July 4 only Latour-Maubourg's cavalry had left Grodno, and by the 8th had reached Lebeda. Meanwhile Davout had marched via Volochin and reached Minsk the same day, when Bagration was at Niesvish. Napoleon kept on prodding Jerome to speed, and would listen to no excuses from him or his lieutenants.

> "My Cousin, answer Poniatowski," he wrote, July 9, to Berthier, "that you have put his letter under the eyes of the emperor. That His Majesty is very discontented to see that he speaks of pay, of bread, when it is a question of pursuing the enemy. That His Majesty has been all the more surprised because he" (Poniatowski) "is alone on his side with small numbers; and that when the emperor's Guards, who have come by forced marches from Paris, instead of having half-rations, are without bread, have nothing but meat" ("no meat," says this letter, as given in Fabry), "and do not murmur, the emperor has been able to see only with pain that the Poles are bad enough soldiers, and have a poor enough spirit, to bring up such privations. That His Majesty hopes that there will be no more talk of this."

Bricks without straw was a sad enough cry; but war without bread is a worse one!

Under this whipping up, Jerome's two corps reached Novogrudok July 11 and Niesvish the 14th, after exchanges on the 9th and 10th with Platov's Cossack flankers; and Davout, fearing, without Jerome's aid, to fall on Bagration, whose force he estimated at sixty thousand men, remained at Minsk on the 12th, lest if he reached Igumen, Bagration should file in his rear to a junction with Barclay. Though ignorant of the enemy's whereabouts, had he been allowed to keep all his divisions, he might have advanced with part and echeloned the others back on Minsk, thus covering his rear, while feeling out in front in search of Bagration; but the distances, the lack of news, and Jerome's slowness made it hard for him to act. Bagration, from Volkovish on the 28th, had reached Slutsk on the 13th, beyond danger of being held up by Davout and Jerome, though whether he could join Barclay in season to stand at the Dvina was yet problematical. The letters and orders seem to show that Davout was doing good work, although the emperor blamed him for laxness. He certainly had kept his divisions in fair condition under the circumstances. On July 12 he reported to the emperor that he had reviewed the *élite* companies (grenadiers and voltigeurs) of Compans, Dessaix and Claparède, in which there were few absent, but that of the *élite* of the 33d Light Infantry only a third was present. "I had these corps file past, butt of musket in air, and the brigadier-general and the colonel at the head, in front of all the other *élite* companies. I ordered that an example should be made in each company of all those who were behind, plying the trade of brigands."

During these days Schwartzenberg had advanced to Pruzhani, and Reynier to Slonim, their eyes fixed on Tormasov's army in Volhynia.

Constrained thereto by Jerome's slowness, Napoleon had ordered Eugene up to Davout's aid in the effort to get at Bagration, and the viceroy left Novo Troki July 7 and reached Solechniki, St. Cyr, the day before, being still at Ganushiski. Like all the rest, Eugene came in for his share of criticism:

> "Generally speaking, you do not write enough," said the emperor, July 4; "and when you are isolated, you do not do what is necessary to tie yourself with headquarters, and get promptly news and orders." And on the 19th: "Have a care to place posts of correspondence, to which you

> will give the order to have horses, so that your correspondence may be quite rapid, and that you may transmit me your reports at the rate of two leagues an hour. If they cannot find horses, they are to furnish their own."

The escape of Bagration was not the only disappointment. Instead of standing for battle, Barclay had retired, July 11, to his intrenched camp at Drissa. The works here were not good, nor had bridges been completed; and the position was strategically unsound; because a retreat on Drissa separated Bagration and Barclay. Had the conditions permitted a prompt French advance from Vilna towards Vitebsk, Barclay would have been pushed up north, where he was useless, and Bagration could have been handled singly.

The alleged reasons for Napoleon's fatal pause at Vilna were, in part, to hear from the manœuvre against Bagration, when on a smaller theatre the news would have come sooner; in part to organize the government of Lithuania, which was a lieutenant's work; in part, after holding Eugene back, to wait for him to come up. The most potent actual reason was lack of victual; it was essential to organize water transportation to Vilna, for the line of advance during all 1812 ran through this town, although when the Grand Army was at Smolensk, much material came from Warsaw, via Brest Litovsk and Minsk.

Despite Napoleon's best labors, Lithuania could not be got in hand. Whatever he did either oppressed the peasants, or annoyed the nobles, or frightened the Jews, who then, as now, held the keys of commerce. In a country where warring armies move, license is always the law, and when the soldiers robbed the peasants, the peasants robbed their masters and the Jews. Most of the adherents of the emperor soon lost their patience; and it cannot be said that the efforts to get the whole-hearted help of the Poles were successful, although that country, in the hope for eventual freedom, did everything it could for the French cause.

When Barclay's retreat called for fresh dispositions, Napoleon, as a second manœuvre, planned to contain the First Army by a front attack, with Murat and the cavalry, Ney and Oudinot, while, with Eugene, part of Davout and, if he came up, Jerome, he himself would move on Polotsk and Vitebsk, and strive there to reach the Russian communications both with St. Petersburg and Moscow. But he still dwelt at Vilna until the Bagration question could be cleared up, and would not begin the fresh operation.

> "My intention is not to have so great a matter engaged in without my presence . . . and not yet to manœuvre on the Dvina," he wrote Berthier, July 6. And the same day Berthier was ordered to write to Murat: "Let him know that I do not intend to move on Dünaburg, but that, meaning to operate with my extreme right, we are far from being ready for it. We must regulate ourselves on the events happening to Bagration. If one can have an affair with him, beat him, throw him into the Pinsk marshes, or oblige him to retire on Mohilev, one may arrive before him at Vitebsk. . . . Make him understand that my intention is to manœuvre to turn the enemy by my right, because on his right the passage of the Dvina is no longer anything, the river being fordable ; that in marching on Smolensk one menaces Moscow, and that in moving on Polotsk one forces the enemy to evacuate all the country to within four or five marches of St. Petersburg. This evacuation would have an advantageous effect" (for us) "on the morale of the Russians, . . . and instead of a little war of rearguard affairs and skirmishes" (*chicanes*), "it would give rise to great flank movements."

This is excellent strategic reasoning, but the work done thereunder savors little of the tremendous activity of Austerlitz and Jena. Both in Spain and Russia, the emperor's map strategy was perfect, but his logistics lacked the winning quality.

Matters progressed slowly, and on July 14 the Grand



Positions, Mid-July.

Army and the Russian forces stood thus: Murat had advanced via Midzi towards Drissa and had reached Somoshi, with Nansouty and Montbrun out at Druia and Cheres. Ney had joined Murat at Drisviati, and Oudinot was marching up river from Dünaburg. Macdonald had reached Smilzi, acting as a flanking corps to protect the Niemen, watch Riga, threaten a diversion below Drissa, collect breadstuffs in Courland, and finally to besiege and take Riga, to secure future winterquarters by holding the navigation of the Dvina. Eugene was at Smorgoni, the Young Guard at Kobilnik, St. Cyr and the Old Guard in Vilna. Jerome had got to Niesvish with Latour-Maubourg out at Romanovo; Schwartzenberg was at Pruzhani and Reynier at Stolovichi, thus opening the Grand Duchy to a raid by Tormasov. Davout had just left Minsk to march on Mohilev.

On the other side, Barclay had vacated his intrenched camp, and crossed to the right bank of the Dvina; Bagration had left Slutsk for Bobruisk. Tormasov's army had been completed and stood at Lutsk, ready to invade Poland and cut the French right wing communications. Not until July 10 had Napoleon's attention been seriously called to this Third Army, and next day he wrote Berthier to have Jerome detach Reynier to cover Poland: —

> "Answer Jerome that you have received with astonishment his letter of July 9. . . . That the order of the 30th is positive, that it was expressed in these terms: 'You are to direct yourself on Minsk. Reynier, without losing sight of covering Warsaw, will direct himself on Niesvish.' This means that the first object of Reynier is to cover Warsaw, that the second, if the enemy should withdraw all his troops from Volhynia and there was nothing more to fear for the Grand Duchy, would be to march on Niesvish."

This is unfair criticism.

By mid-July Napoleon's first excellent plan had completely failed. Jerome's long stay at Grodno, owing to incompetence, conflicting orders and the enormous theatre, and Davout's at Minsk, expecting Jerome to coöperate and Bagration to march his way, had enabled the latter to escape the toils laid for him and make good his retreat via Bobruisk. Moreover, Tormasov now came into the problem as a distinct threat to the French right, to counteract which a speedy success of the French left was essential.

The Russian generals had been acting on no consistent scheme. When Barclay retired to Drissa and ordered Bagration thither, he did not foresee that his lieutenant would have to fray a passage through the French army. Long before the war, the Drissa camp had been erected as a defense to St. Petersburg; but if it were turned by the French reaching the Dvina above it, Barclay would be compelled to fight a superior force alone; and if he were defeated, Bagration would certainly be so, and the road to the heart of the empire be opened. Yet he could scarcely leave the St. Petersburg road open, small chance as there was of Napoleon's marching thither. Between the two plans, the Russians were preparing failure. All that Napoleon needed to profit by the situation was speed; and this, owing to the immense environments, to the question of victual, and, it must be acknowledged, his own lessened incisiveness, was conspicuously absent.

Alexander remained with his army. He had with him his old military instructor, Phull, who had originated the camp at Drissa, in which Barclay had but half-faith, pointing out to the czar that the French would not seek the Russians there, but that these would have to debouch from it and seek the French. There were jealousies in the Russian army, which even the czar could not allay. Although Clausewitz says Phull passed in Prussia as having much genius, and the czar always remained grateful to him, he was a foreigner, and was hated by the real Russians. Even Barclay, though born in Russia, was of Scotch descent, and was not quite trusted. He soon noticed the French intention of turning the Russian left at Drissa and cutting the First from the Second Army. "It is for that reason that I have considered it necessary to make a march on the road to Polotsk," he said to the czar, while Alexander of Wurtemberg suggested taking up a strong position at Vitebsk. In any case, the speedy reunion of the two armies now became essential. As opinions differed, so antagonisms grew. While the czar was at hand, Barclay was not supreme, and although he saw the weakness of the position, he could not leave Drissa. But shortly Alexander left the army to organize the national defense; and no sooner was Barclay in command than he abandoned the camp and started through Polotsk on Vitebsk to a junction with Bagration. It has been questioned whether the formal consent of the czar had been given to this operation; but it may be assumed, and the documents rather support this view. His common sense must have shown him the necessity of joining his two main bodies, that is, for Barclay to move on Smolensk and draw in Bagration. As a rule, he exhibited the same crude but just and comprehensive idea of the requirements of war that was shown in our own Civil War by Abraham Lincoln. Each had to control difficult politics in order to wage efficient war. Alexander was constantly vexed by the ill-feeling between Bagration, who wanted to fight, irrespective of caution, — "I do not understand your wise manœuvres," said this officer: "mine consist in seeking the enemy and beating him," — and Barclay, who wished to draw him in to the main army. As late as November he wrote to Barclay: "Very grave faults committed by Bagration, in consequence of which the enemy forestalled him at Minsk, Borisov and Mohilev, forced you to leave the banks of the Drissa to move on Smolensk.

Fortune favored us there, for against all probability, the junction of the two armies was made there."

In his effort to organize a national system of defense, Alexander began to erect intrenched camps in many parts of the empire, and fully aroused the Muscovite national spirit of resistance by an appeal of July 9: —

"Russian Warriors, you have finally reached the end you proposed to yourselves. When the enemy dared cross the limits of our empire, you were on the frontiers to observe him. Until the entire assembly of our army, we needed by a temporary and indispensable retreat to restrain the ardor with which you turned to arrest the march of the enemy. All the corps of the First Army are now reunited in the positions chosen beforehand. Now a new occasion presents itself to show your approved valor and to win the reward of the labors you have sustained. Let this day, signalized by the victory of Pultavà, serve you for example. Let the memory of your victorious ancestors incite you to glorious exploits. With a powerful arm they threw to earth their enemies. You, in marching in their steps, strive to overturn the project of the enemy directed against your religion, your honor, your country and your families. God, who sees the justice of our cause, will send you his benediction."

A proclamation, probably inspired by Stein, was also issued by the Russians addressed to the German soldiers, warning them to return home. "You know the Russians too well to believe that they are fleeing before you. They will accept battle, and then your retreat will be difficult. They say to you as comrades: 'Return home *en masse*, do not believe those perfidious words that you are fighting for peace. No, you are fighting for the insatiable ambition of the sovereign who does not want peace.'"

The latter appeal had no effect.

While Alexander was thus employed, Barclay left Wittgenstein with twenty-five thousand men at Drissa to hold the communications with St. Petersburg, and promptly moved up the Dvina on Vitebsk. He reached Polotsk July 18, at the time Napoleon arrived at Glubokoi. A few days more and he would have been too late.

When, on July 9, Napoleon gave up the hope of heading off Bagration, he had changed Eugene's direction to one on Dokshizi, thence to move on Polotsk or Vitebsk, as circumstances might dictate, intending himself to join this column with the Guard, while Murat, with his big reinforcement, was to contain Barclay at Drissa, and follow him towards St. Petersburg, should he retreat thither as a consequence of the French operations. He quite disapproved a stroke made by Oudinot at Dünaburg, as Berthier wrote July 16, because it led him to a distance. "You have greatly annoyed the emperor by your movement on Dünaburg. His Majesty charges me to tell you that he hopes that such a thing will not again happen," wrote Berthier. Davout's task was to keep on pushing Bagration, if possible, across the Dnieper. Could this be punctually accomplished, the line of the Dvina might still be won, and Barclay and Bagration cut apart. Of the earlier project, mentioned July 6, to hold Barclay at Drissa, surround him with the whole army, and compel him to fight, there is no further mention. That he would not attack the enemy in his intrenched camps, but turn these and assail him on the march, he wrote Berthier, July 15; and next day, in the hope that Barclay might attack Murat when alone, he wrote that he intended to cross the Dvina between Dissna and Vitebsk, which, by turning their left, would compel the Russians to leave their camp to cover St. Petersburg, or else to attack Murat or himself. In so vast a land as Russia, strategy becomes more difficult than when the theatre is closed in by seas or neutral countries which trace a limit to operations; and moreover the Russians possessed advantages, for though the roads were poor, there was a network of them everywhere, leading through the enormous forests, or over the vast plains, from town to town, which they from knowledge and habit could utilize, when the French could not.

At the opening of the campaign, the emperor forbade small detachments. "The Russian army having a great amount of light cavalry, we must be careful not to make reconnoissances, or to beat the country with little patrols of fifty horse. If the country is open and uncovered, at least a brigade, or about fifteen hundred horse, is necessary." In a broken country, foot should be added. On July 14, from Vilna, he found fault with Latour-Maubourg: "Since when can a chief who has made war in Poland follow the enemy's rearguard, where he knows there are six thousand Cossacks and four thousand men of regular cavalry, with only a division of light cavalry? . . . His Majesty is extremely discontented that personally he" (Latour-Maubourg) "had not been with his vanguard; that when a division of cavalry charges, he should be there."

Napoleon could state his own case with force, if not always with accuracy. From Vilna, July 1, in answer to the approaches of the czar, he wrote: —

"Monsieur my Brother, I have received Your Majesty's letter. The war which divided our states was terminated by the Treaty of Tilsit. I had gone to the conference of the Niemen with the resolution not to make peace without obtaining all the advantages which the circumstances promised me. I had in consequence refused to see the King of Prussia there. Your Majesty said to me, 'I will be your second against England.' This word of Your Majesty changed everything. The Treaty of Tilsit was its corollary. Since then Your Majesty desired modifications made to this treaty. You wished to keep Moldavia and Wallachia, and carry your frontiers to the Danube. You had recourse to negotiation. This important modification to the Treaty of Tilsit, so advantageous to Your Majesty, was the result of the convention of Erfurt. It seems that, towards the middle of 1810, Your Majesty desired new modifications to the Treaty of Tilsit. You had two means to reach this, negotiation and war. Negotiation had succeeded at Erfurt: why this time did you take a different means? You made considerable armaments, declined the road of negotiation, and seemed to desire to obtain modifications to the Treaty of Tilsit only by the protection of your enormous armies. . . . I also had recourse to arms — but six months after Your Majesty had taken this step. . . . Your Majesty first assembled his armies and menaced my frontiers. Your Majesty first left for army headquarters." Napoleon then recites that he had sent Lauriston to St. Petersburg, and that Alexander, and even his minister, had refused to confer with him. "I understood then that the die had been cast. . . . I marched on the Niemen with the intimate sentiment of having done everything to spare humanity these new ills. . . . Your Majesty may say many things, but you will say to yourself that during eighteen months you refused to explain yourself in any manner . . . until I had evacuated the territory of my allies. . . . War then is declared between us. Even God cannot make that which has been not to have been; but my ear will always be open to negotiations for peace. . . . If Your Majesty desires to finish the war, you will find me disposed so to do. If Your Majesty is decided to continue it, and if you wish to establish a cartel" (for the exchange of prisoners) "on the most liberal basis, . . . Your Majesty will find me ready for everything. . . . You will find me full of friendship and of esteem for your fine and great qualities, and desirous of proving it to you. NAPOLEON."

It cannot be gainsaid that the emperor here puts a bad case well.

The war of 1812 in America might at an earlier moment have had some influence on the Russian question; but opening as it did while Napoleon was in Vilna, he was too far advanced to utilize this outbreak against England in lieu or in support of the Russian invasion, as a lever by which to further his projected isolation of that country. Properly made use of, it might have been of assistance to his projects; but anything he did would have been engulfed in the failure of the Russian campaign.

Meanwhile Poland had declared herself free and the old Confederation reëstablished; but Napoleon did not fully approve this act, fearing to make Austria discontented, and prevent a future settlement with Russia. He desired to use Poland, but not let Poland hamper his own conduct.

The days Napoleon wasted at Vilna caused much future complication. Plausible reasons are given for the delay, but in his former campaigns no reasons were valid which excused the loss of a day, and now the days were priceless. The weather had been rainy, the roads were bottomless; if the days were hot, the nights were cold, as Poniatowski wrote July 22; stragglers were an army in themselves; with only green rye as forage, the horses had died wholesale. Batteries were stalled, squadrons afoot; five hundred caissons and one hundred guns were already left behind; Mortier was ordered, July 13, to "let his artillery march at its ease, even if it arrives a day or two late. That is preferable to seeing it lose horses," — a variation from the orders to Ney ten days before. Difficulties in no sense change facts. Much of the Vilna work could have been left to others; the strategic situation could not. Had Napoleon accompanied Davout and the Guard from Vilna on Minsk, he would surely have headed off Bagration, and with Jerome's assistance — or with that of a better leader — have beaten him. Or had he personally advanced on Barclay with the Guard, Eugene and Davout, he could have reached Polotsk on the 12th and have thrown Barclay back on Riga, and this would have ended the campaign. The loss of seventeen days in Vilna was the error of Napoleon's military career most fraught with ill results.

Late on July 16 he left Vilna, headquarters remaining behind under Maret, and reached Sventsiani next forenoon. Hearing that a Russian detachment had crossed on the 15th at Druia and attacked Montbrun, he inferred an offensive manœuvre by Barclay, and ordered the leading corps to delay; but on learning that the attack was partial, this order was shortly countermanded. On the 18th Napoleon reached Glubokoi with the Guard, St. Cyr two marches in the rear, and Eugene on the right at Dolginov; while Oudinot was just below Drissa, Murat and Ney moving on Dissna, with Nansouty and Montbrun in their front; and Grouchy was at Bobr reconnoitring out towards Orsha on the Dnieper. The advance went on. Eugene was ordered towards Kameni on the road to Vitebsk, and the left wing to be drawn in up the Dvina; Davout to reach out from Mohilev towards Eugene, and to bring up in reserve Jerome's wing. The Grand Army was assembling for a passage at the excellent Dvina crossing near Bechenkovichi, and though aware that Barclay had already moved up river beyond Polotsk, the emperor expected to anticipate him at Vitebsk and force battle.

Like all the rest, Davout came in for his share of fault-finding. The emperor felt that he had not been as energetic as usual in his work against Bagration; and though he had taken part of his divisions from him, and given him a big task with the rest, he expressed his discontent.

> On July 20 he told Berthier to write him: "That I cannot be satisfied with his conduct towards Jerome. That I only gave him the command in the case where the assembly had been made, and the two armies being on the battlefield, one commander became necessary; instead of which he published this order before the assembly was made, and when he was scarcely in communication by a few posts. That having done this, and after having learned that Jerome had retired, he was to keep the direction and send orders to Poniatowski. That I do not know to-day how my right is getting on; that I had given him a proof of the greatest confidence that I have in him, and that it seems to me that he has not done himself justice."

Yet Davout took it all in good part, and seems to have been alive as to what it was necessary to do. From Igumen, July 15, he wrote Pajol: —

> "It is essential to have prompt news of Bagration. Jerome day before yesterday was at Niesvish, and announced that he was pursuing the enemy with his sword in his ribs. It is therefore probable that he is marching to-day on Slutsk. The distances are too great for us to take part in any

affair which might occur there, but we must give the utmost disquiet to the enemy, and be ready to act against Bagration according to what he may do. If Bagration wishes to pass by way of Bobruisk, I can, I think, on his march by the flank do him much harm. If he wishes to pass the Beresina lower down, it is important for me to anticipate him on the Dnieper."

On the same day Berthier was instructed to put Poniatowski in command of Jerome's force, the latter declining to serve under Davout. Some one had to be wrong, and it was never Napoleon. From now on, the old reliance upon Davout's capacity and good-will seems to lessen, much to the emperor's eventual loss. Davout wrote Poniatowski, July 24: —

"I see that His Majesty has given you command of the right wing. I know that this command is in very good hands, and the esteem that we bear each other, as well as our devotion to the service of the emperor, is a sure guarantee of our good understanding in our operations. I will lay bare to you my ideas and will let you know my situation, so that you may take action according to your own information or mine." Where upon follow full details of the status.

In consequence of the fresh manœuvres, the situation on July 24 was this: From Glubokoi via Ushach Napoleon had reached Kameni; Murat, with Nansouty and Montbrun in the van, and Ney close behind him, marching via Dissna and Ulla, and Eugene via Kameni, followed by the Guard, had all come on to Bechenkovichi; St. Cyr was at Ushach, and Oudinot at Dissna watching Wittgenstein, who had reached Drissa, and was ready to cross the Dvina and attack anything in his front, as a diversion. Macdonald had reached Jakobstadt July 21, and at Bauske thrown back on Riga a Russian detachment. Poniatowski was coming along to reinforce Davout, who had just crossed swords with Bagration. Reynier was back at Chomsk, Tormasov at Pinsk, Schwartzenberg at Slonim.

Fearing that the French would anticipate him at Vitebsk, or on the road to Smolensk, Barclay had made speed, and by



Positions July 24.

July 23 had in part reached Vitebsk. He would have marched to Orsha; but the French were so close at hand that he had to send Ostermann to Ostrovno to retard them and enable him to draw in his rearguard under Doctorov. The French mass was now concentrated at Bechenkovichi, ready either to cross and give battle, or to march on Vitebsk; and Napoleon wrote Eugene, July 24, that it was important to secure this latter town to rest the troops, but that the safe crossing was the main point.

Davout had reached Mohilev July 20, with Grouchy at Kochanovo, keeping touch with Napoleon. He had a difficult task, as he knew little of the enemy, and had to keep communications open on the left to Orsha and on the right to Beresino. Tried by what the rest of the army had accomplished or failed in, he was doing well. Bagration, who had reached Bobruisk two days before, was marching in two divisions on Mohilev. He could either force his way north through Mohilev, or file off towards Mstislavl; but as his orders named Orsha as objective, he determined on the former plan, and on the 23d, with his first column under Raevski, he attacked Davout. The French position was astride the Bobruisk road, on a high bank in rear of a marshy brook, with the left on the Dnieper and the right on a wood where stood a strong detachment. It could have been turned, but Bagration feared that Davout would cut him from his second column, and made only a frontal attack. The contest was sharp — both commanders were fighters of the first water. At one moment it looked as if the French line would be broken; but by putting in his reserves, Davout held his own, and Bagration, exaggerating his forces, and finding the road thus closed, left Platov with his Cossacks to delay pursuit, and marched back to Stari Bichov, crossed the Dnieper, and marched via Mstislavl on Smolensk. Davout would have exceeded his orders in crossing the Dnieper to again head him off. In this battle of Mohilev each side had some twenty thousand men, and the loss has been stated as high as three thousand killed and wounded on each side, although Napoleon put it at one hundred French and one thousand Russians. Davout wrote Poniatowski, July 26: "I see that the battle of the 23d put great confusion into their projects, but they will follow them in part, and my first manœuvre is not to let myself be separated from the emperor, who to-day must be in Vitebsk. Raevski's two divisions must be looked on as *hors de combat*."

Bagration.

Davout had crossed the Vistula with seventy-two thousand men, of whom twenty-eight thousand had gone to Murat, leaving him forty-four thousand men; and that these had dwindled to one half without a battle shows the stress of the march on insufficient rations. The same condition obtained in all the corps. On July 20 the crown prince wrote:—

> "The resources offered by the country are very feeble. They have been devoured by the preceding troops, but one can pick up here and there something. Mills are wanting to make flour, because on these roads there are only water-mills, of which the use is very slow, and which only yield a sort of paste." On July 24 Kerner wrote: "Stockmeyer's battalion has only one captain. There are several battalions where in all there are but four or five officers who are well. . . . The country is too bad, the troops too numerous, the marches too continuous. When we arrive at a camp, every one is too tired for either man or horse to move a limb. Misery will therefore remain great. It will augment by the continuance of the marches, because the men will always be exhausted. Each night of rest does extraordinary harm, and costs us many men sick and horses dead. Each day when it rains, soldiers are found dead in the bivouac before we leave." And five days later he wrote: "The marches having continued without stopping for eleven days, one easily sees that the soldier's strength has much diminished. Misery has brought on many suicides, and our column resembles more a transport of sick than of warriors. . . . If Ney demanded from the French divisions which precede us, even after a fashion, a little order, all the corps could be well nourished, but all those who go before us can, without being prevented, pillage and burn everything."

The condition of the country and population is indicated in an itinerary from Vilna to Glubokoi, divided into stretches. In the first stretch of forty miles were forty houses and one farm; in the next of nineteen miles were seventy houses, a castle and a near-by farm; in the next of thirteen miles were forty houses, some hamlets and small farms; in the next of sixteen miles were twelve houses, several farms and many near-by houses; in the next of sixteen miles were twenty houses, one inn, one mill, one castle, one church and a number of houses far apart; in the next of twenty-four miles were fifty houses, one convent, one church and several farms.

Bagration had done well. Platov had helped him much, but it was Jerome's slowness that saved him. He was able to reach Smolensk two days after Barclay. On July 24 Davout was still at Mohilev, with Poniatowski coming up, too late to be of present use. Vandamme's corps, now Junot's, was at Krupi, and Poniatowski's at Igumen; Latour-Maubourg was near Bobruisk. The staff of the right wing was dissolved, and the two corps were placed under Davout.

Reynier, ordered back to protect Poland against Tormasov, and starting July 14 from Stolovichi, had reached Chomsk July 24. Opposite him, Tormasov had left Lutsk, and reached the Pripet headwaters on the front Pinsk-Janov-Brest Litovsk about the same time. Schwartzenberg, advancing towards Niesvish to join Davout, had got to Slonim. On July 22 Napoleon ordered Berthier to write Reynier that "I do not prescribe anything to him; that his principal aim is to cover the Grand Duchy; that a good manner of covering the Grand Duchy is to enter Volhynia, to make confederations everywhere, and to get the country into insurrection; that all that is left to his prudence." In the same spirit, on July 26, the emperor told Berthier to write Oudinot that "he alone can decide what he can do; that he therefore has *carte blanche*, but he is to take all means to correspond promptly with us." He was too far off to control his right and left wings.

On this same July 24 Napoleon had ridden to Bechenkovichi, and found Eugene throwing a bridge, and a cavalry party that had waded the river in touch with the enemy's rearguard. Joining the cavalry, he rode with it until satisfied that Barclay had been faster than he, had crossed his head of column, and was well on the way to Vitebsk; but recognizing with chagrin that his turning manœuvre had failed.

he still hoped that the Russians would stand for battle to save Vitebsk. The country was good for defense, as there were forests and ravines which retarded the development of troops, and cavalry could not act to the best advantage; and on the 25th he pushed Murat with Nansouty along the left bank of the Dvina, and Montbrun along the right bank, towards Vitebsk. At Ostrovno, July 25, Murat ran across Ostermann in position in the woods. The Russian foot sallied out to attack the French horse, but was thrown back by the sharp French charges; the enemy then essayed to turn both French flanks; but when Delzon's division came up to aid Murat, Ostermann withdrew to the forest lines back of Ostrovno. Next day Murat renewed the combat, hoping to break through; during the night fresh troops under Konovnitsin had replaced Ostermann, and held their ground behind a ravine and leaning on woods. The French left, thrown around the Russian right, was met by the reserve and hurled back; but Roussel's division finally turned the Russian left, and the corps withdrew on Tuchkov at Komari; and this place was held until Napoleon came up, when, pushing Eugene through the forest, the Russians retired slowly in echelon. At a loss of about twenty-five hundred men on each side, Ostermann had retarded the French two days.

As Napoleon informed Berthier, July 25, the prisoners stated that the enemy was waiting at Vitebsk: indeed, Barclay felt that his junction with Bagration was accomplished, but he stayed there a few days to rest his troops. Lest too smart an attack, however, should incline Barclay to further retreat, the emperor instructed Murat not to demonstrate too strongly; for no strategic means was left of compelling the Russian army to stand; nor could Barclay fight at Vitebsk if Davout headed off Bagration and occupied Smolensk, as he feared he might.

To Eugene Napoleon wrote July 26: "My Son, I have written to Murat to advance near Vitebsk with wisdom and precaution, and without engaging any other affair than a big combat of the vanguard. He can attack a corps of ten or twelve thousand men, but not enter into a general combat without being well prepared. Either the enemy wants to fight or does not want to fight. If the enemy wants to fight, it is very happy for us. He might be prevented from so doing by not being joined by one or two of his corps. There is then no inconvenience in letting him make his assembly, because otherwise it might be for him a pretext not to fight."

It was Napoleon's habit to make the best of everything, to give a rosy hue to affairs, even for his intimates. On July 26 he wrote Maret: "The country is fine, the crops superb, and we find everywhere means of living." This plan worked well for a while, but its consequences were fatal, for although at first his cheeriness encouraged his subordinates, the real situation soon became known to all, and bred a feeling of uncertainty. The evil grew as the campaign went on.

On July 26 the advance on Vitebsk continued, and the French van came into presence of the whole Russian army, which had been marshaled south of Vitebsk and behind the Luchessa stream. Here was the opportunity so long sought: Napoleon could put one hundred and twenty thousand men in line to Barclay's eighty thousand, and the Russian position was bad, as it could be turned by the left and the road to Moscow be seized. Success was certain if the rear corps could be got up. The Russian outposts were pushed back of the brook, and the French head of column deployed in front of the enemy; but as the army was advancing along a single road, and what he deemed a sufficient force could not be got up during the 26th, Napoleon merely demonstrated, deferring an attack until he had concentrated. He felt certain Barclay intended to fight and would remain in position. Such, indeed, had been Barclay's purpose, for not only was constant retreat affecting both army and nation, but he had ordered Bagration in by way of Orsha; he did not know his whereabouts; and farther retreat was compromising his lieutenant. But the stars in their courses fought against Napoleon: during the night of July 26–27 Barclay received Bagration's report that he had been stopped at Mohilev by Davout, and had changed his route to one by way of Mstislavl on Smolensk; and the necessity of fighting the superior French single-handed was past. Still, as there was not time left for the Russians to withdraw under cover of darkness, on the 27th both armies remained in presence. All the more convinced that Barclay would now stand for battle, Napoleon, instead of attacking this day, busied himself in bringing up forces to make the work decisive, reconnoitred the enemy's position and formed his plan; no doubt on the morrow he would have destroyed the Russian army; but early on the night of July 27–28 Barclay quietly and skillfully decamped, and by morning was marching in three columns far along on the roads to Rudnia and Porechi. So cleverly had he done this that Napoleon could not even ascertain by which road the bulk of the Russian army had marched, though that Smolensk was their objective, there could be small doubt. Not a straggler was left behind, and every village was abandoned. His disappointment must have been keen, although he permitted no one to see it.

On July 29 he cheerfully wrote Maret: "We entered Vitebsk yesterday. The enemy is beating in retreat on every side. I have moved as far as Surash to follow him, but as he has divided to follow several roads, it is not possible to reach him. The general opinion is that he is moving on Smolensk to cover this town. These last affairs have lost many men to the enemy. His loss is estimated at seven or eight thousand men; several of his generals have been killed or mortally wounded."

On leaving Vitebsk, Barclay had received notice that the emperor purposed to cut him from Smolensk, and that Davout would head thither, and he sent Doctorov by way of Rudnia to occupy the town. "The entire safety of the country now depends on the rapidity with which our troops shall occupy Smolensk. Remember the marches of Suwarrov and accomplish such," he said. Entering Vitebsk, the emperor pushed Ney on Rudnia and Murat out towards Gaponava. At the Smolensk fork Murat got in touch with the Russian rearguard, and by night all his cavalry, with Eugene and the Guard close behind, reached Gaponava, the emperor accompanying the column. He was so little certain whither Barclay had retired, that on the 29th the Russians got to Rudnia and Porechi, followed only by cavalry, and Eugene advanced on Surash.

Accompanied by the Guard, Napoleon returned to Vitebsk, conscious that Barclay had escaped him. His failure had been due to lack of his ancient habit of pushing his subordinates by his personal presence and example. As, after Eggmühl, he had for the first time declined to pursue a broken enemy, so here at Vitebsk he had hesitated in attacking an enemy drawn up to meet him, and had permitted a whole day to pass without the attack he would in earlier days have delivered; the enemy had escaped, and the long march from the Vistula to the Dvina had been robbed of all result. It may be said that he was wise, at this distance from his base, to wait for all his troops. True, if you like, but was it not possible to hurry them up? In former campaigns they had marched night and day. The army was exhausted and ill-fed, but the old Bonaparte had a way of getting it along; and while no other commander could have done better with half a million men on this enormous theatre, we are accustomed to demand more of Napoleon than of others. If to march faster than the Russians was not possible, his clear vision should have foreseen the fact, and other measures should have been adopted. The entire Russian campaign depended for success on the superior speed he had theretofore always shown.

The army was rapidly decreasing. The emperor had crossed the Niemen at Kovno, Piloni and Grodno with three hundred and sixty thousand men on a front of eighty miles; he now stood from Polotsk through Vitebsk to Mohilev with two hundred and thirty thousand men on a front of one hundred and fifty miles. The advance of two hundred and fifty miles in five weeks, seven miles a day including halts, had lessened his fighting force by over a third, — in some bodies more, for the Wurtemberg division, from July 15 to August 11, diminished by just a half, — and the object of the campaign, viz.: to keep his own force concentrated and separate that of the enemy, had been quite reversed. Barclay and Bagration joined hands at Smolensk August 3. The one purpose of the advance in echelon by the left had been to cut Barclay and Bagration apart and to fall on the flank of either, or both in turn. First went lost the hope of surrounding Bagration; then the hope of keeping him from joining Barclay; last the hope of beating Barclay in a frontal attack. Apart from the vast theatre, the first loss seems due to the growing incapacity of the emperor for bodily exertion, which did not permit his being personally at the critical points; the last rather to an increased habit of mental indecision, perhaps originating in physical ailments. "Fortune is a woman; if you fail her to-day, look not to find her to-morrow," he once said. On the 27th he failed the goddess at the Luchessa; on the 28th she was no longer with him.

Polish Footman.

To the dispassionate observer to-day it is evident that, in operations of no greater speed, the French could accomplish nothing in this vast land if the Russians played a waiting game; but by Napoleon this view of the prospect was not even considered; he still believed he could reach and destroy the enemy at Smolensk.

At Vitebsk everything was seized for the army, and hospitals were established in the convents. July had been rainy; scant or bad food had multiplied sickness; the usual rations were still in the rear, transporting from Königsberg to Kovno, under control of Admiral Basta. Starved men in hot weather break quickly. The foragers generally brought in rye; the men had no mills to grind it, but dried as coffee would be, in any kind of utensil, being stirred all the time, it could be used like rice, and cooked with meat or other things. About a pound per man per day was considered sufficient. The beeves driven along for meat were often unfit to eat. The water was mostly from swamps, or much muddied by constant use, and brandy to cut the water was absent. The men had fallen by hundreds from dysentery, and the hospital train had not got forward. Yet the emperor would not face the facts, and on July 22 he wrote Berthier: —

> "Answer General Jomini that it is absurd to say that there is no bread, when there are five hundred quintals" (cwts.) "of flour a day; that instead of complaining, he ought to get up at four o'clock in the morning, go himself to the mills, and to the administration, and have thirty thousand rations of bread made a day; but that if he sleeps and weeps, he will have nothing. That he ought to know that the emperor, who had many occupations, nevertheless went every day himself to visit the administration," etc.

The army needed rest; and as the first object of the campaign had been forfeited, Napoleon put it into cantonments, while Davout, Poniatowski and the Westphalians were coming up. "The fatigue of the army, want of artillery, uncertainty of the forces at his disposition, all concur to impose on Napoleon a necessary halt," says Coutanceau. The Guard was in Vitebsk; Eugene was at Janovchi and Surash; Nansouty and Montbrun were pushed out to Porechi and Rudnia; Ney came on to Liosno; St. Cyr remained at Bechenkovichi; two of Davout's divisions were in Vitebsk, and one reaching out towards his main force, which, after the affair at Mohilev, had on August 2 reached Dubrovna, with Grouchy at Babinovichi keeping up touch with headquarters. Poniatowski came on to Mohilev July 28. Junot's corps took up position at Orsha. Latour-Maubourg, left at Rogachov, was to pay heed to the rear.

Polish Voltigeur.

The emperor would have liked to keep moving. On July 31 Murat wrote: "I think if it were possible to push our heads of column on Smolensk, Your Majesty would occupy this great town without obstacles. . . . Everybody thinks that the enemy can only fall back on Dorogobush with Bagration." But Napoleon did not know just what forces he could dispose of. He asked Davout, July 30, "the truth for myself alone;" and next day wrote: "Send me the situation of everything, so that I may decide on the part to take, which can only be the result of perfect knowledge of things." On August 8 Jermalov wrote the czar: "Davout could have in effect occupied Smolensk before us without much effort, because some of his troops were in Orsha. . . . Thus we have operated our junction in an unhoped-for manner, in the presence of considerable forces of the enemy. We are numerically more feeble than the enemy, but by zeal, the desire of fighting, fierceness even, we are as strong as he is."

From Vitebsk, July 29, 1812, Napoleon wrote Berthier: "That the situation of the cavalry, infantry and artillery is such that I am resolved, if the enemy does not force me to make contrary dispositions, to remain seven or eight days in refreshment quarters, to repose the army." That he is to notify Ney "to put his three divisions in good localities," near Mohilev, "to have good barracks made for his men where they can be sheltered from the rain, and to begin regular distributions and rationing." Like orders were given the others. And next day he wrote Berthier that "the junction of Bagration with the main army will be made at Smolensk; that it might have been prevented, because it cannot take place for five or six days; that the heat is so great and the army so tired that the emperor judged it essential to give it several days' repose." On July 30 Davout was notified: "My intention is to give seven or eight days' repose to the army, which is very tired; that I have preferred this disadvantage to that of arriving at Smolensk before Bagration."

Only for the moment did Napoleon consider putting an end to the campaign as one of a number of alternatives. Here such a plan would have been faulty. He had announced his purpose to beat the enemy, or else march to Smolensk; he must either abandon his work or go on with it, and to abandon it now would give the Russians time to arm the nation, and show Europe that the Great Captain was no longer invincible. Until Smolensk could be reached, or one battle could be fought, he must keep on; and in a battle he hoped to set all things right. At the opening of the campaign he had had his choice of a slower and more methodical advance into Russia, by keeping the troops back until his means of victualing them could be perfected; or of disregarding the question of food and moving rapidly upon the enemy, hoping to rectify every error by a battle. He had chosen the latter method, and must now abide by it. But the one thing required was greater speed.

Buturlin states that Barclay and Bagration, united at Smolensk in the early days of August, numbered one hundred and twenty thousand men — one hundred and fifteen would be nearer the truth; they had left twenty-five thousand with Wittgenstein, and five thousand had been disabled at Mohilev and Ostrovno. The two armies had started with one hundred and eighty thousand men. Taking out the above, we ought to have left one hundred and fifty thousand men, showing a loss of thirty-five thousand men on the road. This allowed but a reasonable number of absentees. The French corps, on the contrary, were dangerously reduced by sickness, or by wandering away in search of rations. Not only were there stragglers by thousands, but the provost-marshal parties to gather these up consumed an equal number of men. The overwhelming French forces on the Niemen had already been reduced to nearly the figure of the Russians.

Despite the details of the strategical movements of the Grand Army, we must remember that Napoleon never lost sight for a moment of all the questions of transportation, victual, hospital service, paymaster's duties, and the still more serious question of artillery and ordnance. He kept sight of his army everywhere.

On July 8 he wrote Clarke: "There are in Mantua, Peschiera and Legnano, which are unhealthy countries, many young conscripts. . . . These are so many lost men," and ordered them assembled in battalions in more healthful places. To Berthier: "The major-general will make General Bourcier understand that under whatever pretext it may be, I will not have horses which are not full five years old. That I prefer to receive none. That as to height, I leave him the master to do what he can, but that I will not have any modifications of age." On July 31 he wrote Maret: "I see with pain that the three thousand sick at Vilna are in distress, and even lack straw. . . . See that measures are taken to ameliorate this state of things." And on August 4: "I find it convenient to stop to give a little repose to the army and organize magazines. Make yourself busy organizing those at Vilna and along the route. See that the governor has the boats unloaded and their cargoes stored, so that they may return to Kovno."

The emperor's care in prescribing routes, ordering their repair and erecting magazines was constant, but for lack of means, the orders he gave could as a rule be carried out only in part, at times not at all.

The late marches had been disheartening, especially to the allies. The reports sent home by Deroy, the crown prince and Wrede are full of meaning: —

Deroy's report on August 11 says that there was not enough straw for the troops to lie on, and that the thatching of the roofs had been stripped to feed the beasts; that dysentery was so general that not three per cent. were free from it; that the number of stragglers and dying men was beyond description. "Often one met groups of ten to fifteen dead lying around a dead fire, leaning on their knapsacks, with their guns beside them. We passed beside them without according them the least pity, and yet less judging them worthy of attention." "Though the nature and cost of this war were strange and unknown to the Bavarian warrior, the will of his king sufficed. With full confidence in the genius of Napoleon, which impressed all things, and in his fortune, until now unlimited, the Bavarian courageously followed the battalions used to victory. . . . With each day courage and gayety disappeared. . . . Whoever remained behind was considered lost. The songs so much in use in the Bavarian army had long ago disappeared; for entire days you heard not a syllable, not even curses. . . . On the faces of the masses of corpses which lay along the route, each soldier thought to read the fate for which he was reserved: to die of hunger." On August 12 Wrede wrote the king: "The marches and countermarches, the want of food, the heat and the roads have thrown more soldiers into the hospitals, and have made us lose more men, than if we had delivered a most bloody battle."

All this was in summer. What would happen when bad weather came on? In the Life of Brandt are a number of details of camp life in these cantonment days, and the scene is familiar to every old campaigner.

Encampments were assigned to the divisions, and the adjacent woods furnished material. In two days a regular permanent camp of huts was created, and was protected by throwing out cavalry, sustained by infantry posts, on the wide plain. "Pillage and theft were severely forbidden. Some French soldiers taken in the act were shot. . . . Troops of workmen were formed, composed of distillers, brewers, butchers and assistants; to them were joined Russian prisoners and deserters, the last being in great numbers. They rendered excellent service. There were constructed at Dubrovna, and in neighboring villages, establishments where brandy and wine were made. The troops cut, harvested, threshed, ground and cooked. Our people ground the wheat in the mills. As a rule, this was ill done. The French had a species of hand-mill by which six or eight men could grind in a day 250 to 260 rations. That was not the case with us. At the same time we amassed much forage in the camp. From day to day things grew better, and the barracks were provided with benches and chairs. The place of arms in front of the camp was planted with trees. In truth these soon became dry, but they were replaced with others, while the first were burned. All this was obtained with great effort, but it was then a principle to keep the soldier busy all the time. . . . The Cossacks interrupted us in our occupations, they surprised the villages where we were working, but a well-organized service and the fire of the infantry, of which they were much afraid, generally kept them at a suitable distance."

As always, the emperor remained a reader. On the 7th of August he wrote Barbier in Paris that he "desires some amusing books. If there are some good new romances, or older ones which he does not know, or Memoirs agreeable to read, you would do well to send them to us, for we have moments of leisure that are not easy to fill here." In the trying days of earlier campaigns there had not been so many moments of leisure. The emperor's abnormal bodily activity filled them all.

Sword of the Period.

LI.

SMOLENSK AND VALUTINO. AUGUST, 1812.

SWEDEN made a treaty with Russia; England helped both. Poland was less helpful than expected. By threatening Warsaw, Tormasov contained Reynier and the Austrians, while the Russian right was reinforced opposite Macdonald and the Prussians; Wittgenstein outmatched Oudinot and St. Cyr at Polotsk, and Napoleon's plans so far had miscarried. Still he believed the Russians would soon stand for battle, and victory would cure all these evils. He was right: Barclay and Bagration had agreed to advance towards Vilna and fight. But Napoleon had conceived a scheme for a turning manœuvre by his right, to force battle at Smolensk, and although the Russians came on to Rudnia, from lack of information he did not seize the chance. He began his turning movement August 10, and on perceiving this the Russians retired to Smolensk. The Grand Army continued the manœuvre, and early August 16 stood in front of Smolensk. The city was defended and a first attack failed. On August 17 this was unsuccessfully renewed. What Napoleon wanted was battle, and to force this, he needed to cut off the Russian army. He had lost the Rudnia chance, and now should have crossed the river above Smolensk and seized the Moscow road, as there was every chance to do; but he wasted time in front of Smolensk, as if the Russians would come out and fight, backing on the town. Instead, they were intent on regaining the Moscow road, and had only held Smolensk for this purpose. During the night of August 17–18 they evacuated the city, the French followed them across the river, and a small French force went forward to pursue them. Murat and Ney attacked the enemy at Valutino, August 19, but, unsustained, accomplished naught. The Russians had again avoided battle, and were well on the way to Moscow. Napoleon had promised to stop at Smolensk, but as a Russian pause on the Moscow road looked like battle, he followed on. The army had dwindled to half its force, but was still faithful. Had Napoleon accurately gauged the manifest facts, he would have seen that he could not reach Moscow and hold himself there; but still he pushed on, expecting both that Barclay would fight and that Alexander would yield.

ALTHOUGH Napoleon did not immediately hear of them, several political changes happened during the early part of the Russian campaign which tended to upset the calculations on which he had predicated success. On March 24 Russia had signed a treaty with Sweden, which, as Bernadotte continued his negotiations with Napoleon, was kept secret; peace with the Turks was ratified July 14; and on July 18 a treaty was made, by which England subsidized the czar, and afforded the Russian fleet in the Baltic certain harbor privileges. The military disappointments were more serious. In opening the campaign, Napoleon calculated that success in the centre would force back the enemy's wings; but as Barclay and Bagration were now basing on Moscow, Wittgenstein on St. Petersburg, and Tormasov on the Army of Moldavia under Chichagov, which was advancing to its support, and each army could move independently, this calculation failed. Napoleon had also intended that the Poles, after joining the Grand Army, should make a diversion by way of Mozyr into Volhynia and cut Tormasov's communications on the Pripet, but other matters claimed precedence of this operation; and instead of being neutralized by the retreat of the centre, the Russian right and left wings were becoming a distinct threat.

On the French right wing matters looked ill. On July 24 Reynier had met a detachment of Tormasov near Chomsk, and pushing it back, had reached Antopol; Tormasov, having on the 27th captured the French brigade holding Kobrin, was raiding Poland with Cossacks and threatening Warsaw; whereupon Reynier retired to Slonim, and Schwartzenberg, who had been ordered on to Minsk to sustain Davout, came back from Niesvish at his earnest solicitation. All this Napoleon approved, when informed of the facts, and placing Schwartzenberg in command, instructed him through Maret, August 2, "that my intention is that with the two corps assembled, which must make forty thousand men, he is to march on Tormasov . . . to deliver battle to them; that he is to enter

Volhynia, if necessary, and that he shall have a care to so act that in no case can the one or the other come near me." But the emperor was persuaded that Tormasov had not more than ten thousand third-battalion men, for as this army would have been more useful as a reinforcement to Bagration, he could not see why it should be so faultily employed; and although wont to take advantage of the enemy's errors, he was now unwilling to credit them. No one thing attracts the attention more than the passing of Napoleon's power to gauge the value of events. Of old he used to found or alter plans on the information collected, from which he could with astonishing accuracy deduce the hard facts; now he seemed to disregard facts, unless they fitted into his preconceived plans; and his underrating of the enemy's force and exaggeration of his own, not only towards the enemy but towards his own marshals, in the attempt to breed that confidence which numbers produce, was by reaction becoming dangerous.

On August 10 Schwartzenberg drove out of Pruzhani a detachment of Tormasov's, which retired to Gorodechno, and when, two days later, the Russian army came to its aid from Chomsk, he attacked that. Including Reynier's corps, he had a distinct superiority; and although he did not win a decisive or a brilliant victory, Tormasov retired during the succeeding night on Kobrin. Later he withdrew to the Lutsk country; Schwartzenberg followed, and took place in his front.

On the French left wing, though Oudinot had reached Dissna, Macdonald had so far done nothing to coöperate with him. From Ushach, July 23, Napoleon had written Oudinot that it would be advantageous to make headquarters at Polotsk; that a manœuvre on Sebesh ought to compel Wittgenstein to yield up Drissa and Druia; and on July 30 that he was to destroy the Drissa camp, so that it could not be used for operation in his rear; in pursuance of which, Oudi-


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
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SSIA

not crossed the Dvina to Polotsk, July 26. Urged on by Napoleon, who estimated Wittgenstein at ten thousand instead of nearly thirty thousand men, Oudinot sallied out to meet the Russians, and reached Kliastizi July 30, with two divisions, less than twenty-five thousand men, leaving the third behind to hold the Drissa. Wittgenstein had been about to cross the Dvina at Druia and fall on the French rear, but when he heard of Oudinot's advance, and that Macdonald threatened to cross at Jakobstadt, he retired towards Sebesh; and when Oudinot still advanced, he determined on attack as the best defense. His van struck Oudinot's July 30, at Kliastizi: each commander held his own, and brought up his troops. Next day Wittgenstein's energetic onset forced Oudinot beyond the Drissa to Bojarchino. On August 1 Wittgenstein sent his van under Kulniev across the river, but Oudinot drove it back, and following it up heedlessly with Verdier's division, was in his turn forced back. As a result, Oudinot retired August 2 to Polotsk, and Wittgenstein took up a position behind the Drissa at Sokoliche. To enable Oudinot to resume the offensive, Napoleon sent St. Cyr and the Bavarians, twelve thousand strong, from Bechenkovichi to Polotsk, and on August 7 Berthier was ordered to write Oudinot: —

Wittgenstein.

> "That in no campaign have we followed the Russian corps with more attention, and we are perfectly familiar with their organization. That everything leads us to believe that he has not more than twenty thousand men before him. . . . This very light manner of doing things compromises the general operation, because it may lead the emperor to make false movements. If we were not very superior in forces to the enemy, the retrograde movement of the 2d Corps on Polotsk would be a veritable fault. After the fine victory he had obtained, it is astonishing that it should be the enemy who remained master of the battlefield. He fell back, the enemy advanced. The enemy knew that two divisions had crossed the Dvina, he advanced still more. War is a matter of opinion" (sentiment, or morale), "and the art was to keep for himself the opinion that he had got for himself after the great advantage he had won."

With St. Cyr coming up, Oudinot on August 7 again advanced from Polotsk; and when Wittgenstein, who had taken position at Rosiza, advanced on Svolna on August 11, Oudinot next day retreated, writing to the emperor that the enemy was trying to turn his right. He was hesitating and abandoned the initiative to the enemy, who again forced him back to Polotsk August 16. Here St. Cyr came up. Unaware that Oudinot had been so heavily reinforced, Wittgenstein attacked Polotsk August 17, but without success, though the fight was hearty. Oudinot being wounded, St. Cyr took command, and next day attacked Wittgenstein; and though the victory was not decisive, it was a success, and much needed to bolster up the serious position of the Grand Army. St. Cyr was created marshal. Oudinot got small comfort, his chief, on August 19, ordering Berthier to write him: —

> "The emperor has seen with pain that you did not follow Wittgenstein, to whom you are opposed, and that you left this general master to move on Macdonald, or to cross the Dvina to make an incursion on our rear. You have the most exaggerated notions on the force of Wittgenstein. . . . You must not let yourself be imposed upon by such commonplace" (*grossier*) "traps. The Russians publish everywhere, and in the rear, the startling victory they have won over you, because without reason you let

them sleep on the battlefield. Reputation in arms is everything in war, and equals real forces. His Majesty orders you to seek Wittgenstein, and to attack him wherever you shall find him, having a care to manœuvre him if he has a strong position. If he has no position, he cannot resist you. Macdonald, who is ordered to move with all his force on Riga to besiege this place, has been stopped, in consequence of your manœuvres, at Dünaburg." . . . He then tells him that all the Russian numbers are grossly exaggerated. "It is thus that Tormasov had at Volhynia the reputation of having sixty to eighty thousand men. Prince Schwartzenberg marched on him with twenty-five thousand Austrians. The phantom dissolved. Tormasov was found to have only two divisions of infantry and two of cavalry, forming four thousand men. They were dispersed, beaten and lost three thousand men."

Macdonald meanwhile had not crossed at Jakobstadt, but marched up the left bank to Dünaburg, the Russians retiring. The Prussian auxiliaries blockaded Riga.

According to the 9th Bulletin, on August 4 the army stood thus: Headquarters at Vitebsk, with four bridges; Eugene at Surash, Murat at Rudnia, Davout at the confluence of the Beresina, a small stream near Dubrovna, and the Dnieper, with three bridges and bridge-heads; Ney at Liosno; Junot at Orsha, with two bridges and bridge-heads; Poniatowski at Mohilev, with two bridges and bridge-heads; Oudinot in advance of Polotsk; Schwartzenberg at Slonim; Reynier at Roujana; Latour-Maubourg near Bobruisk and Mozyr; Macdonald at Dünaburg and Riga; Victor at Tilsit; Augereau at Stettin.

The outlook was clouding more and more. Alexander had retired to Moscow, where, by appealing to their religious and national fanaticism, he had excited the Russian people to rise against the invader; the Army of Moldavia, released by the Turkish treaty, was marching up to join Tormasov; the Army of Finland, no longer essential against Sweden, was soon to reach Riga, on the French left. Matters looked so grave that, contrary to his habit, Napoleon called in some of his marshals to a council of war. He had not done this since Essling, and now his peculiar assertiveness made the council fruitless. Some desired to remain *in situ*, based on the Dvina-Dnieper line, which plan Napoleon opposed, as these streams, when frozen, would no longer be a barrier; others advised to push the operation to the end, and with these Napoleon sided, for he could see no issue except to conquer a peace or fail; and as his self-confidence led him to believe in success, he kept on with his preparations. On August 9 he wrote Berthier to order the communications from Smolensk to Vilna to be organized by way of Minsk, as being shorter than by Vitebsk, and more in the direction of Warsaw. In a letter to Maret of August 9 he says: "The army having passed, the country ought to settle itself, and with money one ought to be able to find all that," meaning transportation. But the country did not get settled, nor was transportation ever equal to more than a fraction of the demand. Berthier wrote the emperor August 12 that in Russian Poland "the peasants refused to make the harvest for their lords. The rye remained uncut. . . . It will deprive the army of this most precious resource;" and suggests that the peasants be allowed to make the harvest for one third to them, one third to the army, and a third to the lords.

While the troops were resting from their serious hardships in this land of vast distances and scant supplies, and while on right and left the French fortunes were dwindling, Napoleon had been maturing a plan for moving across to the Dnieper towards Davout at Dubrovna, and turning the Russian left, so as to cut it off from Moscow. It was not until the 6th of August that he knew the force of the two Russian armies, and that they had retired on Smolensk, and had a vanguard near Krasnoi. He wrote Eugene: "My intention is to march on the enemy, probably by the left bank of the Borysthenes, to seize

Smolensk and deliver battle to the Russian army." The 9th he sent a similar letter to Maret, to whom the day before Berthier had written: "It is thought that the enemy will be the other side of Smolensk. God grant it. The emperor continues to be satisfied with the situation of the army. These ten days of rest have brought in many men." On the same day the emperor wrote Davout asking for the nature of the country and about the route to Krasnoi via Mstislavl. "This march would be advantageous, and would permit us to arrive in two columns so as to avoid a rather strong position that the enemy has in front of Smolensk. This road would turn it."

Barclay anticipated him. He had written the czar from Smolensk as early as August 3: "While here, I have gathered provisions, which, thanks to the zeal of the inhabitants, arrived quickly, and I propose shortly to attack the enemy, in the conviction that his forces are not all assembled." But all was not rose-color for Barclay. A chill between the Russian leaders had begun with Barclay's complaining that Bagration was slow in joining him. Bagration wrote: "I am not the servant of Barclay. I have always thought until now that I served the emperor and the country. . . . I now see that I serve alone. In three days I shall be in Smolensk to turn the army over to him." But on reaching Smolensk, Barclay's friendly attitude prevailed on Bagration to do duty under him, and he wrote Alexander: "I consider at the moment no personality, but only the general interest, the good of the country, and the renown of your empire;" and Alexander wrote Barclay: "I am satisfied to have learned your good understanding with Bagration. . . All personal consideration must disappear before the good of the country." Bagration was, however, only temporarily swallowing his griefs, for in a week the two were again at odds. Barclay complained to the czar that he was surrounded by officers who talked of his combinations in



Vitebsk-Smolensk Country.

public places, so that the enemy learned them all; and his chief of staff wrote to Bagration as if on the latter alone depended the safety of Russia.

On August 6 Barclay held a council of war, at which were present Constantine, Bagration, the chiefs of staff and the quartermasters of the two armies, and this was unanimously for sharp offensive measures, and a movement on Rudnia. Toll's hope was to destroy the French left, and swing around and crush the centre and right. The risk seemed small because the wooded country to the east of Babinovichi would cover a retreat in case of mishap. Barclay was afraid, if he went too far, that the French would seize Smolensk, or else turn his right flank from Porechi; and his plan was to leave Bagration at Smolensk and himself move towards Porechi and Surash, having gained which country, and minimized the danger to the Russian right, Bagration could then advance and battle be delivered at Rudnia.

Toll won over to his opinion Constantine and Bagration. Wollzogen tells us that Constantine urged that as the French were dispersed on a vast semicircle from Velish to Mohilev, the occasion was good to march on Rudnia, pierce the centre and wheel back on one of the wings; this opinion was supported by the rest, but Barclay said that the czar had confided him the army as the only one which could oppose Napoleon; that if beaten, Russia was lost; that he therefore must use it with scrupulous care, and could listen to no project of an attack on Rudnia; that with the Russians backed against the fortifications of Smolensk, in a battle Napoleon would lose heavily; and that it was essential that he should exhaust a great part of his forces. After later consultations Barclay agreed to an advance not beyond three days from Smolensk; and he explained to the emperor that he wished to anticipate Napoleon's concentration, and by an attack to gain time for the perfection of the new forces in the interior; that he would attack the enemy's left so as not to uncover the Smolensk road; that success would be gained; and that he would avoid disaster in case of loss, by keeping open an easy retreat.

On the 7th, accordingly, Barclay moved towards Vitebsk, sending Nevrovski with a division down the left bank of the Dnieper. Well pushed, the manœuvre might have been a serious annoyance, for the Grand Army was dispersed over a large area, seeking rest and supplies; but it could not well have had permanent success, because, though the Russians reckoned on an equality, the French were still in superior numbers. His plan was excellent, but it was not well executed: from dread of Napoleon's bold manœuvres, he blundered. On August 7, in three parallel columns, he started towards Rudnia, and next day the central van met and threw back some of Montbrun's cavalry, at Inkovo; but from reports of the Cossacks he was again led to fear that at Inkovo the French might fall on his right from Porechi, where indeed some French horse stood in front of Eugene at Surash; and he obliqued to the right towards Vydra and Stobna, Bagration being on his left at Katini. The Cossacks kept on towards Rudnia. On the 9th the two right columns reached Mochinki, Bagration Vydra; and here they remained, as Barclay was uncertain what manœuvre on Napoleon's part his advance might call forth. He feared to carry his initiative too far.

Barclay's plan was to attack Murat and Ney at Rudnia, but not follow them up if they retired, for he considered his hold on Smolensk essential. As he wrote the czar, August 9: "In debouching from my new position I can attack with superior forces the enemy's left flank, cover my communications with the upper Dvina, and protect the left wing of Wittgenstein. Such a position procures advantages not doubtful, and gives us entire liberty to act according to circumstances." And again, after the event: "I would have attacked the enemy at Rudnia if he had stayed there, when I could have hoped to destroy a part of his forces before the rest could have assembled. A general battle beyond Rudnia in the vicinity of Liubavichi and Babinovichi would have served nothing, even had we achieved a glorious victory. It would have cost a great loss in men which we could not have replaced, because our reserves were yet partly behind, partly not yet organized. On the contrary, the enemy had behind him and on his flanks army corps which could easily have reinforced him." It would seem that Barclay's strategic plan was not as strong as the battle fervor of his lieutenants, but he showed his wisdom in saying: "What signifies to create in imagination learned marches and movements, when the destruction of an enemy, who had subjugated Europe, could be attained only in drawing out the war?"

The combat at Inkovo aroused Napoleon, who ascribed it to careless cavalry work: "It seems that the enemy has retired," Berthier wrote to Ney, "and that it was a force of cavalry, probably provoked by Sébastiani, who does not know how to remain in cantonments to rest, and moves out to the plains, where he thinks there is yet no enemy." Believing at first that Barclay might be about to take the offensive in earnest, Napoleon purposed to concentrate on Ney. On the 9th he wrote Eugene: "Assemble near Liosno. If it is an offensive movement of the enemy, arrive as near as you can;" and to Davout: "If the movement of the enemy is an offensive movement, it will be necessary for you to reunite your army at Rosasna." It would have been easy to bring on a battle here, for the Russian leaders were for the moment keyed up to just this. Clausewitz thinks Napoleon should have marched straight on Smolensk and have fought the Russian army, which by advancing towards him showed its disposition to engage battle. Believing Barclay would stand, he had his choice between a battle and his strategical turning operation, and in a battle he might employ a tactical flank manœuvre. But Chambray says (as the documents tend to show) that he did not initiate his turning manœuvre until he believed Barclay's advance would not be followed up; and as he had already matured his sweeping manœuvre around the Russian left on Smolensk, and as a partial reconnoissance developed no Russian troops, he concluded that the Inkovo combat had been a mere attack of Platov's on the outposts, as Ney had reported, and he acted accordingly. Each commander was curiously ignorant of the other's movements, which speaks ill for the French, and much worse for the Russian scouting — in their own land with large bodies of light horse. That Napoleon did not seize the chance offered him by Barclay was a pity. His own operation was perfectly conceived, but its sole object was to bring the Russians to battle, as with their constant retreat he had not yet been able to do; and now Barclay, feeling that he was as strong as Napoleon, was in fact affording him the very chance so long desired, although he may have doubted it. Under the influence of the council of war, the enemy was ready to stand and fight: here was the best opportunity since the French entered Russia; and who can doubt, with the forces each could put in line, that Napoleon would have utterly crushed Barclay? As it was, the emperor did not know the Russian battle fervor. Had he advanced, Barclay would have taken up a defensive position and waited; but when the French began a movement around his left, to seize Smolensk in his rear, he felt compelled to retire, and the battle offered Napoleon here could not be brought on under favorable conditions at Smolensk. This was, however, less a mistake of the emperor than a misfortune. Had Napoleon been sure of the purpose of the Russians, he might have marched straight against them; as it was, he did not believe that, after sufficient rest, he could force them to battle except along the left bank; and once the troops were afoot, he went on with his turning operation: "I intend to march on Smolensk to see if the enemy will wait for us, which seems quite probable, because his reunion with Bagration is made, and he can scarcely expect much more," he wrote Maret, August 9, and proceeded to assemble on his right.

This was the third and last grand manœuvre in this campaign; it was planned to be made in close order, the front of march on Smolensk being only fifteen miles, not much more than battle front for two hundred thousand men. Moreover, he saw that, once on the march, if the Russians continued their advance against him, "the French army would," by the direction it was then taking, "have attacked the Russian army in the rear."

Having made his plan, the emperor acted.

> To Berthier, August 10, he wrote: "Give orders to General Eblé to make big day's marches with two corps of pontoniers, so as to be on hand the 13th early at Rosasna, and to set to work at once to throw at that place four bridges." And to Davout: "It is probable that I shall march on Smolensk with two hundred thousand men. As you are in the country, study a little the roads to know if one might not march in three columns, one along the great road, one on the slope of the waters of the little torrents that pour into the Dnieper, and the third on the right, but without being distanced farther than two or three leagues one from the other." And again on the same date: "I should have made all my Guard leave this morning, but it rains so much that I retard its movement one day to let the bad weather pass. I also retain Friant's division, which, being well off in barracks, is sheltered from the rain; but everything is ready to leave. . . . Have all the means at hand, without, however, throwing the bridge, but in such fashion that your sappers and pontoniers shall have in advance all that is necessary, and may be able to throw the bridge as quickly as the head of the left shall appear, without sooner unmasking the movements."

It appears odd to see the great soldier arresting the march of a corps on the score of rain, but it fits into the combination of numerous little lapses to which failure is traceable. We shall find it again in 1813.

Seeing no further sign of the Russians, Napoleon wrote Davout, August 10, that they had probably retired; that "he was justified in believing that the enemy would hold in Smolensk, and that it would be a decisive battle;" and he ordered afoot the Guard, Ney, Davout's full corps and Eugene, preceded by Nansouty and Montbrun, so as to reach Rosasna the 13th. Grouchy was also to come up, Poniatowski and Junot to advance on Romanovo, and Latour-Maubourg to cover the right at Mohilev and Mstislavl. The Russian leaders were puzzled at finding no enemy on whom they could utilize their battle fervor; Bagration was still at Katini; and Barclay, after awaiting a French onset from Porechi until the 13th, again started towards Rudnia.

On the same day Napoleon left Vitebsk for the front, where the Grand Army was passing the Dnieper. "Everything leads us to believe that there will be a great battle at Smolensk; we must have hospitals," he had written Davout the day before. "They must be at Orsha, Dubrovna, Mohilev, Kochanovo, Bobr, Borisov and Kiev. Have the location of those of Orsha and Dubrovna chosen." Reaching Rosasna, he found two bridges thrown, and Grouchy, followed by Friant, Gudin and Morand, was put over; a third bridge, thrown at Chomino, accommodated Murat, with Nansouty and Montbrun, followed by Ney; the Guard and Eugene crossed next day. Junot and Poniatowski came on to Romanovo, the latter having left six thousand men in Minsk; and Latour-Maubourg reached the Dnieper. Under cover of the extensive morasses and woods of this region, aided by the cavalry divisions near Rudnia, Napoleon had secretly concentrated the Grand Army on its own right, assembling on the Dnieper left bank, along the Smolensk road, a force of one hundred and eighty-five thousand men, wherewith to seize Smolensk in Barclay's rear, cut him off from Moscow, beat him in battle, and throw him off to the north, thus repeating the simple manœuvre so often before successful in destroying the enemy — just what he had done in the campaigns of Marengo, Ulm, Jena. At St. Helena he spoke of this operation as one of his finest.

> "The junction made, Barclay marched with one hundred and eighty thousand men on Vitebsk to deliver battle to the French army, but Napoleon executed that beautiful manœuvre, which is the pendant of that of Landshut, in 1809; he covered himself with the forest of Bieski" (? Babinovichi), "turned the left flank of the Russian army, crossed the Borysthenes, and advanced on Smolensk, where he arrived twenty-four hours before the Russian army, which retired in great haste."

It has the hallmark of the Napoleonic manœuvres, in that before he crossed the river and threw himself on the new line, he concentrated on the hither side, and then debouched from his bridges in one mass. The inception of this manœuvre was as perfect as its predecessors: would it be carried on with the same vigor, that vigor which alone insures complete success? August 9 Davout had written that, "in directing the major part of the troops by way of Babinovichi, the movement would be masked by the forests and the country, and in establishing at the head of the woods some troops, one would be easily protected from the enemy's parties, to which on the march the flank would be exposed." As a fact, Napoleon did not cover his movement by the forest of Babinovichi, for his cavalry went out of it on the line Liosno-Luibavichi. But this is unimportant.

On August 14 Murat, with Nansouty, Montbrun and Grouchy, set out along the Smolensk road, followed by Ney, Davout, the Guard and Eugene, and flanked on the right by Poniatowski and Junot, marching toward Tolstiki. In the afternoon, at Krasnoi, Murat reached Nevrovski's division, ten thousand strong; Ney's van soon came up, and Nevrovski ably defended the road by utilizing the ravines and woods, and by forming square at intervals to resist the French cavalry, but at a loss of quarter his force. Ney took Krasnoi, and Nevrovski retired to Korytnia, pursued by Murat, whose continued attacks he threw back with true Russian constancy. "Never have we seen greater courage on the part of the enemy," said Murat. And although he and Ney had long been at odds, he continued: "Marshal Ney and his staff have constantly marched with me. It is not for me to praise this marshal, whose bravery and talents Your Majesty has so often had occasion to appreciate." From his night's bivouac, Napoleon wrote Maret, August 15: "I am at Krasnoi. I am marching on Smolensk. It is possible that to-morrow or the day after there may be a great battle." He added that reports from prisoners were divided as to whether a part or the whole of the Russian army was at Smolensk, and Maret was to send the news in various directions. On August 15 the van, near which Napoleon remained, got to Lubnia, driving Nevrovski before it; the rear of column reached Krasnoi, and Napoleon heard that the Russians had abandoned Smolensk — probably belated news of their march towards Rudnia. The manœuvring force was concentrated: if only the Russian army could be blinded for a day or two, its fate would be sealed.

Meanwhile, unaware of the impending danger, Barclay, on the 14th, was at Volokovaia. On the 15th Bagration, beyond Katini, on his way to Nadva, received news of the Krasnoi fight and, guessing its purport, dispatched one of his corps to Smolensk and himself retired to Katini, where he learned the facts; then, breaking the bridge he had thrown over the Dnieper, he started early next day towards Smolensk; and Barclay, informed of the danger, did the like.

Just after midnight of August 15–16, Napoleon wrote Eugene that he should in all probability be in Smolensk towards 8 or 9 A. M.; Murat was ordered, if he found only Russian cavalry in front of the town, to seize it, but if he found infantry, to stop and report; and Ney was ordered to move at 3 A. M., to enter the city, and in connection with Murat to keep good order there. Starting about five o'clock in the morning, at eight he came in sight of Smolensk. Nothing practically was done that day except to reconnoitre the place. There is much dispute as to hours. The emperor arrived before Smolensk at some time after noon. Berthier, already there, we are told in the journal of a Wurtemberg captain, advanced with a staff officer and viewed the fortress with his glass. Shortly after, the emperor came up and talked in a lively manner with Berthier. Then the emperor advanced alone to within a short distance of the fortress, Berthier following in the rear, and when, by this reconnoissance, he saw that the town was occupied, he gained the impression that Barclay was assembling for battle, and ordered an attack to be opened.

Smolensk lies on the south bank of the Dnieper, in a beautiful amphitheatre, the Petersburg suburb on the north bank. Although low, the heights about it command the town, and make it quite unsuitable for a strong place. It was an old sacred city, had sixteen churches and several convents, a palace or two, and was full of gardens. In the suburbs the houses were nearly all of wood. Built for eighty thousand inhabitants, it had barely a quarter as many. Toll tells us that Smolensk proper was fortified in the ancient sixteenth



Smolensk and Valutino.

century method, with an irregular brick wall of three miles circuit, twenty-five feet high and ten feet thick, with seventeen little bastions formed of round and square stone towers, and a useless dry ditch, a covered way and a fairly good glacis. The towers looked strong, but were in effect weak, and on the southwest corner the wall was protected by a big earthwork citadel, a regular pentagon, erected by Peter the Great, but really the poorest part of the enceinte. Along the river were no towers. On the right bank was a crownwork of earth. The walls would easily resist field-guns, and could scarcely be escaladed; the towers were less thick than the wall, and might be battered down with twelve-pounders; but the French were not aware of this. Outside the town were a number of ravines, some sharp ones running down to the river, and all affording excellent opportunity for defense by infantry. A wooden bridge crossed the Dnieper, and several boat or raft bridges had been, or were later, thrown by the Russians. From the north bank ran many roads, the main ones to St. Petersburg and Moscow.

Smolensk was already held by twenty thousand men,—a division of Bagration and the Nevrovski division, which had been driven from the ravines and suburbs back into the town,—the whole force being under Raevski and Paskievich. The first French assault was against the citadel, by Ney, in his usual gallant style, and was received in perfect cold blood. Twice the French soldiers reached the top of the counterscarp, and twice they were hurled back by the Russian reserve, timely put in. The initial attack thus failed. All accounts differ as to this day—August 16. Davout says in his Memoirs: "The emperor, after having reconnoitred the whole position of the enemy, determined to throw himself into the place, and to seize it out of hand if it were possible." The 13th Bulletin merely says that "during the 16th we remained in observation." Raevski's report says that he got no reinforcements till evening; Bagration claims that he entered the town at 10 A. M. Raevski speaks of a battle, and says that a captured French officer could see Napoleon examining his position through a glass, and that Murat, Ney and Davout were all in his front. But as Davout only arrived at four o'clock, and Poniatowski at five o'clock, until then the emperor had but Ney's eighteen thousand men, and Murat with Grouchy and Nansouty. Would he have been justified in trying to seize Smolensk out of hand? Bogdanovich says the whole affair was narrowed down to a cannonade, and the enemy undertook only feeble attacks. Raevski also states that Napoleon's attacks were feeble; that he saw a decisive point without profiting by it; that if he had displayed as much vigor as next day, the Russians would have been destroyed. Bagration made a great boast of his defense of Smolensk. "The fifteen thousand men of the army confided to me held during twenty-four hours against all the forces of the enemy, and one may say almost disputed the victory in overturning the assailants, not letting the enemy approach to within two versts of the town, and in laying low up to ten thousand men." This savors of exaggeration.

Before dark Barclay came up, and stationed his divisions on the right bank heights near the St. Petersburg road. The French corps gradually arrived, and by night one hundred and fifty thousand men were in line, drawn-up in a semicircle around Smolensk, Ney on the left, Ledru and Razout in second line, Davout in the centre, Compans and Dessaix in support, then Poniatowski, and Murat leaning on the river. The Guard was in reserve at Ivanovskoi. Ideville wrote Maret that the emperor had been in the saddle from 9 A. M. to 7 P. M., which speaks well for his activity that day.

Early August 17 the marshaling was completed. Junot was still guarding the line to the rear at Tolstiki; and Eugene was kept at Liadi to forestall a Russian attempt to cross below and cut the French communications. Not having surprised Smolensk, Napoleon sent Guilleminot to discover a crossing up river, by which to make a further manœuvre to turn the Russian left and seize the Moscow road, for which duty Junot was selected. This was in manifest and natural sequence to the design of the entire operation; and it should have been pushed home at any cost; but Junot was far in the rear, and before the battle at the walls of Smolensk had been decided, a turning manœuvre was deemed by the emperor too late.

Assuming Smolensk to be the objective, the manœuvre had been skillfully conducted; yet Bagration's quick reinforcement of Smolensk, and the repulse of a first attack, had prevented its seizure. What could be done to repair this initial failure, so that the operation might yet succeed? The capture of Smolensk town was but an incident; the real purpose was to seize the Moscow road, cut off the Russian army, and oblige it to fight at a disadvantage. Coutanceau, in summing up the record evidence, says: "Napoleon desired to march on the enemy by the left bank of the Dnieper, seize Smolensk, then meet the enemy and beat him, *after* debouching from this town." Having failed in this, why not throw bridges at Dresna, and put the nearest corps over to seize the Moscow road? This was what Barclay dreaded. Smolensk was of as much importance to the Russians as to Napoleon. Alexander desired that battle should be delivered here: "The ardor of the soldier would have been extreme, for it was the entrance of the first really Russian town which he would have defended against the enemy." But Barclay said, Napoleon's "intention by this unexpected movement was clearly to cut us from the army of General Tormasov, from the governments of the south and even from Moscow. If we had hesitated the least in the world to take from him this advantage, he would not have missed extending himself as far as Dorogobush, and to get ahead of us at this point of the passage of the Dnieper." Though Napoleon's eye was as rapid and his planning as sound as ever in his tent, we shall see him here hesitate in his decision on the field, until too late to secure the real fruit of his turning manœuvre. In capturing a worthless town, he will forget the essence of the operation — to seize the communications of the enemy on the Moscow road, and force him to disastrous battle.

If Napoleon was too slow in his decision, so was not Barclay. He had no idea of fighting a decisive battle until he could choose his own place and time, and in front of Smolensk was not a suitable position. How could he debouch from two gates and attack a superior enemy? He was aware that to hold the road to Moscow was his only means of withdrawing to a better field; and in order to secure this, he decided to hold on to Smolensk, and at the same time forestall Napoleon's sending a force to occupy the road in his rear. As only a part of the Russians could be used for the defense of Smolensk, there being but few and unsuitable guns mounted on the walls, in the night of August 16–17 he relieved the troops in the town by a fresh thirty thousand men under Doctorov and Konovnitsin, and at early dawn on the 17th, while he himself remained near Smolensk, Bagration, having left a post opposite Shein Ostrov, where there was a ford, was started eastward, and took up a position astride the Moscow road behind the Kolodnia brook. This promptness was proof that Napoleon had had no time to lose; and on reaching Smolensk, he can scarcely have failed to see the danger of delay. The Russians had been constantly escaping him, and he had never yet been able to check their rearward movement. It was not wise to rely solely on their late enthusiasm for battle. Here was another chance. By extending his right across the river, and establishing a corps suitably supported upon the Moscow road, the longed-for battle could be forced, or the enemy thrown back on the St. Petersburg road, eccentrically to his true line of retreat. But during Bagration's movement of the 17th, which was about to destroy all the results of his manœuvre, Napoleon stood still in front of Smolensk, as if hoping that the Russians would debouch and accept battle in front of the town. He mounted his horse at 8 A. M., but scant reliable evidence exists as to what he did this day.

During the morning of the 17th, little of importance occurred. Doctorov had begun his work of defense by driving the French out of the southern suburbs, and this may have led Napoleon to think that the Russians were still ready for battle; but how he could persuade himself that they would fight, backing on Smolensk and the river, is hard to understand. They had had enough of that at Friedland. If the constant Russian retreat had made him despise them more than ever, as is so frequently alleged, one would think he would have run the risk of sending even a single corps to seize the road in their rear and oblige them to stand for battle. Here the emperor's judgment was as much at fault as his lack of speed.

When, between 1 and 2 P. M., Napoleon saw that he was in error, and that the Russians in Smolensk purposed only defense, he himself opened the attack. First the suburbs were recaptured, including the cemetery, by Ney and Davout, the ravines playing a marked rôle in the defense; whereupon Ney went in again opposite the citadel; Poniatowski on the up-river side; Davout on the Roslavl suburb. The centre batteries opened the battle; sixty guns on the right covered the bridges and the enemy beyond. To this fire the Russians suitably replied from batteries on the hills which enfiladed the French right and left, but these continued their work. The suburbs were gradually taken, the ravines crossed, and by 5 P. M. the fighting was pushed fiercely to gain the covered way, or a footing on the wall, especially near the Malakovka gate, but in vain. Poniatowski all but forced his way into a breach made by his field-guns in the walls, and Ney came close to capturing the citadel, while Davout drove Doctorov out of the south suburbs. But still the town held out. Napoleon assembled all his guns to make a breach in the curtain, but the thickness of the walls resisted the light batteries; and it was not then known that the towers were weaker. The guns set fire to many wooden houses; but though the conflagration prevented wheeling up ammunition, it did not spread rapidly, as each dwelling stood in its own little garden. Fabry thinks this fighting does not look like an attack pushed home; and Barclay reported to the emperor that, as the enemy had concentrated all his forces on Smolensk, he merely defended it long enough to stop the enemy's march on Jelnia and Dorogobush, so that Bagration might get there in time to prevent the army being turned.

At 9 P. M. the French withdrew from the attack. Barclay had reinforced the place by an extra division, and got the rest of his forces on the road; and during the night of August 17–18, he vacated Smolensk. "The town was afire," says the 13th Bulletin. "In the middle of a beautiful night of August, Smolensk offered to the French the spectacle which is offered to the inhabitants of Naples by the eruption of Vesuvius." "At 2 o'clock" (A. M., August 18) "the first grenadiers who mounted to the assault found no more resistance, the place was evacuated . . . and one of the most beautiful towns of Russia was in our power, and all this in the sight of the whole army of the enemy." Breaking the bridges, Barclay retired to the heights on the north, as if to protect the St. Petersburg road. Why he did not at once join Bagration is hard to say, for Napoleon would scarcely have ventured to march on St. Petersburg with the whole Russian army on his flank. A division well handled would have been enough to make Napoleon uncertain as to his movements, if it kept up a slight demonstration from this direction, especially as woods hid the troops. But to forestall a French turning operation, Barclay and Bagration "decided together that the First Army should occupy Smolensk, and should remain on the right bank of the Dnieper, covering the march of the Second Army on Dorogobush." "If the route to Moscow were lost, the Russians would have to fall back on St. Petersburg, deprived of their reinforcements, and besides, the coöperation of Tormasov and Chichagov, from which Barclay expected the greatest results, would be torn from them." "The First Army was to arrest the enemy until the moment when the Second Army had reached the crossing of the Dnieper at Solovievo;" then it was to follow.

When, towards midnight of August 16–17, Barclay gave the order to retreat, there was great indignation among the defenders of the town. Bagration had begged Barclay to continue the defense and then take the offensive, and many generals joined him, as they felt they had won a great victory. Constantine was at the head of the opposition, and it would have been a happy day for Napoleon had they tried to do this. There was a protest to the order, and Bagration formally accused Barclay. Even the czar was discontented when he heard of it, and it may have been part of what led to Barclay's removal. In the rear discontent was great. Barclay's reason for giving up Smolensk remains a plain fact — that he could be turned out of it by a crossing of the river above. He also said in his report: "Let us admit that I had held on to Smolensk the 16th. The enemy, who needed only to cross the Dnieper above the town, would have forced me to withdraw my troops. The Dnieper in the month of August was not difficult to cross in many places."

Grand Duke Constantine.

Out of some thirty thousand Russians in the town and sixty thousand French actually in contact, the losses had been about twelve thousand French to ten thousand Russians. Davout gave his as six thousand men, Gudin's alone being seventeen hundred: forty per cent.

The emperor did not change his position, but Junot came up and went into line behind Poniatowski. During the forenoon of the 18th the French occupied Smolensk proper, and as the city was a necessary depot, at once set about extinguishing the fires. Ney was ordered across the Dnieper, and Morand put over in boats to protect the repair of the permanent bridge and the throwing of pontoons; but Barclay sent enough troops under Korv to force the few French back across the river, and then to maintain the St. Petersburg suburb until 4 P. M., when, as Ney could be held back no longer, the troops set fire to it and retired on Barclay. For three days the strategically worthless town had arrested the Grand Army, when time was of the essence.

The entry into Smolensk was not a triumphal one. The men had looked forward to this city as the term of their serious hardships; they had expected to defeat the Russians and earn some repose, amidst smiling fields and in pleasant quarters; but instead of a fine city full of wine and bread, there was a semi-civilized, half-burned town, whose inhabitants had fled, and had either hidden, destroyed, or hauled away all provision. To look back on the long stretch which separated them from their homes, and foresee a further pursuit of a still fleeing enemy, gave rise to no small disquiet.

To Maret, from Smolensk, the emperor reassuringly wrote, August 18: —

> "I have just come in. The heat is excessive and there is much dust, which tires us a little. We have had here the entire army of the enemy. It had orders to deliver battle here, but did not dare to. We have taken Smolensk with the strong hand. It is a big city, having a respectable wall and fortifications. We have killed three or four thousand men of the enemy, wounded treble, and found here many guns. Several of his division generals have been killed, from what they say here. The Russian army is marching, very discontented and very much discouraged, in the direction of Moscow. Schwartzenberg and Reynier together have beaten the Russians." There is a note on the original letter: "His Majesty having thrown himself on his bed immediately after having dictated this letter, and the courier having left without waiting, this letter is sent . . . without being signed."

Although natural enough, this again is one of the countless items which show that Napoleon was no longer in the heyday of his strength.

Indeed, Smolensk must have been a keen disappointment. The crop of 1811 had largely failed; that of 1812, yet growing, had been destroyed by this war, and to feed two hundred thousand men required cantonments so distributed as to be dangerous. To march back through Lithuania almost meant starvation; to retire via Mohilev and Mozyr was to traverse a marshy country unfit for an army; to withdraw to Poland via Lutsk and Brest Litovsk was easier, but any retreat might raise all Europe against him, and Napoleon could see nothing but further advance on the Russian army, which he must beat before he could dictate peace in Moscow. To be sure, Wittgenstein on the left and Tormasov and Chichagov on the right were threatening factors, but Napoleon counted on St. Cyr and Macdonald, on Schwartzenberg and Reynier, to fend them off, while Victor, with over thirty thousand men, was on the Niemen, and could be sent to support either the right on the Bug or the left on the Dvina. Loison and Durutte had fine divisions in Königsberg and Warsaw; others were organizing on the Oder; the new conscription (*premier ban*) was assembling on the Elbe. There were fifty thousand men in Prussia, and as many more coming on as reinforcements. All Europe was contributing its quotas to fill up the gaps.

By past successes Napoleon had learned that a decisive victory would dissipate all collateral dangers. Could he but reach the Russian army, he would put an end to all his difficulties. He had agreed to stop at Smolensk; but how, he argued, could he arrest his operations now? What were his promises to his officers and men compared with his and their eventual success?

Barclay remained on the heights north of Smolensk until the evening of the 18th; and as the main Moscow road was along the river bank and covered by the French batteries, he then sent Doctorov by a long circuit via Sykolina and Prudichevo towards Solovievo. The rest he led, part to the north of Gorbunovo and part through this village towards Lubino, by a bad country road, on which he covered scarcely a mile an hour. In the darkness, Eugene of Wurtemberg, with the rearguard, made a big circuit, lost his way, and reached Gedeonovo only after many hours' march. Korv for a moment took position on the heights behind Gedeonovo to sustain him, and the two were to fend off the French advance. Bagration, under orders to head for Moscow, had already retired many miles along the main road; but the French pressed Barclay so stoutly that he had to instruct his lieutenant to stop. Bagration had left some Cossacks under Karpov, and these Barclay reinforced with foot and artillery.

The Russian commander had not conducted his operations skillfully; and had Napoleon with his usual rapidity manœuvred to turn the Russian left, passed the river at Dresna with a mass, leaving what was essential to contain the Russians for some hours at Smolensk, he could have reached the rear of Barclay's column on the Moscow road, even if Bagration had got away. There was no danger of Barclay manœuvring against the French communications; for Napoleon with his superior numbers could have turned and crushed him. The same lack of decisiveness which at Vitebsk gave Barclay time to retire, was still more apparent; and without pushing to the end his handsome strategical operation, but accepting as a fact that he could not bring the Russians to battle near Smolensk, when they had just refused battle at the town, and that they had already retired too far to catch up with, he merely sent a small force on in direct pursuit. Although partly concealed by woods, he had seen Barclay's forces on the St. Petersburg road, and he should have gauged them as a large part of the Russian army, which he might cut off and beat in detail. During the 18th Napoleon personally paid little heed to anything outside Smolensk. He had sufficient opportunity to send Junot across the river to anticipate the Russians on the Moscow road; he had abundant chance for action; but he wasted the precious hours in trivial work which a staff officer could have accomplished.

All this may sound hypercritical; but we must try Napoleon by his own standard; our question is how far his own decrease of energy affected his power to wage war; and here he was quite behind his better days. It were absurd to blame his shortcomings; but his failure must be explained. There is no desire to make too much of small lapses; yet each tells its story. Something like mental weariness based on a physique no longer equal to the strain of his gigantic conceptions seems to have been at fault.

Early on August 19 Murat forded the Dnieper and Ney crossed on pontoon bridges at Smolensk, whilst Junot marched up to Dresna and Prudichevo to throw a bridge where Napoleon had reconnoitred; and it was even at this late moment a mistake that the bulk of the army was not put over here, in natural prosecution of the original plan. But Napoleon ordered Grouchy in the direction of Duchovchina, and Murat with Nansouty and Montbrun along the Moscow road, to hold the Russians by a smart attack, and to explore the roads; and by the time the French army had crossed into the burned St. Petersburg suburb, Barclay had marched off, leaving only his trailing rearguard.

Karpov's Cossacks had been reinforced by troops under Tuchkov, who first took up a position two miles east of Valutino, and Eugene of Wurtemberg held Gedeonovo long enough for Korv's rearguard to retire to Gorbunovo, and enable the first column of Barclay's main army, under Baggavut, to reach Lubino. Ney moved out behind Murat to follow the Russian retreat, the direction of which was yet unknown: Eugene's column was found standing along the Stabna brook, and attacking it, Ney lost some time, whereas he might have contained it and marched around its flank on Lubino. Eugene, backed by Korv, fought in retreat to Gorbunovo, and held Ney fully three hours. No orders to push the fighting had been given to Ney, nor dispositions to that end made;

and Murat, on meeting Karpov's Cossacks, paused instead of driving them away.

Meanwhile, Tuchkov had reached the heights east of Valutino. Ney's combat against Eugene had carried him away from the Moscow road, and on Napoleon's arrival at the front he was ordered towards the right and to attack. Drawn up behind the Kolodnia brook he found Tuchkov, and fell upon him fiercely. Here was still a chance to redeem the operation, but it needed the eye of the master; yet instead of remaining with Ney, Napoleon, as if satiated with effort, returned to Smolensk. Tuchkov defended the ground, step by step, until he reached the Stragan brook, where he received reinforcements, and took up a position astride the Moscow road, extending two miles or more to the north and south, with Lubino in his rear and the Stragan brook in his front. Had Napoleon remained and pressed the fighting by ordering Davout up to Ney's succor, the Russian resistance might have been broken and the bulk of Barclay's column got cut off. But as Ney alone could not break down the Russian guard, Barclay, who realized that he must check the French to effect his escape, had time to complete his long circuit. The fighting on both sides was severe and costly.

Eugene of Wurtemberg.

On his first arrival Murat had failed to push home against the Cossacks, and now on Ney's right had been prevented from manœuvring by the woods, ravines and marshes; each time he essayed to push in on the Russians by way of Latishino, he was checked by the charges of Orlov Denisov. That his lack of vigor was due to want of good-will towards Ney, existing since Ulm, has been alleged; but this is doubtful; the prime fault clearly lay with the emperor for his absence at this critical moment; he alone could direct in a case like this. His marshals were never equal to the extreme test; and wonderful as they were as lieutenants, few of them rose to conditions such as Napoleon was wont to create. The Peninsular campaign was proving this every year. Junot, who had crossed the river at Dresna, was supposed to advance about the Russian left to reach the Moscow road in their rear; yet, though Murat made a number of demands on him to go forward, one at least in person, Junot clung to his position near the river, and, though usually hasty and impetuous, utterly failed to coöperate. He was afraid to exceed his orders. A year later he died insane. Finally, to the aid of Ney, Napoleon sent the division of Gudin, who, at 5 P. M., renewed the assault on Kosina heights; the Russian line was all but broken; but being reinforced by Konovnitsin, the French were finally checked, and Gudin was killed. By nightfall Bagration's mass had come up, including Baggavut and Korv. Unaware of this, Ney persisted in attacks on the Russian right; but despite magnificent gallantry, he could make no impression; and falling night stopped the slaughter, in which between five thousand and six thousand men fell on each side. The French had had more men ready to put in line; but owing to the absence of Napoleon this had not been done, and no good had been won by the sacrifice; indeed, until midnight the emperor remained ignorant of the fierceness of the struggle which was going on within ten miles of him. On learning the facts, he rode out to the battlefield. Arriving by 3 A. M. of the 20th, he found that the enemy was at a safe distance, marching along the road to Moscow.

The trouble with the fighting of the 19th was that Napoleon assumed that no result was to be gained by pushing the Russians, whom he deemed to have escaped. With the facts as we have them, however, and which Napoleon with his old activity would have ascertained, he could probably have arrested the enemy by actively ordering forward the troops from Smolensk; or he might at least have inflicted a heavy blow on Barclay — perhaps have brought on the decisive battle he craved, or even have beaten him in detail.

The French claim the battle of Valutino (among Russians the battle of Lubino) as a victory; but the Russians had succeeded in what they attempted; the French had not. Tuchkov had held back the French until Barclay could get his whole column on the Moscow road: Napoleon had not brought the Russians to a general battle. The early accounts of this battle are hard to decipher, for as the French knew the country ill, and the Russians destroyed the sign-posts, the names in the several accounts are much mixed.

With reference to the battle at Smolensk, Barclay wrote the czar: "The splendid combats that the First Army sustained at Smolensk are known to Your Majesty by my report. The enemy was stopped, and the Second Army so gloriously covered that it lost not a man; after having attained the veritable end of these combats, we left to the enemy the débris of Smolensk. The army continued its march in two columns on Dorogobush," and on the 20th crossed the Dnieper at Solovievo.

Napoleon had reached Smolensk early August 16; and by neglecting to carry forward his turning manœuvre so as to seize the Moscow road in Barclay's rear, the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th were practically wasted. That he did not sufficiently heed the severity or importance of the recent fighting is shown by his letter of August 20 to Berthier: "Write to the Intendant-General that the service of the ambulance is badly done; that it is astonishing that since yesterday, when there were engagements of the vanguard" (this was the bloody battle of Valutino), "the surgeons of headquarters, some ambulances and empty wagons . . . should not have been sent to the vanguard to pick up the wounded; and that the administration has no head."

Despite abundant cause for it, the French archives seem to show small signs of discouragement, even at Smolensk. Ney was still full of energy, and assuming the enemy to be much demoralized on the retreat, and that the French morale had "mounted to the highest degree of enthusiasm," on August 20 he proposed to take, each night, as the moon was generally shining, a fresh brigade of infantry and harass the enemy's rear, "so as to keep all the Russian army under arms, and thus tire them out, while the French were comfortably sleeping." This was a gallant proposition, but one can scarcely think that the "whole Russian army" would be kept under arms more than one or two nights by whatever even Ney might do with a French brigade.

Despite his recent lapse from energy, the emperor kept an eye on matters in the rear. He was fearful of Cossack raids on the road back to Vitebsk, and on August 20 he sent to Inkovo and towards Vitebsk to see that the communications were not disturbed. And on the same day he wrote Eugene: "My Son, I send you a report of the commandant of Krasnoi. You did not then give orders to the cavalry as I told you to do, to protect my rear and cover it from the Cossacks." Eugene had meanwhile put his division over in Smolensk and taken position on the Petersburg road; the Guard occupied the city, and Poniatowski remained on the left bank.

When, on August 21, Barclay crossed the Usha at Usviati and found his army was still in a mood for battle, he determined to make a stand, and drawing up behind the stream, ordered Bagration, who had retired to Dorogobush, to come back to the chosen line. The advantage of the position was not marked: Clausewitz says it was as good as any other, if the Russians were at that time to fight a great battle. On the 23d Murat came up to the Usha and found the Russians in line; next him came Davout, then Ney, put in the rear on account of his heavy losses; Junot still stood near the place where he had crossed the Dnieper; Grouchy had reached Duchovchina, and Eugene, in his rear, was on the road thither, having sent a division to Surash to hold head against a Russian threat on Vitebsk. Poniatowski had started, south of the Dnieper, via Bielkino and Jelnia, towards Dorogobush; Latour-Maubourg was guarding the communications at Mstislavl. Napoleon with the Guard still occupied Smolensk, but kept his attention fixed on the vanguard column. He was still waiting for them to turn and fight. On August 22 he sent word to Davout: "My Cousin, you do not write me. I desire you to write me every day. . . . I recommend Murat not to tire the troops too much in this extreme heat, to engage only in affairs of the rearguard, and to take position as soon as there shall be reason to think that the enemy has assumed one to receive battle."

So soon as the Usha was reached, word was sent to headquarters that Barclay was standing, and on its receipt, during the night of August 23–24, Napoleon reiterated orders to Eugene and Poniatowski to speed their march forward, and sent Latour-Maubourg instructions to come on rapidly. On August 23, in the evening, he wrote Davout: "In twenty-four hours the whole army can assemble. I await your news this evening to set the Guard in march, so that if the enemy desires to wait for us, we can deliver battle." And as the army needed further reserves, on August 23 orders were dispatched to Victor to move on Kovno in four columns with the utmost speed. Junot and the Young Guard were sent on the 24th along the Moscow road, followed next morning by the Old Guard, the emperor leaving Smolensk at midnight, after writing to Maret: "I leave to-night to go to Dorogobush, where it seems the armies are in presence, the enemy having come to a halt. They assure me that there is a position there of which they desire to profit, to deliver battle and cover Moscow."

Murat had been anxious to attack without waiting for Napoleon, and had thrown Montbrun against the left of Barclay's position; but as Davout judged his foot too weak to open a fight against the whole Russian army, no more was done. Made uneasy by Montbrun's attack, and unaware that the French had no great force in his front, Barclay did not await battle on the Usha; but breaking up during the night of August 23–24, he marched to Dorogobush, whence he reached Viasma the 27th. Nor did he find ground here for a good battlefield; and, burning the town, he kept up his retreat until August 29, and then came to a front at Zarevo-Saimichi. Although he had been full of fight when he advanced towards Vitebsk, Napoleon's outmanœuvring him for the moment drew his temper, and he did not get worked up to the true fighting-pitch again until he got to Viasma. Here Miloradovich came up with fifteen thousand men, and, on the road towards Gshask, Barclay turned to meet the Grand Army. But he had delayed too long. Kutusov reached the army from Moldavia, with the reputation of having conquered a peace from the Turks, and with orders to take supreme command.

With regard to this failure to bring about a battle, on August 26 the emperor wrote Maret: "The enemy having constructed fortifications, set up batteries and redoubts, and having announced the intention to hold a position here, has as usual lacked resolution. We have entered the town, which is quite considerable, because there are eight or ten steeples. The country is good, and they assure me that it remains very fine to Moscow. The heat we are having is excessive. The weather continues to be very fine. They say the enemy is resolved to await us at Viasma."

Kutusov.

The Russians had retired in excellent order, the rearguard under Rosen easily holding back Murat and Davout; indeed, these two marshals failed to work amicably together; and, the horses being so ill nourished on rye straw that they were unserviceable, the French could not match the yet well-conserved Russian cavalry. The French column made slow progress. The squadrons in the van, crowded on the post-road, were stopped at each brook, at each wood, at each bridge, by well-located batteries, and here had to await the foot, which usually arrived to find the enemy gone. Moreover, after passing Smolensk, the signs of a national war increased. In Lithuania, the inhabitants had cared little who was the winner; in Russia proper, the entire population deserted firesides and farms at the approach of the French. Villages were found abandoned or burned, and all provisions disappeared; Viasma's rich magazines were destroyed; Gshask was half in ruins, and but a part of it was saved by the French van in hunting for food. The farther the Grand Army advanced, the more hopeless the prospect looked. The leader alone seemed to be buoyed up by what many call his blind belief in his destiny, but what was really the dread of turning back defeated, and by the confidence that he still should win.

Had not Napoleon, on leaving Smolensk, expected to deliver battle at Usviati, he might have debated the question of further advance; but on reaching this town, August 25, and finding his hope again deferred, the cost of the first step being paid, he decided to keep on in pursuit: "It is probable that the army of the enemy will await us at Viasma. We should reach that place numerous and in order," he wrote Eugene, and so Smolensk and rest were forgotten. Murat, Davout, Ney, the Guard and Junot marched along the great Moscow road; Eugene and Grouchy on parallel country roads to the left, so as to cross the Dnieper at Molodilova; Poniatowski on the right via Voloshok, the emperor accompanying one or other column, and spending the nights in castles near the route; and on the 29th the army was near Viasma.

Along the road, the emperor busied himself not only with the smaller tactical details, but with the broad strategic scheme. Some of his orders have much importance.

On August 26 he had written to Davout: "My Cousin, form a vanguard of infantry, which shall march with the cavalry an hour in front of your army corps, and always take position a league in advance of you. This vanguard should itself be preceded by two battalions of voltigeurs. The rest of your corps, place it always in line of battle an hour in the rear. . . . You must make little day's marches and with order. If the plain is as believed, and the cavalry can pass on the right and on the left, the march can be so directed as not to be tiring for the foot. It ought to be finished early" (each day). "All the probabilities are that the enemy will await us at Viasma. We must then arrive there in order. Have the bridges all well prepared, and have double bridges made." On the same day he ordered Berthier to arrange with Victor to protect the French communications, even to the point of marching on Smolensk. "I suppose that St. Cyr has sufficient with the 2d and 6th Corps to hold Wittgenstein in check, and to have nothing to fear from him, and that Macdonald can move on Riga to invest the place." Then he directs reinforcements to move on Kovno: "That thus it would be only in case St. Cyr were beaten by Wittgenstein and forced to recross the Dvina, that Victor would first have to march to his aid; that, this case excepted, he is to follow the direction of Smolensk." And on August 27, to Augereau in Berlin, he wrote: "My Cousin, I have calculated on the arrival of all the reinforcements which are to rejoin my army, so as to form successive reserves in my rear. It is therefore proper that everything that is not destined, by dispositions determined by me, to make a part of your army corps, should continue its route to rejoin me. You are not to retain a single hussar, a single chasseur, a single artillery wagon. Make everything march. I should be very much annoyed if, at the distance where I am, the reinforcements which should come to me were stopped and turned away from the destination I have given them."

The Cossacks gave no little trouble to the column on the march and in its rear, and to check them, little blockhouses were built, or houses were fortified with palisades and ditches, "in such a manner that one hundred men of infantry and fifteen of cavalry may be protected from all attack;" each intermediate post was thus defended, and the commandant of Smolensk was ordered to see to their safety.

There were no military difficulties to be encountered in the march from Smolensk to Moscow except those of battle and victual. Strategy there was none. It was an advance on the heels of a retiring foe along a single road, and with flanking columns: but the Russians were well supplied, and what they could not use as they fell back they destroyed, and the French, horse and man, were on short commons. Along the road proper, nearly the entire population decamped. At a little distance from it, the population did not desert the farms so generally, and this was an invitation to the French soldiers to straggle and pillage, with the result that the Grand Army lost between Smolensk and Borodino a full third of its numbers. Thousands of stragglers were caught by the Cossacks: death was their easiest fate.

As to the destruction of the Russian villages there is much conflicting testimony. It was manifestly to the advantage of the Russians to let nothing fall into the hands of the French; it was equally to the advantage of the French to conserve everything. Yet so careless are pillagers, indeed so careless is any army on the march, that the chances are that the French did as much damage as the Russians.

In the midst of work Napoleon found time to do a kindly act. General Deroy, commanding a Bavarian division, was wounded at Polotsk. Before knowing of his death from his wounds, Napoleon wrote, August 27: "Monsieur le Général de Division, Comte Deroy, I write you this letter to testify my entire satisfaction at the fine conduct you held at the combat of Polotsk, and the regret that I have to know you are wounded. I wish myself to let you know that I have named you Count of the Empire, and have accorded to you a dotation of thirty thousand francs, transmissible to your children; and wishing to reassure you on the subject of your family, I have sent you a brevet of six thousand francs pension for Countess Deroy."

Eugene was marching on the French left and Poniatowski on the right, and now rather anticipating the continued retreat of the Russians, Napoleon wrote Berthier, August 30: —

> "It is proper that, in case anything happens, the viceroy should be able to turn the right of the enemy, and Poniatowski his left, and that the three vanguards should be so near each other that they may attack in unison. This will necessarily spare blood and put the enemy out of condition of resisting. . . . Notify the viceroy that it is essential that with all his cavalry and a good vanguard of infantry and artillery, he should be able to turn the right of the enemy and take part in the action" (*aux coups de canon*), "if there is one. That it is the only means of sparing blood and accelerating the retreat of the enemy. Give the same order to Poniatowski for the right. He is to turn the left of the enemy."

Little was known on the Continent about the progress of the Grand Army, and what Napoleon wrote home was one-sided. The charge of lying is constantly made against the emperor for what he wrote in these evil days; but as a matter of fact, mendacity was indulged in, not only by him in Russia, but by every one, everywhere in Europe, and certainly on the other side of the Channel. In what war to the knife is the truth ever told at the time? Napoleon wrote for effect upon the French public, and what he wrote had this effect. He neither expected to convince nor succeeded in convincing England. The British clenched their teeth and played their own game. The "London Times" seems to have been able to publish in London both the French and the Russian statements with a promptness which argues wonderful enterprise for those days, and much of the Continent was hoping for Russian success.

Smolensk was the natural terminus of the 1812 campaign. When Napoleon was unable to bring the Russian army to battle there, the campaign — not the war — was definitely ended. He started with the belief that a sharp advance into Russia, and one or two decisive victories, would bring this nation to his feet, like the other European peoples. This belief was the natural sequence of Friedland; but it was an error. As Spain could not be subdued by military success alone, so with Russia, the backward civilization of which made its faith and patriotism strong. As the Spanish mountain regions enabled irregulars to hold their own against well-disciplined armies, so the Russian steppes enabled armies to withdraw at will from contact with the invader, and thus thwart his efforts. The Spanish guerrilla warfare was in Russia matched by constant retreat across the plains; nor were there mountain ranges, or seacoasts, or frontiers to limit operations. Napoleon had found the task in the Peninsula difficult; and the Austrian imbroglio having compelled him to leave it to his marshals, he could not be reproached with failure; here he had put into the scale his individual strength and ability, as well as all the power of France and her allied peoples, and he could not withdraw from the contest. And yet at Smolensk he was called on to decide whether or not he would advance farther into the bowels of the land; and he decided from mistaken premises. The power of truly gauging the facts had passed from him.

From a military point of view he could stop at Smolensk, put the Grand Army into quarters from which assembly was easy, and by holding the Dvina and the Dnieper would be in a somewhat similar situation to those he held in 1805 in Moravia before Austerlitz, and in 1807 in Poland before Eylau. As he would be draining a large section of the empire, the Russian army would sooner or later come forward and attack him. Making Smolensk a secondary base, and there accumulating material for a further campaign in 1813, was the only safety offered him, if he was unwilling to retreat. But Napoleon had built up his entire structure, military and political, on sharp, brilliant successes; and while the defensive basis of action would be proper for the soldier, it might be the ruin of the statesman. Nor indeed can we be certain that the Russians would not have kept up their waiting policy. Napoleon was not accustomed to make safety his guiding star; and he could not believe that Russia would not yield: could he but reach her ancient capital, Moscow, he now argued, he could surely dictate terms to St. Petersburg. In a way Napoleon's belief was justified, for he thought he had fathomed the character of Alexander. His confidence was founded only on the moral standpoint; from a military standpoint, while it was possible to reach Moscow, he clearly could not hold himself there. He was farther away from his base than any conqueror, other than the head of a migratory invasion, had been in modern times. So long a line of operations demanded either friendly nations, or heavy forces on right and left to protect it from being interrupted; or else the main army must be so superior in force that in case the enemy moved towards this line, it might turn upon him, cut him off and destroy him. In 1805 and 1806 Napoleon relied on his speed and superiority to neutralize the danger of his line being cut; but when in 1805 he reached Moravia, we have seen how he put out flank armies to protect his four-hundred-mile long line of operations, and have admired the skill with which these were so located as to be nearer for the purpose of rallying on the main body than were those of the enemy. In 1807 he was equally careful to protect his line, which, from the Elbe, was over three hundred and fifty miles long.

But the conditions were not such here. Arguing, as Wartenburg ably does, on the situation as it will be when the Grand Army shall have reached Moscow, — and the emperor could do this at Smolensk, — we find that Napoleon crossed the Niemen with three hundred and sixty thousand men; he reached Vitebsk with two hundred and forty thousand men; he started for Smolensk with one hundred and eighty thousand men; he left Smolensk with one hundred and fifty thousand men; he met the Russians at Borodino (the battle he must fight) with one hundred and thirty-five thousand men; he reached Moscow with ninety-five thousand, at the end of a line of communications five hundred and thirty miles long. These figures demonstrate that superiority in numbers could not be relied on to protect his communications. Neither were there flank detachments in sufficient force. On the right, Tormasov's and Chichagov's joint army of over sixty thousand men, in the Lutsk-Ostrog country, could hardly be held in check by Schwartzenberg and Reynier with thirty-five thousand men; and this army threatened a point in the main communications four hundred miles to the rear from Moscow, while itself was less than two hundred miles distant from that point. On the left, Wittgenstein on the Drissa was soon to have forty thousand men, and was faced by St. Cyr in front of Polotsk with but seventeen thousand; and this force threatened Borisov on Napoleon's communications only one hundred miles distant from Polotsk and three hundred and fifty from Moscow. In other words, neither by superiority nor by flank armies was Napoleon's line of communications protected. At Smolensk the military situation was within control; at Moscow it was beyond the control of any man. At so distant a point Napoleon could rely only on the moral force of his position: his military situation would be utterly untenable.

Thus there was in reality offered the emperor but a slender chance of safety. If he stopped at Smolensk, he ran a certain risk of political damage; if he advanced to Moscow, all military chances were against him. But with an army at Smolensk, he could personally return to France and bid defiance to his political enemies, organize a fresh campaign for 1813, and by suitable concessions, or good luck, retire, or win with honor. His personal power in Europe was by no means exhausted; it was yet a distinct factor in the calculation. And in 1813 he would be better equipped logistically for an advance from Smolensk, for he would have time to provide proper transportation. This plan offered him a show of success, political and military. The advance on Moscow now could succeed only if Alexander and Russia were content to be browbeaten by a show of military power Napoleon no longer possessed. Yet Jomini and Clausewitz both approve Napoleon's decision to advance from Smolensk on Moscow, as his only proper course. It is difficult to agree with these eminent authorities.

Russian Infantry Officer.

LII.

BORODINO. SEPTEMBER 1 TO 7, 1812.

When the army reached Gshask September 1, within eight days of Moscow, it seemed natural to keep on, though the Grand Army was almost a wreck and the rear looked doubtful. Barclay was superseded by Kutusov, who stayed at Borodino to fight. Napoleon reached his front September 4, and prepared for a decisive struggle. The Russian army stood across the Moscow roads behind a brook and the Kolotsa River, with one big and three small redoubts in its front. Napoleon would not try too marked a turning manœuvre lest it should again retreat, but prepared to break down its centre. There was a vast array of guns; Kutusov had one hundred and twenty thousand men, Barclay on the right, Bagration on the left; Napoleon somewhat less, with Eugene on the left, Davout, Ney and Murat in the centre, and Poniatowski on the right. The Russians were well fed, the French had scant rations. Napoleon opened the battle early September 7 with the guns, and by advancing the centre to take the redoubts, and Eugene to capture Borodino and the big fort, while Poniatowski was to turn the Russian left. The first assault failed, but later the redoubts were taken, Eugene captured Borodino, and Poniatowski advanced slowly. The Russians retired somewhat, and Ney, feeling sure he could drive them into rout, called for reinforcements. But at this moment a Cossack attack on Eugene's left arrested the emperor's attention, and he delayed sending Ney help. The Cossack attack proved trivial, but an hour had been lost. The infantry fighting died down, but into the heavy masses on either side eight hundred guns poured constant fire. Eugene by a final effort captured the big fort, and this was the end of the battle. The Russians had used every man; Napoleon still had the Guard. He believed the Russians must have reserves, and declined to put the Guard in. Had he done so, we know to-day that he would have destroyed the Russian army. As it was, the French had not won the decisive victory needed. They had lost thirty thousand men, the Russians probably forty thousand, but Kutusov's army retired during the night in fairly good order, and the French bivouacked on the battlefield. Borodino was a battle fought in parallel order all along the line without grand-tactics. In it the French army showed wonderful gallantry, and the Russians equal devotion. The percentage of losses was, for such large bodies, the greatest of modern times. Otherwise the battle had no unusual features.

Arrived at Gshask September 1, within eight days' march of the sacred city of Moscow, the ancient capital of Russia, which was full of food and material and a fit resting-place for the foot-weary troops, and especially when the Russians again speeded their retreat, it seemed to Napoleon more natural to proceed. Having sent orders to Victor to come on to Vitebsk or Smolensk with his corps, and to Augereau to bring half his force to Königsberg and Warsaw, to protect his line of advance, the emperor confidently set out to follow the Russian forces. If he had any misgivings, we are not permitted to know them.

The rear of the Grand Army was ill cared for. As a general rule, orders given by the emperor were supposed to be executed apart from any difficulties in the way, but he was now too far distant to know the facts or punish laxity or dishonesty. The able administrators could not, and the lazy ones would not, carry out instructions; and many an employee, divining the future, lined his own pocket. Repairs on bridges and roads were neglected, and the collection of victual was so ill attended to, that the convalescents following the army had issued to them only half-rations. Habituated to exact obedience, few officers dared act on their own initiative, and the well-provided line of communications it was Napoleon's purpose to create became a road of starvation, because the impossible was ordered and the possible was not done. Napoleon had also found out that his staff was ill-trained. He had written Berthier, July 2, that "the general staff is organized in a fashion that one can see nothing ahead by its means," and now, on September 2, he wrote: "My Cousin, the general staff is of no use to me. Neither the grand provost of the gendarmes, nor the wagon-master, nor the staff officers, not one of them serves as he ought to do." But he none the less made skillful preparations for what was in his front, believing he should yet win a decisive battle, and that this would cure the difficulties in his rear, which he was keen enough to suspect, at least in part, but practically never mentioned.

Meanwhile, battle never left the emperor's mind. On August 30 he wrote Berthier: "Give orders to General Eblé to leave at five o'clock in the morning to rejoin the vanguard. He will have all the bridges in the rear repaired. He will march with all his personnel," and all his tools, but no pontoons. "You will make this general understand that as we are nearly in the presence of the enemy, and as it is probable that in three or four marches there will be a general battle, success may depend on the rapidity with which are established the debouches, and the bridges over the torrents and the ravines. That it is indispensable for him to be there, so that, as soon as shall be possible, he may construct these debouches. For an army like this one, there are needed always at least six. For this purpose he is to work with the engineers, and not await any new order to see to the erection of bridges over the ravines and little streams." Chasseloup was also given similar orders to coöperate with Eblé. And then, as he had been riding with the van, he added: "Let me know where is to be found the 'Little Headquarters,' of what it consists, and when it can leave." Next day he wrote Berthier "to have the caissons which are empty loaded with brandy, to be used on a day of battle;" and on September 1, to Maret: "It is probable that in a few days I shall have a battle. If the enemy loses it, he will lose Moscow. My communications from Vilna to Smolensk are not difficult, but from Smolensk here they may become so. We need more troops, some national guards. They need not be good, because they are opposed only to peasants."

Grave abuses had grown up under the trying conditions of the march. One has only to read between the lines of the following Order (of which only the substance can be given) to see how much there was to cure. In effect, the abuses did not, could not, get cured; scarcely palliated.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

GSHASK, September 1, 1812.

"His Majesty the Emperor and King has ordered as follows:" 1st. All wagons to move after the artillery and the ambulances. 2d. Private wagons found in the way of the artillery or ambulances to be burned. 3d. Only the artillery wagons and ambulances to follow the vanguard; other wagons to be two leagues in the rear, and any such found nearer to be burned. 4th. At the end of the day no wagons to rejoin the vanguard until after it has taken position, and fighting has ceased; any wagons transgressing this rule to be burned. 5th. In the morning such wagons to be parked outside the road; those found on the road to be burned. 6th. These dispositions to apply to the whole army. 7th. The chiefs of staff of each division and corps to see that the baggage wagons march in the rear and separate, and in command of a good wagon-master. 8th. General Belliard, chief of staff of the vanguard, to see that these orders are obeyed at the vanguard, and that the wagons do not pass the defiles without his knowledge. 9th. This order to be read September 2 to all the corps, and "His Majesty gives notice that on September 3 he will see himself to the burning in his presence of the wagons found in contravention of this order." But next day he wrote Berthier: "See to it that the first baggage wagons that I order burned shall not be those of the general staff. If you have no wagon-master, name one and let all the" (staff) "baggage march under his directions. It is impossible to see a worse order than now reigns."

Davout came in again for his share of scolding. On September 2 Napoleon wrote: —

"My Cousin, I was ill satisfied yesterday with the manner your corps was marching. All your companies of sappers, instead of mending the bridges and the debouches, did nothing, excepting those of Compans' division. No direction had been given to the troops and the baggage to pass the defile, so that all found themselves on one another's heels. Finally, instead of being a league behind the vanguard, you were close upon it. All the baggage wagons, etc., were in front of your corps, in front even of the vanguard, so that your wagons were in the town before the light cavalry had debouched. Take measures to remedy such a bad condition, which might seriously compromise all the army." And on the same day, to Berthier: "My Cousin, for two days I have not seen a report of the position of Davout. I do not know where his corps is. Let me understand why this is. It is his duty to make a report every day."

Inasmuch as Davout was always noted as a strict disciplinarian, we may assume that equal criticism was applicable to the other corps.

From the enemy's signs of readiness to defend the road to Moscow the emperor now guessed that the long anticipated battle would within a few days be delivered, and he began his preparations. At Gshask, September 2, he wrote Berthier to give orders to Murat, Davout, Eugene, Poniatowski and Ney to repose and rally the troops, "to have roll-call at three o'clock in the afternoon, and to let him know positively the number of men who will be present in the battle; to have an inspection made of arms, cartridges, artillery and ambulances; to make the soldiers understand that we are approaching the moment of a general battle, and that they are to prepare for it." He demands, by ten o'clock in the evening, a statement of the number of troops, of guns, their calibre, the rounds they have, the number of cartridges per man, the number in the caissons, the state of the ambulances, the number of surgeons and their material. Also the detached men who are not present, who will not be present the next day, but who can be up in two or three days, the number of horses without shoes, and the time necessary to shoe them. "These reports are to be made with the greatest attention, because on their result will depend my resolve." Murat, Poniatowski and Eugene were to advance slightly and rectify their position.

The Russian nation, or at least the nobles, for the serfs had no part in the matter, had undertaken the campaign with great enthusiasm, especially in the Moscow district, where ten per cent. of the male population was allotted to the field. The nobles did not understand the wisdom of retreat: invariably assured that the Russian armies were successful, they asked why such constant retreat, and who was at fault? The blame was cast upon Barclay, who was not of Russian blood; and Kutusov, the victor of Rudshuk, became the hero of the nation. Despite his autocratic power, the czar had assembled a commission to select a new commander, and Kutusov proved to be the choice. The Chancellor, Rumantzov, who had been in favor of the French alliance, was also suspected of playing into the enemy's hands; and Sir Robert Wilson, the English envoy, conveyed to the czar, from the army officers in St. Petersburg, what was really a mutinous message, based on the fear that Rumantzov might make peace. Alexander received the message sensibly, and assured Wilson that "he would sooner let his beard grow to the waist, and eat potatoes in Siberia, than permit any negotiations with Napoleon so long as an armed Frenchman remained in the territories of Russia." As to the suspicion expressed, the czar not only retained his confidence in Rumantzov, but he would not submit to dictation: his course at this time shows him to have had unusual balance.

We remember Kutusov in the Austerlitz campaign. He was a good average soldier, perhaps no better than Barclay. He was now seventy, too portly to ride, and not active. Although he had failed in 1805, he yet represented the fighting quality of Suwarrov, and having won the peace in Turkey, he was trusted. Had Barclay fought at Dorogobush, or at Gshask, the nation would have demanded a brilliant victory; but when Kutusov withdrew from Borodino, it was felt that the best possible had been done, — as indeed was true. Had any soldier weighed the conditions at Gshask, as present facts enable one to do, he might have predicted just what happened: the French must march to Moscow; there must be a battle to dispute their advance; and once in Moscow, they could not hold themselves. The advance beyond Smolensk had been a fatal error.

That Kutusov would not fight in Barclay's chosen position, because he might lose part of the credit of a victory, is less probable than that he delayed battle so as to get acquainted with the army. As Clausewitz says, one position was about as good as another. On an open plain, hundreds of miles wide, without marked hills, no stone-built villages to act as redoubts, and few unfordable streams, any position might be turned, and no enemy would attack earthworks if he could turn them. Had not Napoleon ardently longed for a pitched battle, he never would have attacked at Borodino. The new commander had orders to fight the battle which the czar and the nation demanded for the safety of Moscow; and not deeming the position of Zarevo-Saimichi a good one, he had fallen back August 31, on which day Napoleon and the French van reached Vilichevo, with Junot at Viasma, Eugene on the left at Pokrov, and Poniatowski on the right at Sloboda. On September 1 and 2 Kutusov continued his retreat towards Mozhaisk, and on the 3d reached the chosen place on the heights back of the Kolotsa, opposite Borodino. Here he stopped, resolved to receive a battle.

At Gshask, September 1, news of Kutusov's appointment fully convinced Napoleon that the Russians would fight, and here he concentrated the arriving corps, so as to advance well massed. Murat marched through Gshask, and took position, September 2, a few miles beyond; Davout and Ney remained nearby the town, Eugene at Pavlovo, and Poniatowski in the Sloboda country, Junot still being back at Tieplucha.

At Gshask, September 3, another attempt was made to stop the evil of straggling, and Berthier was instructed to write to the corps commanders that "many men are lost by the disorder in which foraging is done; that they must arrange measures to put a term to a set of things which menaces the army with destruction; that the number of prisoners which the enemy makes mounts every day to several hundred; that under the severest penalties soldiers must be forbidden to straggle."

The reports called for by the order of the 2d showed one hundred and twenty-eight thousand men in line, with six thousand more to arrive within five days; and during September 3 Junot came up. It had been raining for three days, but on September 4 it cleared, and the army moved under pleasant skies forward from Gshask toward the fateful field of Borodino. By afternoon Murat, at Gridnieva, ran into the Russian rearguard, which after a defense until nightfall retired to Kolotsi. Personally, Napoleon was at the front, bivouacking at Gridnieva. Next day Murat again attacked the Russian rearguard at Kolotsi, while Eugene turned their flank at Lusosi, and the body fell back on the main army at Borodino, which Murat drew near by 2 P. M., Eugene advancing by way of Bolshi Sadi and Poniatowski by way of Jelnia.

Two post-roads ran from Smolensk to Moscow, an old one and a new. The village of Borodino lay on the new road, where it crossed the Kolotsa, an affluent of the Moskwa; the old one being here two miles and a half to the south. The country is rolling rather than strongly accentuated, but the many brooks run in ravines more or less deep. The country was full of woods, and where these had been cut down were left what we call slashings, alternating with open fields. For a couple of miles the Kolotsa, fordable in places, but needing bridges for quick passage, meanders along parallel to and


OUVAROV
MASLOVA
MOSKVA R
BAGGAVOUT
KOLOTSA R
OSTERMANN
GORKI
BORODINO
TO MOSCOW
RESERVES
DOCTOROV
CAV.
GR.
EUGENE
RAEVSKI
VALEVIEVA
NEW POST ROAD
ALEXINKI
M
SHEVARDINO
SEMENOVSKOI
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UTIZA
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0
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2
MILES

south of the new road, until near Borodino it crosses and leaves it to flow northerly towards the Moskwa; and just above Borodino a little brook runs from the south in a marked ravine, and falls into it. East of the brook, the land rises into a plateau a mile wide; then comes another ravine and another plateau. Near the head of this brook, a mile southerly from Borodino, lay the village of Semenovskoi, on a sloping hill with the brook in its front. It had been razed, for a wooden village, easily set afire, is more of a danger in the line of battle than a defense. On the west side of the brook-ravine are three hillocks, each of which had been crowned by a simple arrowhead field-work, open in the rear — a redan. Between Semenovskoi and Borodino was a hill crowned by a good bastioned redoubt, and in front of all these works the slope was gentle and favorable to artillery fire. Several small works covered the right wing. On the old road, due south of Borodino, is the village of Utiza. North of Borodino lies fairly open country, and between the two roads are a number of hamlets and villages. The position was liable to be turned; but it was also one easy to defend, for in its front assaulting troops could not manœuvre and preserve their formation, and a column forcing its way forward in a ragged mass would be apt to be decimated by well-placed guns.

After a reconnoissance Napoleon first ordered the capture of the intrenched villages of Fomkina, Alexinki, Doronino and Shivardino, which would threaten the French right as the columns marched along the new post-road. Fomkina was easily taken by Murat, who there crossed the Kolotsa, followed by Davout; and while both took Alexinki and deployed in front of the Russian centre, Poniatowski debouched from Jelnia, captured Doronino and threatened the enemy's left flank. Shivardino was valiantly defended, and when lost, retaken;

but by 10 P. M. this position also was yielded to Compans, the Russians falling back on their line of battle. For the night Napoleon's bivouac was near Valevieva on the new road, the Guard with Eugene's corps in its front. Ney came up in Davout's rear; Junot still lay at Gshask. With battle to face, the emperor took short rest. By 2 A. M. he was in the saddle, and with Caulaincourt and Rapp set out to reconnoitre the Russian position.

Kutusov probably had one hundred and twenty thousand men in line, of whom seventeen thousand were irregulars and militia, wherewith to meet Napoleon's somewhat less number. He had leaned his right on the Moskwa near Maslova, whence the line ran behind the Kolotsa to Gorki, and the left wing stretched out through Semenovskoi to Utiza. The line was slightly convex, and troops could be easily moved to and fro back of the Russian front. That the left wing was not protected by the Kolotsa and might be turned from Jelnia, was the origin of the field-works erected; but the sandy soil did not pack well and time had been short; and Kutusov knew that impregnable works would be turned and not assaulted.

Barclay was in general command in the right wing from the big redoubt to the Moskwa, his line being broken by a ravine at Gorki. Bagration commanded the left wing, from the big redoubt to a large wood slashing between Semenovskoi and Utiza. Baggavut, with Ostermann on his left, lay north of the new road, with Ouvarov's Cossacks out on the right as far as the Moskwa; Doctorov extended from the new road to the great redoubt, which he was chosen to protect; Raevski stood on his left to Semenovskoi; and holding the small redoubts were Borozdin and Nevrovski. At first Tuchkov was on the right. The Russian cavalry was four hundred paces to the rear, and the Imperial Guard in reserve one thousand paces behind that: this was much too near, and they lost heavily from the French guns. The Russian right wing, although strong, was in a way lost. Clausewitz suggests that it might have been assembled in closer order so as to fall upon the flank of the French should they drive back the centre, but Kutusov was there to fight and not manœuvre, and he was well aware that he was no match for the emperor in manœuvring, should he try.

This position, drawn up by Bennigsen, was tactically strongest on the right. The left was less strong, for, held by but a small body, this flank was open to be turned by the old Moscow road. Late on the evening of the 6th, after Napoleon's reconnoissances of the left, Kutusov recognized this weakness, and part of the corps of Tuchkov, with ten thousand Moscow militia, was transferred thither to strengthen this wing near Utiza.

Kutusov issued no proclamation, but he paraded the Smolensk statue of the Holy Virgin, which had been borne by the priests from that city, and told the soldiers that they were fighting for her and for God, against the enemy of all God's laws. During the 6th the Russian soldiers attended divine service, and the men received absolution, with the order from their priests to die, if need be, for the conservation of their sacred city of Moscow.

Napoleon issued his usual

PROCLAMATION.

Imperial Camp on the heights of Borodino,
September 7, 1812, 2 A. M.

Soldiers! Here is the battle that you have so much desired. From now on victory depends on you: it is necessary to us. It will give you abundance, good winter quarters, and a prompt return to the fatherland. Conduct yourselves as at Austerlitz, at Friedland, at Vitebsk, at Smolensk, and let the most distant posterity point with pride to your conduct on this day. Let it be said of you, "He was in that great battle under the walls of Moscow."

In gauging Napoleon's short proclamation, which every company commander read to his men, one must not consider it from the standpoint of the highest intelligence, but adapt it to the limited understanding of the men in the ranks. In any event, whether it was this, or the knowledge that they must win, which produced the effect, the French fighting was perfect so far as the courage of the men is concerned. Never in modern times have two armies of this size stood to their work under such decimation as these did during the few hours of the most stubborn fighting at Borodino.

The French were busy in bringing up detachments, perfecting details of position, and placing batteries. The emperor again rode the Russian line during the afternoon of the 6th, rejoiced that the enemy was finally to stand for battle. His plan was rapidly matured. On the left Eugene was to contain Kutusov's right, Davout and Ney in the centre were to break down his left wing, while Poniatowski on the right should turn his left flank to aid Davout and Ney. This Napoleon believed would throw the Russian army back on the Moskwa, where he could fight them to a finish. The plan was simple; the emperor merely busied the Russian right to crush the centre and to turn the left.

As we can see it now, a plan more in accordance with Napoleon's battle habit would have been to let Eugene with less troops contain the Russian centre and right, and to have Davout with all his divisions attack between the Utiza wood and the left Russian redoubt, with Ney on his left advancing on Semenovskoi, the Young Guard between the two, and the whole followed up by Murat, while Poniatowski, supported by Junot, turned Tuchkov's left. This heavy mass would have broken the Russians' left before it was reinforced, and have compelled them to form a new front, as the Austrians did at Leuthen. Backing as they did on the Moskwa, it would have given much greater chance of a decisive result. Or had Davout moved with Poniatowski's column to turn the Russian left, a similar result might have been obtained. Davout suggested that he might break through at the southerly redoubt and at the same time turn the Russian left; and knowing his marked capacity for fighting against odds, the suggestion was good; but the emperor feared that Davout might run across obstacles which he could not readily overcome, and thus get stalled at a distance from the main body. Still, the Russian left was the weak spot, as Napoleon had discovered. His plan was in effect an echeloned attack by his right, and fearing that too evident a turning manœuvre would persuade the Russian army to retire, and thus again defer the battle he had long anticipated, he decided to exhibit nothing of the kind until the whole army was afoot and advancing.

As in all great battles, there is disagreement as to detail: no two accounts agree as to minor manœuvres, but all are alike in the larger factors. One thing was marked: the Russian soldiers had rest and good rations the day before the battle; the French had little bread and were busy moving into place. Yet their fighting was as staunch as the foemen's.

At early dawn next day the French army was marshaled, with Poniatowski on the Jelnia-Utiza road; on his left Friant, Dessaix and Compans, of Davout's corps, stood in the right front of Shivardino, with the Guard in their rear, its artillery sent to the front line. Ney came next, to the left rear of Davout in front of Alexinki, and Junot shortly marched up in their rear. Much against Davout's grain, his divisions under Morand and Gérard (late Gudin), and Grouchy's cavalry, had been added to Eugene's force, which stood north of the Kolotsa, between Valevieva and Borodino; and if Eugene was merely to contain the Russian centre and right, this was taking a valuable force from the active French wing. In the rear of Davout and Ney stood Nansouty, Montbrun and Latour-Maubourg, the latter having just come up from Mstislavl via Jelnia. A great body was thus massed opposite the three redoubts, to break down the Russian defense. Some of the German accounts place Davout with two divisions, and Ney in first line, Murat and Junot in second line, and the entire Guard in third line, in reserve. The positions of the divisions are so variously stated in all the reports — even the French official ones — as to be uncertain. This is in no wise strange. Set two intelligent staff officers to describe the position of troops in a line of battle already marshaled, and the difference of their reports would be in every case marked.

In the evening was issued the order of attack for early morning of September 7.

> "Camp, two leagues from Mozhaisk, September 6, 1812. The Order for Battle." After indicating the assembly of guns for the initial cannonade, the Order goes on : "During this cannonade Poniatowski will move from the village" (Jelnia) "towards the forest, and will turn the position of the enemy. Compans will move along the forest to capture the first redoubt. The combat being thus engaged, orders will be given according to the dispositions of the enemy." Then is ordered a cannonade on the left, to begin at the same time, and the skirmishers of the left to advance as soon as they see the right move forward. "The viceroy will capture the village" (Borodino), "will debouch over his three bridges" (which he was to throw early in the morning) "on the heights, at the moment when Morand and Gérard shall debouch, under the orders of the viceroy, to seize the redoubt of the enemy, and form the line of the army. All this is to be done with order and method, and having a care to keep always a great quantity of reserves."

Sixty-two guns in Davout's corps and the Guard, and forty in Ney's were selected to engage the Russian artillery in front of Semenovskoi; the rest of the Guard artillery was to be held ready. Compans, to whom Napoleon personally gave his orders, was to assault the most southerly of the redans at Semenovskoi, Dessaix was to second him, and Friant to advance in reserve. At the same moment Poniatowski was to begin his march about the Russian left flank. So soon as Davout had won the works, Ney was to advance on Semenovskoi, and as his corps was barely fifteen thousand strong, ten thousand Westphalians were later added to it as a second line. When the attack of the French right began, Eugene was to advance on and capture Borodino, cross the river, and fall on the Russian right wing with his own divisions, while Morand and Gérard were to assault the big redoubt south of Borodino. The French line was not over two miles and a half long, and the force made it very deep. The Russians extended over a wider front, but during the battle they successively moved troops down to their centre and left, into even greater depth than the French. This massing of men and the tremendous array of guns opened the way for frightful losses.

Having issued his orders, Napoleon lay down for rest; but as he could not sleep, he called in Berthier, and after working over all the plans of the battle until after five, he mounted and rode to the work at Schivardino, captured the day before; and in front and somewhat to the east of this work he took up his stand, and here remained all day. He was suffering from a severe cold, and could hardly speak. From this position he could see the Russian centre and left in their intrenchments, and here he intended his main attack to fall. Borodino was hidden by the woods, as was also Utiza. Had Napoleon chosen a manœuvring battle, he would have changed his position from time to time; but having made up his mind to break down the Russian centre before he actually turned its left, he was wise to remain where his subordinates could find him.

At 6 A. M. of September 7 the guns opened along the whole line, and Compans, followed on the right by Dessaix, Friant in reserve, as well as Poniatowski's corps, started on their several tasks. From the outset, it did not look as if the attack on the big redoubt was going to be made in sufficient force. Compans and Dessaix advanced lustily on the works, while on their left Ney led up his divisions; shortly the French were hand to hand with the Russian foot, and before eight o'clock they forced an entrance into the works; but, open in the rear, these had no value. Compans, being wounded, left Dessaix in command, who also fell; Rapp succeeded him, and Davout's horse was shot under him, giving the marshal a serious contusion. But he kept the saddle, and his plucky divisions maintained their holding. Voronzov, in one of the redoubts, was killed; but the defenders, advancing fresh batteries, and with the second line under Nevrovski hurrying up, hurled the French out with mutual heavy losses. Bagration now made haste to defend the works with a fresh division of Tuchkov's corps under Konovnitsin, a division of cuirassiers and a brigade of the Young Guard. Kutusov, who had taken post at Gorki, on the new road, from which he could see the French army better than the emperor could see his lines, early recognized that his left was the threatened wing, and when Barclay sent from the right the corps of Baggavut, which arrived towards 9 A. M., Bagration had already reëstablished the matter, and one division went to Utiza, while another was thrown into the slashing south of the three redans. Observing, somewhat prior to this time, that the Russians might find a gap between Davout and Poniatowski, as the latter had moved to the right of the slashing on his turning manoeuvre, and that only some of Murat's cavalry divisions were there, Napoleon ordered Junot, from his post behind Ney, to oblique forward to Davout's right so as to hold it. Junot had, about 8 A. M., barely started, when the Russian countercharge threw back the French assault; and he was halted and ordered into action between Ney and Davout, to fill a still more threatening gap. The narrow space compelled him to mass his corps, but the Russian charge did not then reach his line. About 9 A. M. Davout and Ney advanced afresh on the Semenovskoi redans, and Murat led up Latour-Maubourg on Davout's right and Montbrun behind Ney. Ney headed Ledru and, in company with Compans' division, after a brilliant charge, once more forced a way into two of the coveted works; while Razout's division went forward on the third redan, and had almost captured it, when the Russian cuirassiers rode down upon it; but the French foot held its own until Bruyère's heavy horse came up to the rescue. Between them all the works fell. But Bagration was in his element. Even Ney was no better fighter. The Mecklenburg grenadiers in the Russian service, with some guards and cuirassiers, what remained of Voronzov and Nevrovski, and some light cavalry were sent in to recapture the Semenovskoi works; and after a fierce struggle one was wrested from the French, and Murat came near capture, the report of which was circulated in the Russian army, much to the elation of the troops. The fighting around the redans was so fierce that Kutusov drew in Ostermann to the centre, massing his troops more and more; and in the heat of battle he so huddled his divisions that their organization was almost lost.

Baggavut.

During this time Junot's Westphalians moved on towards the right and forward to occupy the slashing, but the delay had enabled Eugene of Wurtemberg, backed by Galitzin's cavalry, to occupy it, and they drove the Westphalians back. Encouraged by this success, Galitzin rode out against the French right, and seized a reserve battery; but taken in reverse by one of Dessaix's regiments, was compelled to release his hold.

Galitzin.

While this was going on, Eugene and Poniatowski were intent on their own work, the latter having taken Utiza, and the former Borodino. But, from late hardships, Poniatowski's corps had dwindled to ten thousand men, and he made no progress through the marshy woods in his front against the Russians who were fending off his onset. Still, when the Westphalians came into action in the slashing, he seized the hillock which dominated the Russian left: but Tuchkov drove him out with part of Baggavut's troops, losing his life in the charge, and Poniatowski was forced to a pause, having accomplished practically nothing. It was becoming evident that the fighting would have been better pushed farther on the Russian left.

Nor was Eugene more fortunate. Upon seizing Borodino, within an hour after the opening of the battle, Plausonne had driven the enemy across the Kolotsa; but Doctorov met him firmly and threw him back to the left bank. Leaving Delzons to hold Borodino, Eugene, under cover of his guns massed in the village, again advanced, about 8 A. M., against the big redoubt, Morand in the lead, one regiment in line in front, sustained by the others in column. With a splendid rush he drove out the defenders under Paskievich, and was making preparations to hold the work, when Doctorov brought up his second line of foot, and hurling it on the redoubt, sustained it by a guard brigade under Iermolov. Morand had suffered heavily from the Russian artillery, and, also attacked on the right by Vasilchikov, was driven out and forced down into the ravine, leaving Bonami's brigade in the redoubt, where it was captured. What was left of Morand was received by Broussier and Gérard, who advanced on his left and right respectively. Shortly Eugene was back at the Kolotsa, and his guns alone were shelling the big redoubt.

Thus what at eight o'clock had seemed like success at the great redoubt, at the redans, and at Utiza, had gone lost, and by nine all the French assaults, delivered too much in detail, had broken against the wonderful Russian defense. But Ney and Davout were far from discouraged. Friant, hitherto in reserve, was brought into line on the left of Razout, and the two corps again advanced on the Semenovskoi redans. The onset was made with vigor and well together, and in another hour the French had captured them, and crossing the ravine in its front, Friant seized even the site of the village itself. They were aided by Latour-Maubourg, who rode up on their right, and fell on the left of Konovnitsin, whose regiments received him in square; this enabled the Russian cuirassiers to come to the rescue, but after a long struggle the French foot and horse drove the enemy's line back. Still the Russian infantry was equal to the test, and the right held the big redoubt with determination. The French centre was not able to force its way farther than the captured redans and the village; but it held the works; and by one more joint effort, sustained by the artillery, Ney and Davout — though opposed by Bagration in person, who, desperately wounded, was later succeeded by Konovnitsin — were able to drive the enemy behind the ravine. Here the Russians stood, and the French rushes forward on the tired but still cheerful line were uniformly thrown back. Though the French had won the redans for which they had fought so fiercely, they had not broken the enemy, and from shortly after noon artillery fire was the predominant sound of the battle in the centre, as also on the right: this never ceased.

On the French left, after being thrown back, Eugene was about to renew his assault on the main redoubt, when, hearing that Russian cavalry was appearing on the left bank of the Kolotsa, he deferred the advance, and led back Lecchi to Delzons' aid at Borodino. Ney, holding Semenovskoi under the fire of two hundred guns, was calling loudly for reinforcements to give the *coup de grace*, and Napoleon was about to send in the Young Guard to his support, when an exaggerated rumor of the attack on Eugene's left came in; and as such an attack might compromise the French rear, Napoleon delayed putting in these *élite* troops to sustain Ney, and instead, sent Claparède to succor Eugene, should he be pressed. But the Russian cavalry — it was Ouvarov, with Platov's Cossacks in support, five thousand men in all — found the ground unsuited to a sharp diversion, and beyond throwing back Ornano's weak French cavalry corps which opposed its advance, it accomplished nothing. It could not indeed have had any great result; yet although Clausewitz, who was on Ouvarov's staff, condemns the diversion, it had stayed Napoleon's hand for a critical hour. Delzons' division in square could now hold its own, and Eugene returned to the assault on the big redoubt.

Throwing Gérard, Morand and Broussier forward on this work, and Montbrun's cavalry into the gap between Ney's left and his own corps, Eugene once more started out. In anticipation of a fresh onset, the Russian commander had drawn Ostermann from the right to relieve Raevski's decimated regiments, and his foot came into line with his right on the Moscow road and his left out towards Semenovskoi. Assuming this to be an offensive manœuvre, all the batteries that could be assembled were trained on Ostermann's corps, to which the Russian guns replied heartily, and from Borodino to Semenovskoi, on a front of a mile and a half, over eight hundred guns vomited death into the contending masses. Ostermann advanced in fine style, but Montbrun's squadrons outdid themselves. Montbrun was killed by a cannon-ball before starting, and Caulaincourt took the lead. Riding up against Ostermann's line, backed by the Russian Old Guard on the left of the works, these fine troopers drove it back, rode around the big redoubt, and actually forced their way into the rear outlet. Caulaincourt was also wounded. Such work by horsemen against unbroken foot could not of course succeed, and, attacked by the cavalry of Korv and Pahlen, the French squadrons were thrown back with heavy losses; but the gallant ride enabled the foot divisions to reach the redoubt, surround and escalade it, and put the Russian defenders under Lichachev to the sword. Eugene was about to launch Grouchy on the retiring battalions, but the Russian horseguards held him back, and with Korv and Pahlen, compelled him to retire. It was nearly 3 P. M. The French had won the great redoubt and the three redans on the Russian front, and kept their hold on Semenovskoi, but the Russian troops could neither be forced out of the ravines in the rear, to which they had retired, nor driven into panic.

Some time before this, as Junot was accomplishing no good at the slashing, he was moved to Davout's right, to give countenance to Poniatowski, who at 1 P. M. was still at Utiza. Slow progress was made by Junot against Baggavut, but by steady pushing he gradually worked to the front, by 5 P. M. was on a line with Poniatowski, and the two corps advanced together. Why the emperor had paid no greater heed to this part of the field during the day can be explained only by the desperate nature of the fighting in his front. Once started, the onset of Poniatowski and Junot was vigorous, the Russian left was driven in, and the hillock beyond Utiza recovered; the Westphalians came forward, and the Russians fell back to reform on the heights southeast of Semenovskoi. It was 6 P. M. In the centre, since three o'clock, cannonading alone had gone on, but this had been murderous. Cavalry and infantry had both essayed to advance, seeking to escape the hail of shells, but only for a brief moment could they do so. The losses had been unparalleled, and the mutual exhaustion was such that neither did the French advance beyond the works, nor the Russians attempt to recapture them. Not long after 6 P. M. even the artillery fire died out.

The capture of the great redoubt was the end of the battle. The Russians had lost their first position, but they were in no more disorder than the French, and could not be driven farther back. When Ostermann was ordered to make a counter-attack, and started out, ployed into column, the attempt was futile; he was stopped by the French artillery; and although with him Kutusov used his last fresh man, the conclusion drawn by Napoleon from Ostermann's advance was that no commander would so utilize his only reserves, and that more must be at hand. He himself still had intact his own reserve, the Guard, which had not been put in. Nor did the emperor order it in now. There was no further fighting after Ostermann's advance was driven back.

Though the serious problem of Eugene and the heavy fighting of Davout and Ney had during the day needed his personal supervision, Napoleon remained constantly at his post near the Shivardino redoubt, leaving each of his lieutenants to work out his task. At 4 P. M., when the battle was practically over, he rode over to Ney and Murat; but for an hour, from the dying down of the artillery fire, he had seen that nothing more could be accomplished. Towards 7 P. M. he rode back, and as Bousset says, "against his usual habit he had a heated color, with his hair in disorder, and wore a tired expression." He was convinced that the Russians would decamp during the night and yield up Moscow without further pressure, and he preferred a half success to risking what he had already gained. In effect, Kutusov did retire during the night, in remarkably good order considering his losses, and started towards Moscow in two columns, by the old and the new roads. After the battle the Russian troops were well fed; the French had scarcely any rations. The Russians chanted *Te Deums*, but technically Borodino was for them a defeat, because they gave up the battlefield. Borodino was certainly won by the French, but it was a Pyrrhic victory. It enabled Napoleon to reach Moscow. But as the losses made it certain that he could not hold himself there, unless Alexander would treat for peace, the strategic gain was naught. The indecisive victory meant for the French certain failure of the Russian campaign: had Napoleon put in the Guard and destroyed the Russian army, Alexander might have treated; with the Russian army still intact, he had ample means of defense left.

The battle of Borodino, or of the Moskwa, was one fought in parallel order, "all along the line," a mere push of masses, without grand-tactics of any kind. Except that the cavalry did some work unusual for that arm, and that the percentage of losses was greater than in any battle of the nineteenth century, it has nothing to distinguish it. The casualties are variously given. Probably thirty thousand men killed and wounded for the French, and forty thousand men for the Russian army, is somewhere near the truth. The French practically took no trophies, despite Napoleon's claim in a letter to the Emperor Francis. Nearly all the ammunition had been used up, some sixty thousand rounds having been fired by the French artillery, and nearly a million and a half infantry cartridges.

The battle was not the decisive one Napoleon must win to accomplish his object. A decisive victory can be won only by breaking the centre, or by manœuvring against the flanks or communications of the enemy, or by hurling fresh troops upon him at the moment when he is retiring exhausted. As at Smolensk, there was no attempt to do any of these things. Twice during the battle Napoleon acted on the side of caution: when he delayed sustaining Ney, because the Cossacks had attacked his left, and when he decided not to put in his reserves. That the execution of the battle was not as good as its plan has to do with the conditions as much as with Napoleon's own act. When the weakness of the Russian line had been demonstrated by its lack of effective fire, say at 3 P. M., the emperor did not throw his Guard, still twenty thousand strong, upon it. Up to Borodino, in a doubtful victory, he had always dealt such a blow at the supreme moment, so as to hasten the beaten enemy into flight. Why he did not here do so will never be known, and whether he was right or wrong will continue to be a subject for discussion. It seems that if, about 3 P. M., the Guard had been put in, the effect, at no excessive additional loss, would have been to make Borodino a crushing Russian defeat. But Napoleon did not know the facts now plain. Had he put in his reserves without success, his army must have become a fleeing mob in half an hour. It may have been the fear of reaching Moscow with a force too much depleted that stayed his hand; and yet it was far better to do this, if he had destroyed Kutusov, than to reach Moscow with twenty thousand men more, when Kutusov was still afield. Moreover, he had shown no especial care to save his troops in the late advance; he had pushed on regardless of the constantly increasing numbers who fell out of the ranks, and without any uncommon measures to keep the army intact. It is the manifest duty of the captain to be careful of an army on the march; and equally his duty to sacrifice so much of the army in battle as may be necessary to win the kind of victory needed. What Napoleon had so far shown us of the art of battles is, first, the way to reach the weak side of the enemy, the flank or rear, with least danger to ourselves; and second, the secret of selecting the instant for putting in the reserves so as to turn a simple victory into a decisive one. At Borodino there is no trace of either of these arts. At the important moment Napoleon had been too far away from the critical points of the battle to gauge the necessities of the case. Was it his health which dominated his powers?

As Jomini has pointed out, there are battles where victory should be early sought; others in which victory should be delayed until the end of the day. If one side needs the victory early, the other side needs to defer it. At Waterloo the decisive moment for Wellington was when Blucher could put in his appearance; at Marengo the decisive moment for Bonaparte was when Desaix was to arrive from Rivalta. On the other hand, Napoleon should have striven to win the field of Waterloo early, and the Austrians should have kept up their attack on Bonaparte at Marengo so as to crush him irretrievably before noon. Now at Borodino, Napoleon was in force in front of the Russian left wing by 6 A. M., and he had rightly guessed that their main body was in the other wing. It should have been his main effort to break down the left wing before it could be aided. His troops were well in hand. By not massing his attack in the early hours, he permitted reinforcements to reach the left in season to protect it. The big redoubt and the three redans were carried by the French after Kutusov had had time to bring up forty thousand men and over one hundred guns to support the troops first there: it cannot, therefore, be doubted that the redans would have fallen at the first rush, if Ney and the Westphalians united had assailed them; and meanwhile Davout with his full corps might have backed up Poniatowski in the turning manœuvre against the Russian left. Eugene was quite equal to containing the enemy's right and thus protecting the new Moscow road; and there seems no reasonable question, had the turning manœuvre been made in force by 6 A. M., that the Russian left would have been rolled up like a scroll, that Kutusov would have had to form a fresh line backing on the Moskwa, and that the emperor could have threatened the Russian communications to such good effect as to win the decisive battle he needed in order to bring about a peace.

As to refusing Ney the Young Guard when this marshal begged for reinforcements at some time before noon, it should be said that Napoleon was actually about to send in Mortier and the Young Guard to sustain Ney, when the Cossack diversion on the left attracted his attention and arrested his hand. As to his neglect to put in the Guard, we must remember that, from what Napoleon knew of the Russians, from history and his own experience, he was aware of their exceptional power of defense under any normal conditions. He could not know that the Russians had put in their last man and, as at Eylau, had no reserve left. He believed they still must have fresh troops on the right, and that the Russian Guard was intact. Had he guessed the truth, there is no doubt as to what he would have done, and the Russian army would have been practically annihilated.

The assaults were not delivered by Napoleon in his usual masses. The hand of the giant was not seen at Borodino. They were delivered by masses too small, though they were repeated until all but the Guard had been put in. Partial assaults are the usual stamp of the lesser leaders. The big redoubt should not have been attacked at 10 A. M. by Morand alone. If it was to be taken, as a means of containing the Russian right wing, Eugene should have thrown the bulk of his force, save reserves, upon it. Had this been done, and had Ney been sustained at Semenovskoi by the Young Guard, the Russian centre would have been pierced, and victory sure by noon. Even at 3 P. M., after the redoubt had been taken by Eugene, Ney should have been supported. Bagration had been succeeded by Doctorov, and his divisions were almost destroyed; Baggavut, with the relics of Tuchkov's corps, was much broken; Ostermann alone was in any kind of order. Had the whole Guard been put in, on the right of Semenovskoi, the Russians would have been forced into retreat during daylight; and by a pursuit as vigorous as that at Austerlitz, the Russian army would have been put beyond use, and Alexander would have been left without resources. But on the other hand, the French army was itself in bad order; neither foot nor horse had kept any organization; Napoleon believed that there was still an untouched Russian reserve, and the chance of a decisive victory went lost. It is perhaps hypercritical to-day to say that Napoleon should have done this or that. It is all an academic question. But it remains true that the splendid vigor of mind and body which we have seen and admired at Rivoli, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, that alertness that kept the master mind on every point, was not apparent at Borodino.

Napoleon's unusual prudence was in a way traceable to the situation. His enemy had a homogeneous army, well disciplined, well fed and full of religious enthusiasm, fighting at the gates of its sacred capital. His own army was made up of twenty different peoples, in ill state, not all loyal to the man or his cause; it was in a way dispirited by the long advance and all its sad privations, and had practically no magazines to fall back upon. Napoleon dared not run the risks he had at other times so lightly assumed. He needed rest, food. Moscow would give his army these; and a half victory would open its gates, and, as he reasoned, would assure peace. To look at the other side, even a partial defeat might demoralize the army; a *sauve qui peut* might be started, and would a single man of them all escape? This is an additional argument for stopping the 1812 campaign at Smolensk.

The huge number of wounded on both sides were later, so far as was possible, got to Moscow, where many of them perished in the conflagration. Those of the French wounded who escaped the fire succumbed on the retreat. Among the French general officers killed were Montbrun, Plausonne, Romeuf, Bonami, Marion, Compère, Huart; among the wounded were Caulaincourt, Nansouty, Grouchy, Latour-Maubourg, Rapp, Compans, Friant, Morand, Lahoussaye. The superior officers suffered equally. The Russian list of general officers killed and wounded was even greater, among them Bagration, Tuchkov and Kaiserov killed, and Galitzin, Gorchakov and a score of others wounded.

From Mozhaisk, September 4, Napoleon wrote the Emperor Francis "to announce the happy issue of the battle of the

Moskova, which took place September 7, at the village of Borodino. . . . I assume the losses of the enemy to be forty or fifty thousand men. He had one hundred and twenty to one hundred and thirty thousand men in line of battle. I lost eight or ten thousand killed or wounded. I took sixty guns and made a great number of prisoners."

French Mounted Rifleman.

LIII.

MOSCOW. SEPTEMBER 8 TO OCTOBER 19, 1812.

There was no pursuit after Borodino. Napoleon simply followed the Russians, who occasionally turned to arrest him. He knew that with his few remaining troops he could not hold himself in Moscow, but he believed that its capture would bring Alexander to terms. The Russians marched through Moscow and beyond, and the French took the city September 14. Here they expected to find everything necessary for the army, but the city was half deserted, and a conflagration consumed eight thousand houses. Napoleon failed to divine that he could not bring Russia to terms, and stayed on, hoping for advances, meanwhile considering four operations: to winter in Moscow, to retire by the south, to retire on Smolensk, to march on St. Petersburg. But he did nothing. Meanwhile, Kutusov moved to the south of Moscow, Murat was sent out to meet him, and thus matters remained some weeks, Napoleon striving to bring order out of chaos in the rear, and hoping daily to hear from Alexander, to whom he himself made weak advances, which were not noticed. Meanwhile Macdonald was blockading Riga, Wittgenstein much outnumbered St. Cyr near Polotsk, Chichagov and Tormasov had forced back Schwartzenberg and Reynier at Brest Litovsk. On this immense theatre Napoleon had little over two hundred thousand men, and was vulnerable at many points. He saw the facts clearly, as a Note early in October shows, but he drew from them wrong conclusions. Finally, on October 18, Kutusov defeated Murat near Tarutino, and next day Napoleon began the retreat from Moscow, already determined on.

Leaving a rearguard on the field on the morning of September 8, Kutusov led his defeated but not disheartened army back on Mozhaisk. Napoleon got together the available cavalry under Murat, supported by Dufour's (late Friant's) division, and sent him forward to take this town; but the Russian party at its entrance held him back. The emperor remained all day at his bivouac near Schivardino. He appeared "overcome with lassitude," says Constant, but at 1 p. m. he rode over the battlefield. The wounded were given such care as was possible in and about a large convent nearby; but three days elapsed before all had even their first dressing. To the uninitiated this sounds lamentable; but whoso remembers the battle of Gettysburg with its thirty-odd thousand wounded men, in the midst of a thick and intelligent population, with hosts of doctors and surgeons hurrying up by rail and road from all the adjoining towns and cities, and recalls how scant attention and how long deferred a wounded man might then expect, can understand the difficulties in a sparsely settled country like Russia.

Davout and the Guard had followed Murat; the rest of the army was still near the battlefield, hardly in the mood of victors. No army losing a quarter of its effective strength in one day's fighting can escape a similar shock; and the enormous distance from home was not reassuring. On the 9th the Russians retired to Semnia, the emperor reaching Mozhaisk with Murat, the Guard and Davout, Ney coming up. As flankers Eugene marched on Rusa, Poniatowski on Vereia; Junot remained on the battlefield, to care for the wounded. The retreat and following towards Moscow was continued, the French reorganizing on the way, and searching for food in all directions.

This movement little resembled the tremendous pursuit after former victories. The Russian rearguard was under Miloradovich, and Clausewitz, who was with him, states that the French van struck it only once with any force. It is true that whenever the enemy can flee, the victor can pursue; but this assumes a less exhausted army than the French after Borodino, and more push than Napoleon exhibited. Moreover, the arm for pursuit is cavalry, and Murat's regiments were in sorry plight; and as resistance at Moscow was to be anticipated, the army must be saved for fighting there. It has been suggested that Kutusov should have moved south to Kaluga to threaten the flank of the Grand Army as it moved on the sacred city; but had he done so, Napoleon could have contained him with a detachment, entered Moscow without fighting, and inflicted on the Russians a more serious moral blow than he did.

Personally, Napoleon remained in Mozhaisk until September 12. Recognizing that he could not long hold himself in Moscow without peace, he wrote Berthier, September 11, to hurry all available forces on to Smolensk, and there, as an additional security and threat, form a strong reserve; but he still expected that his occupation of Moscow would result in peace, or at least he so acted.

Leaving Mozhaisk September 12, Napoleon drove forward to Petelina, and next day to Borisovka. Kutusov, standing in front of Moscow, from Fili to Troizkoi, called a council of war to decide whether another battle should be fought, and the vote was cast in favor of fighting to the death; but Kutusov knew that the army was more important to Russia than Moscow could be, and did not choose to be bound by the council. On the 14th he marched through the city, and by late afternoon had vacated it, retiring as far as Panki; whereupon the bulk of the population deserted it, and even on that day a few fires were discovered in the suburbs. When the French drew near, Miloradovich strove to approach Murat, but though declining to receive him, Murat did not check Sébastiani, commanding his van, from stipulating with the Russian general, in order to save the city from a conflagration, which a battle within walls might start among its wooden structures, not to interfere with his transit, and not to enter the city until two hours after he had left it. Murat did not ride into the Dorogomilov suburb until 2 P. M., September 14; but his squadrons then crossed the Moskwa and entered the city proper.

When Napoleon first came in view of this goal of his ambition, — from the top of the nearby Hill of Salute, — "one could not mistake joy and contentment in his features," narrates an officer of the Prussian lancers, who was able to note his looks. The Guard was sent in to occupy the Kremlin; as they came along, Davout and Ney took up a position west of the city, Poniatowski, who had been the right wing, on the south, Eugene coming from Svenigrod towards the north. Murat's van was on the road southeast at Karocharovo. Temporary imperial headquarters were set up in the west suburb.

No sooner established in Moscow than the emperor began working to protect as well as to strengthen his holding.

On the 10th he wrote to Maret: "It is believed that Wittgenstein has left the Drissa to move between St. Petersburg and Moscow. If this is verified, write to St. Cyr to pursue him, and to arrive at the same time as he does, to cover my flank. In this case also write to Macdonald that he has *carte blanche* to commence the siege of Riga, or to do what he thinks will be most useful to my service. Write to Schwartzenberg that the enemy has done everything to prevent our reaching Moscow, that he will do everything to drive us from it; that I am certain that everything that was at Mozyr and at Kiev is moving on Moscow. That he is to follow sharply the movements of the enemy and not let himself be deceived. That if the enemy, who is in his front, falls upon him, he is to follow and fall upon him. That is well understood. Explain this fully. Henceforth the enemy, struck at the heart, will think only of the heart, and think no more of the extremities."

And next day, with a view of creating a strong reserve at a point not too far in the rear, he instructed Berthier to write in similar vein to Victor, whose corps had crossed the Niemen September 4, and could reach Smolensk by the 27th, that certain specified troops were to be directed on Smolensk.

"It is then from Smolensk to Moscow that he should move. The numerous troops which arrive in the rear and those of Lithuania are



Lines of Advance and Retreat.

sufficient to guard the rear. . . . Vitebsk needs nothing. However few troops there are there, the enemy will leave it alone. I should myself keep nobody there, so soon as the hospital is cleared. Victor should then direct everything, battalions, squadrons, artillery, isolated men, on Smolensk, so as from there to be able to come on here."

On September 10 he wrote Maret, ordering clothing and other equipments to be sent to Smolensk. And to Berthier: "We much need French guns . . . to arm the stragglers, and naturally the wounded who have lost theirs. We need twenty thousand." Moreover, with his now settled habit, he ordered Berthier to "tell St. Cyr that the corps of Wittgenstein has not twenty thousand men all told; that he himself is much superior in force, and that if he arranged with Macdonald, he could attack him and beat him by turning his flank." And for effect on the people of France he issued a

CIRCULAR TO THE BISHOPS OF THE EMPIRE.

From our Imperial Quarters at Mozhaisk, September 10, 1812. To the Bishop of X. . . . The passage of the Niemen, of the Dvina, of the Borysthenes, the combats of Mohilev, of Drissa, of Polotsk, of Ostrovno, of Smolensk, finally the battle of the Moskwa, are so many motives to address thanks to the God of armies. Our intention is, then, that on the receipt of these presents you should consult with those in authority. Assemble my people in the churches to sing prayers, in conformity to the usage and the rules of the church in similar circumstances.

NAPOLEON.

While the desertion of the country and country towns by the local authorities in Spain had been trying enough, in the great city of Madrid this had not occurred; but in Moscow every element of organization was broken up. The nobles, who spent only part of their time there, had left, with all their serfs and domestics, for their country estates, and the middle class, consisting of shopkeepers and those who are really most necessary to the victualing of a city, had fled in terror. From the first moment, the question of victualing was embarrassing, and the emperor must have appreciated his insecure footing. Yet to keep up the appearance of success, an empty ceremonial of delivering up the keys of the city was gone through.

Like Rome, Moscow lies upon seven hills. Both European and Oriental in characteristics, having two hundred churches with colored domes and belfries, its aspect was most picturesque. Napoleon had been told that the better classes favored a change in the Russian administration; he had talked idly about rousing the people against their rulers; but far from this being true, the French found bitter enemies in every class, and officials and people alike turned from them as from the pestilence. Hitherto, in all captured capitals public order had been preserved, but here the famished soldiery exceeded all bounds, each one seizing what first came to hand. Although the magazines were guarded, the shops could not be, and all were gutted.

During the night of September 14–15, fires began to break out, the first one noticed in a large storehouse. This was extinguished. Then the great bazaar near the Kremlin was found afire, and the shifty winds fed it. The fires continued, and by the morning of the 16th the whole city was aflame. The emperor, already housed in the Kremlin, was driven out, and went to Castle Petrovski outside the walls. As the equinoxial rains came on, the winds grew less violent. The Kremlin had been injured, but not destroyed, and on the 18th, after the conflagration had consumed some eight thousand houses, it was controlled, and Napoleon reoccupied the palace.

Who set Moscow afire has ever since been a question. The Russian nation professed rage at the act, of which they accused the French; but the French could not have deliberately fired Moscow, the place being essential to save them from disaster. It is easy to understand that careless French pillagers may have continued their habit of destroying what they could not use, sometimes by the torch; or that among the fleeing

Russians many preferred to burn their household gods rather than to have them fall into foreign hands; or that many miscreants or marauders, often soldiers, may have set fire to houses to cover up their crimes; but all these acts are incident to the military occupation and show no deliberate intent. People at that day stated and believed that Rostopchin, the governor, set fire to the city in a fit of patriotic fervor: indeed, he confessed to the act at the time, although later he formally denied it. He burned down some of his own country houses to prevent their use by the French; and there is suggestion that Kutusov was aware of his intention, and strove to prevent it. It was generally believed by the French that the governor had employed incendiaries. The whole story is a mass of contradictions. Unless we believe that Rostopchin fired the city, we can only ascribe the tragedy to accidental fires started by pillagers of both nations. Probably all three causes existed, and the elements did the rest, for a very few fires in a city built of wood, and aided by the equinox, would soon produce a conflagration.

It was now that Napoleon made his most fatal error. Had he as of old reasoned correctly from the facts, — especially from the act of Rostopchin, — he would have recognized in the destruction of their sacred city proof positive that the Russian nation would never treat with the invader, and that he must retire at once if he would reach his magazines and reserves before winter set in. But he continued to hug the delusion that Russia must treat; and instead of withdrawing towards Kaluga and Smolensk, — or into the rich provinces of the south, which would have given a fresh offensive aspect to the war, — he remained in ruined Moscow, where he knew he could not long subsist; for although any well-peopled city can feed an army, a burned city whose inhabitants have fled affords no asylum; and the very machinery of victualing had



Gshask-Moscow-Medyni Country.

disappeared in Moscow. One of the most valuable qualities in any department of life is the ability to recognize the moment when it is wise to retire from an operation; but the emperor could not give up his plan — could not acknowledge failure. Even if the soldier Napoleon gauged it as essential, the man Napoleon could not face the idea of retreat; the word had been spoken but twice since Castiglione: at Eylau it was barely whispered, and at Essling it was acknowledged and explained, but merely to take a fresh start. He had never yet faced failure, and could not believe in it now. Moreover, retreat was no easy matter. The route to Smolensk was eaten out, though it could still be reached via Kaluga and Jelnia. The route by way of Kiev on the Dnieper was through a better country, not yet ravaged; and it led towards Schwartzenberg's army and a fresh base on the line Zamosc-Lublin-Warsaw; but should Austria not prove loyal, this would bring about trouble; and not only did the Tormasov-Chichagov army lie athwart his path, but the French magazines were at Kovno, Vilna and Minsk, in the other direction. Had Moscow been completely burned, Napoleon would have retired at once; as it was, enough of the city was left to warrant delay, in the hope that the Russians would ask for a truce. Many supplies were left, enough to suffice for awhile, or perhaps to feed the army back to Smolensk. There were more luxuries than necessaries: wines were in plenty; preserved fruits and sugar were found in sickening quantities; but of flour there was little, and of meat only what had come along with the army. The troops were kept on scant rations. At least two thirds of the provision on which Napoleon depended to bring the war to a successful issue had been burned; and such of the Russian authorities as had not fled were worse than useless in collecting victual. Some speedy action must be taken to bring matters to a focus, or the Grand Army would die as in a trap.

Looking over the entire field, the emperor considered fou operations: to winter in Moscow; to retire on the southern provinces; to retire via Kaluga on Smolensk; to march on St. Petersburg. The first was not feasible, as it would mean that for six months he would be separated from western Europe; and that was time enough for all his enemies to rise against him, and change the whole political status. The last, had the men and material been at hand, was the most Napoleonic; it would take Wittgenstein in reverse, and force him into Ingria; and Victor, St. Cyr and Macdonald could join Napoleon's army via Pskov. This plan most strongly appealed to the great soldier; but then, he reasoned, Kutusov would follow as if he were in retreat, and might cut him off in the Vitebsk region; he would be marching into a country of marshes and excessive cold, into a strategical *cul-de-sac*, from which was no issue except along the Baltic coast, and where were no victual or forage. Kutusov and Wittgenstein had as large a force as Napoleon and his lieutenants, and with irregulars could make small war on his flanks and rear, and cut off convoys and foragers. To be sure, a march on St. Petersburg could at any time be turned into a mere demonstration to bring Alexander to terms; and if this failed, the Grand Army could file off to the left at Waldai or Novgorod towards the Dvina near Sebesh. But in this plan the difficulties exceeded the chances. There remained open the route to the south, where the troops could winter, and resume operations in the spring: and if this were adopted, a few weeks' delay to hear from Alexander would matter little. But all this planning was in mere subservience to Napoleon's belief that the Russians must yield; for the safest operation was either to march on and beat Kutusov, sending a detachment to destroy the Tula arsenal, and then to retire on Smolensk by way of Kaluga and Roslavl; or else to retire at once by way of Volokolamsk and the upper Dvina on Vitebsk. As a matter of fact, Alexander had made up his mind to defend the Russian throne at any risk: he would not have yielded had Napoleon stood before St. Petersburg; and the Russians knew that the French could never march across the desolate waste from the old capital to the new one. They themselves would scarcely have faced the hazard. Moreover, the French army was in ill case, the Russian army fairly sound, and instinct with one purpose; the French soldier was in want, the Russian soldier had not abundance, but did have what sufficed; the French horses were perishing daily, the Russian were used, like our American broncos, to subsist on even bark and twigs when hay or straw was wanting. Indeed, Napoleon could not meet the enemy on an equal footing: his cavalry was half dismounted, and most of the guns had no teams. Whatever plan excluded another battle was



Proposed Manœuvre on St. Petersburg.

the safer. And yet, as an immediate sequence to the indecisive victory of Borodino, as a mere measure of safety, Kutusov should have been followed up and beaten again.

From the moment Moscow was burned, the loss of each day was irremediable; still, Napoleon, misled by his belief that Alexander would yield to his proposals, continued to delay. Everything appeared to go wrong. After his victory at Salamanca, Wellington had entered Madrid, and the war in the Peninsula had taken on fresh vigor. Schwartzenberg had retired behind the Bug, and Warsaw was in alarm. Wittgenstein was being reinforced. To be sure, Victor was at Smolensk, with ten thousand men coming on under Baraguey d'Hilliers, and Durutte's division was at Warsaw; but this accession was far too small to change the status.

From Panki, September 16, Kutusov had retired along the Kolomna road; but to approach the richer southwestern provinces, and annoy Napoleon by threatening his communications, he followed up the Pachra, and on the 18th was at Podolsk. This was a handsome strategic performance, for it covered the arsenal at Tula and the south, and was a distinct threat to Smolensk and Napoleon's communications. Russian cavalry scouted all the routes diverging from Moscow, and busied the French detachments. Murat believed the enemy had retired to Kolomna, and after a few days' rest, with Poniatowski and the divisions of Dufour and of Claparède, he advanced, September 22, to Bronizi in the trail of a few Cossacks; but when Napoleon heard of Russian movements on the road to Tula, he sent Bessières out in that direction with Lahoussaye and Friedrich, to form a corps of observation, gather news and cover the road until Murat had got in touch with the enemy. Poniatowski was ordered to Podolsk, which he reached September 24, and Murat was to reconnoitre out towards Kolomna, to make sure of the enemy's whereabouts, and then to follow, which he did a day later; and Bessières moved to Desna. Kutusov had continued his movement around the city to Krasnia-Pachra, and from here he sent Dorkov out to reconnoitre towards Mozhaisk.

Meanwhile, as no overtures came from Alexander, Napoleon recognized that the Grand Army was lapsing into a desperate strait; and on September 20 he so far overcame his conqueror's attitude as to write him a letter, which cannot be said to be a successful effort: —

"To Alexander, Emperor of Russia, Moscow, September 20, 1812. Monsieur my Brother, having been instructed that the brother of the minister of your Imperial Majesty at Cassel was in Moscow, I bade him come to me, and talked with him some time. I advised him to go to Your Majesty and make you understand my sentiments. The fine and superb city of Moscow no longer exists. Rostopchin had it burned. Four hundred incendiaries were arrested in the act. All declared that they set the fire by the orders of the governor and of the director of police. They were shot. The fire appears to have finally ceased. Three quarters of the houses have been burned, a quarter remain. This conduct is atrocious and without aim. Had it for object to rob me of some resources? But these resources were in the cellars which the fire could not reach. Moreover, why destroy one of the most beautiful towns in the world and the work of centuries, to reach so feeble a goal? This is the conduct which has been held since Smolensk, which has thrust six hundred thousand families into beggary. The fire engines of the town of Moscow had been broken or carried away, and a part of the arms of the arsenal had been given to miscreants, who obliged me to fire upon them with the guns of the Kremlin to drive them away. Humanity, the interest of Your Majesty and of this great city, demanded that it should be left with me in trust, because the Russian army uncovered it. They should have left the administration, magistrates and civil courts. It was thus they did in Vienna twice, in Berlin, in Madrid. It is thus we ourselves acted in Milan when Suwarrov entered it. Conflagrations authorize pillage, to which the soldier resorts to save the débris from the flames. If I believed that such things were done by the orders of Your Majesty, I should not write you this letter; but I hold it for impossible that with your principles, your heart, the justice of your ideas, you have authorized such excesses, unworthy of a great sovereign and of a great nation. At the time they carried off the engines of Moscow, they left one hundred and fifty pieces of field artillery, sixty thousand new guns, one hundred and sixty thousand infantry cartridges, more than four hundred thousand" (pounds) "of powder, three hundred thousand of saltpetre and as much sulphur, etc."

"I have made war against Your Majesty without animosity. A note from you before or after the last battle would have stopped my march, and I would even have been willing to sacrifice to you the advantage of entering Moscow. If Your Majesty still conserves for me some remains of your ancient sentiment, you will take this letter in good part. In any case, you can only thank me for having rendered an account to you of what has taken place in Moscow. NAPOLEON."

This letter the emperor confided for delivery to one Jacoblev, of the Russian civil service; and receiving no reply, on October 5 he sent his aide-de-camp, Lauriston, to Russian headquarters, with a proposal for an armistice leading up to peace negotiations; and this Kutusov agreed to forward to his master, alleging his want of authority to act upon it himself. These proposals were much the same as others Napoleon made at various times, when he saw that he had reached a point beyond which lay extreme hazard. In March, 1797, he thus wrote Archduke Charles from Klagenfurt, because he saw that every step farther would weaken his strategical position, though he yet had much offensive power, or in case of necessity, having freed Italy, could retire without loss of repute. Again, in June, 1807, at Tilsit, he made similar proposals, because he saw that farther advance would weaken his offensive power, though he might have maintained a defensive attitude, and had accomplished his task in subjugating Prussia. But in 1812, Napoleon neither had accomplished nor could accomplish his task of bringing the Russians to terms; nor did he have the power to hold himself defensively in Moscow, not to speak of further offensive operations. At Smolensk it would have been different. In view of these facts, the czar was right in ignoring Napoleon's proposals. They were a real confession of weakness, as the czar's had not been in his Vilna letter.

With regard to the missive intrusted to Lauriston, there was much suspicion among some of the Russian officers that Kutusov favored peace and intended to meet Lauriston secretly. Sir Robert Wilson was consulted, and after an interview Kutusov received Lauriston publicly, and agreed to convey Napoleon's letter (of which no copy exists) to the czar. No notice was taken of the letter, and the czar reprimanded Kutusov for receiving Lauriston, his orders forbidding any treating whatsoever with the enemy.

From the outpost reports the emperor was convinced that Kutusov had left the Kolomna for the Kaluga road; and as Chichagov, released by the peace from the lower Danube, had marched up to join in the campaign now centring in Moscow, he had new and awkward conditions to face. Although Kutusov had asked for Chichagov's army as a reinforcement, this had left Bucharest July 31, and by September 20 had joined Tormasov in the Ostrog-Lutsk country, making over sixty thousand men. Napoleon's idea that Kutusov's retreat was towards reinforcements was not the fact; the Russians were playing a heroic game, and were preparing at the proper moment to deal him some lusty blows. The emperor must have regretted his error in not making Prussia a loyal ally, so as now to draw on her for reserves on which to fall back.

At one moment Napoleon proposed himself to turn in force on Kutusov; but finally he detailed Murat, and upon his advance, Kutusov retired September 26, Murat having by Napoleon's orders striven to turn his right flank; and on October 4 he was behind the Nara, in a previously intrenched position, holding the Tarutino crossing; here Murat kept touch with him at Viankovo, Bessières in support at the Pachra. The main army was in quarters all around Moscow,



Positions, October 4.

Davout in the southern part of the city, Eugene in the north, with van out at Dmitrov, Ney at Bogorodsk.

Because Napoleon had miscalculated in his Russian campaign, we must not imagine that he had ceased to weigh the evidence. He was fast being persuaded that the Russians would not make peace, and that he would soon have to retreat; and on gauging the situation October 4, this was what he found. On the extreme left, Macdonald, at Dünaburg, with the Prussian auxiliaries, had been blockading Riga; on September 22 Steinheil arrived at Riga from Finland with ten thousand men, and the Russians undertook the offensive; but as the Prussians forced them back into the city, Steinheil led his men off to join Wittgenstein. St. Cyr had been reduced by sickness and poor victual to seventeen thousand men, while Wittgenstein, at this date, had forty thousand. On the extreme right, Chichagov and Tormasov, over sixty thousand strong, had advanced on Schwartzenberg, who with his thirty-four thousand men was gradually forced back to Brest Litovsk. Between the two French wings, Victor had been in Smolensk since September 27, with his own troops and those left behind by Napoleon, in all some thirty-seven thousand effective. Thus, of the triangle of Riga-Moscow-Brest Litovsk, the left side was over five hundred miles long, the right side over six hundred miles, and the base three hundred and fifty miles long; while from Moscow back to the Niemen at Kovno was five hundred and thirty miles. To defend this vast theatre Napoleon had —

At Moscow	under himself	95,000 men.
" Mozhaisk	" "	5,000 "
" Smolensk	" Victor	37,000 "
" Riga and Dünaburg	" Macdonald	25,000 "
" Polotsk	" St. Cyr	17,000 "
" Brest Litovsk	" Schwartzenberg	34,000 "
A total of		213,000 "

As Wartenburg points out, Napoleon had taught the world a new system of strategy, but he had not followed this up by as excellent an organization; and the Grand Army was not equal to so severe a test of his strategy. The modern world has been taught by Prussia what perfect organization and logistics can do. This perfection depends on: universal service; preparations for mobilization; preparations for feeding and moving armies, making use of all modern scientific and material advance; a general staff made up on the modern plan. In Napoleon's military economy these essentials are indicated, not perfected. He had opened his campaign with four hundred and fifty thousand men, and in three and one half months his army had dwindled to little over two hundred thousand all told. As compared with this, in 1870, the Prussians opened the campaign with three hundred and seventy thousand men, and in three and one half months they had placed on a theatre of about one third the extent of that in Russia four hundred and twenty-five thousand men, with nearly as many troops in the rear from which to draw. In other words, the perfection of the Prussian organization and mobilization enabled them to keep on increasing their power; Napoleon's kept on decreasing; and as a result, the Prussians could remain in Paris until they forced a peace on France, while Napoleon was compelled to leave Moscow because he had not force enough to hold himself. These are not parallel cases — the conditions were quite different; but the one illustrates the other.

On the uprising of the people in the French Revolution Napoleon had built up his wonderful system of war; but of itself this required many improvements to uphold and maintain it, and these Napoleon did not add. "In peace prepare for war," is no idle phrase. You cannot get ready to mobilize a large army without many years of preparation.

Napoleon prepared in a marvelous manner, considering his short years of peace. But he retained in his own hand all power, all knowledge, all mechanism of the Grand Army; he was his own general staff; and, with such large armies as he eventually commanded, it is not possible for one man to do this, even if he be a Napoleon; for military work on a large scale must be divided and specialized, as all other modern work is done. Napoleon's step forward was from mercenary armies controlled by the central political authorities to a people's war of masses; but he never worked out the idea to its legitimate conclusion and subdivision. Had he lived and wrought longer, he would no doubt have done so.

The first news of Borodino which reached St. Petersburg had been that of a Russian victory. Kutusov's later report described the battle as drawn, but this was not generally published, and as people could not see why, if they had won a victory, Moscow had been abandoned and burned, there was much discouragement. Some of the imperial family were in favor of peace, some anticipated a march on St. Petersburg, and made ready to evacuate the city. Alexander would not yield to further French dictation. Count Lieven, sent to London as ambassador, testifies that the czar had said: —

> "I have chosen just this moment to send you to London, so as better to enforce by so doing my firm intention not to make peace until I shall have thrust the enemy out of our frontiers, even should I, before I succeed in this, have to retire beyond Cazan. So long as I shall have to defend the Russian territory, I shall ask from London only munition and arms. When, with the aid of Providence, I shall have driven the enemy beyond our frontiers, I will not stop there, and it will be only then that I shall have an understanding with England on the more efficacious assistance that I shall then claim of her, so as to arrive at delivering Europe from the French yoke."

He had notified other countries of his purpose in similar fashion, and with such a spirit in the monarch, Napoleon could expect no approaches from the Russian people for a truce. But he long misconceived this spirit. Alexander may not have been a great soldier, but he came close to being a great man.

Meanwhile everything went on as usual, and the emperor made his inspections and issued his orders daily, some with regard to the larger affairs, some relating to details.

On October 1 was issued an order for arming the Kremlin. On October 2 he wrote to Eugene: "My Son, you have left at the Abbey in rear of Mozhaisk two howitzers. . . . I do not know why you weaken your artillery. Take the horses of the officers who ought not to have any, and carry with you all your artillery. Convey my discontent to General X. for having left his pieces behind. It is contrary to military honor. One should leave everything behind except his guns."

On October 3 he wrote Lariboisière: "I have to-day visited the workshops. I have found there little activity and little order. All the facts we know are that the enemy had one hundred thousand" (cannon) "balls in this park, and it is believed that he threw them into the water, which, being a pond, is easy to dry. You should work with activity to make a little ditch necessary for that purpose, and recover these balls. There have been made during the fifteen days we have been here but ten thousand" (cannon) "ball cartridges. I desire that, beginning with day after to-morrow, you should have this workshop arranged so as to make six thousand gun cartridges a day, which are to be stored in the Kremlin as fast as made."

On October 6 he wrote Maret about the portable mills which had been sent from Paris: "My intention is that you should take one of these mills to serve as model, have it worked under your own eye, and let me know how much it has ground in twenty-four hours, and how many men were needed to work it." He then orders fifty to be made like it at Vilna, and a sample to be sent to Warsaw and one to Königsberg, as models to produce others.

On October 8 he ordered Berthier to "write to the viceroy, to Davout, to Ney, to Mortier, that it is essential they should take measures each in his district to procure enough flour for two months, and biscuit for a month, so that they should always have at least three months' subsistence before them, and three months of wheat."

Much of this was not as easy to accomplish as to order. And all the activity of the great soldier could not correct the evil conditions which, day by day, were weaving tighter about him a net, from which he did not seem capable of making an effort to escape before it was too late.

The emperor has left a Note, made at Moscow, but undated, which probably expressed his views of the situation early in October, and suggested a plan for dealing with the adverse conditions. Those parts of the Note that best exhibit the emperor's trend of thought are quoted verbatim: —

"As the enemy is moving on the road to Kiev, his aim is evident. It is that he is awaiting reinforcements from the army of Moldavia. To march on him is to act in his favor and find ourselves without a place to lean on during winter quarters, having our right and left in the air, while the enemy would have his flanks and rear assured. Moscow, being abandoned by its inhabitants and burned, does not remain for us of any consideration."

To move on Kaluga is reasonable only as a means of moving on Smolensk.

If the army is to retire to Smolensk, is it wise to move upon the enemy? The emperor decides this in the negative, as every little fight of the rearguard would be a species of defeat.

To fall back on Poland for winter quarters, is it better to return by the route we came? "We should not have the enemy upon us; we know the road, and it is the shortest by five marches; we can go as quickly as we wish; we may even receive at half distance our convoys coming from Smolensk, etc."

"We are victors, we are well organized, and if we have affairs and wounded, we shall be in the same position that we were in coming, with regard to the wounded of the vanguard. Truly, one may foresee difficulties in foraging, but forage can be got at three or four leagues distance, so that this would not be a difficulty of the first order."

"There is no species of doubt that if Smolensk and Vitebsk were countries like Königsberg and Elbing, the wise project would be the one already spoken of, to move into a fine country for winter quarters, and to make over the army. In the present circumstances, we cannot dissimulate that the war would drag itself along, but it would drag itself out much longer in bad countries such as Smolensk and Vitebsk, which offer so few resources, and where one would be so ill established to pass eight months in winter quarters."

"What aim have we to fill? To place the emperor the nearest to France, and give the empire the confidence that the emperor is in the midst of a friendly people during his winter cantonments. To canton the army in a friendly country, to approach our resources of clothing and equipments. To put ourselves in a position which strengthens the negotiations of peace which the emperor is making while menacing St. Petersburg. To sustain the honor of arms at the height where this glorious campaign has placed it. Without contradiction, a manœuvre which would fulfill these four conditions would be perfect."

But after this clear exposition of what should be done, the emperor enters into the discussion of a manœuvre which is quite impossible. In this project, Victor would march towards Velikiji Luki, reinforced by St. Cyr and Macdonald, and to coöperate, the emperor would march from Moscow on the same town via Volokolamsk and Bieloi, which would give over one hundred thousand men in one body; and at the same time Ney would march via Smolensk as a flanking column. With St. Petersburg thus threatened, Napoleon thought the enemy would make peace. The whole plan is magnificent, but it savors more of Kriegspiel than of actuality. It was a last intellectual effort of the great soldier to work success out of manifest failure. As a fact, only retreat on the magazines and reserves was now possible for the French army, and the plan assumes certain manœuvres on the enemy's part which might not be made. Nor was the threat against St. Petersburg so real as to have any probable effect on the Russian authorities. Napoleon's Note states the conditions well, but the campaign plan he suggests is impracticable, with nothing in its favor except an offensive attitude.

Later, Napoleon gave up this plan and considered a thrust against Kaluga, to deceive Kutusov, and resume the appearance of the offensive while retiring on Smolensk. On October 9 he wrote Maret that towards November he might take up winter quarters between the Borysthenes and the Dvina, to be near reinforcements, rest the army and more easily dispatch business. On October 16 he instructed Maret to persuade the King of Prussia to send him more troops: —

> "It will be easy for you to make him understand that it is to his interest that everything should promptly finish, because by waiting he finds himself tired out and cramped; that there is only one good way of finishing this struggle, which is to let Russia see the impossibility that exists of undermining the army, as it hopes to do by its great means of recruiting, which the czar not only is using in his states, but also by the aid of his allies. The same reasoning is to be made in Saxony. The same is to be made in Bavaria, at Stuttgart and everywhere. Not only do I desire that they shall send me reinforcements, but I desire also that they shall exaggerate those being sent; and that the sovereigns shall put in their gazettes the great number of troops which leave, by doubling their numbers. It is well understood that the Prussian corps which is at Memel is not to be included in these reinforcements."

This dispatch, asking the various allies to exaggerate the number of troops they sent, is said to have fallen into the enemy's hands, and to have been sent to Austria with suitable comment. It was indeed a weak conceit.

It appears also that a cipher letter was written by the emperor to Maret on the same day. No translation of this letter has yet been made, but it is thought that its contents were those quoted in a letter by Maret to Count Otto, the French ambassador at Vienna.

The quotation is, "That it might happen that towards the month of November His Majesty would take winter quarters between the Borysthenes and the Dvina, so as to be nearer aid, to let the army rest, and more easily to attend to other affairs." Maret says: "The execution of this will produce a sensation, in those countries especially which are distant from the theatre of war. New combinations may result therefrom, whose existence would become manifest near you. It is therefore useful that you should be notified in advance, both of the fact itself and of the aspect under which it would be well to present it. I therefore communicate to you the text itself of my correspondence: 'His Majesty has had the wounded and sick evacuated on Smolensk to the number of two or three thousand, and proposes to leave Moscow the 19th, to move on Kaluga, to beat the enemy's army, if, as is announced, it intends to cover this great place, and according to the season move on Tula or Briansk, or return at once on Smolensk if the weather becomes rigorous. The emperor counts on taking winter quarters between Smolensk, Minsk and Mohilev, in the first week of November. He decided on this movement because Moscow, which has ceased to exist, is not a military position for his future operations.'" Then follows a statement of distances between the principal places, as far as they affect future manœuvres. "The army will find itself at Smolensk, leaning on a friendly country which will furnish all its needs, and the emperor will be ready to prepare his men for the Petersburg campaign, and to go himself where he may be needed." To this letter of Maret's is added a postscript, dated Vilna, October 26: "At the moment my courier is about to leave, I receive from Moscow, dated October 19, the following: 'The army is on the march. We shall decide to-morrow to blow up the Kremlin, and to move either by way of Kaluga or Viasma, to arrive before the great cold, and take winter quarters. Meanwhile everything goes well.'"

During the lull in hostilities following the capture of Moscow, there was the usual amount of intercourse between the outposts, and Bennigsen is said to have met Murat, who expressed himself in favor of peace, a fact that would naturally have strengthened the Russians in their idea of continued resistance. Kutusov meanwhile, behind the Nara with Murat still at Viankovo, had grown by accessions to one hundred and ten thousand men. He was deceiving Napoleon as to hearing from St. Petersburg, for every week scored a gain for the Russians; but when, a fortnight after Lauriston's message, he saw that he could no longer play this game, and that the

French must speedily retreat, Kutusov determined on taking the initiative. He did not move on Mozhaisk, because Napoleon, pushed to extremities, would have been far more dangerous than he was in Moscow, and he had no ambition to fight another pitched battle, when starvation and winter would soon compel the French retreat. A battle might have destroyed the French, or it might have destroyed this particular Russian army. The Russians had been wise in playing the Fabian game: all they needed was to force the French from the country. That was victory enough, for cold and hunger would do more damage than bullet and shell.

Kutusov lay behind the Nara opposite Tarutino, where the river, after running south, turns at a right angle nearly east. Murat, with twenty thousand men, was five miles north, behind a little stream that runs into the Nara near Viankovo, his left in the air, while the Russians had occupied some woods near its front. In rear of Murat's position was a defile through the woods at Spas Upila. Bennigsen, with Kutusov's consent, planned to turn Murat's left with two army corps and a large body of cavalry, seize the defile and thus surround Murat. Early October 18 the Russian cavalry under Orlov Denisov rode down on Murat's left, held by Sébastiani, drove him in, and actually occupied the defile, while Baggavut attacked the French in front. Had Kutusov smartly put in his entire force, he could have captured the army; but Murat was quicker than he. Before the Russian cavalry could be supported, he drove Denisov out of the defile and recovered his communications. Russian laxness had saved him. Murat lost three thousand men, mostly cavalry which he could ill spare, and a number of guns. Lulled into security by the knowledge that Napoleon had sent a message to the Emperor Alexander, he had been careless in his outpost service. Kutusov's main force now remained at Tarutino, with van at

Viankovo. The Russians were manifestly ready to renew the conflict.

Up to this moment the weather had remained pleasant, and Napoleon asked facetiously where was the threatened cold. This very fact was one of the reasons for his delay, and even Kutusov's establishment at Tarutino seemed not to awaken him from his false security. In the Kremlin things apparently went on as in Paris: mails and couriers came in; the emperor settled French measures of economy and state; there was no outward sign of an impending disaster. But Russian horse under Davidov, Slavin, Fiquener, was hovering closer around the army; a convoy had been seized on the Mozhaisk road; the country population was more hostile; even near Moscow raids were made and French foragers captured. Yet while he must have recognized that he could not remain in Moscow, Napoleon seemed unable to take the first step to abandon it, although after a fashion he was paving the way for doing so. On reaching Smolensk he had opened communications through Minsk, and established depots there, like those at Vilna and Smolensk. The whole line was garrisoned, but the Cossacks were giving more trouble. The chief difficulty in a retreat would be bread. For two days' march on either side of the road to Smolensk there was scarcely a grain of corn left; but beyond was a fairly unspoiled country, and to the south, beginning with Kaluga and Tula, the country was still comparatively rich. Had Napoleon started his retreat early enough, or by the proper routes, he could have coped with the Russian army. It was not the burning of Moscow that drove the French out of Russia: the failure of the campaign was due, first, to the advance beyond Smolensk; and second, to delay in Moscow, waiting to hear from the czar. It was to Napoleon, not adverse conditions, that the fault must be traced.

The bulk of the wounded at Borodino had after a fashion been cared for. On October 5 Berthier was ordered to see to their dispatch to the rear, and next day to seize all the wagons in the vicinity to move them, and to have all army wagons coming up with rations carry back wounded men. On October 13 a light fall of snow hurried the emperor's action, and two days later, all patients who could be transferred to Smolensk were sent off.

Although the emperor gave no public intimation of it, he no doubt had matured his plans, for on October 17 he told Berthier to order Baraguey d'Hilliers from Smolensk to Jelnia, on the road to Kaluga, and to have the route kept open by parties of one hundred men every six leagues. Under the existing conditions, although not generally so regarded, the following has the appearance of a *ruse de guerre:* "To General-in-Chief Kutusov, Moscow, October 18, 1812. General Lauriston had been charged to propose to Your Highness to make arrangements to give to the war a character which conforms to established rules, and take measures not to have the country endure more than the indispensable evils which result from a state of war. In effect, the devastation of this country is harmful to Russia as much as it painfully affects the emperor. Your Highness will easily feel the interest that I have in knowing on the subject the definite determination of your government. By order of the Emperor, Alexander, Prince of Neuchatel and of Wagram." (Berthier.)

Napoleon was holding a review of Ney's corps, which with a view to the retreat had been drawn in to Moscow, when, about noon of October 18, preceded by the sound of battle, the news of the defeat of Murat ran in. This made action imperative. Orders were at once issued to the Grand Army to assemble without the city: Davout to move outside the Kaluga gate so as to begin a heavy march at the point of day; Ney to do the same; Eugene to move a league in advance so as to be able to march first; the Little and General Headquarters and the Guard to bivouac in square around the lodging of the emperor; Ney to leave a rearguard at the Kolomna Gate, Eugene to leave one at the St. Petersburg Gate.

So much for the marching divisions. To hold the city as long as necessary to keep the rear safe and to prevent interference on the road to Smolensk, Berthier was instructed to —

"Give notice to Mortier that I leave to-morrow morning with the army to pursue the enemy, and that my intention is that he should hold the Kremlin" with the Young Guard and Delaborde's division, to police the town and keep everything in order. "He is to have shot any Russian soldier found in the street," and to strive to gather as much food as possible. On the same day Napoleon gave personal instructions to Mortier how to fortify the Kremlin and hold it. "Should the whole enemy's army be against you, you must hold the Kremlin a number of days." "A chief of battalion of artillery has been charged to set fire to the Kremlin in case he is ordered to do so. Let him study the subject well." "After the army leaves, have the Intendant issue a proclamation to reassure the inhabitants, and to make them understand that you do not propose to evacuate their town." On the same day the emperor wrote to Lariboisière: "To-morrow, during the day, I shall start to move towards the enemy. Mortier with ten thousand men remains in town, and will defend the Kremlin in all events. It is necessary, then, that to-morrow morning all caissons and wagons whatsoever shall be assembled in the Kremlin. It is possible that I may come back to Moscow. There must therefore be nothing destroyed which is precious, such as powder, infantry cartridges, gun cartridges, lead to make balls; but saltpetre and sulphur may be burned. I have powder enough. . . . The storehouses round the city can be burned. The Russian caissons and other material which cannot be transported to the Kremlin will be burned to-morrow at eight o'clock, with the sulphur and saltpetre."

The emperor notified Maret of the defeat of Murat, and of his intended march, on October 19: "Sébastiani, placed a league on the left of Murat in the vanguard, allowed himself to be surprised by a horde of Cossacks, the 18th, at five o'clock in the morning. . . . Losses were equal, except the guns which he lost. The army is on the march. We shall decide to-morrow to blow up the Kremlin and to move by way of Kaluga or Viasma, to arrive before the great cold and take winter quarters. For the rest all goes well." This last paragraph was in cipher not to be understood, and has been replaced like the one above.

In the 26th Bulletin, of December 23, we find: "Our outposts and those of the enemy agreed among themselves not to attack without giving three hours' notice. But the 18th, at seven o'clock in the morning, four thousand Cossacks debouched from a wood a half-cannon-length from Sébastiani, forming the extreme left of the vanguard, which had not been occupied nor reconnoitred that day. They charged in with a hurrah on our light cavalry at a moment when it was afoot at the distribution of flour. This light cavalry was unable to form short of a quarter-league to the rear. However, the enemy moving into this gap captured in a ravine a park of twelve guns and twenty caissons of Sébastiani's, with thirty baggage wagons. . . . At the same time the regular cavalry of the enemy and two columns of infantry made their way into the gap, hoping to win the wood and defile of Voronovo before us; but Murat was there, he was in the saddle, he marched and broke the Russian line cavalry in ten or twelve different charges. He saw the division of six battalions of the enemy, . . . charged it and broke it in. This division was massacred. . . . Murat in this day showed what can be accomplished by presence of mind, valor and the habit of war. In general, throughout the campaign, this prince has shown himself worthy of the supreme rank where he is."

Mortier.

With regard to the wounded not yet carried off, Napoleon did all that was possible. But the transportation of many of these entailed grievous suffering, and of others, death. On October 19 he wrote to Berthier ordering that of all vehicles, belonging to whomsoever it may be, in the army, "to wit: caissons, wagons, coaches, barouches, cabriolets, britskas, carts," each was to carry one or two wounded, "any such wagons found without any wounded to be burned." On October 20, from Troizkoi, outside the walls at Moscow, Berthier was instructed to order Mortier to send forward towards Mozhaisk on the 21st, all who could march. On the 22d and 23d he was to fire the brandy storehouse, the barracks and the public establishments, all excepting the Foundling Hospital, where there were sick and wounded.

> "He will set fire to the palace of the Kremlin. He will have a care that all the muskets are broken in pieces, that powder shall be placed under the towers of the Kremlin, that all the gun carriages shall be broken, as well as the wheels of the caissons. When these matters are finished, and the fire has started in several places in the Kremlin, Mortier will quit the Kremlin and will march on the road to Mozhaisk. At four o'clock the officer of artillery charged with the business will blow up the Kremlin as has been ordered. On the road Mortier will burn all the carriages which have remained behind, will bury all the corpses as far as possible, and break all the guns that he may find. . . . He will have fire put to the caissons and to everything which cannot be transported. He will take up all the small posts and draw in the garrisons."

The destruction of the fortifications of the Kremlin was justifiable as a military measure; but to apply the torch to the palaces of the czars and to the ancient churches was an act unworthy of any captain, in either success or failure.

On October 21, from Krasnia-Pachra, Napoleon reiterated to Mortier his order about the wounded: —

> "I cannot too highly recommend to you to place upon the carriages of the Young Guard, on those of the cavalry or foot, and on all those which

can be found, the men who still remain in the hospitals. The Romans gave civic crowns to those who saved citizens. Marshal Mortier will merit as many as he saves soldiers. Tell him that he is to have them placed on his horses and on those of all his people. It is thus the emperor did at Acre. . . . Let him assemble all the generals and officers under his orders, to make them feel the importance of this measure and how much they will merit from the emperor if they save five hundred men."

During the forenoon of the 19th the emperor left Moscow, the route given being towards Tarutino, to deceive Kutusov; but near Troizkoi the army was to file to the right on Borovsk and Maloyaroslavez, so as to seize the road to Juknov and get ahead of Kutusov on the route to Jelnia. This would save the retreat on Smolensk. The movement by way of Kaluga was probably intended to keep up in the Grand Army and among the Russians the idea of the offensive intention of the emperor. It is clear that he purposed actually to retire by way of Smolensk, for although the country was eaten out, yet the amount of supplies which had been accumulated on this road, and were still being wheeled up, would be the equivalent of all that they could get on any, except a route much farther south.

Sword of the Period.

LIV.

MALOYAROSLAVEZ. OCTOBER 19 TO NOVEMBER 14, 1812.

The French had grown weaker, the Russians stronger, and the Grand Army, despite good weather, started from Moscow ill-supplied for its terrible march. To deceive Kutusov, Napoleon headed towards Kaluga, purposing to file to the right towards Smolensk, but Kutusov heard of his start, and marched towards Maloyaroslavez. Here was fought a bloody battle, October 24, to hold the road through Jelnia to Smolensk, which the French won, and could have absolutely headed off Kutusov; but for some reason unexplained, instead of utilizing this manifest advantage, Napoleon retired by way of Borovsk and Viasma, by which he lost four days, and permitted Kutusov to reach a point of danger on the French flank. Davout first acted as rearguard, and the army, strung over fifty miles of road, pursued its terrible way, Kutusov on a parallel line to the south, and the Cossacks harassing its flanks and rear. To pass Viasma, a battle had to be fought, and from this place on, Ney had the rearguard. The army was breaking up, the Guard, with which Napoleon marched on foot, alone remained in condition. On November 5 snow came. The underfed horses could not stand; guns had to be hauled up every slope by the men, or abandoned. Provisions had given out, and the men lived on horse and dog meat, stripping the dead for extra clothing. Bad news from right and left and from Paris reached Napoleon, but he could only order his lieutenants to hold on, and keep the Guard together for his own safety. He paid small heed to his marshals, leaving the rescue of his corps to each one. Eugene had attempted a circuit, via Duchovchina, but lost nearly all his men. Smolensk was reached November 9, the Grand Army here numbering but a third of its force seven weeks before. The expected rest could not be taken. Napoleon might have paused to concentrate the army, but he believed that Kutusov would not seriously attack.

Since crossing the Niemen the conditions had quite changed. Not only had the Grand Army grown daily weaker and the enemy stronger, but more Russian reinforcements had already come in than the Grand Army received during the whole campaign. Of these part were fresh levies, but the treaties with Turkey and Sweden increased the regular forces opposite Napoleon's wings to the danger limit. As we have seen, from Bucharest, Chichagov had joined Tormasov on the French right; and when Sweden secured the connivance of Russia and England in her scheme to acquire Norway, the czar was enabled to increase his forces under Wittgenstein on the French left. Ill-used Prussia was prepared to rise, but Austria, suffering less, was not yet ready to lend a hand. News from the Russian headquarters claimed that Napoleon would fail; yet little faith was placed in these predictions, and Napoleon's assurances of success were constant. When Moscow fell, Hardenburg believed that Napoleon had won.

The plans for the administration of the provinces along the line of communications had been but scantily carried out. The country was full of wandering peasants driven from their homesteads, and of army stragglers stealing to eat. Communication with the rear was much interrupted; the various towns were ill-garrisoned; only Smolensk had sufficient troops. Augereau's 11th Corps, gauged at fifty thousand men, was the next large reserve behind Victor, but, largely made up of "refractories," its quality was bad, and it had no cavalry. Part of it crossed the border to participate in the final rout, but as every man was needed to hold Germany in hand, when fresh accessions alone could prevent disaster, none were to be had.

In his previous wars the emperor had seen to it that his orders were carried out, and he now assumed as accomplished too much of what he could not inspect. It is said that Berthier smoothed things over in his reports, but although, as Major-General, he toned down the manner of Napoleon's orders to his marshals (as by altering "*il est ridicule*" to "*il est facheux*," etc.), the matter was always there; and at this critical period he no doubt told his master the whole truth.

Neither did everything move smoothly on the other side. The St. Petersburg authorities intended that the Russian wings should coöperate to inclose the Grand Army, but they were worse at calculating distances than, in the orders issued at this time, Napoleon occasionally appeared to be. The wings were too far apart to coöperate earlier than they actually did; nor were they strong enough until reinforced. In the czar's plan, the Riga forces were to move up river beyond St. Cyr and cut him off from the Grand Army, and Wittgenstein was to move towards the Beresina to join Chichagov; but delays intervened. Instructions in detail issued from St. Petersburg reached the Russian armies too late to be of value. As Chichagov and Tormasov might not agree, the latter was sent to report to Kutusov, and Chichagov with sixty thousand men remained to face Schwartzenberg's thirty-five thousand. The latter had pushed Tormasov to the Styr, but when Chichagov arrived, he retired to Brest Litovsk, one division moving to Pruzhani. Chichagov followed, and on October 9 reached Brest Litovsk, eager for battle; but Schwartzenberg crossed the Bug to Vengrov, and his Pruzhani force retired to Bielostok; whereupon, instead of following up Schwartzenberg, Chichagov chose to move towards the communications of the Grand Army.

Tormasov.

Admiral Chichagov possessed a strong character and fair ability. Kutusov had asked for his forces, but he could not have arrived until the time when Kutusov was able alone to face the wreck of the Grand Army; and his joining Tormasov proved wise. Although from Bucharest up he marched along her frontier, Austria made no protest.

In the 26th Bulletin, intended for the French people, the emperor gives his own explanation of the evacuation of Moscow. It must be read in the light of the actual facts, which have been stated impartially. Comment will not change it.

"The emperor, desiring to oblige the enemy to evacuate his intrenched camp and to throw him several marches to the rear, so as to be able quietly to move to the countries chosen for winter quarters and necessary to be occupied now so as to execute his ulterior plans, had, the 17th, ordered his vanguard to place itself behind the Viankovo defile, so that this movement could not be perceived. Since Moscow had ceased to exist, the emperor had projected either to abandon this pile of rubbish, or to occupy only the Kremlin; but the Kremlin," not being strong enough, "would have weakened and been in the way of the army in its movements without giving a great advantage. . . . Moscow is to-day a real sewer, unhealthy and impure. A population of two hundred thousand souls wandering in the neighboring woods, dying of hunger, seeks in its rubbish heaps to find some débris, and a few vegetables in the gardens, to live on. It seemed useless to compromise anything for an object which was of no military importance, and which to-day has become without political importance."

"All the magazines having been evacuated, the emperor had the Kremlin mined. Mortier blew it up the 23d, at 2 A. M. The arsenals, the barracks, the magazines, all were destroyed. This ancient citadel, which dates from the foundation of the monarchy, this first palace of the czars, has ceased to exist. Of the four thousand stone houses which existed in Moscow, there were only two hundred left. They said that a quarter were left, because they included in them eight hundred churches. Of these a part are damaged. Of the eight thousand wooden houses, five hundred were standing. It was proposed to the emperor to burn the rest of the town, to serve the Russians in the manner they would act, and to extend this measure around Moscow. There are two thousand villages and as many country houses or castles. It was proposed to form four columns of two thousand men each, and to charge them to set afire everything twenty leagues around. That will teach the Russians, they said, to make war according to rule, and not like Tartars. If they burn a village, a house, we should answer by burning one hundred. The emperor refused these measures, which would so much have aggravated the misfortunes of this people. Out of nine thousand owners whose castles would have been burned, a hundred, perhaps, are the supporters of the Marat of Russia; but eight thousand nine hundred are honest people, already too much victims of the intrigues of a few wretches. To punish a hundred culpable, we should have ruined the eight thousand nine hundred. We must add that this would have placed absolutely without resources two hundred thousand poor serfs, ignorant of all this. The emperor, then, contented himself with ordering the destruction of the citadels and military establishments according to the usage of war, without causing loss of anything to individuals, already too unfortunate in consequence of this war."

According to Chambray, whose figures are perhaps too high, the French infantry starting from Moscow was about ninety thousand strong, among them many veterans. They were ill-provided. No issues of shoes or clothing had been made in Moscow, though many had looted various articles of clothing. Except for this, the men were still wearing the uniforms in which they had marched in the summer. Much has been written about what might have been done in collecting equipment and saving victual in a better way. In part just, the fault was originally the emperor's for not creating a better staff — for provision and equipment are staff business.

Still, this is criticism after the event, and a staff corps like that perfected by Prussia fifty years ago is a thing that grows. It cannot be created by a word.

The cavalry was fifteen thousand strong, but so ill-horsed as to be of little use. The artillery was the same. The non-combatants, engineers, headquarters men, hospital and train men, and men of the reserve artillery were some twelve thousand, added to which were the useless non-combatants, fugitives, women and invalided soldiers. The sick and wounded who could march (some fifteen hundred were left behind) joined the column, but few escaped the Cossacks. This pitiful, but worse than useless crew, whose number can never be known, accompanied the column that marched on Smolensk; but it dwindled into a handful before the end.

The emperor forbade the abandonment of any guns, of which there were five hundred and seventy, and two thousand wagons. The sharp decisiveness of a Bonaparte, who abandoned the entire siege material before Mantua to march on and beat the enemy, was no longer present. Not one gun in ten was put to use. and all were left behind, a few at a time, along the fatal route. Wagons with the army chest and ingots of precious metal melted down from pillage of the Moscow churches had their place; but the private wagons half filled with loot were of as much use as the pearl to the cock in Æsop's fable.

The army marched slowly to begin with, on account of the enormous column and the difficulties in evacuating Moscow. No sooner had Mortier left the city than the Russians swarmed in, and the sight of the devastated sacred precincts must have lent a ferocity to their oath to pursue and punish the invader.

To mislead Kutusov as to its purpose, the main column began its retreat on October 19, along the old Kaluga road, in order Eugene, Ney, the Guard, Davout; and its head reached Vatutinki. The old road to Kaluga was the one where Kutusov had stood, and where Murat some miles further back still faced Miloradovich. Along the new road that runs through Borovsk more to the west, a small column under Broussier advanced to Fominskia to threaten Dorkov, who lay at Vereia; while, though Borovsk was his objective, Napoleon started by the old road to threaten Kutusov from such a direction as to keep him from moving on the line of retreat he intended to pursue, and most easily to draw in Murat.

On the 20th the Pachra was crossed, and Eugene, with Poniatowski in his rear, filed to the right so as to reach the new road and move towards Borovsk. Ney advanced beyond the Mocha to get in touch with Murat at Voronovo. "Have Ney understand," the emperor wrote, October 21, to Berthier, "that he is to form the rearguard of the army; that to this effect he is to have his corps increased by the division of Claparède, his two brigades of light cavalry, and that of Gérardin." But owing to subsequent manœuvres, Ney did not become the rearguard until the army reached Smolensk.

Napoleon's instructions to Mortier to evacuate the capital October 22 or 23 and march on Mozhaisk, were changed to a march on Vereia. The Guard and Davout on the 21st followed Eugene, who reached Fominskia, with orders to get on speedily to Borovsk; Murat, Ney and Morand remained along the Mocha. The emperor followed in the track of the army; and during the retreat headquarters was wont to be in nearby castles, or monasteries, or churches in the villages. He was convinced that he had deceived Kutusov, and that he would reach the direct road to Smolensk before the Russians; but Eugene disagreed with this opinion, as the hordes of Cossacks would, he thought, report the actual facts. Murat, with Morand behind him, was to follow on the 22d, and Ney to cover the march behind the Mocha, and catch up in the night of October 22–23. The heavy pontoons were abandoned to complete the artillery teams, the light ones were taken; but as the streams had already been bridged, even these did not go far. The commissariat started fairly well supplied; but the soldiers had had enough of poor victualing, and each one catered for himself. Every company had two or three carts to carry provisions; others were filled with loot under the guise of extra clothing. Non-combatants had a double supply. Every horse near and far had been pressed into some one's service, and the britska of the noble filed along behind the peasant's cart. The emperor knew that in a few days all this would be left behind; and in case of attack by Cossacks, the vehicles would make passable breastworks.

A few apologists for the Russian campaign have ascribed its failure to the weather. This is an error. So far no snow had fallen, and while on November 1 the temperature fell below freezing, yet the sky was clear. The testimony is overwhelming that the winter season was delayed, and that less cold and snow were present than usual. The temperature from Moscow to Krasnaia averaged from 25° to 15° Fahrenheit; few of the streams were frozen so as to bear troops or train. In the 26th Bulletin we find that "The inhabitants of Russia cannot account for the weather we have had for twenty days. It is the sun and the beautiful days of the trip to Fontainebleau. The army is in a country extremely rich, and which can be compared to the best of France and Germany." Sad exaggeration; and to what end? And on November 3 Napoleon wrote Maret: "The weather continues here to be very beautiful, which is extremely favorable." Gourgaud writes that in Prussia, Poland and even in Spain, the cold had been more extreme. According to Fézensac, it was November 7 before real cold set in; and the 29th Bulletin says: "Up to November 6 the weather was perfect."

Early on October 22 Napoleon ordered Eugene to dispatch Poniatowski to Vereia at once: "It is necessary to reconnoitre well and get news. The occupation of Vereia is the great affair for to-day." This was done. With Borovsk as objective, the viceroy himself crossed the Nara at Fominskia, Davout and the Guard came up there, with Murat and Morand in the rear, and Delzons' division got to Borovsk. Next day, out of Vereia, Poniatowski drove Dorkov, who retired by the south of Maloyaroslavez; Poniatowski was notified "not to send his wounded and sick to Mozhaisk, as it would encumber the road, which is already too much so; that it is better that he should carry them with him." Ney withdrew from the front of Miloradovich, who reported the fact to Kutusov. At midnight of October 22–23 Mortier left the Kremlin, having been able to blow up only the arsenal and part of the walls. The harm done was not irreparable.

When Kutusov at Tarutino heard of a French column near Fominskia, he dispatched Doctorov thither with twenty-five thousand men, believing it to be only a detachment which he might cut off. Doctorov soon ran across a heavy body, and a captured French officer revealed the truth. The Russian corps stopped at Aristovo and sent back a report that Moscow was evacuated; upon which Kutusov, hoping to head off the French, hurried a corps of Cossacks to Maloyaroslavez, and slowly followed with the entire Russian army, October 23. Doctorov clearly divined the facts and also pushed his column on Maloyaroslavez, the cross-roads of that section, and begged for reinforcements; but Kutusov was slow in movement, alleging that he must draw in his foraging parties. On the 23d Eugene, with his own and a cavalry corps, reached Borovsk, and Delzons hurried forward to Maloyaroslavez, drove out a few Cossacks, and began repairs on the Lusha bridge. Murat, Davout and the Guard followed on to Borovsk, Poniatowski was in Vereia, Ney was still in the rear. Napoleon in person reached Borovsk, believing Kutusov yet on the Nara, and that, instead of divining the retreat, he would look on the French march as a threat to turn his left; and that the Russian corps at Aristovo was sent out to fend off such an attack. Intending, as he notified Victor, October 23, to march to Kaluga and thence by way of Jelnia to Smolensk, he expected to reach this road first; should Kutusov attack, the army was to base on Vereia; but should Kutusov defend

Kaluga, Napoleon would deliver battle. Hence Junot, who had reached Mozhaisk, was ordered to send all troops ready for the march to Vereia. By holding Maloyaroslavez, which Delzons was to take and there face the enemy, Napoleon deemed the road to Kaluga safe, and thought that on the 24th he would be able to fathom Kutusov's designs.

> "It is necessary that Delzons, as soon as he is master of this little town, shall reconnoitre well on his left," the emperor wrote Eugene, October 23, in the evening: "You should reconnoitre on your left, and should render an account to-morrow early of all that you shall have seen. You are to this effect to send along your left strong reconnoissances, an hour before daylight. We here are making front to the enemy from Delzons to Fominskia."

From Maloyaroslavez there was a new road to Smolensk, via Juknov and Jelnia, of which Napoleon desired to take advantage; Victor had some time before been ordered to send to Jelnia the division of Baraguey d'Hilliers, ten thousand strong, as a reinforcement, and the government of Viasma was to clear up this route. Maloyaroslavez for the moment was markedly a key-point; and Doctorov, marching ahead of his orders, early on the 24th came up.

The Lusha River has here a deep channel and but one bridge, and the fords were not used. South of the town the ground, accentuated everywhere and partly wooded, rises sharply up to a plateau, to fall away again gently. Learning that the town was weakly held, Doctorov attacked and drove out the two French battalions, but the bridge was firmly held. Delzons on the other side essayed to regain the town; and when Broussier came up, a serious contest ensued, in which the French showed such tenacity against the constantly reinforced fighting line of the enemy that Doctorov made no progress. The town was set afire, and in desperate hand to hand struggles it was taken and retaken as many as seven times. Meanwhile the main armies were approaching; Raevski, Kutusov's van, came up to aid Doctorov, and Napoleon arrived about noon, having near Borovsk heard the firing. Davout and the Guard were placed in reserve on the right and left of the road; and the leading Russian corps was put in to sustain the hard-pressed troops which still held Maloyaroslavez; while Eugene, sending in his last divisions, Pino and Lecchi, finally secured the prize, but was unable to debouch into the open. Gérard and Compans also crossed, and came up on the right and left; and though at nightfall Kutusov made a last attempt to force an entrance, he was thrown back and retired to the heights, merely covering the town with artillery. Napoleon had maintained his ability to cross the river and file to the west through Medyni. Each side had put in twenty-five thousand men. The losses have been estimated at ten thousand



Battle of Maloyaroslavez.

men on each side; they may have been six or seven thousand. Dorkov and Delzons were killed. The French won a tactical victory; but failing to utilize it, the real victory, so far as results go, remained with the Russians.

Maloyaroslavez has been called a decisive battle, as putting beyond Napoleon's power to operate his retreat after a victory. It has been called the turning-point of his career; but his decision at Smolensk to advance to Moscow appears to be more nearly that.

The entire Russian army gradually came up and bivouacked around Maloyaroslavez. At headquarters in Gorodnia, at daylight on October 25, it was reported from the outposts that there were signs of cavalry marching in the direction of Medyni. Napoleon called to his tent Murat, Bessières and Lobau, and on asking their opinions as to delivering battle, these officers agreed that retreat alone was advisable, the last suggesting Mozhaisk, the two former Smolensk; that the Grand Army should retire to the Niemen by the least opposed route. Napoleon rode out and spent some hours reconnoitring the enemy, but even then he seemed unable to make up his mind; he still hoped Kutusov would retire. This attitude of waiting on what the enemy would do is unlike anything we have so far seen in his career. Kutusov indeed had determined to retire to Kaluga, and the emperor may have noticed signs of it; but this fact emphasizes rather than lessens his indecision. He rode back to headquarters, and next morning renewed the reconnoissance under cover of his Guard. On this occasion he came near capture. Some Cossacks had been in hiding in a wood on the right; and had not the Guard galloped to the rescue, the Napoleonic scheme might have ended then and there. About nine o'clock the report came in that Kutusov was retiring, and that only a Russian rearguard was occupying the bivouac in the front.



Positions, October 25.

As a description of the battle from his point of view, Napoleon told Berthier, October 26, to write to Junot: —

> "That the Russian army moved on Maloyaroslavez; that its vanguard arrived on one bank at the same time that our vanguard arrived on the other; that the town is situated on the bank of the enemy, and in a very high position, which gave rise to a combat which lost the whole day of the 24th; that while our vanguard sustained this combat, the whole Russian army arrived; that on our side Davout's troops arrived to the relief of Eugene; that we remained masters of the battlefield; that the enemy lost seven or eight thousand men. Our loss is two thousand killed and wounded. Delzons was killed. We found the corpses of two Russian generals; two hundred and fifty or three hundred prisoners remained in our hands. Write also that the 25th the army took position. The Russian army was opposite, a league behind Maloyaroslavez. That we marched the 26th to attack it, but that it was in retreat. That Davout followed it up, but that the cold, and the necessity of getting rid of the wounded that are with the army, decided the emperor to move on Mozhaisk, and from there to Viasma. . . . That the enemy's infantry, since the battle of the Moskwa, is much diminished; that it is not composed of more than fifteen thousand old soldiers, but that they have recruited their Cossacks; and that this cavalry, little dangerous in reality, is getting very tired."

It has been urged that Napoleon might have delivered battle to advantage; but he could scarcely have put in more than seventy thousand men, as Poniatowski and Mortier were not at hand, while Kutusov had one hundred thousand men, with much cavalry. The French infantry would have fought well, but the odds were against them, and Kutusov had determined in any event to retire to Kaluga, if attacked. Looked upon with that knowledge, which Napoleon did not possess, he might have demonstrated for battle, have forced Kutusov sharply back on Kaluga, and then have quickly resumed his retreat via Juknov and Jelnia, well ahead of the Russian army. But when Kutusov withdrew, Napoleon, for some reason which will ever remain buried, determined to retire on Borovsk, and to continue the retreat on Smolensk by way of Mozhaisk, Gshask and Viasma. For the purpose of retiring on Smolensk by this route, four good marching days had been lost; and Kutusov, with his ninety thousand regulars and thirty thousand Cossacks, was nearer than the French to Viasma, Krasnoi, Kopys, on the French communications.

That Napoleon had called a council of war may not have exhibited his growing loss of self-reliance, but his decision certainly showed an unsoundness we little expect of him. The manœuvre towards Kaluga was strategically sound, for, from there, the retreat via Juknov and Jelnia led through an undevastated region on Smolensk, and the holding of Kaluga by a stout rearguard would prevent too sharp a pursuit. If Kaluga could not be reached, then the next most favorable route was from Maloyaroslavez via Medyni, Juknov and Jelnia on Smolensk. As a last resort only, as after a defeat, was a withdrawal by way of Borovsk and Viasma excusable. The very object of moving on Kaluga was to elbow Kutusov off to the east or southeast, and gain the best route, through Jelnia, on which line, moreover, were coming his reinforcements; failing in which, the battle of Maloyaroslavez was to make sure of the next best route through Medyni. Either of these routes would forestall attack except in the rear, whereas the route chosen afforded the Russians time enough, and an open road, to fall on the French flank, or head of column, or rear, as they chose; and yet, after Napoleon had lost the first route, and by hard fighting held the second, he deliberately elected the third and worst route, back on Borovsk and Mozhaisk. That the great captain, on whose intelligence and spirit the French had so long relied for victory, should call in others to prop up his own powers may be pardoned, but that he should delay his decision for two days exhibits a weakening will; and in his selection of the worst route possible for the Grand Army to pursue, when he had just fought a hideous battle to secure, and had secured, a better one, we fail to recognize the leader of 1805 and 1806. And when we compare this attitude with that of Frederick after Kolin or Hochkirch, of Hannibal after Zama, we are forced to the conclusion that



The False Manœuvre.

the emperor had already outlived his best powers, or was under a spell from this his first overwhelming disaster. If speed was ever needed, it had been since the Grand Army left Moscow; and instead of speed, there had been irresolution, and the consequent loss of four or more marches.

Napoleon now ordered what he might as well have done from Fominskia on the 21st. Davout was for some miles to pursue Kutusov with two divisions, leaving two in Maloyaroslavez, and one in Gorodnia; and then, with cavalry as rearguard, he was to follow the Grand Army at night towards Borovsk, to which place, during the day, Eugene was to proceed. Poniatowski, as flanker, was ordered towards Gshask by the southerly route of Jegorevskoi, Ney from Borovsk to Vereia, Mortier with Claparède and Roquet from Vereia to

Mozhaisk, whereupon Junot was to take the lead and march on Viasma. The forces ordered from Smolensk towards Jelnia were to file off on Dorogobush. Thus, left behind at Maloyaroslavez, Davout became rearguard instead of Ney; and on October 26 the Grand Army began the regular retreat, not again to be interrupted.

On October 28 Napoleon learned from Davout that there was no enemy in his front, which meant that Kutusov had either retired to Kaluga, or was moving westerly to cut off the French; and lest Viasma should be his objective, the emperor hurried the Guard ahead to sustain Junot.

Kutusov had retired on the 26th to Goncharovo, under cover of Miloradovich as rearguard. There was a defile in his rear on the road to Kaluga, and he had deemed it better not to fight the French thus placed. Next day he learned of their retreat, and assuming that they would move on Medyni, as they ought to have done, he at once headed his army towards this place, and reached Polotniani-Savodi; while the rearguard, now become a vanguard, returned towards Maloyaroslavez, thence to Adamovskoi, and was later ordered towards Mozhaisk. The main Russian body got to Adamovskoi on the 29th.

On reaching Vereia October 27, Napoleon found Mortier there, and the Grand Army retired in the prescribed order. On the 28th Junot and the Guard marched from Mozhaisk to Kolotskoi, preceded by Mortier, and with Ney and Eugene behind, at or near Borisovo; Davout was still at Borovsk, and Poniatowski was marching from Jegorevskoi to Gshask. Late this day a captured Russian officer reported that Kutusov was marching on Smolensk. As Davout sent in word from Borovsk that only Cossacks were following his column, the credibility of this news spurred Napoleon on; and with the Guard he hurried to Gshask on the 29th, so as to meet

Kutusov, should he first reach the French line of retreat; for soon after his decision, at Maloyaroslavez, he had recognized that his direction was dangerously eccentric thereto. As he passed the Kolotskoi hospitals, he ordered all the Borodino wounded to be carried along; but there being no provision for them on the road, they one by one died from the exposure. Left in the hospitals, the Russians would have given the sick some care, though stragglers in the open field were mercilessly cut down by the Cossacks or murdered by the peasants.

Gshask was reached by Junot, Ney got to Kolotskoi, with Eugene not far behind, and Davout Mozhaisk. This placed the whole army on the Smolensk road in one column, and to speed the march through the eaten-out country, Napoleon divided it into four sections, at half-day intervals. These were the Guard and Junot, Ney, Eugene, Davout; and thus the Grand Army retired, the hardships increasing from day to day, and lengthening the intervals. To the suggestion that for safety the army should have marched in three columns, one on, and one on either side of, the main road, it may be said that the emperor early made up his mind that Kutusov would not seriously attack.

By the end of October the soldiers had neither bread nor beef, the brandy was gone, and except a little plundered food in the private wagons, nothing was left. The men practically lived on horse-flesh, and as the cold nights afforded little sleep, every bivouac looked like a field of battle. To ease their load, the weak or cowardly threw away their muskets and ammunition and swelled the host of non-combatants, and the intermingled masses lost the appearance of an army.

The column kept on its ghastly route, and late on the 31st Napoleon, with the Guard and Junot, reached Viasma, fortunately ahead of the Russian van, and took position west of the town; Ney came on to Velichevo, with Poniatowski and

Eugene at Gshask, and Davout at Gridnieva. Davout had been slow. Told not to abandon his artillery, he may, with the sting of late faultfinding, have set his teeth to obey, if he lost his last man. Left to himself, the marshal had a wonderful sense of what it was wise to do; yet his delays may have compelled the leading corps to wait, and given Kutusov more time to come up. He and Ney were not working cheerfully together.

In Viasma dispatches were received up to October 14 from Paris, from St. Cyr to the 20th, from Victor to the 24th, and from Vilna to the 26th; and Napoleon spent the 1st of November answering these. He learned that Schwartzenberg had on October 15 retired before Chichagov to the left bank of the Bug at Drogichin, thus enabling the Russians at Brest Litovsk to leave a containing force, and move towards the Beresina to help net the Grand Army. Victor at Smolensk had received instructions to keep an eye on both right and left, as the Army of Moldavia might join either Kutusov or Tormasov; and as Wittgenstein was apt to be reinforced, he was to be ready as a central reserve, to march on Minsk or on Vilna. In accordance therewith, Victor had left fifteen thousand men in Smolensk, and judiciously placed the rest in Orsha, Sieno and Babinovichi. On November 2 Berthier was ordered to write him in cipher "that the army is in march, as I have already told him. Finding that the winter was too long to pass it far from my flanks, that it is probable that I shall place my right" (left) "on the Dvina and my left" (right) "on the Borysthenes, and that by this means we shall find ourselves in contact."

The news received accentuated the danger. From Brest Litovsk and Polotsk alike the Russians were threatening the line of retreat, with no sufficient French force to fend them off; but beyond ordering the commanders in the rear to hold their own and to keep him posted, Napoleon could do naught: for the first time he was at the end of his resources.

Leaving Viasma November 2, Junot reached Semlevo, the Guard behind him, Eugene and Poniatowski at, and Davout near, Fedorovskoi. In order that Ney, who had reached Viasma, might undertake the rearguard duty originally cut out for him, he was to remain there until the other corps had passed through.

There was grave danger of Eugene and Davout being cut off; and the Cossacks compelled the troops to march in closed squares, to fend off sudden dashes. "It is very important," Berthier was told to write Eugene, November 2, "to change the manner of marching in the face of the enemy, who has so large a crowd of Cossacks. He must march as we marched in Egypt, baggage in the centre, closed up in as many files as the road allows, a half battalion in front, a half battalion in rear, battalions by files on the flanks, so as when we come to a front, we can give fire towards every side." This could be carried out only in part — as were all other orders.

Meanwhile Kutusov, uncertain how to head off the French army, had from Maloyaroslavez been marching in a general parallel direction. His van aimed for Kolotskoi, but learning from Cossack scouting-parties that the French had already taken it, bore off to the left on Gubino, hoping to anticipate them at Gshask. With the main army Kutusov moved on Viasma, and by October 31 he was at Spas-Kusovi, the vanguard advancing between the two armies to Krasnaia, and Platov's Cossacks feeling Davout at Kolotskoi, and pushing him hard to Gridnieva and Gshask. Next day Kutusov got to Silenki, and the van came in touch with Eugene at Tatarikino. On November 2 the army was at Dubrovna with van at Spaskoi, and Platov still pressing Davout towards Fedorovskoi. The main army had moved through a country affording some supplies, but so slow was Kutusov that, although marching on the chord of an arc, the French got past Viasma before he reached them. A body of cavalry was sent forward on Jelnia.

The French delay on the Lusha was bearing bitter fruit: the Guard and Junot alone had got beyond danger of being cut off. Look again at the situation. Parallel to Ney at Viasma, twenty miles south, was marching the Russian main army; Eugene, Poniatowski and Davout were ten miles behind Ney, harassed by the Cossacks in rear, and with the Russian van on their flank. Should Kutusov on November 3 push sharply on Viasma, these three corps would be headed off and separated from the sections under Napoleon. Happily for the French, the Russian general kept up his policy of caution; but no wonder his lieutenants found grievous fault with his slackness.

Napoleon and the Guard, on November 3, made a short march from Semlevo to Slavkovo, Junot marching ahead to Dorogobush, Eugene and Poniatowski moving on Viasma. The cavalry of the Russian van, advancing beyond Maximovo, struck the head of Davout's column, while Platov harassed his rear.

Davout was filing through Fedorovskoi, ten miles to the east. Miloradovich posted some cavalry across the road in Davout's front, sustained by Eugene of Wurtemberg, and drew up his foot and guns parallel with it. Davout made a good fight against the cavalry, part of which he drove to the north of the road, where it joined Platov, who continued to harass his right flank, part to the south. But then he found a line of infantry in his front.

From this dangerous position Davout was rescued by Poniatowski and the viceroy, the latter sending back to his assistance the Delzons and Broussier divisions, which drew up so as to enable Davout to file by in their rear, but later fell back to Miesoyedova. Eugene of Wurtemberg claims in his Memoirs that he could have held his own against both Davout and the viceroy, because the Russian artillery was in good condition and the French ill-served and half horsed; Miloradovich may have been able to gauge the situation better. At all events, Davout filed past, with Russian fire on his left and Platov on his right and rear, and lost heavily, until he got behind the viceroy; whereupon the French divisions formed line and challenged the Russians to battle, but Miloradovich did not attack. It was said at the time that Davout's men had not behaved with their accustomed gallantry, but this might be said of other divisions, and it was an awkward situation. The loss has been stated at five thousand men each side.



Battle of Viasma.

Here had been a rare chance for a general Russian attack; but knowing the French must keep up their retreat, Kutusov was unwilling to force matters. He was loth to stake his reputation on another pitched battle, when every day's retreat made the chances of success greater. Yet had he cut the French off, attacked them and been beaten, he could have retired on either Chichagov or Wittgenstein; had he beaten them decisively, he probably would have captured the emperor and put an end to the Napoleonic wars; and the campaigns of 1813, 1814 and 1815 would never have taken place. It will always be debated whether Kutusov was wise in adopting a Fabian policy. Once adopted, he consistently stuck to it; and it has been said that if his generals had not so constantly harassed him with demands for action, he might have been more willing to attack.

The isolated French corps commanders held a council and determined on retreat, which Eugene and Poniatowski conducted during the afternoon of the 3d, as a running fight, to beyond Viasma, Davout being in some disorder; Ney held Viasma until the other corps had got through the town; Napoleon remained in Slavkovo, busy with organization and supply — essential duties, but less so than what he owed to his endangered corps. Indeed, he spoke rather scornfully of their danger, and underestimated the forces of the foe, while overrating the ability of his lieutenants to surmount grave difficulties. On the day of battle Kutusov, with the main Russian column, advanced to Bykova. Had he been energetic, he might still have done the French column a fatal damage by sustaining his cavalry and cutting off Ney in Viasma.

From now on, Ney kept command of the rearguard. On November 3 Berthier was ordered to write him, "that as soon as he shall have taken the command of the rearguard, he is to make the army file along as fast as possible, for we are wearing out the remains of good weather without marching. Davout holds back the viceroy and Poniatowski for each Cossack charge that he notices." No one disputes the glory won for himself by Ney in this memorable retreat; neither does the military student forget the remarkable qualities of Davout. It was a pity these two great marshals, so excellent a complement each to the other, could not agree. With constant rearguard fighting, Ney organized his work in a marvelous manner. Beloved by the men, he treated his whole force as if none could ask better than "the glorious opportunity of getting himself killed" — as most of them did, and gamely.

Early November 4 Napoleon heard of the fight near Viasma, and complained to Davout that he had "received no account of what took place since he had been conducting the rearguard, and especially of yesterday." He planned to lie in wait between Slavkovo and Dorogobush, and to fall on Kutusov as he advanced, and he held the Guard and Junot there during the day, while Eugene, Poniatowski and Davout came up to Semlevo, for the most part in very bad order. Fézensac tells us that "the Royal Italian Guard almost alone marched in good order; the rest seemed demoralized and overcome with fatigue. An enormous mass of individual soldiers marched in disorder, and most of them without arms." And Ney wrote Berthier that "the roads were without exaggeration covered by . . . men of all regiments of the Grand Army, who could not be brought to march together." Fending off the onsets of the Cossack corps, Ney left Viasma and reached Semlevo late in the day; and on his report Napoleon decided to forego the ambush. Early November 5 he left Slavkovo for Dorogobush, and hither all the corps successively came, Ney still behind as rearguard. Kutusov spent

Ney.

November 4 at Bykova, the van following the Cossacks on the main road; on the 5th he marched to Krasnaia.

The embarrassment had become extreme. The provisions from Moscow had long been consumed, the unfed horses fell in their tracks and blocked the road; nearly two hundred guns were abandoned between Moscow and Smolensk; the French eagles, former emblems of victory, now seemed to lead the soldier to certain defeat and death. Up to this date the Grand Army had had to contend only with the Russians and with hunger. Snow was now added. On November 5 there was a slight fall, and next day a heavy fall of snow, with biting wind. Smolensk was yet distant, and winter was upon them. Foraging was at an end. The beaten down snow got slippery, and the horses had no footing. Only a part of the Polish cavalry had means of sharp-shoeing, and the soldiers had to push the guns up every slope. Few horses that fell were strong enough to rise again, and fourfold the number of vehicles were now abandoned each day. The army, which had left Moscow ninety thousand strong, arrived at Dorogobush with scarcely half the number.

On November 6, at Michailovska, Napoleon received news from Paris of the Malet conspiracy of October 23, to spread a rumor of the emperor's death and overturn the government. Of small importance, it yet showed him how entirely the empire rested on his single life, and how essential was his presence in the capital.

Victor also wrote. St. Cyr had fortified Polotsk; Wittgenstein, reinforced by St. Petersburg militia, had intrenched his camp, and prevented the French from foraging north of the river. Macdonald had done nothing. He could have accomplished as much with less forces, and the rest have advantageously strengthened Victor; but Napoleon feared an advance down the coast around his left. By October 15 Wittgenstein had forty thousand men, and Steinheil was bringing him ten thousand more: St. Cyr had but twenty-seven thousand. Steinheil crossed at Druia to take Polotsk in reverse, while Wittgenstein was to move on its front, and St. Cyr had the chance of leaving part of his force to contain Wittgenstein, and destroying Steinheil; but he was cautious. Wittgenstein assaulted Polotsk the 18th without success. There was no bridge by which the Russians could join; but fearing the superior numbers, St. Cyr retired, October 21, behind the Ulla to Chasniki, while Wrede moved to Glubokoi to cover Vilna, and a division took post at Bechenkovichi to keep touch with Victor. These operations cost each side about six thousand men, and Victor, whose duty was to support either wing, had to detach troops from Smolensk to aid St. Cyr, some days previous to the evacuation of Moscow, and himself followed. Even this reinforcement proved too small. Wittgenstein followed St. Cyr with caution, and on October 29 Victor took command at Chasniki, while Wittgenstein drew in Steinheil to Lepel, and left thirty-five hundred men at Polotsk. A force of five thousand men, sent down river to watch Macdonald, reconnoitred as far as Dünaburg, and then returned and faced Wrede, who was covering Vilna. Wittgenstein still had in line thirty thousand men; Victor had three thousand more, and Dombrovski at Mohilev with ten thousand men was also under his orders. With no idea of the disaster to the emperor, Victor called in the force at Bechenkovichi, part of which joined; his cavalry had stayed behind. He was now in force to attack, with a strong chance of success, but he permitted Wittgenstein to do so; and although in the ensuing action he was not defeated, he retired, apparently thinking that his duty as general reserve did not comprise attack. Happily Wittgenstein did not improve his opportunity. But, instead of retiring on Sieno so as to protect both

Orsha and Vitebsk, Victor retired to Chereia, November 6 — a strategic error; whereupon the Russian left moved sharply on Vitebsk, and captured it, November 7, with its full garrison. The situation was becoming desperate.

Unaware of what had happened, especially of the disaster to Victor, the emperor, on November 7, instructed Berthier to "Write Victor the following letter: —

"In plain words: 'I have submitted your letter of the 2d to the emperor. His Majesty orders you to reunite your six divisions, and to fall upon the enemy without delay and push him beyond the Dvina, and that you are to retake Polotsk.'

"In cipher (you must have received this cipher from General Nansouty): 'This movement is most important. In a few days your rear may be inundated by Cossacks. The army of the emperor will be to-morrow at Smolensk, but much tired by a march of one hundred and twenty leagues without stopping. Take the offensive. The salvation of the armies depends on it. Every day lost is a calamity. The cavalry of the army is on foot. Cold has made all the horses die. March! It is the order of the emperor and that of necessity!'

"Send this letter to General Charpentier by the courier who is to leave in an hour. He will send it by an officer to Victor. NAPOLEON."

But just as earlier orders to Victor had been impossible of execution, so now was this. The conditions, unknown to the emperor, had entirely changed.

Personally, on this retreat, the emperor rode in his coach, or walked with the Guard, occasionally being in the saddle; his thoughts were locked in his own breast. "He was pale," says Constant, "but his countenance was quiet; there was nothing in his features which permitted his moral suffering to be penetrated." Only such orders as that of November 7 to Victor show us how fully he gauged his danger: in no sense did he confide in his ancient fellows in arms; neither indeed was he frank in writing to Victor, or Macdonald, or Schwartzenberg. How far he had lost the art of dealing with facts; how far, in misrepresenting them to others, he deceived himself, is a question hard to solve; but that he was no longer the same man is plain. He looked towards Vilna, which he determined personally to reach at any loss, and believed that, once out of the horrible situation into which his own faulty judgment had plunged him, he yet had means and characteristic force enough to meet whatever might happen.

Victor.

Every virtue carried to excess becomes a vice. The emperor's habit of exaggeration had grown beyond reason. It had been deliberately assumed, and within bounds had accomplished its purpose, but it was now abused. Yet although much fault may be found with this misleading method, it remains a question whether war can be carried on by always stating the exact facts to subordinates. There is in history no more heroic moment than that of the evening before Leuthen, in which Frederick the Great collected about him his officers, and told them that the enemy intrenched on the heights beyond was three to one of them, and that they must beat him or fall one and all at the foot of his batteries; but

Napoleon never exhibited just that quality, nor did he ever have officers or men of the temper of those the king's father had passed through his training furnace, and the king had welded into steel. It is unwarranted to tax the emperor with mendacity on account of these lapses: the diplomacy of the day was full of lies on both sides, and military reports were then, as they commonly are now, utterly misleading. Napoleon kept up a habit which had worked well, but which under existing abnormal conditions would not work. It did mislead Victor as to Wittgenstein's strength, but what soldier would have had the emperor say to Victor: "You are outnumbered, the enemy has resources which you lack, and yet you must move against him and beat him"? The emperor was wiser, within bounds, to keep up his ancient habit; his fault was in exceeding reasonable bounds. Only Davout and Ney were fighters against fate. With twice his force Victor would not have been too well equipped for his work; but to tell him he had not resources enough and yet must accomplish results, would have been very much like hanging an unsuccessful admiral to the yard-arm *pour encourager les autres.*

For ordering certain things to be done at a distance, which he ought to have known could not be executed, Napoleon is in a way justly criticised, in a way not. Should he at Moscow, even if conscious of the dangers in his rear, have ceased from giving such instructions? Should he have assumed that his foundations were crumbling, and issued orders accordingly? Which system of care for his base and his reinforcements would work the best: the assumption that little can be done with weak orders, or the assumption that much can be done with vigorous instructions? Had the emperor sent dispatches, for instance to Maret, that he was in a desperate strait and it was a question if he would ever reach Vilna, would he have held the allies to their work until he fairly got out of the clutches of the Russians? It seems that, taking the man as he was, with all his strong and weak points, it bred more accomplishment for him to order too much than too little. He probably foresaw disaster before he left Moscow, and he would scarcely have acted a Napoleonic rôle by accepting this, and requiring less of his subordinates. We know what happened while he acted the stronger rôle; had he acted the weaker one, would he have been able to reach France, and within a few months raise so mighty an army again as to march back to the Elbe and defeat his enemies in the first two battles? Much fault must be found with Napoleon in this campaign, but this may be carried too far by characterizing his orders as absurd because he knew, or might have guessed, that they could be carried out only in part. There was no man in the Grand Army who could have got any part of it from Moscow back to the borders of Prussia; Napoleon himself saved only a skeleton of it — and its head; and sharp and constant and even unreasonable requirements seem to have accomplished the end. Napoleon had been spoiled by the hitherto universal obedience to his commands; but to assume that he had lost all perception of the limits of his power, or that he did not realize his difficulties, is as far from the truth as to assume that he was, before starting from Smolensk, as accurate and far-seeing in his calculations as he had previously been. During the first week at Moscow he probably foresaw nothing worse than another year's campaign in Russia, but after Maloyaroslavez he did foresee disaster. Even then, to weaken in his self-assertion was to invite a greater calamity than actually followed. Much must be said against Napoleon's inaccurate gauging of possibilities in the Russian campaign; but during the retreat, it was only his strong will, his almost abnormal control over his lieutenants, which enabled him to guide even the ghost of an army beyond the Russian frontier. To exhibit weakness was but to invite a *Sauve qui peut!*

As an instance of this hypercriticism, Chambray quotes a dispatch from Berthier to Victor ordering immediate attack, and telling him that if Wittgenstein has too difficult a position, he must turn him out of it; adding that if Victor can win a handsome victory, the emperor will be able to take up winter quarters on a line from Polotsk to Vitebsk, Orsha and Mohilev, which would bring about peace during the winter, or a chance to menace St. Petersburg in the spring; that Wittgenstein must not be allowed to join Kutusov at Vitebsk, which would cause the loss of Lithuania; that the campaign could not close without a battle between Victor and Wittgenstein, and the sooner this took place the better. Because this order was not capable of execution, the emperor is blamed for misleading Victor. Over this point never-ceasing arguments could be had, but it is answered above. If it be held that in disaster the commanding general should weaken in his purpose and in his orders, then Napoleon was in the wrong; but the strong commander is slow to acknowledge defeat. By conduct leaning towards weakness, it would have been easy on any day during the retreat to change the Grand Army into a mob of fugitives, of which not one could have crossed the Beresina.

As another instance, the emperor, on October 5, ordered the removal of the wounded to begin, and made Junot and Baraguey d'Hilliers responsible for the collection of vehicles and horses, although the country had already been stripped of everything of the kind. Despite all this, many wounded were actually got to the rear, as with less crisp orders they would not have been. This is quite apart from whether it was wise to move the wounded; as a matter of fact, most of them perished from exposure. They could not have been worse off had the Cossacks cut them down; but the situation was such that, even if he knew that all the wounded would die, Napoleon also believed that if he abandoned them, they would all meet a like fate, and he would be bitterly held to task for so doing.

When, however, it comes to judging the emperor's lapse from the clear, vigorous thought and action to which he has accustomed us, then criticism becomes fair. The old Napoleon would not have gone beyond Smolensk; or, having done so, would not have dwelt so long in Moscow; he would have better harbored his resources; he would have attacked Kutusov a second time; he would have more constantly looked after his lieutenants and disciplined his divisions, and have personally directed their movements. There is no desire to cover up the manifest decrease in characteristic power of the great soldier. He was no longer the man he had been in the Ulm and Austerlitz and Jena campaigns, when his intellectual force and vigor of character and clearness of vision may be said to have been at their highest. There are so many open questions in this campaign that it is easy to insist that Napoleon erred every day in what he did: he certainly com-

Napoleon.
From a sepia by Horace Vernet.

mitted errors enough. So did Kutusov, unless we assume that he intended to play only the Fabian game. But it is not necessary to seek for mistakes in order to combat them.

The further march on Smolensk continued. The weather grew colder and the men suffered more; the Grand Army was fast dissolving. There was no more cavalry; the guns grew fewer each day; the water-courses all ran in deep channels in the plain, and it was impossible to cross them with unsharpened, ill-fed horses and heavy loads. At each of the crossings, the guns, caissons and munition wagons had to be dragged up the steep bank on the further side by hand.

The men ate horse-meat, or dogs found in the burned villages they passed. Stragglers fell into the hands of the enemy, and were mostly cut down or saved for a worse fate. The roads were covered with men without weapons, each looking out for himself. Every nightly bivouac saw hundreds perish with cold and hunger. Dead men and horses lined the road; the men were passed without heed — 't was but one more; the horses were seized on to keep alive the famished wretches for another day's trials. Men went mad from the terrors of the route: hosts committed suicide.

No description can equal the horrors of this retreat. Old comrades plundered each other to keep from starvation. The man who fell by the way was stripped of his clothing to keep others from perishing by cold. The scenes among the actual or self-made non-combatants were too sickening to describe; but there was, as there always is, a nucleus of true heroes, who did not forget their manhood or the ancient ties of blood and service. The proportion of officers who got through was greater than of men, not only because they could in a sense better care for themselves, but because they were of a higher type, with moral courage to outlast the others.

So many volumes have been written on this subject that the mere recital of the losses must suffice. The hideousness of these weeks has nothing to do with the History of the Art of War.

On November 9 Napoleon with the Guard and Junot reached Smolensk; he and all his military family afoot, for the saddle-horses could not stand. All the corps shortly arrived: Poniatowski on the 10th, taking position on the Mstislavl road, Davout on the 12th, Eugene and Ney on the 13th. From Dorogobush Eugene was sent by way of Duchovchina, so as to move on Vitebsk.

Russian Landwehr.

At Smolensk Napoleon heard of the loss by Baraguey d'Hilliers of a brigade surrounded at Lakovo on the road to Jelnia, showing that Kutusov was active, and that the Grand Army could not rest in Smolensk. He also heard of the fall of Vitebsk. The weather continued cold, but the snow had the one good effect of forcing Kutusov farther to the south to forage his horses.

In his circuit via Duchovchina, Eugene was followed by five thousand Cossacks under Platov; and at the Vop, on the 9th, being unable to throw a bridge, he was in grave danger. In summer the Vop is easily fordable; but now its channel was full, the bridges broken, and the steep banks covered with ice. The men waded the river in water up to their shoulders; and with loss of half his men, all but a dozen of his sixty guns and his entire train, Eugene reached Duchovchina, where he found a little food. Had Vitebsk been open to him, he could not now march thither on account of his depletion.

At Smolensk the Grand Army numbered barely fifty thousand men, a large part unarmed — less than a third of its strength here seven weeks before. Meanwhile Kutusov marched via Gavrukovo, Jelnia and Lakovo, and on November 13 reached Chelkanovo, two marches south of Smolensk; and his van, which had kept between the main column and the French army, stood at Chervonoi, leaving a cavalry force to follow the French rearguard. Though nearer his base, Napoleon's position had not improved, for the Russians, advancing through a country as yet undevastated, were in the better condition; and with ordinary exertion Kutusov could reach Krasnoi, or Orsha, in time to fall on the flank of the French, or head them off.

Napoleon had expected to pause at Smolensk for rest and for reorganization, with the fresh men under Baraguey as leaven to call back the soldiers to their duty. The army was raveled out of all recognition in spirit, leg-weary and starving, and heart and body alike needed to be knit up; it had looked forward to Smolensk as furnishing repose and food. In summer, though burned, this town had shown them pleasant environments and rich grain-fields; now, towards winter, they found but half-roofed houses, filled with sick and dying, empty shops and misery. The garrison, the sick and wounded, the passing troops and trains, had eaten everything: Smolensk was as naked of food as the road from Moscow. Had the army come through the less poor Jelnia country, it would have kept its ranks better. It was no longer an army.

Victor was still at Chereia, Wittgenstein on the Ulla, a detachment in Vitebsk. To Victor's report, received on the 11th, Napoleon replied, "His Majesty will turn with a part of the army on Orsha; but this movement can be made only slowly; it is all the more essential for you to attack Wittgenstein." He appears to place the danger of Wittgenstein before that of Kutusov.

French Cuirassier on Cossack Pony.

From the French right came like ill news: Schwartzenberg and Reynier, after crossing the Bug, had retired to Vengrov about mid-October, while Chichagov held Brest Litovsk and Pruzhani. Essaying a partial blow against Schwartzenberg by passing the Bug, he was driven back; but by the end of the month he left Sacken in Brest Litovsk with twenty-five thousand men to contain Schwartzenberg, while he, with thirty-eight thousand, marched towards Minsk, and reached Slonim November 6. Reinforced by Durutte's division, Schwartzenberg recrossed the Bug October 30 at Drogichin, and marched on Volkovisk, being near Svichloch when Chichagov was at Slonim, and Sacken, following him up, was at Orlia. It would have been better strategy for Schwartzenberg originally to leave a containing force behind the Bug and march on

Minsk, so as to rally on his chief. His half-hearted aid was now useless.

The attempt to reorganize at Smolensk largely failed. What cavalry was left was consolidated under Latour-Maubourg, but with the half-starved horses, it was a sorry body. It sounds pathetic to read: "The first and second divisions of cavalry, each composed of three regiments, will be formed into one company, or one squadron, according to their forces." This reorganization was temporary, but the dismounted men were to be held, "up to the moment when, on the arrival of remount horses, each regiment can have three hundred or four hundred men to put in the field, at which period everything will go back to the original status." In victualing, too, the hungry troops would not wait for regular distribution; much was pillaged and more wasted. Many impossible orders were issued in these days. They speak of stores at Lepel, but the Russians had possession of Lepel. Dombrovski's five thousand men extended over hundreds of miles from Slutsk to Mohilev, but he was ordered to defend Minsk, when this was already held by Chichagov. It seems as if the emperor paid insufficient heed to Chichagov, but he had rightly gauged Kutusov, and believed he would not press for a decisive battle.

As another sample of the impossible orders of these days, on November 11 Berthier was ordered to write Poniatowski: —

> "That it is necessary for him to march with his army corps to Mohilev. . . . That arrived there he will strive to reorganize his corps, in joining to it the march-regiments which belong to him, and which the governor of Minsk has kept back. After this first operation he will occupy himself in gathering all his cadres into one division, and that afterwards, the cadres which are found disposable he is to lead back to Warsaw to take the men there present and complete his division. He can leave the 12th."

But the road to Warsaw had long been closed — as perhaps Napoleon might have guessed, if he did not know it.

Whether to halt at Smolensk or not was a question. Ney and Davout were far in the rear, and Eugene's eccentric march kept him at a distance. To disperse meant destruction in detail; to wait to assemble would enable the several Russian armies to close the trap. The army was now so small that the little food went farther: and the snow made separation for subsistence unnecessary. On November 13 Davout was nearing Smolensk and Eugene coming down from Duchovchina. The army could have been concentrated; but Napoleon pushed forward Junot's van, and it was again strung out to a length of fifty miles.

The march of the army along a single road had made victualing more precarious, and afforded the enemy a better chance of attack; three columns, upon the main road and along parallel by-roads, would have proved safer. It was thus Napoleon advanced; he would have done well so to retreat; for it was Kutusov's avoidance of battle alone that saved the army.

Though the Grand Army was perishing of exhaustion, yet Wittgenstein and Chichagov, not ready, as Kutusov seemed to be, to let it so die, were striving to encircle it. Napoleon was fully aware of the gravity of the case, yet neither in orders, dispatches, conversation, nor bearing did he give his marshals, correspondents, or staff the remotest conception of what was passing in his mind. On November 14 he left Smolensk with Junot, Poniatowski and part of the Guard, the headquarters baggage and treasure, under escort of another part, having preceded him two days, and Claparède one day. Davout remained in Smolensk, with Eugene and Ney to arrive. Eugene was to follow on the 15th, Davout on the 16th, and Ney on the 16th or 17th, after having blown up the walls and towers. Should the rearguard be attacked, Davout was to aid Ney.

On November 14 Berthier was ordered to write to Ney that the emperor was going to Krasnoi: —

> "That it is necessary that he should continue to lead the rearguard, that Davout will sustain him. . . . That on the 16th he will blow up the town" (Smolensk) "on leaving, or simply take up a position at the bridgehead, so as not to blow up the town until the 17th, if all should not be ready. That it is necessary to make his arrangements with Davout; that I recommend him especially so to act that the guns and munitions are destroyed, and that the least French possible should be left in the place."

Meanwhile Kutusov slowly advanced towards Krasnoi, and the light horse of his van ran against the French head of column and was driven back. Napoleon passed the night of November 14–15 at Korytnia. The situation had become worse than at Viasma, for the Russians had relatively gained in strength and morale; and the French army was strung out over four days' march — unquestionably an error in logistics.

In other campaigns frequent extracts have been given from the Bulletins of the Grand Army. Those issued during the Russian campaign are almost entirely omitted in the Correspondence. The following explanation of this fact is given after Bulletin 1: —

> "There will not be found hereinafter all the Bulletins of the Grand Army during the campaign of 1812. The commission has thought that it should reproduce only the Bulletins of which the manuscript text bears some corrections of the emperor, and those which by reason of their exceptional importance cannot be considered as the work of the staff, and can be attributed only to the emperor."



Sword of the Period.

LV.

THE BERESINA. NOVEMBER 15, 1812, TO JANUARY 31, 1813.

Kutusov played a Fabian game, when by an attack he could have destroyed the wreck of the Grand Army. On November 17, at Krasnoi, Napoleon stood with the Guard to let his rear close up. Kutusov weakly attacked, and all came up except Ney, who, left to his fate, by a circuit fought his way through to the army, reaching it with less than a thousand men. At Orsha a slight reorganization was made, and much material was burned. Napoleon intended to move through Minsk, but when this place went lost, Studianka was chosen for crossing the Beresina. Meanwhile Wittgenstein had pushed back Victor, who had gone to St. Cyr's aid, and Chichagov had come up to the Beresina. At frightful loss the Beresina was crossed November 27–28, and the army kept on towards Vilna. On December 5 the emperor left Murat to command the army, and made his way to Paris by December 18. At Vilna and at Kovno the army — now only a mob — expected to pause, but could not. Pursuit stopped at the Niemen. The Prussians and Austrians made a Convention with the Russians. The French losses in the campaign were probably four hundred thousand men, the Russian a hundred and fifty thousand. Murat turned over the command to Eugene, who conducted the army back to the Oder, and later to the Elbe. Napoleon at once began creating a new army, with which he proposed to march back to the Niemen.

The emperor's judgment of Kutusov's enterprise proved accurate; and although every day added to the danger as well as the difficulties of the French, yet the Russian general clung to his policy of letting distress do the work of battle. On almost any day he might to advantage have attacked in force, but he refrained. On his side, the emperor might have foreseen that the Russians could anticipate him at Krasnoi, and have evaded them by marching on Orsha north of the Dnieper; but poor maps and uncertain news induced him to keep to the route he knew, bad as it was.

On November 15, at 8.30 A. M., Napoleon and the Guard started from Korytnia for Krasnoi, while the Russian van under Miloradovich, advancing towards the main road, reached it at Rshavka just as the Guard appeared. Instead of attacking smartly and pushing on to Krasnoi, Miloradovich, held back by Kutusov, only opened artillery fire, and Napoleon filed by with small loss. Junot and Poniatowski were already beyond Krasnoi, Eugene had left Smolensk and reached Lubnia, Davout and Ney were still in Smolensk. Kutusov's main force was at Jurova. Sending Roguet's division of Guards to drive off the Cossacks, Napoleon remained at Krasnoi during the 16th to allow the corps in the rear to close up. During the day Kutusov came along to Novoselki and his van to Nikulina, both close to Krasnoi; but he seemed still to avoid attack, though this was the auspicious moment. There was good reason for the loud complaints among Kutusov's lieutenants; to end the matter would be to save thousands of Russian as well as French lives; for although they were not perishing in droves, the Russian force was also dwindling in the extreme cold. All his officers urged action, but Kutusov stuck to his own course. He was hyper-conservative.



Smolensk-Krasnoi Country.

When Eugene reached the Russian van astride the road east of Nikulina, his smart attack was repulsed, and Miloradovich sent in a demand for surrender. But, made of rugged stuff, Eugene started on a circuit around Miloradovich by way of Fomina, and reached Krasnoi at night of the 16th with thirty-five hundred men left of the six thousand with which he had left Smolensk. Davout was at Korytnia, and Ney still at Smolensk. Junot and the Poles had kept on to Liadi. During this threat against Eugene, Napoleon might to advantage have attacked Miloradovich's rear, but he had only the Guard to put in, which, although still consisting of thirteen thousand foot, two thousand horse and a few guns, he must keep intact, as a nucleus for the army, and, as he never forgot, for his own personal safety.

A worse situation could scarcely exist. Strung out over a distance of forty miles, Kutusov by one strong push could cut the French army in two, and successively demolish the several corps; or, should Napoleon await their arrival at Krasnoi, Kutusov, by extending his left, could seize the road to Orsha and cut the army off from its one line of retreat. This was, in an uncertain way, the Russian leader's idea. He thought to throw Tormasov to the left, hold Galitzin in front of Krasnoi, and let Miloradovich, from a position south of the road, handle Davout and Ney; but the whole scheme was lamely carried out. Napoleon, however, had to choose between abandoning Davout and Ney, and running this risk; and at the point of fatal danger the old Napoleon flamed up. Relying on the dread inspired by his own personality and the Guard, he stood his ground, and enabled both Eugene and Davout to join the army. At first blush, this act appears foolhardy, but it was the only thing to do; the least risk lay in the boldest course; he could not remain passive and encourage the enemy to offensive measures; it was safer, even with his handful, to attack, himself; and as after Eugene's escape Miloradovich still held the road at Nikulina by which Davout and Ney must reach him, he advanced on the enemy, hoping Kutusov might call in Miloradovich to strengthen his own line. Both from an individual and a military point of view, his act commands our admiration.

Early in the morning of the 17th Napoleon sent out Mortier, who took Uvarova after a slight combat; and so soon as the emperor with the Guard demonstrated along the Smolensk road at Nikulina, Miloradovich was called in from the right to the main army, drawn up in order for battle. Recognizing his danger, Davout pushed through and reached Krasnoi before noon. But as Tormasov had extended far beyond the French right, this fragile offensive could not last. Napoleon must withdraw before Ney could come up, and leave the rearguard to its fate. This was done. It was a sad necessity, but unless we go back to Hannibal at Crotona in 203 B. C.,



Battle of Krasnoi.

perhaps no finer figure can be found in the annals of war than Napoleon standing here with fifteen thousand famished men facing an army of eighty thousand effective, for many hours, to enable ten thousand comrades to escape annihilation. There was no particular fighting. Kutusov's purpose to throw his left around the French, to cut the road to Orsha, weakened when he ascertained that Napoleon and the Guard were in his front, and he let them pass on towards Dubrovna, intending to harass their rear and then turn on Davout. Thus when the emperor retired through Krasnoi, he met only the light horse which had been sent beyond the town; this fell back, and the handful reached Liadi. In covering the retreat Davout suffered considerably; especially Friedrich's division at the rear was harassed. The army generally lost heavily in prisoners, mostly, however, non-combatants, without whom it was better off. Eugene was at Liadi, and Junot and Poniatowski beyond the town. Kutusov assembled his army at Dobraia.

Ney was thus cut off. With six thousand men, and an equal number of unarmed stragglers, he had left Smolensk before daylight, November 17, and had marched to Korytnia, unaware that the Russian army stood across the road. There had been another quarrel with Davout, because Ney, reaching Smolensk last, found no food; and he afterwards accused Davout of deserting him on the march to Krasnoi; but Davout was drawn in to Krasnoi by the emperor's order, although Ney claimed that he received no intimation of this fact. It was not like Davout to fail to communicate important instructions, and it is not fair to assume that he did so fail: the numberless Cossacks on the road would have made the loss of a dispatch probable. Ney was, however, not fully informed; and Fézensac, who was with him, says that he had no news for three days before he left Smolensk. Of the two



Smolensk-Vilna Country.

men, Ney was the more given to prejudice; but in such awful days much must be forgiven.

Next day, about three, Ney ran across Miloradovich, standing athwart the main road east of Krasnoi. As the fog prevented his seeing what was in his front, he attacked sharply and was repulsed. In a worse position than Eugene, he adopted the same course: Miloradovich demanded surrender, at which Ney laughed; and at dark he left his bivouac-fires burning, and moved away to the north, knowing nothing about the roads or country. At one place he broke the ice on a stream to ascertain which way the water flowed. His direction proved to be towards Syrokoreni on the Dnieper. Crossing during the night with the loss of a number of men drowned, frozen, shot or sabred, by morning of the 19th he was at Gusinoi, with but half of his men. Those who could not follow were captured. At Gusinoi he met the Cossack corps from Smolensk, and had to fight for every mile of his route. Luckily, the extreme cold had ceased. During the 19th and 20th he reached Rosasna, and next night the main road to Orsha, sending couriers ahead to establish touch with Napoleon, who at once ordered a body under Eugene back to his aid. Ney reached the wreck of the Grand Army with eight hundred braves left out of the thirty-nine thousand men his corps had counted under the colors on the 1st of March. Nor was his case an exception.

Napoleon blamed Davout for abandoning Ney: he had to blame somebody. The charge was unfounded, as Davout had only obeyed his orders. If any one abandoned Ney, it was the emperor. There was probably no man he would not rather have left in the lurch; but abandoning rearguards, as every old soldier knows, is too old and essential a matter in war to need defense. The author has twice been in such a case. To save the rest of the army, Ney had to be sacrificed; but his marvelous escape was a great relief to Napoleon. Early on November 20 he had written Maret: "I have no news from Ney. I have almost given up hope of him." But when, after leaving Orsha on the same day, he learned of this gallant marshal's arrival there, he wrote Maret: "My anxiety for Ney is ended. He has just rejoined us. I have determined to set the whole army, even Oudinot and Victor, on the march to Borisov, and from there to Minsk." And he added: "My chief anxiety relates to victual."

Why Kutusov did not send cavalry towards Orsha to capture the garrison and to cut the bridge can be explained no better than his other inactivities. The river here is wide, and a broken bridge would have caused the Grand Army as much trouble as they had at the Beresina; but after Krasnoi, the Russian leader pushed even less than before.

The army was to halt for a short respite behind the Dnieper at Orsha; but on reaching Dubrovna on the 18th, the emperor was met by serious news. Minsk had been lost, and though Oudinot was ordered to Borisov, to join Dombrovski and retake the place, it was too late. Victor with his own and Oudinot's corps, some twenty-five thousand men, had advanced, November 13, from Chereia on Smolianzi to turn the Russian left; but Wittgenstein did not move from his strong position on the Ulla, and Victor fell back to Chereia. Had Wittgenstein pressed Victor seriously, he might have seized the main road of retreat, but he neither knew the condition of the Grand Army, nor where stood Chichagov, on whose advent he was counting to assume a bold front. On November 19 Napoleon wrote Berthier to order Victor to operate as if the emperor were moving against Wittgenstein — "a very natural manœuvre. That my intention is to move on Minsk, and when I shall be master of this town, to take up the line of the Beresina; that it would therefore be possible that he might receive the order to move on Beresino to cover there together the route to Vilna, in communication with the 6th Corps. Let him study this movement and let you know his observations."

News also ran in that the Minsk garrison had, on the approach of Chichagov, retired towards Borisov, and had been joined by Dombřovski from Mohilev. It was evident that unless a Beresina crossing could be held, the Grand Army must perish to the last man; and Oudinot and Dombrovski were ordered to hold Borisov at all hazards, as a means of arresting the junction of Chichagov and Wittgenstein.

This idea of marching on Minsk appears in several documents at this time — the emperor had harbored it some days. To Maret, November 20, he wrote: "Notify Schwartzenberg that I am marching on Minsk, and that I count on him;" and next day he mentions the same thing to Berthier; but he soon found that his route might not lie that way: after crossing the Beresina, it would depend on the operations of the Russian armies.

Headquarters now came on to Orsha, and from here Victor was ordered to maintain Chereia, and was notified that Oudinot would get to Borisov by the 24th and the army by the 25th and 26th, and that Victor was then to undertake the rearguard duty.

At Orsha were food, arms and ammunition, and some artillery. Six new batteries were formed, and an effort made to rearm the stragglers, and get them back to their corps; but the obedience of a mob cannot be compelled without rougher methods than could then be used. The infantry was not reorganized as the cavalry had been, the corps being left as they were: a change would have made public the grievous losses, and have unnecessarily puzzled the soldiers. The Russians always exaggerated the French numbers, and as the Romans with Hannibal, so the Russians cared not to bring Napoleon to bay.

The emperor did succeed in reducing the train.

> On November 22, in an order of the day, he said: "The baggage is to be reduced. Every general or administration officer who has several carriages will have half of them burned, and will turn in the horses to the artillery park. The Major-General is charged with the execution of this order." Two days later an order was given to Berthier, "To have burned half of the carriages, cabriolets, carts, coaches, etc., in the several corps . . . it being indispensable that all the provisions should be carried along, and that no guns or munition-caissons should be left along the route."

In addition to private seizures, a number of small country horses had been got for the artillery, and while general officers kept one wagon, no horse was left in the possession of a regimental officer. That these orders were but partially carried out was shown by the crowds at the passage of the Beresina, but something was accomplished.

Lest they might be captured, the emperor burned his own papers. Davout's, and doubtless other corps headquarters records, fell into the Russian possession.

The pontoon train was burned, although Eblé was able to keep a few tools. This was a curious mistake, as the pontoons might have been of critical value at the Beresina; but Napoleon at the moment proposed to cross on the Borisov bridge, and though he did not know it had been burned, this was an accident which might at any moment occur.

It was a time, however, when mistakes were natural. It is easy to place dates in juxtaposition to orders, to prove that Napoleon should have done this or that; but no man could have kept breath in the body of the Grand Army until it reached the Niemen, so well as he. All the mistakes he committed, any leader would have committed, and more.

It is often assumed that Napoleon did not hurry the retreat as was required, but he probably moved as fast as was possible for the exhausted men. He is charged with undervaluing the danger threatened by Chichagov and Wittgenstein. He had already discounted Kutusov, and his old habit of not estimating obstacles until he reached them may here have made him underrate the two others; but had he gauged them at their true value, he could not have moved much faster.

It must not be forgotten that none of the Russian generals knew much about his colleagues' movements; Wittgenstein and Kutusov exchanged some dispatches, but the other armies were much in the dark; and despite orders from St. Petersburg, each of the army commanders had been acting on his own ideas, with only a very general view of coöperation.

The retreat continued along the main road, and on November 21 Junot and Poniatowski were at Tolochin, with seven hundred men between them fit to put in line. The Guard and headquarters were at Kochanovo, with Eugene and Davout closing up. Kutusov lay at Lanizi, with van at Goriani. Except the Guard, which the emperor now accompanied afoot, no semblance of an army was left. From Kochanovo Borisov was the objective, and thither, as the key-point of the movement, had been ordered all the nearby corps. But Napoleon's calculation failed: he could not get there before the Russians. Chichagov had reached Minsk the 17th; his van advanced on and carried the bridge-head at Borisov on the 21st, and next day he crossed the Beresina.

It is interesting to compare with the forces at the opening of the campaign the numbers left at this time. On the 21st of November Junot and Poniatowski, seven hundred armed men in all, were at Tolochin; Napoleon and the Guard, forty-eight hundred strong, and the cavalry, reduced to sixteen hundred men, were near Kochanovo. On the 20th Dom-



Positions, November 21.

brovski with four thousand men had joined the garrisons of Minsk and Borisov, some fifteen hundred men, at the latter place; but Chichagov's van drove him out on the 21st after a noble defense, and he retired with but fifteen hundred effective on Bobr, where he met Oudinot with eight thousand men and the Mohilev garrison of twelve hundred. There had been a little French garrison in Minsk under Bronikovski, and a small Russian force at Bobruisk, together with a larger one at Mozyr under Ertel, but the latter took no part in the Beresina manœuvre. Victor with eleven thousand men stood at Chereia. The Grand Army had thus dwindled to less than thirty thousand men all told. Opposite this handful of desperate soldiers stood Kutusov at Lanizi with sixty-five thousand men; Wittgenstein with thirty thousand men at Chasniki; Chichagov at Borisov with thirty-four thousand, — a total of one hundred and thirty thousand men fit for duty. Thus Napoleon had so managed as, out of half a million, to have left for his desperate struggle only thirty thousand armed men — one in seventeen; while out of a quarter of a million men the Russians could put in line over one half.

Let us see how Chichagov had come into the present problem. When Schwartzenberg crossed the Bug and marched on Volkovisk, October 30, he left Reynier opposite Sacken. Sacken attacked November 14, but was beaten; and Reynier followed on to Volkovisk, while Schwartzenberg was at Slonim. A second attack had no better result, and Reynier then followed Sacken back to Brest Litovsk, which he captured November 26. Still, though defeated, Sacken had actually contained both Reynier and Schwartzenberg. The latter has been charged with acting treacherously. He was half-hearted, but his task was to protect the Warsaw country; and that he did not know the grievous case of the Grand Army was Napoleon's fault, for Schwartzenberg got his warped facts from Maret. Being in the campaign only as auxiliary, he did not care to march to the emperor's relief without definite orders. When Chichagov left Slonim, November 8, he sent the czar's aide, Chernishev, with a body of Cossacks to Wittgenstein, asking for coöperation to stop the French on the Beresina. Chernishev managed to push through, after a combat with some cavalry under Corbineau, which was marching from Vilna to the Beresina. Chichagov reached Niesvish November 12, his van under Lambert drove back at the Niemen a party from the Minsk garrison, and on Lambert's further advance, Bronikovski abandoned Minsk with its stores, retiring to Borisov to join Dombrovski. Chichagov again moved forward, and Lambert, sending a detachment up to Sembin, reached Borisov November 20. On being attacked, Dombrovski, after a stubborn defense, was driven out without destroying the bridge, and Lambert, wounded, was replaced by Phalen. In Borisov, Chichagov found dispatches which gave him a slight knowledge of the French disaster, but having no idea how weak the Grand Army was, he dreaded meeting it. The importance of Borisov and the danger of Chichagov's presence were not lost on Napoleon. Berthier wrote Oudinot, November 22: "Should the enemy have seized

Chernishev.

the bridge-head and burned the bridge so that we might not cross, it would be a great misfortune;" and should other crossings be hard to find, "we should have to be prepared to march on Lepel."

The weather had changed after November 14, and by the 19th it was thawing; rain fell, the roads were deep and the Beresina full of floating ice. The news of the fall of Borisov reached Napoleon at Tolochin the 22d, and here, says Ségur, "he felt that his only chance was to offer up the army piece by piece, one after another, beginning with the limbs, to save the head." He wrote Oudinot that he was to capture the Borisov bridge; or if it was broken, to seek a fresh crossing, either at Beresino or at Sembin, build bridges and bridge-heads, and hold them. This was really a week's work, which Napoleon in his hurry ordered done at once. Later, he selected the ford at Viesolovo, and on November 22 wrote Oudinot to prepare the bridges there. Next day he established head-quarters at Bobr, having of late constantly been with the van. Oudinot with Dombrovski, who had reached Loshniza the 22d, at once continued his march towards the Beresina; and meeting the Russian van, which itself was marching on Bobr, he so furiously attacked it on the 23d, that he drove it back in panic sufficient to infect Chichagov and his staff, and to bring the whole Russian army into disorder. This did not argue well for its condition. The success was a misfortune; for though it enabled Oudinot to seize Borisov, it induced Chichagov, who believed the whole French army upon him, to recross and destroy the bridge. From Bobr, November 24, Napoleon wrote Maret that Dombrovski had lost Borisov, but that Oudinot had recaptured it. "But the bridge is burned. They hope to make another one during the day. It is cold. My health is very good. I am very anxious to have letters from Vilna and Paris. I have received no messenger from you. This, however, was easy. I have no news from Schwartzenberg. Where is he? See that you collect at Vilna a great quantity of victual."

The Guard had been the one body cared for, and was in least ill condition; and owing to its excellent material, as well as to the constant presence of the emperor, it had kept its discipline. On November 19 Napoleon addressed the men: —

> "Grenadiers of my Guard, you have been witnesses of the disorganization of the army. The majority of the soldiers, from a deplorable fatality, have cast away their arms. If you should imitate this fatal example, all hope would be lost. The safety of the army is confided to you. You will justify the good opinion that I have of you. Not only must the officers maintain a severe discipline, but the soldiers must exercise among themselves a rigorous surveillance, and themselves punish those who fall out of their ranks."

Quite apart from his own safety, the emperor was aware that the only hope of the army again seeing the Vistula was to hold together the Guard as a nucleus on which to rally the disorganized forces. Orders to the line to stop pillaging, or to maintain discipline, were useless: starving men cannot be held together. Yet the spirit of the troops and their admiration of the emperor never ceased; the blame for their troubles was not cast upon him; and Napoleon could have accomplished more towards holding the Grand Army together by himself moving among the troops to encourage them, instead of rarely leaving the immediate environment of the Guard. All agree in testifying that the soldiers of the Grand Army, even those who were taken prisoners, maintained their fealty to the Great Captain. Heine's poem of "The Two Grenadiers" is not an idle thought.

At this time Napoleon considered several manœuvres for freeing himself from his fast encroaching foes. One idea was to add the arms-bearing men of the Grand Army to those of

Victor, and drive back Wittgenstein, so as to open the route on Vilna via Lepel; but as that country was full of marshes, which might not be frozen so as to bear troops, and as Wittgenstein might arrest him until Kutusov and Chichagov came up in his rear, after mature reflection, on consulting various staff officers who had studied the country,—among them Jomini, who recommended a crossing as near Borisov as possible to get on the straight road to Vilna,—Napoleon decided rather to force the Beresina at a point between the three



Orsha-Beresina Country.

Russian armies, and to head for Molodechno through what was a less barren country. It was hard for him to give up the idea that he could yet brush aside Chichagov, march through Minsk, join Schwartzenberg, and finish the retreat by a tactical if not strategic victory. Had the Borisov bridge stood, he might have attempted this. He dreaded to reënter France a defeated man. But the information brought in by Corbineau, who had just come from Wrede with some cavalry, — and met Chernishev on the way, — showed such facts that he finally chose the straight road to Vilna; and when he heard that the Borisov bridge was definitely lost, nothing could be done but bridge the river somewhere else; and this he set about with his usual skill.

Meanwhile Victor retired before Wittgenstein, who reached Chereia. Exaggerating the numbers of the Grand Army, and unaware that Chichagov had taken Borisov, the Russian leader was cautious. He might to advantage have marched to Viesolovo and Sembin, but he believed the Grand Army was moving to Borisov, and indeed heard that part of it was heading towards Bobruisk. With growing inertia, Kutusov had got only to Morosovo, while his van crossed the Dnieper at Kopys.

When Oudinot reported that he still held Borisov, but that the bridge could not be repaired in season, he added that Corbineau had found a good ford at Studianka, and that this was a safe place for a passage; and on November 24 Napoleon sent Eblé with Chasseloup and Jomini to him, with what was left of the pontoon tools and the sappers; and to protect the operation, formed under Ney, out of the Mohilev garrison, the Poles and the relics of his own corps, a body to follow the Guard, and hold Bobr until Davout and Eugene came up. Davout was notified not to march so fast as to prevent the wounded and the stragglers from keeping up. Headquarters was transferred to

Loshniza. Oudinot reconnoitred the Studianka ford and those at Stakov and Ukolodi, and reported next morning that he was striving to deceive the enemy, of whom some twenty thousand men stood on the other side. At noon he further reported: "I have decided for Studianka as the point where I intend to make my crossing the coming night, and to-morrow early I will make diversions at Ukolodi and Stakov." A later report was that the lay of the land was not favorable, and towards evening Oudinot sent this information to headquarters at Loshniza.

Chichagov.

The emperor was much disappointed; he had hoped Oudinot would force a passage that night, and wrote him that Mortier and two divisions of the Guard had been ordered to Borisov to his support, and that he must cross on the 25th, if he had not done so previously. Victor was ordered to fend off Wittgenstein at all hazards, and pushed to Kostriza to attack whatever he met. While Eugene and Davout were coming up to Loshniza and Nacha, Napoleon went on to Borisov, and near that town heard from Victor that he was falling back on Loshniza, thus opening the Studianka ford to Wittgenstein. With a sharp rebuke for this retreat, Napoleon ordered Victor forward again to Ratutichi, as the only means to prevent the Russians from cutting the army in two on the Borisov road.

The Grand Army was indeed in a critical state. Nothing better shows the bad condition of the line of communications than the fact that, at the Beresina, Napoleon received the first letter from Maret for a fortnight. Strategically, the army was pressed by Kutusov in the rear, threatened by Wittgenstein on the right and by Chichagov on the left front, and had a difficult river to pass in the teeth of far superior forces. A problem for an army in perfect condition, what a task it was for the wreck of an army, dying of famine! Had the Beresina remained frozen, Napoleon might have crossed and beaten off Chichagov, for there were still of the Moscow troops some fifteen thousand armed men, and Victor and Oudinot had fifteen thousand more; but the river was open, and while once crossed it would be a protection, it was now a difficulty of the first order.

When Eblé and Chasseloup reached Studianka in the afternoon of November 25, they found that demonstrations had been made up and down the Beresina, but that little had been done towards bridging it, and they at once took matters in hand. Chichagov had at hand twenty thousand foot and eight thousand cavalry, the latter useless on this marshy terrain. Wittgenstein and Kutusov had given him the impression that the French army was going to cross at Borisov and below it; and thus misled, he sent a division under Chaplitz up river as far as Brili, which pushed a reconnaissance out to Sembin, and leaving Langeron at Borisov, he marched, at Kutusov's suggestion, down river nearly twenty miles. Reconnoitring on the 25th, he found no enemy, returned to Borisov, and dispatched Langeron on Sembin, but too late to dispute the crossing.

The French forces on November 25 stood as follows: the Guard in Borisov, headquarters at Stari-Borisov, Oudinot at Studianka, Ney on the road from Loshniza to Niemeniza, Eugene at Nacha, Davout between Krupki and that place, Victor at Ratutichi. Of the Russians, Kutusov was at Kopys, out of harm's way, and his van at Tolochin; Wittgenstein had advanced to Baran; Chichagov was at Sabashevishi and Usha, with Chaplitz watching Borisov, and a division opposite Studianka. Good luck had for a moment smiled on the Grand Army, and had left its passage of the Beresina open; frosts set in and hardened the roads so that



Positions, November 25.

wheels could travel; and at Studianka, where the bridge was thrown, there was plenty of timber in the houses for use for the bridges.

Early on November 26 the emperor left Stari-Borisov, the Guard ahead, and on reaching Studianka, found that the material for two bridges had been assembled. The throwing was begun by 8 A. M., under cover of Oudinot, while his artillery, placed on the heights back of Studianka, commanded the plateau, and staved off attack by the Russians. Corbineau's cavalry crossed by wading and swimming to clear the farther bank, and a battalion of five hundred sharpshooters was put over on rafts. Although the marshy ground would now bear the troops, the river was still open except at the edges, and was floating down huge blocks of ice. Of the two bridges, the upper was a fragile one, suitable for foot-troops and, according to some authorities, cavalry, and the lower was a stronger one on trestles, nearly five hundred feet long, to serve for the artillery and train. The brave sappers stood chest-deep in the water to do their work, and more than half of them died of the exposure — few soldiers are called on to equal such heroic work. Eblé, an old man, showed great devotion. At one o'clock, November 26, the upper bridge was finished, and Oudinot and part of Ney began the crossing. The lower bridge was finished at about 4 P. M., and the artillery started across, followed during the night by the rest of Ney and Claparède; and by morning of November 27, over ten thousand men were on the right bank. Had Davout been ordered to hurry up his column, there were enough hours for the whole body of the non-combatants to cross.

A long causeway ran over marshy ground from Borisov to Sembin, and was provided with three bridges. Had the Russians seized this causeway, the French army would have been lost; but Oudinot was quick enough in throwing forward some of his first troops over, and held it; and once well across, he fell smartly upon Chaplitz, who had started back towards Borisov, but had returned, sustained by Pahlen. Holding the woods, which were plentiful, Oudinot fended off several Russian attacks; and finally, though hotly withstood, pushed the Russian division back on Stakov, and also occupied Sembin, which freed the road. Men of all nationalities and corps fought side by side, French, Poles, Swiss, Croats, and all did well. On the other side the Guard and Ney came up; Victor, leaving Partouneaux at Loshniza as corps rearguard, fell back to Borisov; Davout reached the same place, and Eugene Niemeniza. Puzzled by the situation, Chichagov had not moved; Wittgenstein advanced to Kostriza; Kutusov crossed the Dnieper to Staroseli, with van at Moliavka. The French were favored by the slowness of the enemy; for instead of marching on Oudinot, Chichagov, who feared to meet the Grand Army singly, strove to get in touch with Wittgenstein. The latter, from Baran, should have marched on Sembin, but on November 27 was still at Kostriza. From here there was no direct road to Studianka, but he slowly marched on Stari-Borisov with part of his force, and sent the rest to Borisov. Victor, with the main column, had already got above Stari-Borisov.

The crossing was not accomplished without accident. At eight in the evening and six next morning, the heavy bridge broke, and, requiring hours to repair, occasioned dangerous delay; but Victor, reaching Studianka at 4 A. M. of the 27th, took position to cover the operation. When, on the 27th, Wittgenstein reached Stari-Borisov, Partouneaux, who had acted as rearguard, found himself cut off. He strove to push his way through, but had to retire to Borisov, and there surrendered, with over two thousand men and more stragglers. One battalion found its way to Studianka by accidentally taking a little river road, unknown to Partouneaux.

About noon of November 27 the emperor and Guard filed across the bridges, and headquarters was set up in Sanivki; Eugene and Davout came up during the day, and got over that night. Napoleon took Victor to task for not better fending off Wittgenstein, but he had been outnumbered two to one.

On November 27 the emperor wrote to Maret: "I have just passed the Beresina, but this river, which is floating much ice, makes the stability of our bridges very uncertain. The army which was opposed to Schwartzenberg wished to dispute our passage. It is concentrated to-night on the right bank of the Beresina, opposite Borisov. The cold is very considerable. The army is excessively fatigued. Thus I am not losing a moment to get nearer to Vilna, so as to restore ourselves a little. . . . Have a great quantity of bread baked and biscuit made. I suppose you have constantly given news of us to Paris. I have received your letter of the 22d, of which Monsieur Abrahamoviz was bearer. This is the first I have received. What is Schwartzenberg doing?"

Learning the facts early the 27th, Chichagov came down to Borisov, repaired the bridge, and, opening connection with Wittgenstein, it was determined to attack next day along both banks. Accordingly, on the 28th, by 8 A.M., Chichagov advanced upon the French line, standing astride the Sembin road, with Oudinot on the right, Ney on the left and the Guard in reserve. Ney first attacked and drove back the Russian van on Stakov. Unable to manœuvre in the heavily wooded country, and cavalry being useless, Chichagov made no headway. An all-day battle was gallantly contested, and bloody on both sides, but Ney so far won as to prevent the Russians from debouching from Stakov. On the other bank Victor, with six or seven thousand men and little artillery, defended the heights beyond Studianka, on a three-mile front; but being almost surrounded by Wittgenstein during the forenoon, drew in nearer the bridges. He fought with determination which did him the highest credit.

It was supposed that when Eugene and Davout and the non-combatants arrived, the bridges would be in constant use to get the masses over; but the mob could not be handled. With the management required to pass a defile, such as a



The Beresina.

bridge, and the undisturbed parking of all vehicles so as to cross in order, three or four thousand guns, caissons and carriages might well have been got over; but without discipline, and Napoleon and his staff being absent, with no particular person in charge, the mob acted as mobs generally do. There were many men still available in line, if they could be put over, but not only was the mass unmanageable, it was so crushed by its disasters, and so torpid and apathetic, that it could not be got to move until the Russian cavalry van appeared, and from the heights shelled the mass of human beings on the banks and produced a panic. All at once fled. Thousands were driven into the river; and the camp followers, men and women alike, fought for precedence like wild beasts. Carts, wagons, guns, caissons, were inextricably mixed in the effort to reach the entrance to the bridges, thus blocking the avenues of escape. Hundreds fell from the bridges into the river, to be carried down and perish. Other hundreds fell by the hands of comrades. Neither age nor sex protected any from the mad rush for safety. At nightfall Victor began his passage, and by midnight all the armed troops that were left, some three thousand men, were over; how many stragglers and non-combatants were abandoned, to be cut down by the Cossacks, will never be known. By morning the bridges were set on fire and soon consumed. The fight of both Victor, and Ney and Oudinot, to protect the crossing, had been praiseworthy to the last degree.

The Russians had not exhibited their wonted vigor: the mass of human beings along the river led the commanders to overestimate the French numbers. Had the three Russian armies better coöperated, neither the emperor nor any French soldier would have crossed the Beresina; the few who did escape owed their safety to the laxness of the enemy. During the 29th the Grand Army filed through Sembin towards Vilna in great distress; and, within three days, the armed men under the colors numbered less than ten thousand. Once across, Napoleon appears to have paid little heed to the rear: he could not or would not exert himself as in earlier years. He had hoped for a respite in Molodechno, but there was none. Wrede had some four thousand men there, protecting the army on the north, but as Wittgenstein was following on a parallel line still farther north, hoping to reach Vilna first, no delay was afforded. Yet from Molodechno the Poles were sent towards Warsaw, which they reached in safety with all their guns, their route lying outside the region of operations.

It was manifest to Napoleon that his place was no longer with the relics of the army, but in France, where he might create another.

> On November 29 he wrote Maret: "The army is numerous, but disbanded in a fearful manner. A fortnight is necessary to get it under the colors again, and a fortnight, where can you find it? Cold, privations, have disbanded this army. We shall reach Vilna; can we hold ourselves there? Yes, if we can stay there a week; but if we are attacked there the first week, it is doubtful whether we can remain there. Food, food, food! Without that there are no horrors to which the undisciplined mass may not be carried against this town. Perhaps this army cannot be rallied till behind the Niemen. In this state of things, it is possible I may deem my presence in Paris necessary for France, for the empire, for the army itself. Tell me your opinion. . . . I desire there shall be in Vilna no foreign agent: the army is not fine to show to-day. As to those who are there, you must send them away. You must tell them, for instance, that you are going, and that I am going to Warsaw, and send them thither at once, indicating to them a day on which they are to leave."

As in Egypt, the emperor had already predetermined his action, and for the first time he was quite frank in telling Maret the condition of the Grand Army. He wrote him, but in a less direct, coherent style than usual, on November 30. In these letters much can be read between the lines.

> "Send victual, bread, biscuit and meat to us. Establish a good garrison to do the policing and to arrest stragglers. I have more than forty thousand men whom fatigue, want of food and cold are making travel like vagabonds, or rather like brigands. If they cannot give us one hundred thousand rations of bread at Vilna, I pity the town.
>
> Victual in abundance alone can restore order. . . . The army is horribly tired. It has been marching forty-five days. It has needs of all kinds. . . . The stragglers must have food; but they must be stopped and sent to their flags. Much firmness and food everywhere, and it will be

restored in a few days. . . . I sent you word that I beat Chichagov and his four divisions, and that I made six thousand prisoners. I have reduced him to seven thousand foot and six thousand cavalry. I have beaten Wittgenstein at the passage of the Beresina. . . . I desire to enter into winter quarters, and my army needs to be restored from its exertions. . . . Victual in Vilna, victual in all the districts, bread, meat and brandy! Where in the neighborhood are there cantonments where it could best live? Are there any horses there? Where and how many? We need them much. Bourcier must not count on any harness. We bring back nothing but men and a few sabres. The operation of the enemy on Minsk, which obliged us to prolong our retreat twenty-two days, and the shameful inaction of Victor, who did not attack, have done us a grievous harm. Without these accidents I should have remained at Smolensk, Vitebsk, Orsha, Mohilev. Schwartzenberg has cruelly compromised me. You do not speak to me of Paris, yet it is twenty days since I have heard from there. Where are the eighteen couriers? How is the empress?" Again he wrote Maret, December 3: "We are horribly tired and very hungry. Send to meet us bread, wine and brandy. I have one hundred thousand isolated men who are trying to keep alive and are no longer with the colors, which makes us run horrible danger. My Old Guard alone holds together, but hunger is reaching it too.

"Let the governor remain in Vilna, where he is necessary. Let him assemble all the stragglers by army corps and in the convents, and let him feed them well with a complete ration of bread, meat and brandy. Let him arrest all stragglers and prevent their passing Vilna. Let him condemn to death any soldier having left his flag and gone beyond Vilna.

"I need to know what food there is in Vilna and Kovno, as well as clothing and munitions of war. Has Kovno been fortified?"

And again: "We must have one hundred and twenty thousand rations of bread a day, that is a *sine qua non.*" Next day he wrote Maret: "I want you to come to meet me at Smorgoni. Send to Warsaw the ministers of America, of Prussia, and all the other ministers, and you will announce that you are going there yourself."

On December 2 Berthier's aide-de-camp, Montesquiou, had been ordered to Paris with a letter to the empress: —

"He will announce everywhere the arrival of ten thousand Russian prisoners, and the victory won on the Beresina, in which we made six thousand Russian prisoners and took eight flags and twelve guns. He will announce it also at Kovno, at Königsberg, at Berlin, . . . and will everywhere have put in the gazette: 'Monsieur de Montesquiou, aide-de-camp, has just passed, bearing news of the victory of the Beresina, won by the emperor over the reunited armies of Chichagov and Wittgenstein. He carries to Paris eight flags taken from the Russians in this battle, where we made six thousand prisoners and took twelve guns. When this officer left, the Emperor Napoleon was in Vilna in very good health.' . . . Montesquiou will go as fast as possible, so as to contradict everywhere the false reports which have been spread. He will tell that these two corps" (Chichagov and Wittgenstein) "desired to cut off the army, and that it marched over their prostrate bodies (*qu'elle leur a marché sur le ventre*); that it has arrived at Vilna, where it will find numerous magazines, which will soon restore it from the suffering it has undergone. In Paris he will be able to give the empress details of the good health of the emperor and of the state of the army."

On December 5 the emperor reached Smorgoni. Here he wrote in his own hand the 29th Bulletin, dating it Molodechno, December 3, called his marshals together at supper, apparently well at his ease, and had Eugene read it to them. He then placed Murat in command, with Berthier as Chief of Staff; but it was Berthier who was the real commander. There was necessity for no more than one marshal: Ney or Eugene could have done the work ample justice. Few agreed among themselves, and to leave them behind under Murat could not work well. Yet to leave them there kept up, as it were, the cadres of the Grand Army, so as to be filled by future levies, and, in a manner, imposed on the enemy.

Just before leaving, Napoleon wrote to Berthier, December 5: "My Cousin, two or three days after my departure, the following decree will be put in the orders of the army. You will spread the rumor that I have gone to Warsaw with the Austrian corps and the 7th Corps. Five or six days afterwards, according to circumstances, Murat will issue an order of the day to let the army know that, having had to go to Paris, I have confided the command to him." The decree spoken of is that "Murat is named our lieutenant-general to command the Grand Army in our absence."

Having done this, the emperor left Smorgoni before midnight, with Caulaincourt in the carriage beside him, and Rustan on the box, with Duroc and Mouton following, and drove towards Vilna. On the road to Oshmiana he barely escaped capture, as some Cossacks had raided and only just left the town. After consulting with Maret at Vilna, he drove to Warsaw and thence to Dresden and Paris, traveling day and night, as was his lifelong habit. He reached the Tuileries December 18.

Criticism upon Napoleon's abandoning the army may be overwrought. As a commanding general has no right to expose himself in battle, so is the duty imposed upon a ruler to protect his person for the safety of the state. Whether he be a good or bad monarch makes no difference in the principle, and unless Napoleon was to abandon his empire, it was essential that he should go back to France and raise new levies. Nothing he could personally do would alter the fate of the Grand Army: that had long been sealed. Not only so, but unless his enemies were to be given opportunities to join against him, France first, and the rest of the world next, must understand the retreat from Moscow and the fate of the Grand Army from the Napoleonic standpoint. To give the matter proper color, Napoleon's presence in Paris was imperative; and while the limited information afforded during the campaign by the Bulletins and Napoleon's letters to the rear had deceived his subordinates and his own people, it also prevented the rest of the world from too soon gauging the immensity of the disaster.

The constant insistence on the emperor's good health has been pointed out as a selfish characteristic; and that Napoleon was profoundly selfish, there is no one to deny. But has not the health of the sovereign always been the first thought of his people? So long as he was to keep alive the Napoleonic scheme, so long must he foster the French interest in his personal welfare. Are there not Court Circulars to-day in which, in times of profound peace, the simple ailments of the sovereigns are announced as matters of prime importance to the state? How much more, then, the health of the emperor in the midst of a great campaign.

The campaign had ended at the Beresina, but the mob of mostly unarmed men, once the Grand Army, was followed sharply to Smorgoni, where were some small supplies. The cold again came on; few escaped frozen members, and all were dulled in body and mind. Twenty thousand men fell from exhaustion from Smorgoni to Vilna, which was reached December 8. Gallant Ney, who had successively commanded every part of the army, and now led a rearguard of some two thousand men of Wrede's and Loison's divisions, was harried by the Russian light troops every step of the way, and had Chichagov and Wittgenstein in his rear, and Kutosov back two marches.

The demoralization spread to the reserve corps, which in its retreat the Grand Army had picked up. Loison had arrived at Vilna from the rear with ten thousand men, and was sent out to receive the Grand Army, but in three days two thirds of this number had fallen in their tracks. If we can credit Chambray, the number under arms had dwindled from thirty thousand at the Beresina to nine thousand men. Of these, ten thousand may have been lost in the crossing, and the cold which began on December 3 may have frozen the last resistance out of an equal number.

Vilna was full of stores, accumulated from Königsberg and by levy throughout Lithuania. The famished men — no longer soldiers — pillaged at will; and what was not consumed or destroyed fed the oncoming Russians. Devouring food with the voracity of animals and over-drinking brandy threw the bulk of them into every house, sick with dysentery; many died; every church and public building became a hospital. Nearly twenty thousand men who entered Vilna were unable to leave it.

Five miles west of Vilna is the steep Ponary hill, and this, covered by ice, arrested everything on wheels. Here were abandoned nearly all the guns that were left; and even the treasure chest, with six millions in coin and the Moscow spoils, stalled with four thousand other wagons, fell a prey partly to the French soldiers, partly to the Cossacks. Orders to hold Vilna for winter quarters could not be executed; those who could drag themselves away followed the army, to perish in the snow; and so Murat continued the retreat.

A fortnight later Alexander arrived at the Russian headquarters in Vilna, and did everything to aid the French invalided, as well as to reorganize his own forces. There were almost as many Russian sick as French in Vilna, and no discrimination was made: the czar and Constantine were equally active in the good work. Want of care brought on gangrene, and this was followed by typhoid. The distress left room for naught but charity. Vastly to his credit, the czar issued an immediate amnesty to Poland.

Kovno, seventy miles from Vilna, was reached in three days, December 12, and was also looted. Ney defended this town until some Cossacks passed the Niemen on the ice and cut him off; he then moved down the left bank on Tilsit, and eventually got to Königsberg with five hundred men. The Russians did not move into Prussia for some days: the pursuit ended at the Niemen, although this was frozen over so that artillery could cross. At the Beresina, with still a semblance of organization, this might have been a benefit; at the Niemen, where barely six thousand men had muskets, it aided the Cossacks to harry them; and the Grand Army, which had made so proud a show here in the early summer, took refuge in every direction through the woods and along any roads from the pursuing swords. The most part fled with Murat and headquarters towards Königsberg. From Kovno, December 12, Berthier wrote Napoleon: —

> "I must say to Your Majesty that the whole army is dissolved; even your Guard, which is barely four or five hundred strong. Generals, officers, have lost everything they had; nearly all have different parts of the body frozen. The streets are covered with corpses, and the houses filled with them. The army makes up a single column of several hours' length, which breaks up mornings, and comes in evenings without order." There was no possibility of stopping even at the Niemen, and the mass kept on towards Gumbinen. "I will not relate to Your Majesty the sorry details of plunder, disobedience, dissolution," wrote Berthier, December 16; "everything has reached its worst."

On December 19 Murat got to Königsberg with four hundred men of the Old Guard and six hundred of the Guard cavalry, followed by a few thousand stragglers.

The Russian generals had striven to conserve their own force rather than inflict further defeat on the French. But they themselves had not come off without losses. On December 4, says Buturlin, there were, out of eighty-eight thousand aggregate, only forty thousand men in line.

Wittgenstein marched on Tilsit, hoping to cut off Macdonald, who had gone into winter quarters before Riga. Napoleon might have made the latter more useful, but his men would have dwindled fast like the rest. Macdonald and Yorck, who commanded the Prussian contingent in his corps, were on bad terms, yet Yorck had done his work well. On December 18 Macdonald received orders to withdraw to Tilsit, which with the bulk of his corps he reached in about ten days, before Wittgenstein got so far along. Yorck, who was in the rear of his column, in the course of the manœuvre got isolated. He might perhaps have fought his way through, but being first a Prussian patriot and next an officer serving Napoleon, he entered into the Convention of Tauroggen with the Russians.

Yorck.

Yorck's Convention, received January 1, 1813, proved to Murat that Prussia was not an ally to trust, and he retired to Elbing. Including Macdonald, who just managed to reach Königsberg, the garrison of that city and the Poles, Murat could number twenty thousand men on the Vistula. The Poles were later thrown into Danzig, where Rapp was in command. At the Vistula a few men gradually came in. As an instance, the 3d Corps, says Fézensac, reached its headquarters at Marienwerder one hundred and twenty strong, and in a fortnight had one thousand men. But when the Russians took Marienwerder, and thus cut the French army in two, the left fled towards Danzig, the right towards Thorn. Thereupon Murat retired to Posen, turned over the command to Eugene on January 16, and left for his kingdom of Naples. Thus was even the line of the Vistula forfeited. On the side of the Russians in January, 1813, Chichagov came on to Marienwerder, Wittgenstein to Elbing, Kutusov slowly marched to Plotsk. Schwartzenberg, ordered back to Bielostok and Warsaw, also concluded an armistice, which released the Austrian corps from further activity, but permitted Reynier to retire, though he was attacked by the Russians at Kalish.

It is possible only to guess at the losses of the Russian campaign. Chambray gives the total number that crossed the Russian frontier as six hundred and thirty thousand. Some sixty thousand, mainly the right and left wings, returned. Buturlin says there were two hundred thousand prisoners, but how many of these died, no one can say. All told, over four hundred thousand lives must have been sacrificed. How many Russians perished has never been estimated, but it may have been one hundred and fifty thousand men. The loss was an enormous drain on France; that it included the veterans on whom Napoleon relied for victory made it still greater. Had not the proportion of officers who returned been superior to that of the men, Napoleon would have been unable to raise an efficient army in 1813. Especially was this true with the cavalry and artillery.

It is curious that not one of the French officers above the rank of division general lost his life. They one and all fearlessly exposed themselves and some were wounded, but all got back to the base. As the greatest losses in the campaign were not from battle, that these men could better protect themselves and had higher morale explains the fact.

In Posen Eugene received the first sketches of Napoleon's plan for recreating the army. Gradually the Oder was reached, and, with the aid of fifteen thousand men from Italy under Grenier, Eugene made his way back to the line of the Elbe.

It was months before the world understood the meaning of the failure in Russia. Prussia was ready for anything. Austria was still debating, and Alexander was willing to go on with the work he had so well begun. England cared only for the overthrow of the Continental System, and the return of peace. The English press was outspoken, but England continued to work slowly. Despite discontent, France was still Napoleon's tool. The French press was muzzled and unable to say much, although the commercial element kept on crying for its ancient trade, which the Continental System had sapped to its roots, and the peasantry protested against continuing to send their sons to the shambles. The real truth was long hidden, but invalided officers, who had managed to return, gradually told the story. France has always been patriotic, and though the people cried out against further wars, few words were spoken against the imperial régime. Napoleon was almost as strong in France after the Russian campaign as before: it was the country that was weaker.

Great and distant enterprises, says Montesquieu, perish by the greatness itself of the preparations which have been made to insure their success. The reasons for the failure of the 1812 campaign are marshaled by Jomini. Each of the many errors has already been commented on; but they may be crudely rehearsed. The principal error was in not recognizing that an army numerous enough to conquer peace in Russia could not be subsisted there, if the Russians conducted a retiring campaign and led it into the heart of the country. If a decisive battle could be early won, success was probable; if not, Smolensk was the farthest point that, in 1812, could with safety be reached. Jerome did not act with sufficient vigor against Bagration; but so important a charge should never have been confided to him; the best men, not relatives, should have been chosen for high command. The Poles were not as valuable allies as had been expected, but Napoleon did little to win their support. Russia furnished less grain than Napoleon calculated on, and no means of grinding the corn had been provided. The beeves bought in Poland and Galicia could not travel rapidly enough. Food could not be transported from the magazines on the Niemen and the Vilia — no campaign has ever better proved that an army travels on its belly. Napoleon remained two weeks at Vilna instead of pushing to Glubokoi and Polotsk against Barclay, or on Minsk against Bagration, and lost the precious moment. The grand-tactics of Borodino was faulty: the mass should have been thrown upon the Russian left along the old road, and with more *ensemble*, while the viceroy merely contained the right and centre; and the Guard could have been put in to advantage, though not to do this was a proper precaution in any one but a Napoleon. The Russian army should have been pushed more sharply after reaching Moscow, for it was not then in good order; and if Kutusov could have been beaten at Tarutino, the campaign might have been less disastrous by a retreat via Kaluga. The delay in Moscow, expecting Alexander to yield, showed Napoleon's power of gauging facts to have deteriorated. The eccentric retreat after Maloyaroslavez lost several days. The French army markedly lacked topographical knowledge about Russia, and there was no suitable staff to acquire it; Napoleon used only the main roads, whereas there were fair roads, unknown to him, in every direction. Napoleon did not work the Swedish problem wisely. Turkey might have been of great assistance to the invaders; the peace won by Chichagov was concluded when Napoleon's plans reckoned on Turkey to push operations; and when Bernadotte joined the Russians, the two armies from Moldavia and Finland took the field. The Russians showed more aptitude for modern war than Napoleon had credited them with. The manœuvre by which Barclay abandoned his proposed Drissa defensive and fell back on Smolensk to receive Bagration, was as masterly as Alexander's courage in refusing to make terms was noble. Macdonald, Oudinot, Victor and St. Cyr should have operated under one head on the Dvina; such a mass might have destroyed Wittgenstein. Though strategical and tactical errors were committed, the logistics was most at fault. While the military errors are more open to criticism, yet two broad reasons lay at the root of Napoleon's failure: he could not feed his army, nor did he measure the stanchness or ability of his oppponent.

Those of Napoleon's panegyrists who underrate the Russian resistance, either from its military or characteristic standpoint, do ill-service to the Great Captain's reputation. Cut in two at the opening of the campaign, they retired five hundred miles without leaving a trophy to the pursuer. Not one of the Russian commanders was a great soldier; but they all did excellent work. Barclay and Bagration, cut asunder, made their junction, and the men so held themselves that, after the serious defeat at Borodino, they could yet harry the Grand Army and face Napoleon at Krasnoi. Wittgenstein, inferior to the joint French armies opposed to him, yet managed to overcome them all. The Russians opened the campaign by a series of faults; they corrected these errors while operations continued, and succeeded in destroying the Grand Army as no other army of modern times has been destroyed, their own forces meanwhile being kept fairly intact and in good order. When Kutusov could hold head to the diminishing French forces, the Russians, instead of permitting their wings to fall back with the central army, brought them forward against the French rear with wonderful effect. And while the campaign lacked method, in a sense, yet the direction given the Russian armies in its second half by Alexander and his staff was accurate and resultful. It has been common to give many explanations of the failure of the Russian campaign. We have rehearsed those of Jomini, with a few added. Perhaps they can all be summed up in one: that the enterprise was too great an one for any human being to carry through, with the then methods of transportation and communication.

Prussia and Austria were still discussing; Hardenberg and Metternich exchanged letters. When, after the burning of Moscow, Cathcart was assured by the czar, whose words speedily reached the powers, that the disaster in no wise changed his mind, Prussia and Austria began to see their chance. Prussia refused reinforcements on the ground that she had no more men, and that the contributions exacted by force vastly exceeded the war indemnity due. Austria still continued distrustful of Russia. During November, Austria had essayed mediation, but it did not go far: she was afraid to break with France. But when Napoleon asked Francis for thirty thousand more men, and stated that Prussia would send reinforcements to stave off Russian invasion, he taxed Austria too far.

That Napoleon had scant praise to bestow on the brave men who fought his battles in the Russian campaign has often been made a serious reproach. This may be just, but it has a parallel in the dispatches of the Duke of Wellington. Neither is justifiable.

It may be interesting to note that the Grand Army, on the average, marched from the Vistula to Vilna at the rate of about fourteen miles a day; from Vilna to Vitebsk, and on to Smolensk, at the rate of twelve miles a day; to Moscow at the rate of ten miles. The Russians, under Barclay, in retreat covered about ten miles a day, except from Vitebsk to Smolensk, when they doubled the distance. Bagration, from Volkovisk to Smolensk, averaged seventeen miles a day. On the retreat from Moscow to Kovno, the rate was about thirteen miles.

It is worth while to quote almost entire the Bulletin penned by the emperor himself on the eve of leaving the army. Whatever its prevarications, in view of the fact that those were not the days of special war correspondents and telegraphs, and compared with the reports of other unsuccessful campaigns by the commanding generals, it will hold its own.

29TH BULLETIN OF THE GRAND ARMY.

Molodechno, December 3, 1812. Up to the 6th of November the weather had been perfect, and the movement of the army was executed with the greatest success. The cold had commenced the 7th. From this moment, each night we lost several hundred horses, which died in the bivouac. Arrived at Smolensk, we had already lost many cavalry and artillery horses. The Russian army of Volhynia was opposed to our right. Our right left the line of operation of Minsk, and took for pivot of its operation the line of Warsaw. The emperor learned at Smolensk, the 9th, this change of line of operation, and guessed what the enemy would do. However hard it seemed to him to undertake a movement in such a cruel season, the new state of things necessitated it. He hoped to reach Minsk, or at least the Beresina, before the enemy; he left Smolensk the 13th; he slept at Krasnoi the 16th. The cold, which had commenced the 7th, gained sharply, and from the 14th to the 15th, and to the 16th, the thermometer marked 16 and 18 below freezing [nearly zero Fahrenheit]. The roads were covered with sheet ice. The cavalry, artillery and train horses perished every night, not by hundreds but by thousands, especially the horses of France and Germany. More than thirty thousand horses perished in a few days; our cavalry was all afoot; our artillery and our transports were without teams. We had to abandon and destroy a great number of our guns, and all our munitions of war and mouth.

This army, so fine the 6th, was very different dating from the 14th, almost without cavalry, without artillery, without train. Without cavalry we could not reconnoitre a quarter of a league; still, without artillery we could not risk a battle and stand with firm foot; we had to march so as not to be forced to a battle which the want of munitions prevented our desiring; we had to occupy a certain space so as not to be turned, and this without cavalry, which would reconnoitre and tie together the columns. This difficulty, joined to an excessive cold suddenly arrived, made our situation a sorry one. Men whom nature had not fashioned stoutly enough to be above all the chances of fate and of fortune seemed overcome, lost their gayety, their good humor, and dreamed of nothing but misfortune and catastrophe; those whom it had created superior to all things kept their gayety and their ordinary manners, and saw a new glory in the different difficulties to be surmounted.

The enemy, who saw on the roads the traces of this horrible calamity which had struck the French army, sought to profit by it. He enveloped all the columns with his Cossacks, who carried off, like the Arabs in the deserts, the trains and the carriages which lost their way. This contemptible cavalry, which only makes a noise and is not capable of driving in a company of voltigeurs, was made redoubtable by the favor of circumstances. However, the enemy was made to repent all of the serious attempts which he undertook; he was broken by the viceroy before whom he placed himself, and he lost large numbers.

Ney, who with three thousand men formed the rearguard, had blown up the ramparts of Smolensk. He was surrounded and found himself in a critical position ; he escaped it with the intrepidity which distinguishes him. Having held the enemy off from him the whole day of the 18th, and having constantly repulsed him, at night he made a movement by the right flank, crossed the Borysthenes, and upset the calculations of the enemy. The 19th the army passed the Borysthenes at Orsha, and the Russian army, tired, having lost many men, there stopped its attacks.

The army of Volhynia moved by the 16th on Minsk and was marching on Borisov. Dombrovski defended the bridge-head of Borisov with three thousand men. The 23d he was driven in and obliged to evacuate the position. The enemy thus passed the Beresina, marching on Bobr ; Lambert's division was the vanguard. The 2d Corps, commanded by Oudinot, which was at Chereia, had received the order to move on Borisov, to assure to the army the passage of the Beresina.

The 24th, Oudinot met Lambert's division four leagues from Borisov, attacked it, beat it, made two thousand prisoners, took six guns, five hundred wagons of the baggage of the army of Volhynia, and threw back the enemy to the right bank of the Beresina. . . . The enemy found safety only in burning the bridge, which is more than three hundred fathoms long.

Still the enemy occupied all the crossings of the Beresina. This river is forty fathoms wide. It was floating a great deal of ice, and its banks were covered with marshes three hundred fathoms long, which made it difficult to cross. The enemy's general had placed his four divisions at different outlets, where he guessed the French army would want to pass.

The 26th, at the point of day, the emperor, after having deceived the enemy by different movements made during the day of the 25th, moved on the village of Studianka, and at once, despite a division of the enemy and in its presence, had two bridges thrown over the river. Oudinot crossed, attacked the enemy, and followed him fighting two hours ; the enemy retired on the bridge-head of Borisov. . . . During the whole day of the 26th and the 27th the army crossed.

Victor, commanding the 9th Corps, had received orders to follow the movements of Oudinot to form the rearguard, and to contain the Russian army of the Dvina, which followed him. Partouneaux's division was the rearguard of this corps. The 27th, at noon, Victor arrived with two divisions at the bridge of Studianka.

Partouneaux's division left Borisov at night. A brigade of this division which formed the rearguard, and which was charged to burn the bridges, left at 7 o'clock in the evening ; it arrived between 10 and 11 ; it sought its first brigade and its division general, who had left two hours before, and which it had not met on the route. Its search was vain : it became anxious. All that has been since ascertained is that this first brigade, leaving at 5 o'clock, lost its way at 6, turned to the right instead of turning to the left, and marched two or three leagues in this direction ; that at night and nearly frozen it rallied on the fires of the enemy, which it took for those of the French army; thus surrounded it was captured. This cruel mistake made us lose two thousand infantry, three hundred horses and three guns. The rumor runs that the division general was not with his column, and had marched alone.

The whole army having passed by the morning of the 28th, Victor held the bridge-head on the left bank; Oudinot and behind him all the army were on the right bank.

Borisov having been evacuated, the Armies of the Dvina and of Volhynia got into communication ; they concerted an attack. The 28th, at the point of day, Oudinot notified the emperor that he was attacked ; a half an hour afterwards, Victor was attacked on the left bank. The army took to arms. Ney moved in the rear of Oudinot and Mortier behind Ney. The fighting became lively : the enemy wished to turn our right. Doumerc, commanding the 5th division of cuirassiers, and who made part of the second corps remaining on the Dvina, ordered a charge of cavalry to the 4th and 5th regiments of cuirassiers at the moment when the legions of the Vistula were engaging in the woods to pierce the centre of the enemy, who were beaten and put to rout. These brave cuirassiers broke in, one after another, six infantry squares, and routed the enemy's cavalry, which came to the relief of his infantry : six thousand prisoners, two flags and six guns fell into our hands. On his side, Victor charged the enemy vigorously, beat him, made five or six hundred prisoners, and held him beyond cannon-shot from the bridge. . . . In the combat of the Beresina the army of Volhynia suffered much. Oudinot was wounded ; his wound is not dangerous : it is a ball he received in the side.

The next day, the 29th, we remained on the battlefield. We had to choose between two routes, that of Minsk and that of Vilna. The route of Minsk passes through the middle of a forest, and uncultivated marshes, where it would have been impossible for the army to subsist. The route to Vilna, on the contrary, passes through very good country. The army, without cavalry, feeble in munitions, horribly fatigued with fifty days' march, carrying along its sick and the wounded of so many combats, needed to reach its magazines. On the 30th headquarters was at Plekshenizi ; December 1, Staiki ; and the 3d at Molodechno, where the army received its first convoys from Vilna.

All the wounded officers and soldiers and all which was in the way, baggage, etc., were moved towards Vilna.

To say that the army needs to reëstablish its discipline, to repair itself, to remount its cavalry, its artillery and its material, is the result of the statement just made. Rest is its first need. Material and horses have arrived. Bourchier has already more than twenty thousand remount horses in the different depots. The artillery has already repaired its losses. The generals, the officers and the soldiers have suffered much with fatigue and want. Many have lost their baggage on account of losing their horses, a few by the ambushes of the Cossacks. The Cossacks took a number of isolated men, geographical engineers who were sketching positions, and wounded officers who marched without precaution, preferring to run risk rather than to march in order and in the column.

The reports of general officers commanding the corps will make known the officers and soldiers who most distinguished themselves, and the details of all these memorable events.

In these movements the emperor always marched in the middle of his Guard, the cavalry commanded by Bessières, and the infantry commanded by Lefebvre. His Majesty has been satisfied with the good spirit that his Guard had showed ; it has always been ready to move wherever the circumstances demanded; but the circumstances have always been such that its simple presence sufficed, and it was never necessary to put it into action.

Berthier, Duroc, Caulaincourt and all the aides-de-camp and the military officers of the house of the emperor always accompanied His Majesty.

Our cavalry was dismounted to that degree that we had to reunite the officers who had kept a horse, so as to form four companies of a hundred and fifty men each. The generals performed the functions of captains, and the colonels those of subordinates. This sacred squadron, commanded by Grouchy and under the orders of Murat, did not lose the emperor from sight in all the movements.

The health of His Majesty has never been better.

French Imperial Cuirassier.

LVI.

SALAMANCA AND VITTORIA. 1812–1813.

JOSEPH and Napoleon were at odds, and the Russian campaign left the king poor troops and little money. Wellington's position was admirable. From Portugal he could debouch upon the French right, centre or left. The only suitable plan for the French was to concentrate and fight, but the troops were dispersed all over the land. In May Wellington advanced, and June 17 laid siege to Salamanca. Marmont handsomely outmanœuvred him, to relieve the town; but in a battle, July 22, Wellington badly defeated him, and Joseph, who had come up to sustain him, retired to Madrid, while Clausel, vice Marmont, wounded, moved back across the Douro. Salamanca was the beginning of the end. From Madrid Joseph retired towards Valencia, whither he also ordered Soult, and Wellington occupied the capital August 12. Clausel reorganized and moved towards the Douro. Wellington vacated Madrid September 1, leaving Hill behind him, pushed back Clausel, and besieged Burgos citadel, but on November 21 fell back, foiled. Meanwhile Joseph returned, with his assembled forces under Soult. Hill retired and joined Wellington November 7 on the Tormes, and on November 11 all the French assembled. With his superiority Soult might well have attacked Wellington, but both armies went into winter quarters. Thus in 1812 Andalusia was lost, but Wellington cannot be said to have gained much. During the winter the English grew in strength and discipline, and when 1813 opened, the French cause being seriously hurt by the Russian campaign, Wellington was ready to attack more seriously than heretofore. Joseph took up a long line from Madrid to Bayonne, and in May Wellington crossed the Douro, so as to threaten his communications. He largely outnumbered Joseph, who left Madrid for the last time May 17, and called in Suchet, who did not respond. Joseph must retire to Bayonne, or else fight with full strength. He did neither. He failed to hold himself at Burgos, or south of the Ebro. Wellington continued to manœuvre around his right, and Joseph finally moved into the pot-hole of Vittoria. Wellington attacked him here June 21, and won a decisive victory. Joseph's army fled towards Bayonne. Wellington's six weeks' campaign had been most able.

FROM the inception, Joseph had been involved with the national Cortes, which, sitting at Cadiz, represented the rights of the ancient Spanish monarchy. Many of the old nobility had been won over; more held out, and played, with occasional lapses, into the hands of the English. National procrastination and ill-will against the invader stood in the way of an understanding until the French successes at Tarragona and Valencia, when the Cortes began to wonder whether the French régime would not be better than the domination of the English, who, if victorious, might prove worse taskmasters; and Joseph's pacific advances were beginning to bear fruit, when the battle of Salamanca, in July, 1812, upset all calculations, and a backward course began which was never again arrested. It was no easy position the king filled, with neither the support of his subjects, the confidence of his generals, nor the good-will of his master. In 1811 he had gone to Paris for the baptism of the little King of Rome, but got small comfort from Napoleon, who had quarreled with nearly all his family. Still, when Napoleon agreed to allow Joseph a million francs a month and a quarter of the provincial receipts, he returned to Madrid with his half-loaf.

Legion of the Vistula.

French victories only redoubled English efforts; the easy triumph expected in Spain had been a dream, and Wellington's gains were deemed by many in France but premonitions of failure; and in the large forces dispatched to the Peninsula, the recruits were of such poor quality that time was needed to leaven them into soldiers. Though at first Wellington had, in Napoleon's view, shown himself an abler man in a war of positions than in open manœuvring, the bold capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz was to have wider results than he conceived. The projected Russian campaign had summoned from Spain the Guard, the Legion of the Vistula, and a number of skeleton dragoon regiments; and the veterans, especially officers, were drawn from the battalions there to swell the Old Guard. But despite this drain and the discontinuance of the Army of the North, the French in the west and south of Spain were still a host: Soult had forty-five thousand men in Andalusia; Marmont almost as many at Salamanca; twelve thousand under Souham held Old Castile; Joseph, beside whom Jourdan again stood, had the Army of the Centre wherewith to maintain the capital and the Tagus region; and there were many garrisons in Navarre, the Asturias, Leon, and Biscaya. Before undertaking the Russian campaign, Napoleon had at one moment thought of withdrawing everything behind the Ebro — possibly a wise course; but the Valencia success decided him to let the armies work as they were. His conception of the conduct of the Spanish campaign was excellent, but his officers could not act as ably as he could think, and he never gauged at its full value the intelligent force of Wellington, who recognized that if the French could not be beaten by sharp methods, they could be exhausted by cautious ones. At Madrid there was no one military head equal to the control of the various armies, and when the emperor dictated manœuvres, they were construed in different ways by different commanders, with confusion as a result.

Spanish Light Infantryman.



West Central Spain.

The allies had somewhat less men in the aggregate than the French, but they had fewer tied up in garrison and on detail, were more concentrated, and generally outnumbered the forces in their immediate front. The Anglo-Portuguese had seventy-five thousand effective under the colors, and the Spaniards furnished sixty thousand men, now frankly placed under Wellington's orders.

This general's position was advantageous. Portugal was as sound a base as an impregnable and well-victualed fortress, while affording better elbow-room; and it was located on the right flank of the French line of operation, which from Bayonne to Cadiz was seven hundred miles long. Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz were excellent outworks; and if to this superior strategic situation we add the good-will of the people and the French difficulty in victualing, Wellington was sure to succeed, unless the French should vacate some of their holdings, concentrate sufficient forces to attack him at some one point, and overwhelm him in battle.

He understood his position, and having taken all the time he needed to prepare his forces, his commissariat and his plans, was ready to assume the offensive. With Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz in hand, he might choose from three lines of operation: on the left up the Douro against Marmont in Salamanca; in the centre up the Tagus towards Madrid; on the right, from the line of the Guadiana, against Soult in Andalusia. By the last line, which he had thought of choosing, as Soult expected him to do, he would tempt more French troops towards the south of Spain. By the second line he would lead Joseph to concentrate in the Castiles, drawing from both his wings. By the first, he might attract Soult towards Leon, and give the Spanish Cortes the chance to reconquer Andalusia. Should Soult hold on to Seville, Wellington could throw himself on Marmont, thus left, despite recent accessions, with an inferior force; and a victory here might so threaten the French communications on Bayonne, as to bring about the evacuation of southern Spain.

Soult's plans in Andalusia and Estremadura covered too much ground, including, as they did, the capture of Alicante, Carthagena and Tarifa, and finally a march on Lisbon. At the time of Wellington's attack he had moved up too late to save Badajoz, and since then divers Spanish manœuvres had been made against Seville, especially one under Ballesteros; but the city escaped, and Soult returned thither and sat down to await an advance by the English into Andalusia. He exhibited none of the enterprise required of him by his master.

Spanish Grenadier.

The thrust by the allied left contemplated by Wellington was not only on the true strategic line, but the base of operations could be shifted from Portugal to, or a subsidiary one be created in, some of the ports of northern Spain, such as Santander, and thus distinctly aid the operation by providing for rapid supplies. In his former operations, Wellington had gauged the probable movements of the French in north and south, and had moved against these successively, but now, Spanish delays and coming accessions to Marmont persuaded him at first merely to move into Beira. These facts did not escape Napoleon, but he did not expect Wellington to adventure much.

In May, 1812, when Napoleon was on the eve of the Russian invasion, Wellington made ready to debouch from Portugal. To occupy the attention of Suchet, he got a detachment of sixteen thousand English and auxiliaries sent from Minorca, to land in Catalonia; and to sever quick connection between

Soult and Marmont, he sent out Hill from Badajoz to destroy the Almaraz bridge, meanwhile improving his own means of transport between the Tagus and the Douro regions. He had for the field one hundred thousand men, one third English; and the Portuguese had been transformed into excellent troops. With the lessened ability of the French, the chances were better than in any former campaign.

While Napoleon had confirmed Joseph in his authority as commander-in-chief, he had given Marmont a species of *carte blanche* in his own operations; and the latter had marched towards Ciudad Rodrigo, pushing before him the Spanish army, and later on Sabugal, driving some minor Portuguese and English forces from that country and from Guarda. It was partly this activity that determined Wellington to manœuvre against Marmont instead of Soult; but he took his time. Having crossed the Tagus and captured Castello Branco, his position threatened Marmont's, who retired across the Agueda. This gave Wellington a larger space of country to canton his forces, and a chance to revictual Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. He had left to the Portuguese the duty of supplying Elvas and Badajoz. Bad weather further arrested him some weeks; but the rain having ceased, he crossed the Agueda June 12, and advanced to the Tormes, whereupon Marmont again retired, and the English sat down before Salamanca, June 17.

Spanish Sapper.

Wellington established himself at San Christoval, intending to use one division in the investment of the outlying defenses, and with the rest to operate against the French. Marmont



Salamanca Manœuvre.

approached a few days later, hoping to save Salamanca, or at least the garrison ; but reluctant to engage in a decisive operation, he withdrew after two days' demonstration, and appealed for reinforcements to Madrid, and to Caffarelli in Castile.

Salamanca was covered by three big conventual buildings, turned into effective forts. These were sharply cannonaded by the allies, and surrendered June 17 ; and Marmont, seeing no way of saving the place, withdrew behind the Douro between Toro and Tordesillas, where Bonnet's divisions joined him from the Asturias, giving him an effective of forty-five thousand men and seventy-five guns. Wellington followed him up to the left bank, and Marmont, finally deciding on the offensive, on July 13 concentrated his army east of Toro and put over some troops there as a diversion. At this moment Wellington was in front of the Guarena, and had Marmont crossed with his whole army, he would have been nearer Salamanca than the allies, and would have turned their left; but unable quickly to change from the manœuvre he had studied out to turn their right, he went on with it; and smartly turning back to Tordesillas, crossed July 16, and by the evening of the 17th drew up at Nava del Rey. He had been rapid, some divisions having marched forty miles and some sixty with only temporary rest, and he had managed his passage cleverly. At Castrejon there was a sharp combat. Marmont turned the left of the allies and forced them back on the Guarena, where, after another combat, they crossed, lest they should be cut off from the road to Ciudad Rodrigo, and Marmont held the river. He had opened the operation handsomely, but instead of taking advantage of his position at Toro, he had made two or three forced marches to accomplish less. Meanwhile Joseph had put the Army of the Centre on the road to aid the operation.

On July 19 Marmont concentrated near Tarragona, and Wellington on the table-land south of him at Valeza, where he hoped Marmont would attack him. But Marmont moved upstream to Canta la Piedra, crossed the stream, and again turning Wellington's flank, took possession of a parallel range of hills. In order to keep the French at a distance from Salamanca, Wellington strove to retire by Cantel Pino on Huerta. As Marmont followed along his ridge, Wellington found no chance to shunt him off, and finally Marmont seized the ford at Huerta, and forced Wellington to move towards

Velosa and Aldea Rubia. As Napier says, "Marmont had outflanked and outmarched the allies." Wellington's object still was to cover Salamanca, but he felt his position to be weakening. On July 21 he was at San Christoval, and Marmont, still intent on cutting him from Ciudad Rodrigo, crossed the Tormes at various places between Huerta and Alba; whereupon Wellington also crossed by the Salamanca bridge and at Santa Marta and Aldea, and drew up on a height with his left near the first-named place and his right extending out towards Arapiles village, thus covering Salamanca from the attack he expected from Huerta. But as the French, by filing to their left, could still threaten his line of retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo, the English leader had about concluded to retire, unless Marmont should attack him in his chosen position.

British Dragoon.

Early July 22 Marmont advanced Foy and Ferey to the ridge of Calvariza, also occupying the lower knoll of La Peña in its front. On the left of Calvariza were two other higher and more rugged knolls called the Arapiles, which, if he could seize, would give him a strong position on Wellington's right. These heights were as essential for Wellington to hold, if he proposed to fight a defensive battle, as Round Top was for the Federals at Gettysburg, and both commanders endeavored to gain possession of them. The French won the larger and southerly one, and placed artillery on it, but were unable to seize the other; Clausel, Sarrut, Maucune, Brennier, were in the centre behind the French Arapiles, or yet coming up through the woods in the rear; they were, however, getting into such position as to be on Wellington's marching flank should he retreat, unless the English could also hold the second knoll, so as to have the protection afforded by both. Marmont was waiting for his troops to close up; and during the hours thus afforded him, Wellington, by filing to the right, absolutely changed his position, so that his left could lean on the English Arapiles, and his right on Aldea Tajada: he had almost changed front to the rear. The train was ordered on the road to Ciudad Rodrigo, and everything was made ready for retreat, should matters go wrong.

About noon Marmont, expecting an attack on the French Arapiles, — which indeed Wellington had intended, but withdrew his orders, — brought up Foy and Ferey to prevent such a manœuvre; and fearing that the allies would retreat before he could get ready to attack them, sent Thomières' division to threaten the Ciudad Rodrigo road, and put Bonnet in to take Arapiles village. About three o'clock Wellington had his attention drawn to the fact that this threat towards his communications had opened a gap between the French centre and left, and instantly perceiving the advantage to be taken from this, he prepared to fall upon Thomières' division with a heavy force, and to move forward into the fatal gap. It was this noteworthy promptness of action that won him the day: battle alertness was his strongest military quality.

Ordering Pakenham, on his right, to march his division parallel to the Ciudad Rodrigo road, so as to head off Thomières, the centre was instructed to move forward on an even front with Pakenham, to strike Thomières in flank and cut him off from the centre, while Pack should assault the French Arapiles, so as to forestall attack on the allied flank from there.



Battle of Salamanca.

At this critical moment Marmont was not ready; attacked in the midst of the manœuvre by which he was to outflank Wellington, he stood practically in three separated bodies, left, centre, right. Quickly divining the danger, he sent to call back Thomières; but it was too late, for about five o'clock Pakenham fell sharply upon Thomières' head of column and, taking it unprepared, staggered it by his hearty blow, while a well-timed charge by the English cavalry, which was riding on Pakenham's left, contributed much to the French confusion. At this moment Marmont, when personally rushing to Thomières' aid, fell, heavily wounded; Thomières had no time to form, though he made a gallant effort so to do, and was himself killed in the confusion. Meanwhile Bonnet, next in command, was attacking Arapiles village, and Maucune held his position behind the French Arapiles. Fortune was against the French: Bonnet also was soon disabled, Clausel took command, and in less than an hour, what had opened as a success had, by the quick manœuvre of Wellington, been turned into a disaster. The French centre had after a fashion joined the left, but the line was ill-marshaled. The sun was in the men's eyes, and the dust was blowing in their faces, preventing

Gordon Highlanders and Irish Sergeant.

proper aim. An end was soon put to the French left by Wellington's onset, and Thomières' division was practically eliminated from the battle.

Meanwhile the allied centre had forced Bonnet's troops back beyond the village and to the French Arapiles; and when Pack came up and assaulted this height, Wellington's position had become defined as one on a line almost in prolongation south of the first one held. Against oncoming fate Clausel did good work: Ferey moved by his left from Calvariza hill to support Bonnet, Foy was still intact on the French right, and Maucune held himself firmly. The remaining French troops had been got forward through the wood, and on Maucune's fresh line Clausel rallied the brigades which had fallen to the rear. Not willing yet to retreat, Clausel strove to reëstablish the battle. Pack's assault had been driven back; the allies were temporarily checked in mounting the heights along which Thomières had marched, and on which some French guns had been assembled; and it looked for a moment as if the allies would be forced back, especially when Beresford was wounded. But the loss of their leaders had crippled the French army. For half an hour victory was still undecided, but Wellington, who as always in battle was omnipresent, had the more reserves at hand. Appreciating the wavering conditions, he brought up a division from the second line, and the southern ridge was won. Ferey fell, mortally wounded. Pakenham continued on the wide flanking sweep which had accomplished so much, Maucune had to fall back of the French Arapiles, and Foy, who had striven hard but in vain to aid the French centre, was turned out of and abandoned the Calvariza hill. Wellington unsuccessfully strove to cut off Foy. Clausel, though injured, kept in the saddle, and seeing that the battle was lost, drew in Foy and Maucune to protect the retreat to Alba. Wellington ceased not to push, but Maucune held his own with gallantry, until Pakenham's advance had turned his left. Supposing that by crossing the Tormes at Huerta he could catch the relics of the French army at Alba, Wellington threw forward his left, but the effort was not successful. The French got away.

Marmont.

The French loss was six thousand men, that of the allies one thousand less. In his vexation at this defeat, Napoleon was almost tempted to ascribe it to disloyal management; but it was really due to Wellington's skill and speed as a tactician.

Meanwhile Joseph, with his Guard, his reserve and part of Caffarelli, reached Blasco Sancho; but when he heard of the disaster to Clausel, he fell back again to Espinar, and thence filed on Segovia. An officer named Fabvier, who had fought at Salamanca July 22, made a journey with the news of the defeat and reached Napoleon September 2, — over sixty miles a day, — and himself was wounded at Borodino September 7.

From Gshask, September 2, Napoleon wrote Clarke that Marmont's report on the battle of Salamanca had come in.

"It is impossible to read anything more insignificant. There is more jumble in it, and more wheels than any clock, and not a word which lets one understand the real state of things." He is then generous enough to tell Clarke to wait till Marmont reached Paris and had recovered from his wounds, when he was to answer categorically: "Why he delivered battle without the orders of his general-in-chief? Why he did not work in unison with the whole system of the Spanish armies? That it is a case of insubordination. Why did he give up the defensive and take the offensive without the aid of a body of fifteen or seventeen thousand men, which was marching towards him, part of which reached him the evening of the battle? Not having retarded his attack two days, to receive reinforcements of fifteen thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse which the king was bringing to him, leads one to think that Marmont feared that the king would participate in the success; and that he has sacrificed to his vanity the glory of the fatherland and the advantage of my service."

It is, however, by no means clear how much Marmont or Clausel knew of the movements of the king.

Crossing the Tormes at Alba, and escaping with only a cavalry combat, Clausel was shortly joined by some horse under Chauvel, which covered his retreat. Meanwhile Wellington, following to and crossing the Douro, captured Valladolid July 30; but upon Clausel retiring to Burgos, not caring to be led beyond a certain point, he marched back to Cuellar. Believing that he could accomplish nothing to aid Clausel, Joseph retired from Segovia, crossed the mountains without disputing the passes, and returned to the capital, while Wellington, the road to Madrid being thus opened, left a force under Clinton at Cuellar, and also crossed the range, with but one or two cavalry fights.

Salamanca was the beginning of the end in Spain, and the Cortes threw itself bodily into the arms of England; Wellington was made generalissimo of the Spanish armies, the Cortes conferred the order of the Golden Fleece upon him, he was raised to the British peerage, and given a money grant of one hundred thousand pounds by Parliament, — the equivalent to-day of several million dollars. Thus does Great Britain reward her successful generals for victory.

Having returned to Madrid, Joseph threw his baggage, guns and two thousand men into the Retiro, and with the relics of his army started for the Tagus, instructing Soult to gather his forces and withdraw from Andalusia; but unable to see the necessity of such action, Soult urged the king to join the Andalusian army with whatever troops he had. Joseph reiterated his orders, but Soult maintained that if the army under his command were strong enough, it mattered little how much of central Spain the allies overran, because by threatening Lisbon he could draw Wellington back to his base. Finally, late in August, seeing that his own sensible plan could not be carried out, because the king held too firmly to reoccupying Madrid, Soult obeyed peremptory orders to join Suchet at Valencia, whither Joseph marched via Aranjuez, Ocaña, Albaceta, Chinchilla, under dispirited and trying conditions.

Clausel.

Soult's labors in Andalusia were thus nullified, and the costly works at Cadiz, with the whole southern country, were vacated, — all as a result of Salamanca.

Wellington carefully scanned the movements in Andalusia, and when, on August 26, Soult left Seville to march towards Granada, he dispatched against him what allied troops there were in that country, Hill moving against Erlon, and Ballesteros on Malaga. Soult's retreat was, however, rather followed up than interrupted. Clausel gained time to rehabilitate his army, while Foy collected French garrisons in Leon, marched towards Zamora to again threaten Salamanca, and in his rear along the northern coast the active Spanish insurrectionists recovered much of their power.

At Almanza, near Valencia, Soult came up with Suchet and Joseph, and the whole army made ready to about-face and head for the Tagus and the capital, via Alicante. As Ballesteros had not seriously interfered with Soult's retreat, so now he did not with the fresh advance; he had received orders from the Cortes to march to La Mancha to operate under the orders of Wellington, but declining, with his old-fashioned pride, to submit to this dictation, he was deprived of his command.

Having for a while little to fear from either Soult, Clausel, or Suchet, Wellington marched on Madrid, which he entered August 12. The Retiro was not strong enough to hold out against a serious attack, though it possessed a double enceinte, built within two years. The outer one needed more troops than were on hand to hold it, and was promptly taken by assault; the inner one could have held out some days, but on being bombarded for a few hours, the commandant surrendered. Wellington was received with acclaim by a large part of the population of the capital; but this joy was tempered by the prompt levy of a contribution of two million dollars on the city.

Strategically speaking, after the battle of Salamanca Wellington would have done better to follow up the Army of Portugal and neutralize it for some months, rather than march on Madrid. He could easily have sent it whirling back to the Pyrenees, which would have done as much to settle the status of Joseph and Soult as the march on Madrid. But the political question seemed at the moment more important in his eyes than the military. To reanimate the Spanish heart was imperative, and the king's expulsion from the capital would in his view accomplish this end. But once given time, Clausel began to recuperate, ably gathered his fragments, and moving forward to Valladolid, called Wellington back to the Douro; and he, leaving Hill with three divisions behind him, after three weeks' occupation left Madrid September 1 to fend off the French, who had resumed the offensive against the divisions left to contain them, and advanced to the succor of Toro and Zamora. With four divisions and the Spanish Army of Galicia, he reached Valladolid September 7; and on learning of his return, rather than meet the allies who were ready for battle, Clausel, after actively delaying them at various positions, retired to Briviesca, a strong place on the Burgos road, in the hills which lie south of the Ebro. Wellington would have been wise to follow him up; but occupying Burgos September 8, he felt secure in undertaking the siege of its citadel; for, though without heavy guns, he hoped to accomplish his end by mining operations. Burgos would be of great advantage in his operations against the French right. Dubreton, in command with less than two thousand men, made a number of vigorous but unsuccessful sorties; the allies soon opened what they thought was a practicable breach; but a first assault failed, and a second one in force on October 18 had a like result. Not discouraged, Wellington kept on with his work, and in all delivered five stanch assaults; but one and all were driven back by the plucky garrison. To create a

French Portuguese Legion.

diversion in favor of the besieged, the Army of Portugal advanced towards Burgos, but did nothing effective. Clausel being disabled by a wound, Souham was sent to take his place, Massena refusing the command.

Meanwhile Joseph offered the supreme command of his joint armies to Jourdan, and then to Suchet, but each having declined, it thus fell to Soult. Had Ballesteros advanced from Granada instead of acting the unpractical rôle of Spanish grandee, he would, aided by Hill, who was in the Toledo region with thirty thousand allies, have made a difficult task for Soult; but when Ballesteros fell out, Soult was able to take Chinchilla. He now had seventy thousand men and eighty guns, and if, with Valencia as a base, they advanced across the Tagus, Souham, whom Caffarelli had joined with reinforcements, would be able to act with them. Wellington, hearing from Hill of the probable advance of Soult, and aware that Souham with his good army and able lieutenants was strong enough alone to force an action, saw that his position was not secure, for Soult might decide to move down the Tagus on Lisbon. After a month of hard but useless work, ably met by the defenders, the siege of Burgos citadel was thrown over, and on October 21 Wellington retired from the place. He had lost nearly three thousand men, to six hundred of the garrison. Souham did not discover this movement for twenty-four hours, and then sent Foy, Maucune and some horse in pursuit. Combats occurred at Celada, Villadrigo and Villa Muriel, Venta de Pozo and on the Carion, but Wellington got across the Douro near Valladolid October 29, and destroying the bridges of Tordesillas, Toro and Zamora, purposed to join Hill somewhere near Salamanca. This was just after the evacuation of Moscow.

"In England," says Napier, "the retreat from Burgos was viewed with the angry fear which always accompanies the disappointment of high-raised public expectation; the people, taught to believe the French weak and dispirited, saw them so strong and daring that even victory had not enabled the allies to make any permanent stand beyond the frontiers of Portugal." That Wellington had much of this sort of thing to contend with is one explanation of what at times would seem to be a lack of energetic action.



Burgos Citadel.

Meanwhile the king and Soult, by way of Tarançon and Aranjuez, advanced towards the Tagus, proposing to drive Hill from the river and, in coöperation with Souham, to move upon Wellington. After some resistance Hill retired: Wellington had given him the option of falling back down the Tagus or crossing the Guadarama. The former was the best strategic operation, but although the latter route exposed Lisbon, he chose it, the sooner to join his chief; and after blowing up the Retiro, he abandoned Madrid, — the occupation of which had scarcely been worth the while, — and by the 1st of November was in full retreat across the mountains. Joseph reëntered Madrid November 3; he had held himself as king by the reflected glory of his brother, but the Russian campaign was to destroy this influence.

Having the interior position, when they joined, November 7, on the Tormes, Wellington might well have utilized this advantage to fight another battle with either Soult or Souham, — Napoleon never would have neglected such a chance, — but he retreated towards Salamanca, and ordered Hill on Alba. This opened the way for Joseph to unite Soult and Souham and move upon him. The recovery of Andalusia thus resulted in concentrating opposite Wellington a larger force than he had ever theretofore encountered, and with Hill he went into position not far from the old battle-ground behind the Tormes. The tables had fairly been turned, and though the French had scarcely gained in morale by the year's disasters, they were yet eager to wipe out the disgrace of Salamanca.

On November 11, on the Tormes, Joseph reorganized his army of eighty thousand foot and ten thousand horse, putting Soult in command, and replacing Souham by Erlon. There was considerable discussion as to the best plan of attacking the allies, who were seventy thousand strong. Wellington might have been willing to fight on the old battle-ground, which he knew and the present French commanders did not; but when they crossed the Tormes above Alba and seized the Arapiles, the key of the field, Wellington, who was at Salamanca, lest the road to Ciudad Rodrigo should be cut, promptly retired November 16, and after a sharp combat reached Ciudad in safety, November 19. His losses in the campaign had been nine thousand men.

Both armies went into winter cantonments. This was just before Beresina days.

About Christmas Wellington visited Cadiz, where he secured a better hold upon the Spanish army; but it was well for the cause of England in the Peninsula that Napoleon withdrew from Spain so many of his best troops, to leaven the lump of his armies for the German campaign; for about these days Joseph was more than once approached by the Spanish leaders and members of the Cortes, with the suggestion that he could have the help of both, provided, in his civil government, he would play into the hands of the Cortes. Wellington had political difficulties with the Portuguese authorities, as well as commercial ones with trading vessels, and even with English ships of war; but by careful management they were pushed aside, and the efficiency of the army was maintained.

Thus, while in Spain 1812 began for the French by the loss of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, continued by the defeat at Salamanca, the loss of Madrid, and the entry of the English into Valladolid and Burgos, Soult might have repaired this damage by forcing battle with his superior army in November, but he failed to improve his chance. From the narrow standpoint, the campaign had not been brilliant for Wellington, who had returned whence he came; but from the broader view, it had been successful in compelling the French to vacate Andalusia. Moreover, Wellington had impressed his own personality on the French to their manifest disadvantage, and although the campaign had been marked by caution on his part, it had with exceptions shown good strategy, tempered by wise conservatism. "Strategy, in its general aspects, was never one of the strong points of Wellington," says O'Connor Morris. Neither, indeed, was pursuit: with seventy-five thousand men and the aid of the Portuguese and the Spaniards, a Bonaparte would have wrecked the French army beyond recovery, after he had won a field like Salamanca; and he would not have entered Madrid until he had done so.

French Orderly Gendarme.

At the close of the 1812 campaign, Wellington issued a circular to superior officers, saying "that discipline had deteriorated during the campaign in a greater degree than he had ever witnessed or ever read of in any army," and this without cause, as there had been no severe labor. This complaint seems overwrought, as the army had done some handsome work, if nothing unusual; but Wellington was apt to be critical of his troops. In this march to Madrid, says Napier, his "operations were one continual struggle to overcome obstacles occasioned by the enemy's numbers, the insubordination of the troops, the slowness, incapacity and unfaithful conduct of the Spanish commanders, and want of money, and the active folly of the different governors."

In Catalonia, the bellicose inhabitants under Lascy still held themselves in their mountain fastnesses against the French under Decaen; but although the latter won several engagements, the Catalonians could not be driven from their hills, and the French practically held only the fortresses and towns.

Suchet had rested on his laurels. Before leaving for Russia, Napoleon had drawn up a plan to join in one body the armies of Catalonia, Aragon and Valencia, but it was not carried out. There was a constant change in the allied commanders; and a succession of small campaigns by O'Donnell, Elliot, Maitland, Mackenzie, Murray and Clinton kept up activity in the eastern provinces of Spain during 1812 and 1813, against which Suchet managed to hold his own, though at times with some difficulty. Much interesting matter may be found in these operations, but neither Wellington nor Napoleon, who are chiefly of value in our study, had any part in them, except by distant orders. Suchet's success was noteworthy, but his province was constantly invaded from the sea or the mountains. The Catalonian patriots kept up their small war despite constant defeat; and the Aragonese were almost as enterprising. About all the French could do was to hold the strong places, and the Russian campaign put an end to any French future in Spain, although the crash was still deferred a year.

While, after his return from Russia, Napoleon was raising fresh armies to oppose the allies in Germany, Wellington, in his same cautious manner, went ahead with his operations in the Peninsula; and of these we may continue to treat, although slightly in anticipation of Napoleon's great victories of Lützen and Bautzen.

When Wellington went into winter cantonments about Ciudad Rodrigo at the end of 1812, the French stood on a line, more or less interrupted, from Valencia on the east coast to the foothills of Galicia. On the left, Suchet had the allies in his front at Alicante; Soult, with headquarters at Toledo, was watching Delparque, and outposts in the Talavera country and at Coria were keeping an eye on Hill; Foy was at Avila watching the pass at Bejar; Reille held Salamanca and adjoining towns and the cities along the Douro; Caffarelli sustained the Army of Portugal; and Joseph with the Army of the Centre held Madrid. In the capital, want of money pre-



Northwest Spain.

vented the king from maintaining anything like proper state, or from keeping about him those men who usually surround royalty, or who at this juncture could be of service to the new régime; and the pay of the army was in sorry arrears. The French forces were, moreover, deteriorating more than in 1812 by the steady withdrawal of veterans, and their replacement by conscripts of low quality — many "refractories," and others, it is said, drawn from the prisons of Germany. And the Napoleonic organization or discipline would not bring a rough character to do his duty in as full measure as Frederick's autocratic method.

To Wellington's army considerable reinforcements came in during the winter, and the British commander was able to markedly improve their discipline, and to place both the Portuguese and the Spanish armies on a substantial footing. He had made the Douro navigable up to the frontier, and created a transport train of sumpter-mules which was effective, if costly. Early in 1813 the allied army was composed of seventy-five thousand English, Hanoverians and Portuguese; and the Cortes confided to Wellington the command of a force of fifty thousand Spanish, for as the French had evacuated Andalusia, Grenada, Estremadura, La Mancha, in the south, and Galicia and the Asturias in the north, it became much easier for Spain to raise troops. All told, Wellington stood at the head of two hundred thousand men. Some of these were in Galicia and the Asturias, operating towards Bilbao; a part were to threaten the French left and Madrid. Opposed to Wellington were ninety thousand French, and Suchet still had forty thousand men on the eastern coast; but reinforcements arrived only in niggardly numbers, for the third battalions, on which the old regiments relied to keep up their strength, had been largely mobilized and sent to replace the troops lost in the Russian campaign. And yet the armies in Spain needed replenishing, for the climate, the daily skirmishes, and the guerrilla warfare, which was increasing throughout the land, consumed many men. Napoleon had calculated on sending thirty thousand good troops to Spain; but only a part actually came to hand. France had long been less willing, she was now less able, to respond to the drafts made on her, and the several Spanish armies existed mainly on paper. "Thus weakened in numbers," says Napier, speaking of the French, "the armies were also in quality deteriorated at a critical moment, for Wellington was being powerfully reinforced."

Joseph had reëntered Madrid after the allies had been forced from the Douro. He could not bear to give up the capital, as it now seemed probable he might have to do, and he was possessed by the absurd idea that a long defensive position from the Douro to the Tagus — the old-fashioned cordon, in other words — could be maintained. He also imagined that Wellington would devote himself to reoccupying Madrid; and Wellington, who really proposed to operate by his left so as to secure a fresh base upon the Bay of Biscay, and to threaten the French communications on Bayonne, encouraged this belief by reports spread broadcast, and by an occasional manœuvre.

Early in May, 1813, — when the emperor had just won the victory of Lützen, — there were four French armies in Spain north of the Tagus: Caffarelli's Army of the North observing the English fleet in the Bay of Biscay, and keeping that shore quiet; the Army of Portugal, now under Reille, watching the allies from the east of the Tormes and the Esla; Gazan, with the Army of the South, watching Hill and the Spanish army in Estremadura; the Army of the Centre under Erlon, who had his hands full to suppress the irregular troops on the central plateau, and keep up communications between the other forces. These armies at times interchanged troops, and each one of them felt itself in need of reinforcements, as they scarcely averaged eighteen thousand men each. Napoleon had long foreseen that Madrid must be evacuated, but he wished this to look like a concentrating for renewed operations. He expected Joseph to suppress the insurrection in the north, so as to hold the entire coast and the line of the Ebro, and to so maintain the offensive as to prevent Wellington seizing the initiative; and he advised his brother, when he should quit Madrid, to merge the king into the soldier, command the army in person, do nothing else, and moving on Valladolid, to act from there as if he were merely changing his base, and not as if he were deserting the capital. Joseph and Soult were more at odds than ever, and finally Soult, the ablest man left in Spain, was recalled, and Jourdan again became the king's adviser.

French Drummer.

Little by little the insurrectionists in northern Spain captured all the coast towns. Unable to keep them down, Caffarelli was replaced by Clausel, who took command February 22, and at once moved on Castro, which Napoleon had ordered him to take; but failing to get the place, he marched into Navarre, where he defeated Mina and drove him into Aragon. Foy then tried his hand at Castro, and during May took and garrisoned it, and then returned to Bilbao; but with ever growing enterprise the insurrectionists kept up their threat to the French communications which ran through Bayonne, and gave endless trouble.

By April Wellington was ready to take the field, with forces superior to the French, and sustained on each flank by British fleets opposite Lisbon and in the Bay of Biscay, and by Spanish troops. The Anglo-Portuguese army was now of vastly better quality than the French. Napoleon's idea had been that Suchet would coöperate with the general scheme in the north of Spain; but Wellington strove to give Suchet plenty to do where he was, by ordering Delparque and Murray to open operations. And overrating the French numbers in the north, while ignorant of their plans, he sent one part of his force through Tras-Os-Montes to clear that country of danger to the British flank in its advance on the French right.

On the French side, of all the things Napoleon had ordered, none had been done, and nothing was in readiness. He had instructed Joseph, whom he had made generalissimo, to send his heavy train and hospitals to the strong places in the rear, but they were in fact kept with the armies. He had ordered Burgos to be made strong: the works were scarce begun. He had ordered communications to be arranged for and kept up with Suchet, which was unheeded. He had long urged that an end should be put to the northern insurrection, and no commensurate steps had been taken. Chief of all, Napoleon had ordered Joseph to keep up a series of minor operations so as to forestall the very thing Wellington was intent on doing, as the emperor shrewdly guessed. Thus the French, through Joseph's suspicions of his subordinates and his own inertia, resorted to a pusillanimous defensive, instead of taking action which might have delayed, if it did not arrest, the vigorous onset Wellington felt he could afford to undertake, now that the Russian campaign had weakened the emperor and arrayed the whole of Europe against him.

On May 15, Wellington's left wing under Graham crossed the Douro at Lamego, and marched through Tras-Os-Montes towards the Esla; starting on the 22d, the right wing passed through Salamanca May 26 on Zamora, which it captured, and the two wings joined here and at Toro. Wellington thus placed seventy thousand Anglo-Portuguese, with twenty thousand Spanish, opposite the French right flank, Joseph having in his centre all told some thirty-five thousand foot and ten thousand horse to oppose to the great leader, with twelve thousand men under Foy in Biscaya and fifteen thousand under Clausel at Logroño. This well-executed manœuvre compromised Joseph's entire defensive position; and having handsomely opened the campaign, Wellington with assembled forces advanced on Palencia, expecting Joseph to defend the line of the Carrion.

The king left the Spanish capital May 17, for the last time; and from Valladolid the French forces gradually retired across the Carrion and Pisuerga. Had Joseph, in part only, carried out what the emperor ordered to suppress the insurrection in the north, many troops would have been released to swell his army, and Wellington could scarcely have accomplished what he did in so rapid a manner.

Reille and Maucune were drawn in, and Joseph had sent word to Suchet to march to Saragossa, but this officer was not only disinclined to leave Valencia, he was kept too busy by what was in his front. Joseph rightly estimated the allied forces, and they were indeed growing by the accession of irregulars; but he still believed that, if he had time to call in Clausel and Foy, he might win a battle in front of Burgos. So far, so good: the late position had been untenable; the Russian disaster, the gains of the Anglo-Portuguese, the mere fact that the army was more important than the capital, made the concentration at Burgos proper; but the one ✓ thing needful was to ploy the French into a single mass, march on the enemy, and attack him; or if this was not deemed safe (and a victory now would merely delay the catastrophe), at once to retire on the Pyrenees. But, like most mediocre men, Joseph selected a middle defensive course, and when, on reaching the Pisuerga, he heard from Jourdan that Burgos could not be held, the works being unfinished and provisions lacking, it was determined to retire beyond the Ebro. The allies passed the Carrion June 7, following Joseph, who retired along the road to Burgos with Gazan, Erlon and Reille. Wellington's operations were steadily by his left, moving ahead no faster than he could arrange for victual, Hill following along the main road.

Before reaching Burgos, news ran in of the emperor's great victory at Bautzen, which cheered the French not a little. With skillful and prompt manœuvring, Spain was not yet lost. Wellington expected the French to rally at Burgos; but the king ordered the castle to be blown up (the explosion accidentally killed some three hundred French), and retired on Pancorbo. The French soldiers and officers, as always, were ready to fight, but the king's manifest weakness drew much of this good temper.

At the strong position afforded by the hills and defiles of Pancorbo Joseph paused for reinforcements, and extended his position to collect food. Gazan was in the French centre with a strong outpost on the main road. A considerable part of the army was behind the Ebro, and the train was sent to Vittoria. Clausel, who had been pursuing Mina, now turned about to join the king, and hoping successfully to dispute the allied passage, Joseph wished to stand where he could best receive reinforcements. Wellington manœuvred again by his left over country roads, turned the French general line, and established a new base at Santander; whereupon Joseph hurriedly fell back, June 18, to the plains of Vittoria, a veritable pot-hole, one of the worst positions he could have chosen. Its only value was that it was the cross-roads of this section.

He might well have retired down the Ebro and ordered in Suchet to his aid, so as better to cope with the allied army when, by following him, it was at a distance from its base and victual. A small force could hold the Bayonne defile, and Wellington was not apt to invade France with a large army behind him in Spain. This plan was suggested by many, but Jourdan and Joseph felt that a retreat to the eastern end of the Pyrenees at Perpignan was too long, and being through a bad country, full of a hostile population,



Vittoria Manœuvre.

unsafe. In any case, Joseph should have concentrated to give or receive battle, or have promptly retired towards Bayonne and stood athwart the defile. But the division generals did not wish to leave Castile and Navarre without drawing sword; they deemed this a disgrace; and although only part of the French fighting force was present, and the army was encumbered with the families and impedimenta of most of the Spanish grandees who had cast in their lot with the French régime, it was determined to abide the result here. Joseph took up a line on the left bank of the Zadora, covering the road to Bilbao, the road to Bayonne, the road to Logroño.

There was but one good route between Spain and France at the west end of the Pyrenees, — the post-road from Bayonne to Madrid. Forty miles south of Bayonne this road forked, the easterly road leading to Pampeluna. From Vittoria to Pampeluna ran a fair road, on which artillery could be moved; and from Pampeluna one could cross the Pyrenees by the Col de Maya, and by Roncevalles, made famous by the retreat of Roland.

Meanwhile Wellington skillfully pursued the operation by his left. Graham crossed at Rocamunde on the allied left; the centre followed near Arenas on June 15; and Hill, on the right, made his passage above Miranda. This movement across the Ebro, sustained by the Spanish irregulars from Leon, compelled the French to evacuate all the northern towns except Santoña and Bilbao, which were invested, and the allied leader was able to establish his communications with his fleet. He might now move still further by the left so as to cut the French communications with Bayonne, or else march down the north bank of the Ebro and attack the enemy when met. He chose the former plan, and after a rough week's work over the mountains, during which his artillery had at times to be hauled by hand, Graham was ready to descend into the Vittoria plain from the northwest, while Wellington moved on the French front.

Jourdan had told Joseph that Wellington would turn his right, and advised that all troops along the Biscay coast should be drawn backward and sustained, so as to head off operations against the communications; but Joseph wasted several days in non-essentials, while Wellington kept on with his work. Reille was, however, sent out to safeguard the right; he was intended to be, but was not, promptly sustained by Maucune, and on reaching Osma, he met Graham's forces and a lively exchange took place; Maucune meanwhile on his left had also met opposition, and both retired after a second combat at San Milano. Graham followed Reille and Maucune down into the valley.

Joseph had taken up a position generally parallel to the post-road, and so placed in the low-lying plain that the allies could easily debouch from the hills upon his right, without altering the direction of their strategic advance. Clausel still lay at Logroño to hold the Burgos-Pampeluna road; and Foy was at Bilbao holding the approaches to San Sebastian. Both these flying wings were an evil incident to the defensive position: without them the allies could turn either French flank; and yet they weakened the already inferior forces which had to do the fighting. There was no excuse for this faulty position. Either the Pyrenees should have been reached, or an attack with all forces assembled should have been made; and as even a victory, in the present condition of European politics, could achieve no real gain for

Foy.

France, the retreat was the better course. Joseph had no clear conception of what he should do; Wellington's plan, on the other hand, was crisp and definite.

French Trumpeter and Grenadier.

By the defeat of Reille and Maucune, Joseph's right flank was turned, and Gazan and Erlon were drawn in closer to the army in the Vittoria basin. Joseph marshaled his forces in three lines behind the Zadora, and sent orders to Clausel at Logroño to come on to Vittoria, and similar orders to Foy; but neither officer received them in season.

The plain of Vittoria is about ten miles long by eight wide, surrounded by hills passable only through certain gaps, and divided by the little river Zadora, which falls into the Ebro at Miranda. Wellington had so manœuvred that, by pushing forward his left, he could cut the direct line of retreat of the French to Bayonne. Joseph still debated whether to move from this plain towards Foy and secure his communications, or to retire towards Pampeluna and join Suchet, who had been ordered towards Saragossa; but worse than his vacillation was so enormous a train that he could scarcely move in any direction, although he sent away one or two convoys towards France. On June 19 and 20 no action was taken; on the 21st Maucune left with another convoy, and Joseph took up a new line of battle. Reille was placed on the right to hold the Zadora where the roads from Durango and Orduna cross it; the centre lay astride the royal road from Miranda, in front of Arinez, with the left under Gazan extended out towards the mountains. Erlon was in the centre in second line. The artillery covered the bridges, which had not been destroyed, and the cavalry was mostly in reserve. Conscious of his superiority, Wellington detached Graham to seize Orduna, and to move around the French right, in tactical pursuance of his strategical plan; and although he had left a number of detachments in the rear, he could go into action with many more men, if less artillery. Afforded abundant time to study the enemy, Wellington soon saw the disadvantage of Joseph's position. His line of retreat was in prolongation of his right flank, which stood at Gamara Mayor, his main body was too far away, and the valley was blocked with his enormous train. His centre was well placed, but there were seven unbroken bridges from which the allies could debouch, and the position was not concentrated.

French Sapper.

The allied leader quickly made his plan. Graham, with two English divisions and some Spaniards, was to advance against Reille and cut the French army off from its communications; Hill, with two English divisions and some Spaniards, was to fall upon Gazan through the Puebla Pass; Wellington was to cross the ridges in the centre with Beresford, and act with left or right as occasion offered.

The day of June 21 opened rainy, but later cleared. The allied troops broke up early, crossed the ridges and advanced towards the Zadora, thrusting back the French outlying parties. As the allied left, centre and right were moving into action by different roads, Wellington did not push forward the centre too rapidly, lest they should not act together. About one o'clock Hill and the Spaniards assaulted Subriana, and Wellington moved the 3d division towards Mendosa, where on debouching they would be upon the right of the French centre. Little by little the English divisions were got across the Zadora; the fighting became general, and lasted some hours, especially in front of Magarita and Hermanbad. By sending troops to meet the attack at these points, the French lines at Arinez were somewhat denuded, and Wellington threw at this place a body of troops under Picton, who captured it and compelled Joseph, whose left was imperiled, to retire from his vigorous assault. By six o'clock the retreating French drew up on the heights in front of Armentia, still in fair order — although the day was clearly lost, and everything depended upon Reille holding the only road by which safe retreat could be made. The train was so much in the way that the artillery could not pass. The non-combatants struggled for exit with their treasures. Confusion grew worse. Reille held his two bridges with great gallantry, but Graham finally took Gamara at the point of the bayonet and sent a force to occupy Durand, which cut the direct line of retreat and left open to the French only the road to Pampeluna. Still Reille fended off the attack until Joseph was driven back to and finally out of Vittoria, and it was due solely to him that any line of retreat remained.

English Fusilier.

Confusion gave place to terror. A *sauve qui peut* had been cried, and all made haste to gain the road to Pampeluna. For lack of exit the unwieldy train was corralled by the allies, including one hundred and fifty guns, twenty-five million francs of treasure, pictures, jewels and works of art, and an immensity of private plunder, most of which fell into improper hands. The French had lost six thousand men, the allies five thousand two hundred. Retreat soon became flight, and the wreck of the French army of Spain before it reached Bayonne could, by proper pursuit, have been made as dire as that of the French army of Moscow had been at the Beresina. All the credit won on the Peninsula had been forfeited on this one day.



Battle of Vittoria.

Before reaching Vittoria, Clausel ascertained the facts, and returned to Logroño. Wellington made an effort to net him, but making a forced march to Tudela, he escaped to Saragossa, and after a halt and some manœuvring against Mina, he marched to Jacca. Foy, who had manœuvred towards Montdragon, all but fell into Graham's hands, who had been sent across the mountains; but he cleverly managed to vacate Biscaya and move back on Tolosa, throwing a garrison into San Sebastian. With a trifle more speed Graham might have cut off his eight thousand men at Tolosa. Joseph hurried the Army of Portugal to the Bidassoa, and retired with the Armies of the Centre and the South to Pampeluna, where he left a garrison. Wellington marched to Pampeluna, keeping in contact with the French rearguard, and Joseph further retired by the Roncevalles road. The sea-coast towns, except Santoña and San Sebastian, were lost, and the latter was soon besieged by the allies. Gazan occupied the Bastan until driven from there by Hill. O'Donnell reduced the Pancorbo forts. With reference to his non-pursuit, Wellington said that "the soldiers, instead of preparing food and resting themselves after the battle, dispersed in the night to plunder; and were so fatigued that, when the rain came on the next day, they were incapable of marching, and had more stragglers than the beaten enemy. Eighteen days after the victory, twelve thousand five hundred men, chiefly British, were absent, most of them marauding the mountains." The soldiers "were detestable for everything but fighting, and the officers as culpable as the men." Wellington no doubt told the truth: victory and defeat alike often produce such results. Yet one cannot help feeling that the gallant British soldier deserved a better certificate of conduct. A more valid reason for non-pursuit lies in the fact that Wellington had long been playing a Fabian game, partly from


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
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L SPAIN

natural caution, partly from political difficulties, and partly because the liberation of Portugal, and incidentally Spain, and not conquest, was his object. He could be enterprising at times, but he never forgot his theory, which was safety first, enterprise next. Moreover, Wellington was in a high degree suspicious of the action of the allies in Germany, — these were the days of the armistice, — and was afraid that, should they make a peace with Napoleon, he would be overwhelmed by the forces which could then be thrown upon him. He was never noted for pursuit.

English Drum-Major and Pioneer.

"The whole line of the Spanish frontier, from Roncevalles to the mouth of the Bidassoa River," says Napier, "was thus occupied by the victorious allies, and Pampeluna and San Sebastian were invested. Joseph's reign was over. The crown had fallen from his head, and after years of toil and combat, which had been rather admired than understood, the English general, emerging from the chaos of the Peninsular struggle, stood on the summit of the Pyrenees a recognized conqueror."

This campaign of six weeks does as little credit to Joseph or Jourdan as it is brilliant for Wellington. Like many of Napoleon's great successes, Wellington had won this one against a weak opponent. Nearly every step of Joseph was a mistake; he had neglected every precaution, and while the country in which he fought was within his own lines, he was quite unfamiliar with most of it. His fighting was weak and his manœuvring worse. Even on the eve of Vittoria, he took no means to strengthen his position, such as breaking the bridges on the Zadora, or building bridge-heads. Only Reille in the battle acted with credit, and he was distant from Joseph's direction. This fact in no sense detracts from the skill of Wellington, whose conception of the whole campaign was as excellent as was his marching his one hundred thousand men nearly five hundred miles and winning a decisive victory.

It has been said that after the battle of Vittoria was Wellington's chance to cross the frontier and seize upon Bayonne; but this was not consonant with that adhesion to safe methods which enabled the great soldier to carry the Peninsular War through to entire success. It might have been a brilliant manœuvre, or it might have ended in disaster, and Wellington was not sufficiently informed as to the conditions of Bayonne and other towns beyond the border to risk so much, especially when he was leaving Suchet and Clausel in his rear.

Napoleon would have been wiser at once to evacuate Spain on his return from Moscow, and to send Ferdinand back to his throne, thus acquiring a useful ally. The Spaniards would have been satisfied, and Wellington, with only his Anglo-Portuguese army, might not have cared to cross Spain to invade the soil of France. It is probable that the English ministry would have rather decided to move the English troops to the Netherlands, an act which would have given Napoleon a hundred thousand more troops for the 1814 campaign in France.

Suchet had been ordered to approach the French frontier; and when he heard of the defeat at Vittoria, he evacuated Valencia early in July, leaving garrisons to hold some of the coast cities, especially Sagonte, where was much provision, Tortosa, Tarragona, Mequinenza, Lerida, Gerona and Figueres. This latter scheme was an error. Either the land could be held or it could not. To leave these garrisons in the unoccupied country was to place twenty thousand French troops at the mercy of the allies; but Suchet had his orders. It was all of a part with Napoleon's growing indecisiveness. He could not make up his mind to withdraw in season from a country he had once overrun. He strove to hold everything, and he was to end by keeping nothing.

English Officers.

END OF VOLUME III.

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